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INTRODUCTION   1
1 Introduction and structure of the research 
“We know surprisingly little about mergers and acquisitions, despite the buckets 
of ink spilled on the topic. In fact, our collective wisdom could be summed up in a 
few short sentences: acquirers usually pay too much. Friendly deals done using 
stock often perform well. CEOs fall in love with deals and don’t walk away when 
they should. Integration’s hard to pull off, but a few companies do it well 
consistently.” (Bower, 2001, p. 93) 
Mergers and acquisitions are among the most dramatic and visible manifestations 
of strategy at the corporate level. With a single deal, the strategic course of the 
organizations involved can be altered permanently. Acquirers can gain immediate 
access to technologies, products, distribution channels, personnel and desirable 
cost and market positions. Moreover, acquisitions can bring into a company 
capabilities the organization finds hard to develop and can also provide the 
opportunity to leverage existing capabilities into much more significant positions. 
The M&A phenomenon shows no signs of slowing and has even embraced the 
high-technology sectors where it was formerly rare. M&A is increasingly 
becoming a more integral part of business life. The idea of ‘mega deals’ is 
haunting the top floors of the world’s largest companies. Every day new deals are 
announced, and various stakeholders greet them with reactions ranging from 
euphoria to skepticism. 
• On the 4th of September, 2001 Hewlett Packard (HP) has announced the 
acquisition of Compaq in a deal worth $21.4 billion. 
• In 2000, Vodafone AirTouch has acquired the German telecommunications 
and engineering Group Mannesmann in a deal worth $173.25 billion. 
• Since 1992, Tyco International has acquired and integrated more than 110 
companies. 
• Between 1993 and 2000, Cisco Systems has made 65 acquisitions of small 
high-tech start-ups with deal amounts between $40 million and $450 million. 
Mergers and acquisitions are justified by the extent to which they add value. 
Despite the important role which acquisitions play in most discussions of 
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corporate strategy, a harsh reality underlies the M&A activities, whether it be 
high- or low-technology industries: more than half of these transactions fail. Kay 
(1993) has summarized major studies about the performance of mergers and 
acquisitions and has come to the overall conclusion that “taken as a whole, 
merger activity adds very little value” (Kay, 1993, p. 146). The following Figure 
1 provides an overview of the studies considered by Kay (1993). 
Figure 1: Performance of mergers 
However, none of this evidence should be interpreted as indicating that no merger 
is ever successful. But, it is necessary to ask why do mergers perform poorly or 
even do fail completely. A recent study of McKinsey (Bekier, Bogardus & 
Oldham, 2001) has pointed out that many companies lose their revenue 
momentum after the acquisition as they concentrate on cost synergies or fail to 
focus on post-merger growth in a systematic manner. In fact, only 12% of the 
companies in the sample of the McKinsey study managed to accelerate their 
growth significantly over the three years following the merger. A study of A.T. 
Kearney has come to the conclusion that the post-merger integration phase bears 
the greatest risk in an acquisition (Habeck, Kröger & Träm, 2000). This point of 
view is corroborated by a study of Bain (Duelli, 2000), which revealed that more 
than half of all merger and acquisition failures are caused by faulty post-
merger/post-acquisition integration activities. Besides a fragmented perspective 
Method of evaluation Major Studies Conclusions
1. Subjective opinions of Hunt et al. (1987) Around half are successful
company personnel
2. Whether acquired Ravenscraft & More are divested than
business is retained in the Scherer (1987) retained
long term
3. Comparison of overall Meeks (1977) Nil to negative effect
profitability before and Mueller (1980)
after merger Ravenscraft &
Scherer (1989)
Cosh et al. (1990)
4. Effect on stock market Franks & Harris (1986) Positive initial impact
valuation Franks, Harris, & Mayer
(1988)
Source: Kay (1993), p. 148
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and unresolved expectations, Jemison & Sitkin (1986b) identify the limited 
consideration of integration issues as one of the major reasons for unsuccessful 
M&A activities. The second major reason that is often discussed in this context is 
the overestimation of potential synergies that are supposed to result out of an 
acquisition (Sirower, 1997; Coenenberg, 1988; Chatterjee, 1986). However, 
Buono & Bowditch (1989) have pointed out that 
“because of the myriad questions about merger and acquisition success, attention 
has begun to shift toward human resource concerns, the cultural ramifications of 
merger activity, management of overall combination process, and specific efforts 
aimed at post-combination integration”. (Buono & Bowditch, 1989, p. 10) 
Furthermore, a study of Chakrabarti (1990) has found that post-merger 
performance depends even more on post-merger integration than on strategic fit, 
because organizational factors intervene and essentially determine which of the 
pre-merger potentials are really achieved and which are not. 
Although there is a lot of literature from strategy researchers or financial 
economists in which M&A activities have been analyzed from different 
perspectives, the issue of post-merger integration is still a rather neglected one. 
Some of these studies have been done in the context of the market for corporate 
control (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, 1988), whereas 
others have investigated the specific performance or success of the 
acquiring/acquired company, sometimes also linked to a specific type of 
acquisition (Seth, 1990a & 1990b; Ansoff et al., 1971; Möller, 1983; Agrawal, 
Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; Lubatkin, 1983; Shelton, 1988; Ahuja & Katila, 2001). 
Another set of studies has coped with the broader question, whether mergers and 
acquisitions do create value under the influence of certain variables (Schmush, 
1998; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1994; Datta, 1991; Healy, Palepu & Ruback, 1992; 
Markides & Oyon, 1998; Rad & Beek, 1999; Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Shanley 
& Correa, 1992; Datta, Pinches & Narayanan, 1992; Lubatkin, 1987), or of which 
steps the M&A process should consist (Jansen 1998; Gomez & Weber, 1989; 
Ivancewich, Schweiger & Power, 1987; Hunt & Downing, 1990; Kübler, 1996). 
Despite this broad body of literature, the issue of post-merger integration, which 
is closely linked with the complex organizational implications of acquisitions, has 
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been rather widely neglected. This fact has already been pointed out with the 
introductory quotation of Bower (2001). In addition to that, some other authors 
(Shrivastava, 1986; Napier, 1989; Hunt & Downing, 1990; Gerpott, 1993; 
Chakrabarti, 1990; Seed III, 1974; Davidson & Neumann, 1997; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1987 & 1991; Deiser, 1994; Walsh, 1989; Inkpen, Sundaram & 
Rockwood, 2000) also emphasize the importance of the post-acquisition 
integration strategy and support the need for further research in this context: 
“Improving the acquisition integration process, however, may be one of the most 
urgent and compelling challenges facing business today.” (Ashkenas, DeMonaco 
& Francis, 1998, p. 166) 
Already almost 40 years ago Mace & Montgomery (1962) stated the following: 
“The values to be derived from an acquisition depend largely upon the skill with 
which the administrative problems of integration are handled. Many potentially 
valuable acquired corporate assets have been lost by neglect and poor handling 
during the integration process.” (Mace & Montgomery, 1962, p. 230) 
After having seen, that mergers and acquisitions have become an integral part of 
business life, on the one hand, and that more than half of mergers and 
acquisitions fail, primarily because of a poor post-merger or post-acquisition 
integration strategy, on the other hand, this study will put its analytical focus on 
the post-acquisition integration of small biotechnology companies into the 
structure of big pharmaceutical companies. The two questions that arise now are: 
(1) Why is it necessary to focus on the post-acquisition integration issues between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies? (2) What contributions can this 
analysis make to the topic of post-merger integration? 
To start with, biotechnology is one of the most important technologies to have 
emerged over the last twenty years. Today, this growing industry comprises a 
range of companies from research-focused start-ups to mid-size companies with 
manufacturing capability and large pharmaceutical companies. Along with 
information technology and new materials technology, it is, in fact, considered to 
be one of the ‘generic’ technologies which will underpin much future industrial 
growth. Hence, biotechnology’s novelty and scope inevitably cause considerable 
turbulence and changes within firms, and, particularly, in the relationships 
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between firms relying on it. The rapid changes in the pharmaceutical industry 
occurring as a result of biotechnology’s development provide the context of this 
study. One important question is why these two industries are of such high 
analytical interest. The simplest and also most obvious answer lays in the most 
fundamental need of mankind: the will to survive. The discoveries of the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies help to reduce mortality and to 
prolong life. This can surely be considered as one of the most important needs, if 
not the need of all human beings. Some contributions pharmaceutical discoveries 
have already achieved are indicated in Figure 2: 
Figure 2: Contributions of pharmaceutical discoveries 
Apart from that, the pharmaceutical industry is undergoing a consolidation 
process. This process is characterized by M&A activities between large 
pharmaceutical companies such as SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome, 
on the one hand, and the acquisition of small biotechnology companies like 
Sugen by Pharmacia, on the other hand.1 The merger activities between 
pharmaceutical companies are primarily motivated either by achieving 
operational improvements or by getting a specific product. In contrast to this, the 
                                              
1  These issues will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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acquisition of biotechnology companies takes place, because the pharmaceutical 
companies want to get access to the knowledge and research capabilities 
embedded in the biotechnology companies. Thus, pharmaceutical companies are 
involved in a multitude of M&A activities that demand a great variety and 
combination of different skills and concepts which could also be very interesting 
for other industries. 
The title of this study – ‘Post-acquisition integration of small biotechnology firms 
into the structure of large pharmaceutical companies’ – points out the further 
analytical focus. The emphasis will be put on how a smooth organizational 
integration of the biotechnology companies into the organizational structure of 
pharmaceutical companies can be ensured in order not to endanger the innovative 
capabilities and the loss of the key knowledge holders at the biotechnology 
companies. Pharmaceutical companies have a severe problem when facing the 
need to integrate an acquired biotechnology company. On the one hand, they need 
to integrate the biotechnology company to some extent in order to be able to 
profit from the capabilities of the newly acquired company. But on the other 
hand, these capabilities are very context-specific and cannot simply be transferred 
from the biotechnology company to the pharmaceutical company. Thus, the 
pharmaceutical companies face the paradox, that they need to integrate the 
biotechnology companies in some way in order to get access to the desired 
capabilities, whereas, on the other hand, they need to preserve the autonomy of 
the biotechnology company in order not to endanger the future existence of the 
desired capabilities.2 This study will analyze how pharmaceutical companies have 
handled this paradox by investigating five different M&A case studies with 
special regard to their specific post-acquisition integration activities.  
                                              
2  Zaby (1999) analyses the international biotechnology activities of Bayer AG. In this 
context some aspects are very interesting for this study. In 1978, Bayer acquired Miles 
Laboratories that also had a small presence in West Haven, Connecticut, close to Yale 
University in New Haven. Bayer entered into a joint venture with a group of young 
professors from Yale University in order to learn from the organizational structure of a 
biotechnology company which was a novel concept for European pharmaceutical 
companies at that time. However, Bayer was not able to sustain the entrepreneurial spirit 
of the biotechnology company during the cooperative phase and even much less after the 
full acquisition and integration of the joint venture into Miles Laboratories. 
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Therefore, the goal of this study is to shed light on this phenomenon, to explore 
how a successful post-acquisition integration between small start-ups and large 
corporations can be realized in the specific context of a knowledge-intensive, 
innovation-driven and capability-focused high-technology industry. Because the 
few existing studies about post-merger integration, such as e.g. Haspeslagh & 
Jemison (1991) or Shrivastava (1986), have not yet analyzed this paradox, this 
study tries to close that gap by providing a framework for the integration of small 
high-technology companies into the structure of large corporations. Such research 
is explorative in nature, because not enough is known about the post-acquisition 
relationships between small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical 
companies in order to perform large-scale hypotheses testing research using 
quantitative analysis. Instead, this study aims at developing a set of rigorously 
formed hypotheses that have the potential to extend extant post-merger and post-
acquisition theory and that lend themselves to subsequent tests. The overall aim 
of this study is to further the theory of post-acquisition integration by developing 
a framework for the development of a successful integration strategy of small 
high-technology companies into the structure of large companies.  
Since very little is known about the different post-acquisition activities between 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, a considerably detailed approach is 
called for. A contextually rich description of the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical industry, of the firms operating in them, and of their M&A 
activities is needed if a deeper understanding is to be gained. Thus, detailed 
descriptions are indispensable for eventually creating rich theoretical insights. 
Hence, the research approach selected for the purpose of this study is descriptive, 
holistic and to some extent also longitudinal. However, it is even more than that, 
because this study is also analytic in nature. It does not only ask ‘what’ questions, 
it especially asks ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions. The appropriate research 
methodology for a study that attempts to extend existing post-merger and post-
acquisition integration literature by description and analyses is the comparative 
case study research methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989). This brief introduction of 
the methodological foundation may suffice at this point, since Chapter 2 contains 
a profound discussion of the selection and the application of the comparative case 
study methodology. This section will also explain the research process itself. 
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Furthermore, one other topic must be considered in the course of this introductory 
chapter. It is the inevitable topic of terminology, which will be limited to a short, 
yet concise, explanation of some key terms. In this section, however, there will be 
no explanations about what is understood by either the biotechnology or the 
pharmaceutical industry, since this will be done in the context of the respective 
sections concerned with building industry context (Chapter 3.1). Instead, this 
section will now focus on a terminological foundation around everything that 
deals with the terms ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’.  
Although the terms ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’ do not describe the same thing, 
the growing literature in this field suggests that they are homogeneous in nature 
and typically have the same repercussions for the firms (Schweiger & Ivancevich, 
1987). Therefore, the terms ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’ are used interchangeably 
in most discussions. That is also the approach taken in the context of this study, 
in which the terms ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’ will be used synonymously. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out the specific differences and meanings of 
these expressions. In a more technical sense, ‘acquisition’ describes any transfer 
of ownership, whereas ‘merger’ describes a transfer of ownership in which one 
entity legally disappears into the other, or both entities disappear into a third 
entity created for the purpose of the merger (Lajoux, 1998). In other situations, 
the word ‘merger’ is used to mean the union of two companies of substantially 
equal size involving a high degree of cooperation and interaction, while the word 
‘acquisition’ refers to the combination of a large company with a much smaller 
one. 
The difference between mergers and acquisitions, however, tend to be much more 
than technical and semantic in nature. Mace & Montgomery (1962) found when 
talking with the executives of a target firm that management representatives of 
the acquiring company always referred to a ‘merger’ of the two firms, although it 
was implicit and apparent that the one firm proposed to acquire the other. In the 
respective situation the negotiating executives of the acquiring company would 
talk about ‘merger’ with the management of the company to be acquired, but 
when discussing this opportunity with their board of directors, they referred 
invariably to the possibility of ‘acquisition’. In the words of Mace & 
Montgomery (1962): 
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“There seemed to be an inoffensive quality in the word ‘merge’ not found in the 
word acquire. As one executive stated, ‘The reasons for the difference are unclear, 
but management find comfort in the merging of mutual interests. Being acquired 
connotes being had!’” (Mace & Montgomery, 1962, pp. 3-4) 
For analytical purposes, it is usual to consider mergers and acquisitions in terms 
of the extent to which the activities of the acquired organizations are related to 
those of the acquirer. This kind of classification proposes four main types of 
mergers and acquisitions (Walter, 1985; Hovers, 1973; Kitching, 1967):  
• Vertical M&A is the combination of two organizations from successive 
processes within the same industry with an actual or potential buyer-seller 
relationship. In this context, an organization may chose to acquire a supplier 
(backward integration) or a firm that could distribute its products (forward 
integration). 
• Horizontal M&A comprises the combination of two similar organizations in 
the same industry and often occurs, when the firms involved produce one or 
more of the same or closely related products or services in the same 
geographic area.  
• Conglomerate M&A occurs when the acquired organization is in a completely 
unrelated field of business activity. The rationale usually cited for such 
acquisitions is that the combination opens entry into an attractive business or 
industry and spreads the company’s risk. 
• Concentric M&A is when the acquired organization is part of an unfamiliar, 
but related field into which the acquiring company wishes to expand. This 
kind of M&A activity is often referred to as product extension and occurs, 
when the acquiring and acquired companies are functionally related in a field, 
but sell product or services that do compete directly with one another. 
Napier (1989) suggests that mergers can also be considered as falling into three 
main types, depending on the degree of integration necessary, if the merger is to 
achieve its objectives. These types are described as follows: 
• In extension mergers the acquiring organization does not intend to change, 
other than perhaps minimally, the way in which the acquired company 
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transacts its business. This approach is also referred to as ‘hands off’ 
approach. 
• In collaborative mergers the success is dependant upon the integration of 
operations (‘synergy mergers’) or exchange of technology or other expertise 
(‘exchange mergers’). 
• In redesign mergers the acquiring organization intends to introduce widescale 
changes, whereby the acquired company totally adopts the practices and 
procedures of the acquirer. 
The terms ‘post-acquisition’ or ‘post-merger integration’ refer primarily to the art 
of combining two or more companies – not just on paper, but in reality – after 
they have come under common ownership. Integration refers to a combination of 
elements that results in wholeness. Moreover, integration occurs at several levels, 
e.g. by combining the accounting systems of the two firms or by creating a single 
legal entity. Other important issues may be the integration of physical assets, 
product lines, production systems, technologies, or the cultural integration. Not 
all these types of integration are always achieved or even necessary for acquired 
organizations to function. The necessary degree and fields of integration are 
determined by a variety of contingencies which will be discussed at a later point 
of this study. Apart from that, it is necessary to mention that – in the context of 
this study – the general use of the term ‘integration’ is not able to catch all 
dimensions, because the ‘integration’ of the small high-technology companies 
comprises two different aspects. On the one hand, this means the necessary 
degree of integration of the acquired company into the structure of the acquiring 
company in order to add value. On the other hand, this refers at the same time to 
the necessary degree of autonomy for the small high-technology company in 
order to ensure the future existence of the small company’s capabilities which 
made the large company acquire it. 
One of the key challenges in managing acquisitions is to ensure that acquisitions 
support the firm’s overall corporate renewal strategy (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991), because in most cases acquisitions are strategic decisions that can both 
reinforce and change a firm’s direction. Hence, acquisition decisions must be 
consistent with the firm’s strategy. The acquisition activity analyzed in this study 
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aims at such strategic acquisitions, because all biotechnology acquisitions that 
were analyzed aimed at reinforcing the current strategy of the acquiring 
pharmaceutical company. 
At this point of the introduction – after having dealt with the most fundamental 
terminological issues – one might typically expect a section that deals with an 
overview of the existing literature. However, in the context of an exploratory 
study – like this – the recommendations of leading case study methodologists are 
different. They favor an ideal of theory free research (Eisenhardt, 1989 & 1991; 
Yin, 1984; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991) – however feasible this in reality may be. Due 
to these recommendations, the subsequent chapter (Chapter 2) leads directly to 
the research methodology and Chapter 3 to the description of the pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology industry as well as the different case studies. 
The focus of this study was chosen to better understand what happened when 
pharmaceutical companies acquired biotechnology companies and subsequently 
had to decide about the transfer of skills, knowledge, resources, and ways of 
managing to improve their relative competitive position with respect to their 
newly acquired business. Analyzing these post-acquisition integration activities 
involves a lot of time and energy, and also requires attention to detail. This study 
leads to a framework for the post-acquisition integration of small high-technology 
companies into the structure of large corporations as well as insights into the 
integration problems that managers of pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies encounter when they try to combine their activities. 
This study is organized as follows (cf. Figure 3): Before the cases can be 
presented, a set of research questions must be specified that guide the entire 
research process from field work to case description and analysis to theory 
extension. Thus, the necessary formulation of these questions will be done in the 
following Chapter 2, which also introduces the research methodology and 
research design of this study. Chapter 3 deals with the profound description and 
analyses of the cases embedded in their industry context. Only after a rich and 
theoretically unbiased understanding of the post-acquisition integration activities 
has been gained, extant theories are confronted with the case findings (Chapter 
4). The frequently propagated procedure of postponed literature review will lead 
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to the extension of theory and contribute to the construction of a new framework 
(Chapter 5). 
Figure 3: Structure of the study 
 
Source: Author 
Chapter 1: Introduction and structure of the research
Chapter 2: Research methodology
Research questions
Research design
Chapter 3: Case study chapter
- Building industry context
- Detailed case desciptions and analyses
- Cross case analyses 
- Building a set of tentative hypotheses
Chapter 5: Constructing a new framework and conclusions
Chapter 4: Confrontation of case findings with theoretical perspectives
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2 Research methodology 
“For the most part, the cases of interest in education and social service are people 
and programs. Each one is similar to other persons and programs in many ways 
and unique in many ways. We are interested in them for both their uniqueness and 
commonality. We seek to understand them. We would like to hear their stories.” 
(Stake, 1995, p. 1) 
This chapter starts with explaining the research methodology of this study. This 
explanation draws on the writings of several case study research methodologists 
and demonstrates the actual application of their recommendations in a real-life 
study. Section 2.1 aims at being of value to the reader in evaluating the 
methodological foundation of this study. The subsequent section (2.2) 
concentrates on the particular research design of this study. 
2.1  Research question and methodology 
The research of this study starts from a perceived inappropriateness of existing 
studies in the field. In the context of post-acquisition integration activities, where 
testable theoretical propositions have not been sufficiently developed, the 
paradigm of critical rationalism, as proposed for example by Popper (1976), 
seems inappropriate. This paradigm considers the purpose of scientific research 
as explaining reality by formulating theories and then attempting to falsify them 
(Kretschmann, 1990). However, falsification is hardly possible when relatively 
few hypotheses on a phenomenon have been stated. Thus, for this study, theory-
building using mainly qualitative research is much more appropriate than theory-
testing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Snow & Thomas, 1994).3 Qualitative research has 
become increasingly accepted in disciplines such as psychology, sociology and 
business administration (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
                                              
3  E.g., Gioia & Pitre (1990) argue for a multiparadigm approach to theory building as a 
means of establishing correspondence between paradigms and theory-construction efforts. 
From their point of view, qualitative research corresponds to ‘theory-building in the 
interpretative paradigm’, whereas quantitative research is viewed as ‘theory-building in the 
functionalist paradigm’. 
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Moreover, qualitative and quantitative research differ in more than their research 
methodology and data analysis. On the one hand, qualitative research is often 
characterized as interpretative, whereas quantitative research is considered as 
being positivist. Thus, regarding qualitative research as interpretative might even 
imply that quantitative research is not interpretative. Although the selection of 
specific variables as likely causes of some designated effects, the formulation of 
hypotheses, and the use of statistics might create this impression, the design of 
the research strategy as well as the subsequent interpretation of the collected data 
have both interpretative aspects (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois III, 1988).  
Because of convenience – and perhaps of an aura of rigor – there is an undeniable 
temptation to conduct cross-sectional research that ”proceeds from a distance, 
with a remote researcher gathering abstract data from organizations he knows 
almost nothing about” (Miller & Friesen, 1982, p. 1014). This study takes a 
different approach.  
”Longitudinal research seems to enable us to obtain a sounder understanding of 
organizations. It puts us in a better position to establish causal relationships, to 
take into account the most important variables, and to ensure that we do not 
overgeneralize by lumping very different organizations together.” (Miller & 
Friesen, 1982, p. 1014) 
With the help of within-case and cross-case analyses the goal is pursued to find 
diverging as well as similar patterns of integration activities on the basis of which 
tentative hypotheses can be formed. The end result – a set of tentative hypotheses 
– represents the actual goal of this case study’s work describing and comparing 
several integration processes. This study’s longitudinal aspect stems from the fact 
that the aim is to ‘reconstruct’ the acquisition and especially the post-acquisition 
integration process between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. 
According to Yin (1984) “defining the research question is probably the most 
important step to be taken in a research study” (p. 19). Stake (1995) refers to the 
‘research question’ also as ‘issue question’ or ‘issue statement’. The central 
research question of this study focuses on how the post-acquisition integration 
between biotechnology companies and big pharmaceutical companies takes place. 
In this context, it is necessary to consider what consequences this implies for the 
knowledge transfer and the organizational changes that might affect the 
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innovative and organizational competencies and flexibility of the acquired 
company. In analyzing and trying to answer this question the following research 
fields, which can also be considered as kind of sub-research questions, which 
Stake (1995) refers to as ‘topical questions’, are of great interest: 
1. the impact of motives, sequence and timing of the M&A process on the 
integration process, 
2. the analysis of the integration process itself with respect to the dimensions of: 
  - strategic integration, 
  - organizational/structural integration, 
  - knowledge/competence transfer, 
  - cultural integration, 
  - personnel/HR integration, as well as 
3. the organization of the integration process itself. 
 
The set of research questions guides the entire research process from field work 
to case description over analysis to theory extension. Moreover, it helps the 
investigator to specify the kind of organization to be approached, and the kind of 
data to be gathered. The formulation of the research question is crucial, because, 
on the one hand, the researcher may risk to become overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the data with questions that are too broad and general in nature, 
and, on the other hand, with questions that are too focused, too specific the issue 
of bias reappears. In such a dilemma situation a carefully compromising solution 
appears appropriate and, in fact, is proposed by Eisenhardt (1989). The research 
questions need to serve as ‘guiding lights’ without overly restricting the necessary 
degrees of freedom of the research process. In Mintzberg’s (1979) words:  
“No matter how small our sample or what our interest, we have always tried to go 
into organizations with a well-defined focus − to collect specific kinds of data 
systematically.” (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 585) 
A contextually rich description of the biotechnology as well as the 
pharmaceutical industry, of the firms operating in them, and of their M&A 
activity is needed if a deeper understanding is to be gained. Thus, detailed 
descriptions or ‘stories’ are indispensable for eventually creating rich theoretical 
insights, even if this means that researchers have to collect seemingly 
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circumstantial technical information on the industries or companies they are 
observing in a time consuming effort. Piore (1979) points out that each 
information collected in the case study process can be considered as a certain 
piece of pattern of these cases. 
Due to the fact, that this study does not only ask ‘what’ questions, but it also asks 
‘why’ and ‘how’ questions, it can also be considered analytic in nature. The 
appropriate research methodology for a study that attempts to extend theory by 
description and analysis, that describes in detail ‘what’ M&A activity of the 
pharmaceutical companies in the biotechnology sector exists, that analyzes ‘why’ 
the observed integration patterns occur, and that analyzes ‘how’ the described 
behavior unfolds regarding both the forms and the sequences it takes on, is the 
comparative case study research methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The choice for this research strategy is also supported by the work of Yin (1984), 
who distinguishes five research strategies: experiments, surveys, archival 
analyses, history, and case studies. From his point of view there are three basic 
conditions that determine the selection of an appropriate strategy for a study: (1) 
the types of research questions, (2) the extent of control an investigator has over 
actual behavioral events, and (3) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed 
to historical events. This study asks ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions which are more 
explanatory in nature and thus – according to Yin (1984) – favor the use of case 
studies as the appropriate research strategy. Moreover, he also points out that the 
case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence – 
documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations. 
As in all exploratory studies of this kind, the case chapter is not only the longest 
chapter – it must also be considered as being the ‘heart and soul’ of the research. 
The goal is to develop a rich, complicated understanding of the integration of the 
biotechnology enterprises in the structure of the industry incumbents through the 
description and analyses of the different integration histories. Why the case study 
approach is chosen can best be expressed in the words of Stake (1995): 
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“We study a case study when it itself is of very special interest. We look for the 
detail of interaction with its contexts. Case study is the study of the particularity 
and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances.” (Stake, 1995, p. xi) 
The study is directed at the integration process of small biotechnology companies 
in the structure of industry incumbents and the subsequent collaboration between 
them. The aim is to generate hypotheses and to extend theory in this field. Thus, 
the selection of an appropriate research methodology – such as the case study 
approach – is necessary. Of course, it is widely accepted that qualitative data are 
most appropriate for generating an initial understanding of the rationale or theory 
of a process. After that, the results can be tested by quantitative support 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). But, with a research focus that seeks to grasp the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ of processes a story that narrates the sequence of events is absolutely 
needed (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990).  
Yin (1984) mentions three major concerns a case study strategy has to deal with. 
First, there is the complaint about the lack of rigor of case study research. Thus, 
every investigator must work hard in order to ensure methodological rigor, which 
for example can be realized through the help of well-identified research questions 
as well as well-developed interview schedules and questionnaires (Eisenhardt, 
1991). Taking this into account, the problems in case study research are not 
different from experiments, surveys or historical research. In this context, Yin 
(1984) mentions that “much depends on an investigator’s own style of rigorous 
thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of evidence and careful 
consideration of alternative interpretation” (p. 105). Second, there is the 
frequently asked question of how to generalize from just one case. According to 
Yin (1984) the answer is that  
“case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and 
not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, 
does not represent a ‘sample’, and the investigator’s goal is to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization)”. (Yin, 1984, p. 21).  
The third concern about case studies is that they take too long and result in 
massive, unreadable documents. This represents another challenge for the 
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investigator who has to look for alternative ways of getting information. He could 
for example make more use of the telephone or the data available in libraries 
instead of being a participant-observator. Moreover, he should keep in mind who 
the audience of the case study is going to be. 
Eisenhardt (1989) emphasizes that “theory-building research is begun as close as 
possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test” 
(p. 536). Because of this, the third chapter leads directly to the cases and the 
contextual descriptions of the industries of which the regarded companies are 
part. After a rich and theoretically unbiased understanding of the organizational 
integration activities has been gained, there will be the confrontation of theories 
and case results. This procedure of ‘postponed’ literature review will lead to the 
extension of theory and thus to a theoretical contribution of its own. Of course, 
even Eisenhardt (1989) must admit that “it is impossible to achieve this ideal of a 
clean theoretical slate” (p. 536). Thus, her advice is that the case study researcher 
“should avoid thinking about specific relationships between variables and 
theories as much as possible” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 536). And, that is exactly the 
approach this study is going to take.  
Another crucial issue is to choose the right numbers of case studies. According to 
Eisenhardt (1991) it is important to notice that “the appropriate number of cases 
depends upon how much is known and how much new information is likely to be 
learned from incremental cases” (p. 622). Comparing this with her former 
statement, Eisenhardt (1989), this must somehow be seen in relative terms: 
“A number of 4 to 10 usually works well. With fewer than 4 cases, it is often 
difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is 
likely to be unconvincing.” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545) 
Considering both statements, one may even draw the conclusion that every 
number of case study is right as long as new insights are gained. This study 
investigates the M&A and organizational integration activities of four 
pharmaceutical firms as well as their subsequent collaboration with the acquired 
company. The study is intentionally focused on this small number of enterprises 
in order to allow a detailed analysis and contextually rich description of the 
complex processes. Moreover, this study is limited to five cases because of the 
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given time and particularly the funding restraints. Having to choose between 
more cases and richer context this study tries to put its emphasis on a more 
contextualist research which, according to Pettigrew (1990), is more capable of 
capturing the embeddedness and temporal interconnections of corporate change 
processes. In this study, context refers to outer context, on the one hand, 
especially the development of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, 
and to inner context, on the other hand, e.g. the organizational structure of a 
company. 
Due to the limited number of five cases that can be included in this study, the 
selection of the firms is, hence, one of the most critical elements of the case study 
research process. As far as large-sample quantitative research is concerned 
random sampling is used to overcome the problem of bias. Following the advice 
of Pettigrew (1990) and Eisenhardt (1989) the investigator should choose cases 
such as extreme situations or polar types in which the process of interest is 
observable, because the goal of a case study research is to replicate or extend the 
existing theory. 
This study selects two widely-known industries: the pharmaceutical industry as a 
well-developed industry, on the one hand, and the biotechnology industry as an 
emergent industry with lots of interconnections with the first one, on the other 
hand. Thus, we have large diversified corporations as well as small start-up 
companies which clearly represent the polar types recommended by Eisenhardt 
(1989). As a starting point this study has a look at the M&A activities within and 
between these industries. This procedure results in a 2x2 matrix (cf. Figure 4) 
determined by biotechnology/pharmaceutical companies as buyers on one axis 
and by biotechnology/pharmaceutical companies as targets on the other axis.  
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Figure 4: Classification matrix for M&A activities in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry 
Now, the question arises which quadrant is of analytical interest. In order to 
determine this, the buyer-axis as well as the target-axis are each added by a 
second dimension. The buyers are differentiated according to their financial 
strength expressing, i.e. their capacity of being able to finance a takeover. It is not 
very surprising that pharmaceutical companies are ranked among those with great 
financial strength, whereas the biotechnology companies are rather ‘poor’ 
financial performers. On the target side, the additional dimension is the 
innovative capability concerning both research as well as organizational 
capabilities. Here, the pharmaceutical companies are considered as having rather 
low innovative capability, whereas the biotechnology companies are some kind of 
‘stars’ in the field of innovation. Thus, the quadrant of analytical interest is the 
one where pharmaceutical companies being rich in cash acquire biotechnology 
companies having lots of innovative capabilities pharmaceutical companies do 
not have, however desperately would like to possess. This again reveals the polar 
types recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Pettigrew (1990). To generate a 
pool of potential sites for filling this quadrant a process of scanning documents 
had to be employed. Once a sufficiently large number of firms had been 
identified within this quadrant, a more detailed analysis of the kind of M&A and 
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integration activities was undertaken. Companies promising new, interesting 
insights have been approached with a request for cooperation for the study. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989 & 1991) case studies can be regarded as a 
powerful mean in order to create theory, because they permit replication and 
extension among individual cases. The rich background context of cases is 
provided by stories (storytelling), but the deeper theoretical insights of case 
studies are gained from methodological rigor and multiple-case comparative 
logic. 
As far as validity is concerned Yin (1984) points out four standard tests of 
validity: (1) construct validity by developing a correct set of operational 
measures, (2) internal validity by establishing a casual relationship, which Jick 
(1979) refers to as ‘within-method triangulation’, (3) external validity by 
establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized, which 
Jick (1979) calls ‘between-method triangulation’, and (4) reliability by 
demonstrating that the operation of a study can be repeated. In the context of this 
study the concern of validity will be addressed in several ways. I.e., triangulation 
was used to increase construct validity. In this sense, triangulation was used not 
only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives, but also to 
enrich the understanding by allowing for new and deeper insights to emerge. The 
issue of internal validity was handled by conducting multiple iterations and 
follow-ups during the analyses. The problem of reliability and repeatability was 
addressed (1) by drawing up a detailed case study protocol and (2) by strictly 
following the required documentation and transcription standards. External 
validity was increased by studying multiple companies and analyzing 
comparative findings. This search for meaning within a case can be considered as 
a search for patterns or for consistency. If similar results are to be obtained from 
multiple cases, replication is said to have taken place. The multiple-case study 
contains multiple narratives which are presented as separate sections in Chapter 3 
about each case.  
In addition to that, this study also contains a section covering the cross-case 
analyses and results. Strauss (1987) describes this in three steps. First, the 
researcher will tend to construct for each case an overall descriptive picture, 
including both the inner and outer context. Second, each case is to be analyzed 
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separately. Within-case analysis typically involves detailed case study write-ups 
for each site. The central focus is to become intimately familiar with each case as 
a stand-alone entity, which allows the unique patterns of organizational 
integration and collaboration in each case to emerge before the investigator 
generalizes patterns across cases. To avoid being overwhelmed by the large 
amounts of information and data, the within-case analyses are focused around the 
already identified sub-research questions dealing with essential elements of M&A 
activities. Third, the case study researcher will draw general conclusions about all 
these cases. With the help of the cross-case analysis, the crucial part of multiple 
firm case studies, the investigator will capture the novel findings which may exist 
in the cases by looking at the data in many divergent ways. From the within-case 
analysis in connection with the cross-case analysis tentative hypotheses begin to 
emerge. Overall, the triangulating investigator is left to search for logical patterns 
in mixed-methods results. According to Eisenhardt (1989) it must be considered 
that “shaping hypotheses in theory building research involves measuring 
constructs and verifying relationships” (p. 543). After that, the comparison of the 
emergent hypotheses with the extant literature is an essential feature of theory 
building in case study research. By this, the internal validity, generalizability, and 
theoretical level of theory building from case study research will be enhanced. 
The theoretical saturation is reached when the incremental improvement through 
a new iteration process to theory is minimal. The issue of external validity, i.e., 
establishing the domain for generalizability, is a frequently overextended topic in 
the criticism of case studies. This case study does not claim to produce 
generalized theory, rather its aim is to produce hypotheses and theory extension 
for subsequent testing to then develop a general theory. However, this does not 
imply that external validity is not an issue to be addressed in case studies. This 
study uses multiple companies and comparative findings to increase external 
validity to the extent available. Furthermore, building on the experience of 
Harvard Business School case study researchers (Leonard-Barton, 1990), the 
issue of external validity will be taken into account by briefly discussing the post-
merger integration activities of different companies, that can also be considered 
as some kind of ‘mini-cases’. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   23
2.2 Research design 
This section will expose the particular research design of this empirical study by 
describing the choice of the research sites and the process of data collection. 
The sampling of the case studies is crucial for later analysis, as the choice of the 
sample tends to influence the results of the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
When analyzing a rather small sample of cases – as already depicted in the 
section before – ‘extreme’ research sites, also called ‘polar types’, are to be 
chosen (Pettigrew, 1990 & 1992). Based on these reflections, the following Table 
1 provides an overview of major M&A deals between big pharmaceutical/health-
care focused companies, of European origin, and U.S.-based biotechnology 
companies, which are to be analyzed in the context of this study.  
Bidder Target Year Value  
(US $ 
billion) 
Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. 
(now: Pharmacia Corp.), 
Peapack, NJ, U.S. 
SUGEN, Inc., 
San Francisco, CA, U.S. 
1999 0.650 
Bayer Diagnostics Corp.,  
Tarrytown, NY, U.S./ 
Leverkusen, Germany 
Chiron Diagnostics Corp., 
Walpole, MA, U.S. 
1998 1.100 
Merck KGaA, 
Darmstadt, Germany 
Lexigen Pharmaceuticals 
Corp., Lexington, MA, U.S.
1998 Undisclosed 
Sandoz AG 
(now: Novartis AG), 
Basel, Switzerland 
SyStemix, Inc., 
Palo Alto, CA, U.S. 
1991/ 
1997 
0.625 
Sandoz AG 
(now: Novartis AG), 
Basel, Switzerland 
Genetic Therapy, Inc., 
Gaithersburg, MD, U.S. 
1995 0.283 
Table 1: Sample of major M&A deals  
             (Source: Author) 
The focus on U.S. biotechnology companies as targets can be explained by the 
fact that the American biotechnology industry is more advanced compared to the 
European biotechnology industry. This reveals also quite well why European 
pharmaceutical companies have mainly made their acquisitions in the U.S. and 
not within Europe. This view is also supported by the following quotation: 
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“[...] it is clear that Europe is slipping vis-à-vis the US. But why? The main 
reason is that pharmaceutical investments tend to go where the markets are. And 
for the past decade or more that has meant the US, where demand for medicines 
has been clipping along at double digits. [...] And yet, as with the pharmaceutical 
industry, European biotechnology is trailing the US.” (Pilling, 2001, p. 8-9) 
Among a lot of other companies that had been contacted, the four companies 
mentioned in Table 1 have agreed to participate in the study. Apart from that, the 
facts that target and bidder are of the same origin and have the same differences 
in size enhance the comparability of the cases. Furthermore, this sample includes 
successful deals like Pharmacia – Sugen, but also analyzes failed deals such as 
the acquisition of SyStemix by Novartis. This corresponds to the ‘polar types’ 
recommended by Pettigrew (1990 & 1992). At a first glance, these ‘polar types’ 
might also be represented by the fact that the acquired biotechnology companies 
are of U.S. origin, whereas the acquiring pharmaceutical companies come from 
Europe. This might result in cultural problems. If this kind of problems existed, 
these potential cultural problems and differences would be quite similar for all 
acquiring companies. However, the case studies revealed that country cultural 
differences played no role in this specific context. Because of this, the analytical 
focus of this study is not put on potential problems that might arise due to the fact 
that the acquiring companies are of European origin, whereas the acquired 
biotechnology companies are of U.S. origin. Moreover, there is a clear tendency 
that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have broadened their search 
for good science, great scientist, new opportunities for expansion and funding far 
beyond their own borders. They have formed international start-ups, composed of 
managers and researchers residing on two different continents, or even have 
reached across the ocean to acquire companies whose technology and skills are 
not only complementary, but will allow them to achieve a critical mass going 
forward. Thus, the geographic boundaries have more or less completely 
disappeared. This point of view is corroborated by the following quotation: 
“It’s a global trend caused by the opening up of the capital markets paired with 
greater competition in the pharmaceutical industry [which is also establishing 
new footholds around the world]. Companies, whatever their nationality, are 
quickly looking beyond their own geographic boundaries – for good science, for 
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funding, for partners, for growth through acquisition, and for expansion into new 
markets. The borders have become all but invisible.” (Van Brunt, 2000, p. 9) 
Hence, both industries, the pharmaceutical and the biotechnology industry, can be 
considered as being global industries existing across almost all borders.4 Because 
of this – in the context of this study – internationalization is not to consider as a 
separate phenomenon when analyzing the post-acquisition integration activities 
between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. Instead, 
internationalization is rather an inherent part of these two industries. As a 
consequence of this, theories or studies that treat international aspects are not 
summarized under a heading such as ‘contribution of internationalization theories 
and studies’, but will be included when discussing the respective aspects of the 
post-acquisition integration issues. 
Given the qualitative nature of most of the data sought, triangulation was one of 
the most important means of increasing construct validity and substantiating 
findings and subsequent hypotheses (Denzin, 1978). The archival documents 
used are presented at the beginning of each case write-up and are also included in 
the case study database. The most common documents used were: SEC filings 
(forms 10-K and 10-Q), annual reports according to German law, ‘red herring’ 
prospectuses pursuant to Part Ia of the 1933 act registration statements, articles 
from the business and trade press, internal documents such as presentation slides, 
catalogs, executive speeches, and company press releases available through the 
web-sites of the case study companies, their subsidiaries, partners, and 
competitors. Apart from that, analysts’ reports of different investment banks were 
used as well. The advantages of the documented sources include their tendency to 
be more comprehensive and less subjective to memory based bias. The amount of 
                                              
4  The theoretical discussion about the concept of a global strategy has already started with 
Perlmutter’s (1969) categorization scheme the starting point of which was the worldview 
of a firm as the driving force behind the way it structured its world-wide activities 
(Robinson, 1978; Rutenberg, 1982). Different studies about the topic of global strategy 
(Levitt, 1983; Hout, Porter, & Rudden, 1982; Hamel & Prahalad, 1985; Kogut, 1985) 
reveal that there is a great deal of conceptual ambiguity about what a ‘global strategy’ 
really means. Thus, Ghoshal (1987) has developed a framework in order review and 
analyze a firm’s strategies.  
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relevant documents differed by firm. All documents collected are included in the 
case study database.  
While the preliminary interviews and conversations were unstructured, the 
interviews with the company representatives employed a semi-structured design 
in order to allow for an appropriate degree of comparability and, at the same time, 
to allow for ample opportunity for an unobstructed flow of narrations.5 
Interviews were conducted ‘face-to-face’ (with one exception via telephone) in 
German or English and usually lasted 1.5 to 2.5 hours, the longest exceeding 3 
hours. The interviews were taped and fully transcribed.6 This procedure of full 
transcription is imperative for reasons of internal validity and reliability. In their 
authoritative work on the methods of data collection Bortz and Döring (1995) 
state: ”If an interview also contains open questions and narrative parts, an audio 
recording is unavoidable” (p. 230).7 All transcripts are included as part of the 
case study database. Similar to the well-established Harvard Business School 
case research approach, all interviewees were granted anonymity, so that nothing 
they said was attributed to them personally until and unless they approved of the 
transcript (Leonard-Barton, 1990).8 In order to increase the overall quality of the 
study, the draft case reports have been reviewed by the participants and 
informants in the case. Furthermore, from a methodological viewpoint, these 
corrections enhance the accuracy of the study, hence increasing the construct 
validity of the study (Yin, 1984). 
                                              
5  The questionnaire is included in the case study database. 
6  Citations from interviews conducted in German were translated into English. 
7  In addition to the added rigor and internal validity, one of the main benefits of taping and 
transcribing interviews is that the interviewer can concentrate on what is being said, rather 
than being continuously distracted by note-taking. 
8  Interviewees received copies of the case description with requests for approval. If they 
objected to certain parts of the case descriptions they were asked to mark the parts which 
were then omitted from the final version. Interviewees were also asked to make additions 
or clarifications which were then integrated into the final case descriptions. In one case 
study the interviewees insisted on the fact that no quotation of their statements may be 
used. 
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Often, case studies confront the investigator with a choice regarding the 
anonymity of the case. Should the case study and its informants be accurately 
identified, or should the names and the entire case be disguised? The most 
desirable option is to disclose the identities of both the case and the individuals. 
By this, the reader is able to recall any other previous information he or she may 
have already learned about the same case in reading and interpreting the case 
report. Nevertheless, there are some occasions when anonymity is absolutely 
necessary. The most common rationale is that, when the case study has been on a 
controversial topic or involves big failures linked with the loss of money, 
anonymity serves as a measure to protect the real case and its participants. On 
such occasions when anonymity may appear justifiable – as it is in the cases 
studied – a compromise should be first sought (Yin, 1984). In such a situation, 
the investigator should determine whether the anonymity of the individuals alone 
might be sufficient, thereby leaving the case itself to be identified accurately. 
This compromise was also necessary and, hence, was used in some of the cases 
analyzed in this study. 
While the objective of the data collection phase was to create an accurate 
portrayal of the ‘what’ question concerning the integration processes of the 
different deals, the objective of the data analysis was to enable the generation of 
hypotheses concerning the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. However, as 
recommended by Pettigrew (1990), the data collection and data analysis phases 
were overlapped chronologically in order to allow for follow-up data collection. 
The entire process of data collection and analysis lasted from January 2000 to 
March 2001. The analysis phase consists of two parts: within-case analysis and 
cross-case analysis. Building on the detailed case descriptions, the within-case 
analyses aim at identifying patterns in the integration process of each firm. In 
order to avoid being overwhelmed by the large amounts of information, the 
within-case analyses are focused around the same specified categories that serve 
as essential elements of organizational integration activities. The crucial part of 
multiple firm case studies is the cross-case analysis. Eisenhardt (1989) points out 
that: ”Across-case searching tactics enhance the probability that the investigators 
will capture the novel findings which may exist in the data” (p. 541). 
Furthermore, the cross-case analysis builds on the results of the within-case 
analyses by focusing on the same categories. 
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The organizational integration patterns that gradually emerged from within and 
cross-cases analyses were iteratively (re-)confronted with the cases in order to 
assess their fit with the observations. If necessary, some of the emerging patterns 
were either dropped or refined and adjusted until their fit with the data appeared 
close enough to base some tentative hypotheses on them. This process of field 
work and data analysis reached closure when additional iterations did not result in 
a better accord between the tentative hypotheses and the cases, i.e., when 
theoretical saturation was achieved and marginal improvements became minimal.  
The final step in the research process for this study began concurrently with the 
cross-case analyses and can be best described as ‘enfolding the literature’. An 
essential feature of hypothesis formation and theory extension from tentative 
hypotheses lies in the comparison of the emerging hypotheses with extant 
literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Chapter 4 of this study is devoted to such an 
extensive juxtaposition of the case-based findings of Chapter 3 with both 
conflicting and similar findings in the literature. This procedure of ‘postponed’ 
literature review will lead to the extension of theory and thus to a theoretical 
contribution of its own (Chapter 5). 
The research outline of this study is again summed up in the following Figure 5: 
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Figure 5: Research outline of the study about post-acquisition integration 
activities 
On the basis of the methodology discussed in this chapter, the following Chapter 
3 will present the empirical case studies, starting with building the respective 
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3 Case studies of organizational integration of biotechnology 
companies after the M&A deal 
“To find the balance, acquiring companies must decide where they can allow the 
new acquisition to continue as it has in the past, and where the acquisition will 
have to adopt to the new order.” (Copeland, 2001, p. 94) 
The aim of this chapter has already been referred to in the introduction. At the 
heart of this chapter stand several case studies of integration activities between 
big pharmaceutical and small biotechnology companies. The goal is to develop a 
rich understanding of the organizational integration process of these enterprises 
through the descriptions and analyses of five firm-level integration histories. This 
will be done by gaining insights into the motives, forms, and processes of 
organizational integration activities of four big pharmaceutical enterprises that 
are active in the biotechnology industry by selecting a firm-level perspective.  
In a first step, the development of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry 
will be presented in order to provide the appropriate setting for the different case 
studies. The analysis and description of the industry development and the M&A 
activities in these industries are to serve as a useful background for the rich 
understanding of the cases, but are also to make clear why the cases are 
worthwhile analyzing.  
Each case starts with a short corporate profile of the companies involved and is 
subsequently divided in two major parts. The first major part is the case 
description which contains a detailed depiction or story about the integration 
process and collaboration between the considered companies. The second major 
part is the subsequent within-case analysis section which – in contrast to the 
almost pure descriptive section of the first part – is much more analytical in 
nature and tries to analyze the given data, which can be considered as being one 
of the most crucial steps in building theory from case studies. The necessary 
prerequisite for the within-case analysis is the detailed case study description as 
will be done at the beginning of each case study section, which is central to the 
generation of insights, because it allows the researcher to cope early in the 
analysis process with the enormous volume of data. As already outlined in the 
methodology section in Chapter 2, the overall idea is to become familiar with 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
30
each case as a separate, stand-alone entity (Eisenhardt, 1989). The following step 
deals with the analysis of the specific case in order to allow unique patterns of 
each case to emerge and to be explained before the cross-case analysis is 
performed. A separation of case description and within-case analysis is absolutely 
necessary, because of the huge amount of data and information involved. Besides 
this overwhelming amount of data a combined descriptive and analytical section 
would also make disappear the border between the pure description of the facts 
and the respective analysis. Thus, the reader would no longer be able to 
distinguish between what has been described based on the interviews as well as 
documents, on the one hand, and what has been the analytical contribution and 
conclusions of the author, on the other hand. Because of these two reasons, a 
division becomes quite inevitable. 
The framework selected for the within-case analysis is based on the semi-
structured questionnaire used for the interviews. The topics chosen for the 
questionnaire have been developed by making a first review of the post-
merger/post-acquisition and M&A literature and studies as well as preliminary 
discussions with industry experts and has also been continuously up-dated based 
on useful remarks which came up during the different interviews. To start with, 
there is the question about the motives and, by this, also the strategic rationale 
behind the acquisition and the subsequent integration and collaboration. After 
that, there is the analysis of the integration process, which can be subdivided in 
two major perspectives. On the one hand, it is necessary to analyze the integration 
topics of organizational/structural integration, knowledge/competence integration 
and transfer, cultural integration as well as people integration. The central subject 
in this context is the aspect of organizational integration, because all the other 
issues are in some way centered around this. On the other hand, there is a clear 
need to analyze the organization of the integration process itself which only 
allows, supports and enables the different integration issues to be realized. 
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3.1 Building industry context 
This section will analyze the development of the pharmaceutical and the 
biotechnology industry with the aim of (1) depicting the peculiarities of both 
industries that need to be considered in the post-acquisition integration process as 
well as (2) revealing that both sectors have a huge potential for M&A activities. 
The final section will provide some empirical evidences for M&A activities in 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry that have occurred during the last 
years. 
3.1.1 The pharmaceutical industry 
“The early 1990s were a watershed in the evolution of the pharmaceutical 
industry. After years of relatively stable growth, high profits, and an enviable 
record of innovation, pharmaceutical firms found themselves struggling against a 
tide of hostile forces.” (Pisano, 1997a, p. 51) 
When Felix Hoffman produced Aspirin, he turned Bayer, the dye-maker for 
which he worked, into the world’s first drug company. The birth of the 
pharmaceutical industry epitomizes its subsequent development. Over the past 
hundred years, it has successively adapted to advances in medicine, biology, 
epidemiology, economics and information technology. This ability to evolve in 
response to new sources of scientific knowledge has served it well. However, this 
evolution is rather a process of slow change and the industry now faces a 
challenge of absolutely unprecedented scale. During the next several years – as 
already indicated in the above quotation – there will be a continuous 
transformation process in the pharmaceutical industry. Competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry has historically been characterized by three factors. First, 
competitive advantage has been driven by blockbuster drugs, which were 
required to offset the cost of expensive hit-or-miss clinical trial programs. 
Second, all pharmaceutical companies have traditionally been vertically 
integrated from discovery through sales. Third, pharmaceutical companies have 
played a peripheral role as ‘suppliers’ in the health care system, provided 
marketing solutions to payers and providers, but had no intention in driving 
primary consumer demand or becoming involved in care, diagnosis, or decision-
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
32
making. Thus, in this environment success was based on a combination of 
serendipity and operational capabilities (BCG, 1999).9 
Nowadays, pharmaceutical companies face daunting stock market expectations 
and short-term operating pressures on earnings. Basically, they have to choose 
between two alternative strategies: either they turn to mergers and acquisitions in 
order to plug strategic holes and accelerate operational improvements, or they 
remain independent and put a concerted focus on near-term performance-
improvement. Whether merging or not, pharmaceutical companies have to face 
lots of revolutionary changes on the horizon. The challenge is to weather short-
term pressures, while at the same time rethinking fundamental questions of 
business strategy in the light of revolutionary changes ahead. 
But what are these revolutionary changes the pharmaceutical industry has to deal 
with? The challenges for the pharmaceutical companies arise from the 
consequences of two basic developments: the change in prolific discovery and the 
possibility to manufacture tailored products. First of all, we will have a closer 
look at these basic developments before considering their repercussions on the 
pharmaceutical industry itself in the light of the stock market expectations and the 
short-term operating pressures on earnings pharmaceutical companies face. 
(1) New challenges for the pharmaceutical industry 
The fundamental task facing the pharmaceutical industry has been relatively 
constant: identify targets for drug intervention, create novel compounds, and 
screen the two against each other in order to find compounds that might be 
effective drugs. So far, nothing is easier than that. However, the technologies and 
the knowledge underlying these functions are changing dramatically, altering the 
fundamental nature of discovery (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998a & 1999e). 
Traditionally, the discovery of new chemical entities (NCEs) has been a rare, 
                                              
9  The following characterization of the pharmaceutical industry is partly based on a BCG 
report (BCG, 1999). But, the argumentation is quite different. Whereas BCG treats the two 
basic developments in the pharmaceutical industry − the change in prolific discovery and 
the possibility to manufacture tailored products − only in the Appendix, this study 
considers these developments as the fundamental basis of discussion. Hence, this study 
starts with these revolutionary changes, stressing the crucial impact biotechnology has on 
the pharmaceutical industry by altering the fundamental bases of competition. 
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expensive and serendipitous event, and has long been the principal bottleneck in 
the pharmaceutical value chain. Apart from that, pharmaceutical companies are 
organized to meet their present objectives, the development and sale of drugs. 
Their structure often reflects the different stages of a drug’s development and the 
technical expertise of the personnel involved. This is shown in the most important 
parts of the pharmaceutical value chain – the research and development steps – as 
Figure 6 reveals. 
Figure 6: Research and development process of a new drug 
Explosive developments in the areas of genomics, combinatorial chemistry and 
high-throughput-screening are fundamentally altering the science and economics 
of drug discovery (BCG, 2001b & 2001c). This is one of the most important 
impacts of biotechnology on the traditional pharmaceutical industry. The strategic 
implications of the new discovery technologies are that: 
• the NCE bottleneck disappears, 
• there will be a trade off between the quantity of hits against the quality, 
• the new economics of discovery change requirements of scale, 
• finding alternatives to animal studies will be the next bottleneck, and 
• a cultural change towards a more effective selection of drug candidates 
from a larger portfolio will be indispensable. 
Source: Pisano (1997a), p. 119
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Hence, success will require pharmaceutical firms to develop new capabilities on 
many fronts. First, they have to dedicate resources in order to stay informed of 
technology developments and integrate the most promising technologies in-
house. Second, the efficient storage and effective retrieval of the vast quantities 
of data provided by the new technologies have to be assured. Third, companies 
will have to hire the right talent for each specific task and pay attention that they 
effectively work together. Fourth, development and marketing must continuously 
be informed over the advances in discovery, because they have to create targeted 
products for smaller subpopulations of diseases. Fifth, pharmaceutical companies 
will have to create effective tools for portfolio selection and management. Thus, 
new discovery technologies are leading the way to a world where pharma 
pipelines are not constrained by a limited number of promising compounds, and 
the former random screening approach for new compounds will be replaced by a 
more focused, science-guided screening approach. 
Across the pharma industry, traditional boundaries are disappearing. The 
traditional pharma business has been driven by mass-marketed products that were 
not differentiated across consumers. With the help of pharmacogenomics it will 
be possible to tailor drugs to a particular subpopulation of patients (BCG, 2001b). 
Thus, the traditional mass-market paradigm is challenged because this tailoring 
will shrink market sizes, create opportunities for higher prices, and, over time, 
change the cost and the success rates of clinical trials. In the old days, drugs were 
marketed to the entire patient population. This implied some drawbacks for 
pharma companies as well as consumers, payers, and providers. E.g., pipeline 
productivity suffered, because, if a drug proved toxic or was effective in 50 
percent or less during clinical trials, the project was terminated, although the 
compound might have been viable for a particular patient subsegment. 
Furthermore, mass-market development reduced the potential efficacy rates. 
Products that did reach the market often experienced only 50 percent to 80 
percent average efficacy. Moreover, many drugs were approved with known side 
effects for a small, but undefined percentage of approved users. Apart from that, 
the early termination of pipeline products meant for groups of patients who might 
have responded well to this particular new medicine the deny of access.  
Now, the pharmacogenomics revolution leads to an increase in the number of 
targets for pharmaceutical intervention (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998b). Of 
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course, pharmacogenomics is still in its infancy, and most experts estimate that it 
will take at least another ten years before there is enough genetic knowledge to 
begin tailoring treatments for most diseases. But, from then on, 
pharmacogenomics will drive the replacement of blockbusters with a new 
portfolio approach. This approach is characterized by a potential for premium 
pricing, the creation of blockbuster suites, an improved pipeline productivity, and 
lower-cost clinical programs. By this, the former hit-or-miss clinical trial 
programs are replaced by tailored products for a specific patient subsegment. 
Consequently, the costs of clinical trials decrease, whereas its speed and efficacy 
rate increase (BCG, 2001c). Although its timing is unpredictable − science is 
always proceeding at an unknown pace − the direction of changes described is 
virtually certain. To succeed in an environment of tailored products, 
pharmaceutical companies will have to establish a systematic linkage with 
diagnostics, targeted marketing to payers, providers, and consumers, and 
regulatory management. The emergence of tailored products as a consequence out 
of the new discovery technologies will lead to a promise of revenue opportunities 
as well as a threat of new competition.  
(2) Strategic options for pharmaceutical companies 
Besides these two fundamental developments described in the section above, the 
pharmaceutical industry faces daunting stock market expectations and short-term 
operating pressures on earnings. Hence, it is necessary to consider short-term as 
well as long-term requirements in operational and strategic decision-making of 
the individual company. This means that this study shifts now from the industry 
perspective to the company perspective. 
While the financial community is calling for strong earnings growth, there are 
three existing threats to that growth. One, over the next few years, the 
pharmaceutical industry faces an unprecedented level of patent expiration. Two, 
increasing demands for cost containment are preventing pharmaceutical firms 
from taking price increases above the rate of inflation. Three, the late-stage 
development pipeline is insufficient to overcome these factors.10 Figure 7 tries to 
                                              
10  A broader survey among top managers identifying the key issues facing the pharmaceutical 
and health care products industry was carried out by PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999d).  
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depict the huge amount of money and the risk pharmaceutical companies have to 
bear in order to bring a drug to market. 
Figure 7: Development of research costs in the pharmaceutical industry 
Basically, there are two broad strategies for filling this earnings gap. For some 
companies, a merger is the best answer to both short-term pressure and long-term 
pipeline gaps. For other companies a multipronged operational improvement 
aiming at achieving best-in-class performance will be a viable solution for filling 
the gap (BCG, 1999). In order to close the earnings gap organically and remain 
independent, companies can rely on three pillars: 
(1)  To make the most of each product, they are to put their attention on 
simultaneous global launches, enhanced market penetration, and 
improved life-cycle management. 
(2)  More and swifter new-product launches can be realized by cycle-time 
reduction due to structured resource allocation, better data management, 
improved trial methodologies, better filing approaches, and an increased 
understanding of regulatory requirements as well as by in-licensing. 
(3)  A more efficient asset utilization is possible through an improved 
inventory management and a better asset turnover. 
Source: VFA (1998)
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Nevertheless, achieving these operational changes requires only reaching the 
boundaries of the existing industry paradigm. This can only be regarded as a 
prerequisite for the realization of the next wave of opportunities: the challenge of 
biotechnology. Analyzing the M&A activities in the pharmaceutical industry may 
also contribute to gain insights in how operational improvements can be realized. 
However, this would mean that this analysis is staying in the existing industry 
paradigm. As the focus of this study is on the impact of biotechnology, leading to 
a new industry paradigm, this study will not analyze M&A activities in the 
pharmaceutical industry itself as a mean to achieve operational improvements or 
scale effects although it seems that this is a widely proliferated strategy as Figure 
8 shows.11 
Figure 8: Earnings pressure and M&A activities in the pharmaceutical industry  
From a competitive perspective, biotechnology challenges the historical bases of 
competition (blockbuster drugs, vertical integration, role as supplier) in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Basically, there are three factors to take into 
consideration. First of all, innovations in combinatorial chemistry, high-
throughput screening, and genomics are not only changing the output of 
                                              
11  A more detailed analysis can be found in Schweizer (2001). 
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discovery, they are also opening up new defensible patent spaces. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies have to protect more systematically the discovery of 
innovative lead compounds and have also to stake claims to new classes of drugs 
by patenting targets, methods of actions, and pathways. In the traditional 
discovery paradigm, identifying new compounds was slow and expensive, and 
innovative launches tended to be followed by ‘me-toos’. Because the patenting 
focused on compounds and the available tools were used broadly by all 
competitors, patents based on these tools could not be effectively established. 
Now, the increasing knowledge creates spaces for broader intellectual property. 
There will be larger patent spaces around molecules and new types of patent 
spaces such as high-value knowledge about genes, disease pathways, and drug 
targets. Of course, the proposition of defensible innovation rests on the 
assumption that legal authorities will uphold broader patenting. Moreover, the 
ability to write broader patents forces companies to think much earlier about the 
role of patenting in their product development strategy. The strategic implication 
to bear in mind is that patenting needs to shift from a supporting role to a 
strategic function in order to create well-defined isolating mechanisms. The new 
capabilities required to support innovation are a more strategic approach in 
defining and protecting intellectual property, a larger intellectual property 
department with more experienced staff, a broader understanding of the global 
and regulatory environment, as well as the ability to assess the value of 
competitive patents. 
Second, knowledge and technology are not only transforming drug discovery, 
they are also redefining the business structure of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Many new players focus on narrow elements of the pharmaceutical business, 
from clinical trials to specialty manufacturing to genomic databases and 
screening capability. Due to the evolving expertise of these focused companies 
and an increased communication linkage between them, one company can 
identify a new compound, another may match it to a target, a third could carry it 
through clinical development, a fourth might launch it, and still another company 
can bear the financial risk of bringing the drug to market. This trend is called 
deconstruction of value chain (Heuskel, 1999; Hamel, 2000; Amit & Zott, 2001). 
According to BCG (1999) there are two main business models available to 
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pharmaceutical companies in an environment changing like that.12 Orchestrators, 
integrated companies, must rethink the value of external connections. This 
means, at each step of the value chain, they need to assess the tradeoffs between 
improving internal skills and accessing superior external capabilities. Focusers, 
which mainly will be biotechnology companies, can be distinguished in service 
providers, such as contract manufacturing organizations (CMOs) and contract 
research organizations (CROs), and technology players. As far as orchestrators 
are concerned the question is: To what degree do major pharmaceutical 
companies want to build skills in suppliers that can offer those same skills to 
competitors? The key question regarding technology players is: Can 
pharmaceutical companies come up with strategies to bypass or otherwise 
neutralize the power of these specialists? In order to be an effective orchestrator 
in a networked world it is necessary to access technology, maximize the 
effectiveness of executive functions and balance insourcing versus outsourcing. 
Outsourcing can hence be used to free up resources for higher-value activities. To 
succeed and to survive orchestrators have to adopt a new mindset, assess internal 
capabilities critically, view functions as modular units, engage in sophisticated 
dealmaking, and hire and retain the right talents. As the pharmaceutical business 
model evolves and external providers (focusers) develop superior skills and 
knowledge, the integrated company is being transformed through a complex web 
of partnerships and supplier relationships (orchestrators), reshaping the industry 
structure. 
Third, for the first time in history, the person with the greatest influence over the 
sale of a drug may soon be the person who takes it. Basically, there are two forces 
that are initiating a consumer revolution in health care, moving consumers from a 
peripheral to a central role (BCG, 2001a; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999c). First, 
consumers are gaining access to information and establishing greater control over 
decisions about their care. Second, accelerating progress in genetic understanding 
creates the possibility for the first time to segment patients on the basis of 
                                              
12  A more detailed discussion about the construct of business models especially in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry can be found in Meinhardt & Schweizer 
(2001). A theoretical approach to the construct of business models can be found in zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß & Meinhardt (2001). 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
40
genomic descriptors and tailor therapy according to their specific needs. 
Traditionally, health care focused on diseases, not individuals. In the old 
paradigm, consumers’ experience with pharmaceuticals was radically different 
from their experience with other industries that supply products for their use. 
Nowadays, leveraging advances in technology and encouraged by payers, 
providers and manufacturers, consumers are claiming a more active role in 
decisions about their care. This is made possible by the access to information and 
by an increasing availability of genomic knowledge. From a strategic point of 
view, pharmaceutical companies must begin to recognize the increasing power of 
consumers in shaping care (Harms et al., 2001). To become consumer-centric 
companies must develop strategic and sophisticated marketing programs, 
establish a deep understanding of consumers’ need, and move beyond targeted 
marketing and integrate consumer understanding into the entire pharmaceutical 
value chain. The consumer-centric paradigm will evolve at different speeds in 
different markets, and may not work for all diseases. 
The main points which characterize the development in the pharmaceutical 
industry are again summed-up in Figure 9: 
Figure 9: Transformation process in the pharmaceutical industry  
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(3) Concluding remarks 
Because of this transformation process the leaders of today’s pharmaceutical 
companies face a demanding but nevertheless exhilarating challenge. They have 
to steer their companies through the near-term earnings gap, pursue an industry-
wide approach to shaping the health care environment, address the fundamental 
choices of where to compete and how to compete, and foster the build-up of new 
capabilities such as patenting, licensing, strategic human resource management, 
internal and external information management, marketing, and partnering. This 
study focuses on the fundamental choice of how to compete. This implies that 
companies must adopt a new way of looking at integration and coordination, 
assessing the value created in each function, determining what skills are available 
through partnerships with service providers or technology players, and building 
an organization capable of coordinating across boundaries 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999b). Besides the need to establish a strong financial 
base that will fund continuing investment in new markets, technologies, and 
customer needs, the acquisition of knowledge in the biotechnology sector and its 
understanding are crucial for their future survival.  
Basically, there are three different strategies: first, organic growth, which means 
that pharmaceutical companies have to build up this knowledge on their own, 
second, any kind of partnership such as strategic alliances or R&D agreements 
with biotechnology firms or universities, through which the company can gain 
access to the required knowledge, and, third, M&A in order to integrate 
companies which possess the necessary knowledge and capabilities. Thus, M&A 
is not only a method to close near-term earnings gap and improve operational 
performance, it is, first and foremost, a strategic possibility to overcome a lack of 
knowledge in the biotechnology sector or catching-up as a late entrant. It is this 
last point on which this study puts its focus: the acquisition of biotechnology 
firms by large pharmaceutical companies in order to add internal knowledge and 
contribute to the short as well as long-term objectives of the firm by internalizing 
a whole body of laboratory and product development capabilities. Thus – from 
the point of view of this study – the aspect of organizational integration and the 
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respective collaboration in the context of the post-merger integration process is 
the most crucial issue pharmaceutical companies have to cope with. 
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3.1.2 The biotechnology industry 
“The commercial potential of biotechnology appealed to many scientists and 
entrepreneurs even at its embryonic stage. In the early years, the principal efforts 
were directed at making existing proteins in new ways, then the field evolved to 
use the new methods to make new proteins, and now today the race is on to design 
entirely new medicines. The firms that translated the science into feasible 
technologies and new medical products faced a host of challenges.” (Powell, 
1998, p. 232) 
This chapter tries to describe the development of the biotechnology industry from 
different perspectives: from a technological/scientific perspective, from an 
organizational/management perspective, and from a financial perspective. But 
first of all, it has to be made clear what is meant by the term ‘biotechnology’. 
Biotechnology has been defined in many different ways, but none of the 
numerous definitions has been universally accepted. The OTA (Office of 
Technology Assessment) definition, focusing on third generation biotechnology, 
has, however, been widely accepted by international organizations and scholars.13 
In its special report on the biotechnology industry the OTA states: 
“To differentiate between biotechnology using more traditional techniques from 
the newer techniques developed in recent years, OTA uses a second more narrow 
definition of biotechnology. This definition refers only to the ‘new’ biotechnology: 
the industrial use of recombinant DNA, cell fusion, and novel bioprocessing 
techniques.” (OTA, 1998, p. 29) 
Biotechnology thus encompasses the use of skills drawn from biology, 
biochemistry, genetics, microbiology, biochemical engineering, combinatorial 
chemistry, and separations processing. This definition above puts the emphasis on 
three elements: recombinant DNA, cell fusion, and bioprocessing techniques. All 
                                              
13  E.g., the OECD (1989) defines biotechnology as “the application of scientific and 
engineering principles to the processing of materials by biological agents” (p. 21). 
Furthermore, Weisenfeld-Schenk (1995) demonstrates in her survey of definitions for third 
generation biotechnology that there is considerable convergence around the OTA 
definition. 
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these elements will be explained in greater detail along the discussion of the 
scientific foundations of modern biotechnology in the following section. 
(1) The development of the biotechnology industry from a scientific point of view 
Broadly considered, biotechnology includes techniques as old as Western 
civilization itself: e.g., the cultivation of micro-organisms for brewing and the 
intentional cross-breeding of plants and animals. Thus, the roots of modern 
biotechnology, the so-called ‘first generation of biotechnology’, lie in the 
fermentation of foods and drinks, industries spanning almost every society and 
evolved over centuries (Sharp, 1991; Kenney, 1986). In other words, 
biotechnology has been used as long as people have baked bread and drank wine. 
‘Second generation biotechnology’ developed as an outgrowth of traditional 
fermentation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and depicted the 
greater understanding about micro-organisms. The discovery of penicillin by the 
British bacteriologist Alexander Fleming in 1928, and the subsequent 
development of the antibiotic industry, has been one of the major milestones of 
the twentieth century – as already indicated in Figure 2. ‘Third-generation 
biotechnology’, also called ‘new’ or ‘modern’ biotechnology, on which this study 
puts its focus on, results from the discovery in the early 1970s of the method by 
which genes could be cut and spliced. It includes the use of recombinant DNA 
and cell fusion techniques as well as bioprocessing technology, to make or 
modify products.14 The development of the three biotechnology generations − as 
it is shown by Sharp (1991) − is summarized in Figure 10.  
                                              
14  Before describing the development of the biotechnology industry from its different 
perspectives in more detail, it is necessary to emphasize the distinction between the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry – considered from the point of view of this 
study. On the one hand, the pharmaceutical industry can – in simplified terms – be 
subdivided in a non-biotechnology (rather chemical) part, which is losing more and more 
of its former importance, and in a biotechnology part, which, obviously, is becoming the 
most important one. On the other hand, the biotechnology industry can be segmented into 
(1) red biotechnology dealing with human health care, (2) green biotechnology focusing on 
agriculture, (3) gray biotechnology dealing with environmentally friendly methods, and (4) 
biotechnological equipment/devices. The most interesting segment to analyze is the 
overlap between the increasing biotechnology part of the pharmaceutical industry and red 
biotechnology which also includes the diagnostics business as this covers red 
biotechnology as well as biotechnological equipment and is a very important part of the 
health care business. 
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Figure 10: Three generations of biotechnology  
The development of ‘new biotechnology’ has been characterized by Wirth (1994) 
in four phases, whereas this study is adding a fifth phase. The first phase, the so-
called research phase, lasting from 1970 to 1980, was dominated by two 
pathbreaking discoveries that revolutionized molecular biology, and, therefore, is 
discussed a little more in detail than the subsequent phases. These two separate 
scientific discoveries formed the basis of ‘new biotechnology’ (Barley, Freeman 
& Hybels, 1992). First, in 1973, Herbert Boyer of Stanford University and 
Stanley Cohen of the University of California at San Francisco reported the 
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discovery of recombinant DNA (rDNA). Their experiment involved the insertion 
of a foreign piece of frog DNA into a host genome. rDNA technology is used to 
propagate DNA fragments inside a foreign host (vector). The first experiments 
dealt with the insertion of foreign DNA into E. coli, a well characterized 
bacterium with a ring-shaped plasmid DNA structure. The foreign DNA fragment 
was a gene governing the production of human insulin. Second, in 1975, Cesar 
Milstein and Georges Kohler of the British Medical Research Council discovered 
monoclonal antibodies (MABs) by fusing cells from a mouse myeloma with cells 
derived from mouse B-lymphocytes to create a ‘hybridoma’. The human defenses 
against infectious agents are specific proteins called antibodies, which 
continuously confer resistance against diseases. It is possible to use antibodies 
therapeutically, as vaccines, and for diagnostics purposes in order to detect 
abnormal substances in the blood. With the help of MABs technology an efficient 
way to mass produce antibodies is provided (Zaby, 1999). 
Although the science of these two process innovations was characterized by very 
considerable uncertainty and speculation, biotechnology’s potential excited high 
levels of interest. In this first phase, universities and research institutes played a 
critical role in biotech’s emergence, not only as the places where young scientists 
were educated, but, particularly, as the sources of breakthrough discoveries and 
techniques that fostered scientific and technological innovation (Powell, 1996). 
Hence, most biotechnology firms have been started by scientists with the help of 
either venture capitalists, specialized law firms, or ex-pharmaceutical 
executives.15 Zucker, Darby & Brewer (1994) show in their study that the growth 
and diffusion of intellectual capital was the main determinant of where and when 
the American biotechnology industry developed. They compared the timing and 
location of new biotech firms (NBFs) with the presence at a particular time and 
place of ‘star’ scientists who are actively contributing to the basic science.  
                                              
15  Kenney (1986) has analyzed the development of biotechnology from a university-industrial 
perspective. Olson (1986) points out that the biotechnology industry has (and will always 
have) a vital interest in establishing and maintaining ties with academic research institutes 
through a variety of cooperative agreements, because most of the basic techniques that has 
given rise to biotechnology has originally been developed in university laboratories and 
other research institutes. 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
47
The second phase, from 1980-1985, is considered as being the pioneering phase. 
The first product of a biotech company made by recombinant DNA, human 
insulin, was marketed in 1982 and was soon gaining appreciable market 
penetration. In 1983, first experiments with genetically modified micro-
organisms were allowed to be carried out in the U.S., and, in 1985, the first 
genetically produced hepatitis B viral antigens were introduced.  
The third phase, starting with the year 1984, is regarded as being the first 
prospering phase of biotechnology, because there have been strong indications 
that the real ‘take-off’ point for the large corporations came in the years 1984-
1985. Big-firm investment in commercial biotechnology in the U.S. increased 
dramatically. Having remained relatively static through the early 1980s at 
approximately $200 million a year, it rose to $300 million in 1984 and jumped to 
$1.2 billion in 1985 (OTA, 1988). In 1986, alpha-interferon, used for the 
treatment of leukemia, received approval by the FDA, and, in 1988, the first 
cloned mouse was patented in the U.S.  
The fourth phase, identified by Wirth (1994), has started in 1990 and is perceived 
as the real prospering phase of biotechnology leading to new opportunities. 
However, this study puts the end of this phase to the year 1996, due to the fact, 
that, henceforth, the financing window for biotechnology has been closed.16 In 
1990, the first experiment to treat ADA-deficiency genetically took place, and, in 
1992, the U.S. Trade Office has worked out new rules for biotechnology as well 
as genetic engineering according to which genetically developed products are to 
be treated equally as conventional products. In the same time, the market share of 
drugs and diagnostic methods, based on biotechnology, has increased steadily. By 
the end of 1994, more than two dozen biotech drugs and vaccines had been 
approved by the FDA, more than 200 medicines were in various stages of clinical 
testing, and approximately two dozen drugs awaited FDA approval (Powell, 
1996).  
                                              
16  DeCarolis and Deeds (1999) refer to the financing window as ‘hot markets’ which 
entrepreneurs may use in order to improve their access to capital by going public and 
taking advantage of investors’ optimism. 
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The fifth phase, starting in 1997 and still holding on, is characterized by the 
discussion about necessary consolidation activities, on the one hand, and, the 
future ‘dream’ about the never-ending benefits of biotechnology, on the other 
hand. Pharmaceutical companies clearly understand the role that biotechnology 
companies play in developing cheaper, faster and more effective drugs. In this 
sense, they are considered as being the ‘innovative engine’ for the pharmaceutical 
industry. However, pharmaceutical companies are facing significant short-term 
earnings pressure, and it is uncertain whether they will be able to continue to 
provide biotechnology companies with the necessary amount of money they need 
to survive. Apart from that, institutional investors are not motivated by 
biotechnology’s past performance and are looking for new areas to invest 
(Purcell, 1998). Today, this growing industry comprises a range from research-
focused start-ups to mid-size companies with manufacturing capability and large 
pharmaceutical companies. The future prospects of biotechnology are also 
influenced by the increasing number of start-ups in Europe. This suggests that a 
so-called ‘second wave’ of biotechnology, now emerging in Europe, may lead to 
a more unified global infrastructure for discovery and implementation (Edington, 
1998). This increasing interest in Europe is also exemplified by Exelixis’ 
acquisition of German-based Artemis and the spinout of Atugen Biotechnology 
GmbH, located in Berlin, from Ribozyme Pharmaceuticals (Christoffersen, 1999; 
Stoiber, 1999).  
Moreover, with the launch of the Human Genome Project in 1990, there was a 
growing perception that drug discovery was to undergo radical changes. First, the 
number of possible targets relevant for diseases was about to rocket. Second, new 
technologies like high-throughput screening or new bioinformatic tools in 
connection with combinatorial chemistry made it possible to test a large number 
of potential drug targets against an even larger number of chemical entities. 
Third, the growing awareness of the innovation deficit at pharmaceutical 
companies made them to look for alternatives: biotechnology (Drews, 1998b). 
The convergence of genomics and informatics heralds a new era of biomedical 
research, offering lots of opportunities. The principal contribution of genomics to 
date has been in the identification of new molecular targets for drug action 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1998b). The challenge now lies in how to select 
targets with the highest probability of relevance to disease pathogenesis. The 
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development of new informatics tools to annotate, archive, and analyze the vast 
volume and diversity of datasets creates four immediate challenges (Poste, 1998): 
• the design of systems architecture and hyperlinking tools for large-
scale, heterogeneous distributed databases, 
• the creation of novel algorithms for data mining in bioinformatics, 
cheminformatics, and population genetics, 
• the assembly of comprehensive clinical databanks and their use for 
large-scale genetic association studies in order to define robust gene-
disease risk correlations, and 
• the development of encryption methods to protect proprietary data 
and to assure the privacy and confidentiality of clinical information. 
Thus, the strategic direction for healthcare is clear. It will increasingly focus on 
the assessment of how individual genetic variations will affect overall health. 
From this it follows, that individual risk profiling will be at the core of 
information-based clinical trial. Hence, genomics and informatics have the 
potential of being among the dominant growth industries of the early 21st century. 
(2) The development of the biotechn industry from an organizational perspective 
As illustrated in the section above, university laboratories have played a critical 
role in developing the scientific fundamentals of biotechnology. However, it was 
the dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs), also referred to as new biotechnology 
firms (NBFs) or entrepreneurial life sciences companies (ELISCOs), that 
commercially exploited the results of the research. Gilis (1998) compares the 
factors of success in starting a successful biotechnology start-up in the early 
phases with those in the latest ones. First, the former naiveté with the dream of 
the potential uses of recombinant DNA technology has now been replaced by 
frenetic cynicism that accompanies an industry which knows there will be 
winners and losers. Second, the struggle for investor support has become far more 
competitive. The vast majority of the NBFs were financed by venture capital 
firms and later by IPOs that were usually carried out on the NASDAQ exchange 
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in the U.S. and for German companies on the ‘Neuen Markt’ in Germany.17 
Third, where once good science was enough to attract investors, now founding 
management needs relevant and successful industry experience. Fourth, in the 
early days neither investors nor entrepreneurs paid much attention to whether the 
focus was on licensing one’s inventions to a third party or on attempting to build 
a fully integrated company. Today, however, biotechnology start-ups need a 
complete and bulletproof business strategy. Fifth, the beginning of a 
technological revolution without much competition has given the way to far too 
much competition. The NBFs represented a new type of organization, because 
they typically originated from within the leading research institutes and 
universities and kept close ties with academia. 
The scientific breakthroughs of biotechnology constituted a radical change from 
previously dominated technologies in the human health care sector. Hence, in the 
sense of Schumpeter (1934), Abernathy & Clark (1985), and Tushman & 
Anderson (1986), “biotechnology is a dramatic case of a competence-destroying 
innovation” (Powell & Brantley, 1992, p. 368). Technological change in this case 
builds on a scientific basis (immunology and molecular biology) that differs 
significantly from the knowledge base (organic chemistry and its clinical 
application) of the established pharmaceutical industry (Powell, 1993).  
Internally, biotechnology firms are organized flexible in overlapping 
interdisciplinary project teams. Thus, the firms have minimal hierarchy and 
sometimes they have even created their own postdoctoral fellowship program. 
Obviously, biotechnology companies have merged the practices of academy with 
the requirements of high tech industry in order to create a lean and effective 
organization for drug discovery and commercial development (Powell, 1996). 
Small biotechnology firms require large financial support and regulatory savvy, 
while larger pharmaceutical companies desire access to the research prowess of 
smaller companies. However, during the early years of biotechnology’s 
development, most established pharmaceutical companies remained on the 
                                              
17  Two German biotechnology companies have a dual listing on the NASDAQ and on the 
‘Neuen Markt’. These two companies are Qiagen N.V., which is incorporated under the 
laws of the Netherlands and is headquartered in the Dutch town of Venlo, and Lion 
Bioscience AG, headquartered in Heidelberg. 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
51
sideline, which Powell (1993) also called a ‘wait and see approach’. As a 
consequence, pharmaceutical companies found themselves losing out in 
competition, because there was a lack of trained workforce in biotechnology, and, 
moreover, they were unable to create an internal environment that was 
comparable to university or biotech laboratories (Powell, 1996). It is evident, that 
the full range of relevant skills needed to develop therapeutic drugs is not readily 
found under a single roof. Whereas the necessary basic and research skills to 
create a new product are found either in universities, research institutes, or small 
biotechnology companies, the cash needed for product development, clinical 
trials, and world-wide marketing is located in large pharmaceutical companies. 
Hence, the players in this field have turned to numerous forms of collaboration 
such as joint ventures, research agreements, or licensing agreements 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999b). According to Freeman & Barley (1992) the 
biotechnology community as a whole includes at least nine categories of 
organizations: new biotechnology firms (NBFs), university departments, research 
institutes, established corporations, venture capital firms, regulatory bodies, 
industrial associations, scientific bodies, and suppliers. 
At its current stage of development the biotechnology industry is closely 
connected with the established pharmaceutical industry and thus can not be seen 
as fully independent. According to EuropaBio (1997) biotechnology is considered 
as being an integral part of the pharmaceutical sector. This interrelation is 
captured by Figure 11 which depicts an overview of the biotechnology value 
chain for human health care. 
 
Figure 11: Biotechnology value chain for human health care 
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Formela (1998) describes four possible business models reflecting a new 
generation of biotechnology companies which are focusing not on specific 
vertical applications, but providing technology to their customers: 
• First, a purely horizontal, non-exclusive model, such as Incyte, plays 
the role of a dominant content provider. 
• Second, the pure tool/component model, such as Affymetrix or Perkin 
Elmer, aims at creating and protecting a standard in a complex, fast-
moving and immature environment. 
• Third, system integration, such as Millennium, focuses on being a fully 
integrated discovery company which integrates new tools into a 
platform that can then be licensed to customers for use on specific 
applications. 
• Fourth, the fully integrated pharmaceutical company, such as HGS, 
may be another option. 
Whatever business model will be chosen – again a more detailed discussion about 
business models in the biotechnology industry can be found in Meinhardt & 
Schweizer (2001) – these trends will foster M&A transactions within the 
biotechnology industry, particularly if one considers M&A as a possible exit 
strategy for biotech investors. 
There are two more questions which have to be answered: One, how can the 
competitive situation in the biotechnology industry be characterized, and, two, 
what is the organizational structure of the biotech industry. According to 
Liebeskind et al. (1996) this industry is placed in an extremely challenging, 
hypercompetitive environment, compounded by appropriation problems, high 
levels of uncertainty, and critical resource immobility. Hypercompetition stems 
from the fact that biotechnology itself is a revolutionary technology with lots of 
rapid technological innovations. Hence, biotechnology firms can sustain a 
competitive advantage only by continuous innovation which results in valuable 
and patentable products. Uncertainty comes from its leading edge technological 
character that makes it impossible for biotechnology companies to determine in 
advance if any particular research program in which they invest will lead to a 
valuable discovery or not. Appropriation problems arise from the fact that 
according to patent laws, only firms which are first to discover a product or 
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process can reap any financial rewards from it. Thus, incentives for rival firms to 
appropriate scientific knowledge that is not already protected by patent laws are 
created. Intellectual resource immobility is caused by the scarcity of real ‘star’ 
researchers being able to make commercially valuable discoveries. Because many 
of them work in universities, biotechnology firms need to develop organizational 
arrangements which give them access to these valuable, but scarce, external 
intellectual resources. The overall need for strategic partners is seen as one of the 
biggest issues facing biotechnology firms. 
As a consequence of this, the second question concerning the organizational 
structure of the biotechnology industry needs to be answered. The biotechnology 
industry is more than any other industry characterized by a social network 
structure which exists in order to ensure the reliability of scientific information 
due to well defined and socially enforced norms, reciprocity, respect for 
individuals’ intellectual property rights, and honesty in research (Blau 1973; 
Crane 1972; Merton 1973). Liebeskind et al. (1996) define a social network as  
“a collectivity of individuals among whom exchanges take place that are 
supported only by shared norms of trustworthy behavior. [...] We define a social 
network that includes members of more than one legally-defined organization as a 
‘boundary-spanning’ social network”. (Liebeskind et al., 1996, p. 430-431) 
Given that social network structure, a better environment for efficient 
organizational learning and also enhanced flexibility for responding to 
unpredictable changes is provided. Social networks allow the exchanges between 
legally distinct entities without competitive pricing or legal contracting. A 
prerequisite for this is that a shift from coordinating the internal activities of the 
firm through a command and control structure to providing organizational 
support for internal as well as external exchanges takes place. As a consequence 
of this, there may then be an extend in the scope of organizational learning, a 
better integration of knowledge in the firms participating in the social network, an 
increase in the operating, organizational as well as strategic flexibility, and a 
more efficient self-coordination among the employees involved.  
Powell (1993) points out that biotechnology – compared to traditional business – 
operates according to a different logic, one in which firms must be expert at both 
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in-house research and cooperative research with external partners. In this context, 
external linkages are considered, on the one hand, as a means of gaining fast 
access to knowledge and resources that can not be provided internally and, on the 
other hand, as a test of internal expertise and learning capabilities. In fact, the 
pattern of interfirm collaboration in biotechnology is probably more extensive 
than in any other industry (Powell, 1993; Powell & Brantley, 1992; Barley & 
Freeman 1992; Arora & Gambardella, 1990). Powell (1996) states that networks 
of collaborative ventures serve as the primary institutional arrangement 
governing exchange and production, because due to the rapid technological 
developments, research breakthroughs are so broadly distributed that no single 
firm has the internal capabilities necessary for success. The models used for 
overcoming the respective deficiencies (e.g. the lack of downstream capabilities 
for bringing the new drugs to market such as clinical development and trials as 
well as marketing or cash-shortage) were cooperative agreements and 
partnerships, minority investments, joint ventures, and licensing (Pisano, 1997a; 
Shan, 1990).  
Greis, Dibner & Bean (1996) distinguish four different types of partnership 
agreements: (1) research contracts or minority investments for the purpose of 
gaining a window on new technologies, (2) licensing and marketing agreements 
to obtain the use of a particular technology, (3) corporate alliances such as joint 
ventures with or without the transfer of equity, and (4) mergers and acquisitions. 
Interestingly, in their study mergers and acquisitions are regarded as types of 
‘partnership’ agreements. Of course, up to now no hostile takeover has taken 
place in the biotechnology industry. Hence, one may consider M&A as a 
partnership agreement. But now, times have changed, because the pharmaceutical 
as well as the biotechnological industry undergo a radical transition enforcing 
both sectors to act. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that either a big 
pharmaceutical company or even a biotechnology firm, rich in cash or stock – 
however feasible and likely this in reality may be – will try to carry out a hostile 
takeover.18  
                                              
18  Of course, the specific industry structure and the strong dependence on tacit knowledge 
will make a hostile takeover difficult, but nevertheless not impossible. 
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Moreover, Greis, Dibner & Bean (1996) emphasize the double layer of 
innovation by pointing out that “the locus of innovative activity is no longer the 
firm, but a network of inter-organizational relationships which are controlled by 
different firms” (p. 612). The existing networks of relationships in biotechnology 
span a broad spectrum of industries rather than one single industry as well as 
national boundaries. It has become clear that biotechnology companies cannot 
rely solely on internal knowledge development. In contrast, they need to absorb 
knowledge from external sources. Hence, one of the most crucial competitive 
advantages of biotechnology companies is their speed and capacity in absorbing 
new knowledge, because this industry heavily depends upon the continual 
accumulation of relevant knowledge (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999). A detailed 
overview of strategic alliances in the biotechnology industry can be found in 
Goldman Sachs (2000 & 2001). 
The simultaneous restructuring of the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology’s 
development, and resource scarcity have created circumstances in which M&A is 
a probable solution to occur.  
(3) The development of the biotechnology industry from a finance perspective 
The development of the biotechnology industry has triggered the question of how 
this technology should be financed. Financing a biotechnology company is the 
result of interactions between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, management 
teams, investment bankers, research analysts, and institutional investors (Hurwitz, 
1999). The role and influence of each player depends on which stage the 
company is in.19 To date, moreover, the biotechnology industry has enjoyed more 
funding by governments, international pharmaceutical companies, the equity 
capital markets, and the venture capital community than virtually any other high-
growth sector in the worldwide economy.  
Teitelman (1989) describes Wall Street’s initial attitude to biotechnology as 
‘biomania’. In 1980/1981 biotechnology investments in the U.S. were attracting 
nearly $100 million of venture capital (Hacking, 1986). Wall Street’s overall 
                                              
19  Birndorf (1999) provides an interesting overview for bioentrepreneurs of when to raise 
how much cash from whom.  
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relationship with biotechnology has, however, been extremely variable, being hot 
and cold on a number of occasions. In its early enthusiasm for the technology it 
ensured that many NBFs enjoyed substantial funding. Pierce (1999) analyzed the 
fates of the U.S. industry pioneers − companies that have been public  for at least 
a decade. This study includes 41 biotechnology companies that had gone public 
by the end of 1988 and raised nearly $10 billion in venture capital, equity, and 
debt financing. Of those, 27 are still continuing to exist as stand-alone entities, 
and barely half are profitable. Large, established pharmaceutical companies were 
generally slow to become involved in biotechnology, but, nevertheless, have been 
devoting considerable resources to it, and many also have acquired NBFs.  
The restructuring and reorganization within the two primary sources of 
biotechnology funding − pharmaceutical companies and the institutional 
investment community − now pose a threat for the continued growth of the 
industry. On the one hand, the short-term earnings pressure on pharmaceutical 
companies to maintain their valuations will probably result in a reduction of 
discretionary dollars traditionally used for biotech funding. On the other hand, the 
bull markets that institutional investors have enjoyed, combined with the 
inconsistent market performance of biotechnology investments, have reduced 
their interests in future investments.20  
From the point of view of the institutional investor, four trends have emerged that 
force a different set of priorities (Purcell, 1999). One, institutional investors are 
managing more and more money as a result of continued escalation in equity 
prices, inflows to mutual funds, and increased merger and acquisition activity. 
Two, due to the growth in average fund size, fund managers need to take larger 
                                              
20  Menzel (1998) points out that accessing the capital markets is not simply a function of the 
strength of prevailing conditions. Of course, knowing when the company is truly ready is 
the first step. Thus, he stresses some prerequisites for an IPO: (1) evidence of a compelling 
and differentiated business model, (2) equity story that is easily to articulate to investors, 
(3) proof of concept for technology platform, (4) advanced clinical trials, (5) validation 
from pharmaceutical partnerships, (6) strong intellectual property position, (7) strong 
management and scientific base, and (8) specific post-IPO milestones. But, fulfilling these 
prerequisites is simply not enough. Knowing when the company is ready to access the 
capital markets is a balance between internal as well as external factors, which means 
being ready to access capital markets at the right time in the right cycle when a financing 
window is opened.  
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and larger positions in order to make investments meaningful to the portfolio’s 
bottom line. Three, volatility in the stock market has significantly increased the 
need for fund managers to hold stocks with greater liquidity. Four, Coyler (1999) 
stresses that investors’ caution in the biotechnology sector is rooted in its 
historical return, which means that the additional risk assumed by biotech 
investors is not being rewarded within a reasonable time. Investors in the average 
biotech IPO in 1993 have enjoyed on average only an 8% return through 1998, 
whereas the return to investors in the average U.S. pharmaceutical company over 
the same period counts for 36%.  
The restructuring of these two industries will ultimately provide new 
opportunities for biotechnology companies, if they succeed in adapting to this 
changing environment. From this it follows, that the dilemma for biotechnology 
companies is how to manage this new environment, in which the drug companies 
who still believe in them no longer have excess discretionary dollars to spend and 
the institutional investors with discretionary dollars to spend are not true 
believers. The short-term strategic answer is to find ways to give both providers 
what they need. First, biotechnology companies have to become as financially 
innovative in their interactions with pharmaceutical partners as they are 
scientifically innovative by using creative financing structures such as off-
balance sheet or product debenture financing. Second, they have to develop a 
critical mass − either through organic growth, consolidation, or collaborative 
agreements − in order to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry as well as 
the institutional investment community. Third, they have to become more skillful 
in addressing the needs of the institutional investors by changing their business 
model to fit better the risk/reward profile of potential investors (Purcell, 1998 & 
1999).  
For companies which are not able to survive by following these short-term 
strategies, they must look to alternative business models to provide them with 
enough cash to develop their technology and products. One widely discussed 
solution to this cash-shortfall is industry-wide consolidation − either through 
biotech-to-biotech or pharma-to-biotech merger. Because of pharma companies 
being rich in cash, the latter one will be the most probable solution ahead. Of 
course, in a first step, biotech companies will try to remain independent due to the 
fact that (1) in some cases neither the board of directors nor the management 
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teams realize the urgency of creating shareholder value on a sustained basis in the 
near or immediate future, (2) senior management wants to protect existing jobs, 
and (3) the emotional attachment between entrepreneurs and the companies they 
have created overshadows logic (Esposito & Ostro, 1998). 
In addition to that, two factors suggest that perhaps now, more than ever, the time 
is ripe for more consolidation in the biotech industry. The first reason is the 
growing disparity in valuations between large-capitalized and small-capitalized 
biotechnology companies. Ostro & Esposito (1999) show that large-capitalized 
biotech companies have performed better than the NASDAQ Composite Index 
over one year (12/97-12/98), while the small-capitalized companies have been 
significant underperformers. The second factor is the dim financing environment, 
particularly for the small-capitalized companies. Actually, small-capitalized 
companies have approximately 15% institutional ownership while those with 
valuation over $1 billion have 45-60% of their equity held by institutional 
investors. It is estimated that over 50% of the biotechnology companies do not 
have sufficient cash for two years of operation (Malloy, 1999). If done correctly, 
biotechnology consolidation should create an environment with enough visibility 
for the new company to attract greater analyst coverage, diversify risks, and 
realize the operational and financial efficiencies to achieve success. 
Of course, nobody will deny that biotechnology companies are important 
technical innovators and thus have an advanced understanding of the basic 
technology underlying the respective biotechnology firm’s area of activity. 
Consequently, successful biotechnology companies live on the innovation edge, 
and need to master the state-of-the-art in their chosen activity. Hence, the 
competence that distinguishes a successful biotechnology firm is its ability to 
grasp and diagnose new, unique problems and to come up with innovative 
solutions. But, in the long run this fact is not enough to survive, because of what 
is clear from the remarks made before is that the biotechnology industry is 
undergoing a major transition − perhaps the greatest since it began − and that for 
those willing to adapt, there are many opportunities ahead. The major key 
changes are: 
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• Institutional investors are now resistant to invest in biotechnology, 
because of the small size of the companies involved and because of 
their lack of liquidity. 
• The pharmaceutical industry is undergoing an M&A process, in which 
pharmaceutical companies are redefining themselves in ways that make 
them more risk averse and that make them also look for biotechnology 
companies that can provide them with a new range of solutions. 
• The trend of ‘niche’ biotechnology companies has turned a number of 
these niche goods and services into commodities. 
Obviously, the biotechnology industry is undergoing a fundamental change, 
leading to the creation of radically new business models. It seems, that a strategic 
consolidation resulting in fewer but stronger, larger, more market capitalized, and 
thus more financeable biotechnology companies is only a question of time. 
Basically, biotechnology companies can choose between two solutions in order to 
solve the problem of survival: a biotech-to-biotech deal or a pharma-to-biotech 
solution. This study will put its analytical emphasis on the latter one, the pharma-
to-biotech solution, because there are too few biotechnology companies having 
enough money for the acquisition of a pharmaceutical company. The following 
section will provide some empirical evidence for the M&A activities in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. 
  
3.1.3 The inevitable need for M&A 
“To buy or not to buy. That’s the question.” (Based on Shakespeare) 
The last two sections contained a short description of the development and 
challenges of the pharmaceutical industry, on the one hand, and of the 
biotechnology industry, on the other hand. It has been revealed that both 
industries are undergoing radical changes and face lots of difficulties. Moreover, 
it has been shown that M&A is a (very) possible solution for both industries. The 
last two sections have also clearly demonstrated that both industries mutually 
depend on each other. One could even say that they live in some kind of 
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symbiosis in which one part merely can survive without the other. This section 
tries to combine the findings of the two last sections. To start with, Figure 12 
shows potential future scenarios for R&D in the pharmaceutical industry. From 
this the interconnection between the two industries becomes, again, absolutely 
clear. 
Figure 12: Potential developments of the interplay between biotechnology and  
         pharmaceutical companies  
Obviously, not only pharmaceutical companies are forced to act but also 
biotechnology companies face the need to act in order to ensure their future 
survival. Thus, possible reasons/motives for merger and acquisition activities in 
the biotechnology sector as they appear in the literature are collected as follows 
(Arnold, Grindley & Smart, 1999; Webber, 1999): 
• IPOs become more and more difficult, because the window of IPO 
financing has been shut for the last years. 
• High-profile clinical trial failures or difficulties are making investors 
wary of limited pipeline companies. 
• Some venture capitalists are simply not ready to wait any longer to cash 
in their investment. 
Source: Drews (1998a), p. 264
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• On the sell side, there is a drive toward bigger investment banks, which 
is not only causing deal size to increase, but also making smaller 
capitalized stock less attractive. 
• On the buy side, the ballooning of the average size of mutual funds in 
recent years means that many biotech market capitalizations and stock 
floats are too tiny for portfolio manager to consider. 
•  Too many biotech stocks have greatly underperformed. 
• There is a great number of young biotech companies who desperately 
need money. 
• There is a necessity to increase market capitalization in order to gain 
access to new investors. 
• From the point of view of pharmaceutical companies there may be 
economies of scale and the possibility to exploit hidden values. 
• The creation of a new product pipeline is considered as a possible  
explanation for consolidation activities in the biotech sector. 
• The access to products and sales distribution channels is another very 
good reason for consolidation. 
• Through M&A activities a completion of the existing intellectual 
property portfolio may be reached. 
• The acquisition of manufacturing facilities and expertise may occur. 
• Moreover, patent expiration in the pharmaceutical industry will result 
in a dramatic drop in sales. 
• By internalizing a whole body of laboratory or product development 
capabilities, pharmaceutical companies try to overcome a lack of 
knowledge in a specific field or catching-up as late-entrants. In this 
context, biotechnology is seen as a competence-destroying technology 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Moreover, established firms are 
considered as being unable to create internally a research environment 
that fosters this kind of innovation and discovery necessary to survive 
in the long run (Powell & Brantley, 1992; Powell, 1993).  
All these elements appear to be in place for a major increase in M&A among 
biotechnology companies over the coming years. Having a closer look at the 
reasons for M&A activity in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry one 
can identify two fundamental reasons for their appearance: the first one steams 
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from financial necessities from the point of view of the biotechnology companies, 
which have to ensure their future survival, as well as the pharmaceutical 
companies, which need to make sure their high profitability margins. The second 
one is driven by the need to acquire knowledge in order to remain competitive in 
the future by having enough promising lead compounds as far as the point of 
view of the pharmaceutical companies is concerned. These two dimensions have 
also already been used to specify the target and buyer axe of the already 
introduced matrix in Section 2.1. The financing environment for biotechnology 
offerings was not robust in the last years and most of the companies are only in 
early-stage development of products and will face significant challenges to stay 
solvent. Pharmaceutical companies can mostly acquire broad-based technologies, 
such as drug delivery, more inexpensively and quickly than they can build the 
technologies internally. All in all, these are the two dominant motives which 
determine M&A activity in these industries.21  
Major pharmaceutical companies have always had big interest in biotechnology 
companies, primarily to secure access to new technologies and products. 
However, these companies more commonly operated through licensing 
agreements rather than outright takeovers. Just to give a brief example, Glaxo 
Wellcome has entered into a number of collaborations agreements with 
biotechnology companies, but has made no major biotech acquisition since its 
$538 million purchase of Affymax in 1995. One of the reason for such a behavior 
has probably been the over-inflated valuations attached to biotechnology 
companies in the mid-1990s. In the meantime, these valuations have been 
adjusted downwards, making acquisitions more attractive and cheaper. 
Consequently, large biotech acquisitions have multiplied in the last years. 
Pharmaceutical companies are now seeing the possibility to acquire broad-based 
technologies cheaper (1) than they could have done before and (2) than they can 
build internally. In accordance with this argumentation, the total valuations of 
mergers and acquisitions which involved biotechnology companies have 
increased steadily from $3.3 billion in 1997, over $8.9 billion in 1998 and $13.7 
                                              
21  In order to gain a deeper understanding of the integration process, the motives for the 
M&A activities have to be analyzed in a first step during the case analyses. These 
identified motives will later be confronted with the motives found in the M&A literature. 
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billion in 1999 up to $19.0 billion in 2000. Apart from that, the average valuation 
attached to the acquisition of a biotechnology company has also increased from 
$129 million in 1998 over $191 million in 1999 up to $202 million in 2000 
(Goldman Sachs, 2000 & 2001). The following Figure 13 summarizes the 
development of valuations of mergers and acquisitions that involved 
biotechnology companies during the last years. 
Figure 13: Valuations of mergers and acquisitions involving biotechnology  
 companies 
Moreover, of course not only the valuation of M&A activities has increased, 
there is also a considerable and steady rise in the total number of M&A activities 
between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies as well as between 
biotechnology companies themselves, as it is shown in Figure 14. In 2000, there 
were 136 mergers and acquisitions, up 31% from 1999 and 62% higher than 
1998. On the one hand, approximately 22 of the M&A activities involved 
pharmaceutical or chemical companies, versus 34 in 1999 and 20 in 1998. On the 
other hand, the M&A activity among biotechnology companies is increasing 
steadily, with 114 in 2000, 70 mergers and acquisitions in 1999, and 64 in 1998. 
This trend of increased M&A activities among biotechnology companies reflects 
the increasing financial strength of some big biotechnology companies, especially 
with its record high valuation in 1999-2000. Apart from that, the financial 
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markets have currently been rather weak for biotechnology offerings, which 
severely restricted the financing options for early public companies or privately 
held companies. Nevertheless, companies that managed to raise capital in 1999 
and 2000 – as some of the major biotechnology players did – are relatively rich in 
cash and, therefore, are well positioned to acquire other companies. 
Figure 14: M&A activities in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry  
Basically, we have two layers of M&A activity: first of all, the pharmaceutical 
industry itself – as already depicted in Figure 8 – is going through merger mania, 
and, second, consolidation activity in the biotechnology industry takes place. The 
latter one can be distinguished in biotech-to-biotech and pharma-to-biotech M&A 
activity. The following three tables provide an overview of the major 
biotechnology acquisitions valued at more than $100 million in 1998, 1999 and 
2000 either in a biotech-to-biotech or in a pharma-to-biotech deal. 
4
21
10
31
20
43
17
56
20
64
34
70
22
114
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Biotech-Pharmaceutical/Chemical Biotech-Biotech
N
um
be
r 
of
 M
er
ge
rs
 &
 A
cq
ui
si
tio
ns
Source: Goldman Sachs (2000)
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
65
In 1998, the following 15 acquisitions were valued at over $100 million: 
Target Bidder Deal value  
in million $ 
Carnick Laborities Elan 150 
Chiron Diagnostics Bayer AG 1.100 
CN Biosciences Merck KGaA 150 
DeKalb Genetics Monsanto 2.300 
International Murex 
Technologies 
Abbott 234 
NanoSystems Elan 150 
Molecular Dynamics Amersham 
Pharmacia Biotech 
256 
Mycogen Dow 325 
Neurex Elan 700 
Penederm Mylan 205 
Molecular 
Simulations 
Pharmacopeia 140 
Sequus Alza 580 
Somatogen Baxter International 188 
TheraTech Watson 
Pharmaceuticals 
300 
 
Tseng Labs Cell Pathways 177 
Table 2: M&A deals valued more than $100 million in 1998 
             (Source: Author) 
The 16 biotechnology acquisitions valued at more than $100 million in 1999 (8 of 
which involved pharmaceutical or chemical partners) are the following: 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
66
 
Target Bidder Deal value  
in million $ 
Advanced Inhalation 
Research 
Alkermes 114  
Agouron Warner Lambert 2.100 
BioRad Laborities Sanofi Synthelabo 210 
Centocor Johnson & Johnson 4.900 
Chiroscience Celltech 535 
ClonTech Becton Dickinson 200 
Collagen Aesthetics Inamed 142 
Diatide Schering AG 130 
LeukoSite Millennium 
Pharmaceuticals 
635 
Medeva Celltech 
Chiroscience 
950 
NeXstar 
Pharmaceuticals 
Gilead Sciences 550 
North American 
Vaccine 
Baxter 390 
PE Corporation EG&G Wallace 425 
Research Genetics Invitrogen 160 
SUGEN Pharmacia & Upjohn 650 
U.S. Bioscience MedImmune 440 
Table 3: M&A deals valued more than $100 million in 1999 
             (Source: Author) 
In 2000, 23 acquisitions of biotechnology companies were valued at more than 
$100 million, up from 16 in 1999 and 15 in 1998. Furthermore, eight of the 
mergers and acquisitions in 2000 exceeded $500 million, versus seven in 1999 
and four in 1998. 
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Target Bidder Deal value  
in million $ 
ADL Matritech 200 
Anesta Cephalon 444 
Biochem Pharma Shire 4.000 
Biomatrix Genzyme 245 
Bradford Particle 
Design 
Inhale Therapeutics 200 
Catalytica DSM 800 
Celtrix Insmed 140 
Coulter  Corixa 570 
DJ Pharma Biovail 163 
Dura Elan 1.800 
GelTex Genzyme 1.000 
GSI Luminomics Packard Biosciences 120 
Kinetix Amgen 170 
Life Technologies/ 
Dexter Corporation 
Invitrogen 1.900 
LJL BioSystems Molecular Devices 263 
Mallinckrodt Tyco 4.200 
NEN Life Science Perkin Elmer 400 
Operon Qiagen 110 
Oxford Asymmetry Evotec 475 
Pathogenesis Chiron 700 
Principa Human Genome 
Sciences 
120 
Signal Celgene 200 
STC Technologies Epitope 200 
Table 4: M&A deals valued more than $100 million in 2000 
              (Source: Author) 
In recent years, pharmaceutical companies have conceded the need to maintain 
earnings growth through product line expansion as opposed to an increase in drug 
prices. This has put an almost unbearable burden on internal R&D. Thus, 
pharmaceutical companies have had to gain access to novel drugs and 
technologies coming out of biotechnology companies. Although the majority of 
the interplay will take the form of collaborations ranging from R&D agreements 
to joint ventures, acquisitions have become a more attractive alternative.  
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Although the focus of this study is put on pharma-to-biotech deals, it seems 
reasonable to make some remarks about the relationship between mergers and 
acquisitions, on the one hand, and the overall development of strategic alliances, 
on the other hand, in which the role of mergers and acquisition becomes 
increasingly important. In 2000, there was a record of 933 alliances. The number 
of alliances in biotechnology has increased rapidly from 1993 to 1997, and 
peaked in 1998, as shown in Figure 15. In 1999, there were 720 alliances which 
represented a decline from 802 alliances in 1998. This decline was caused by two 
major reasons: (1) consolidation in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industry has led to fewer potential partners, and (2) there is also an increase in 
size and scope of the alliances. The resurgence in the number of alliances was 
due to the more than 100 public biotech companies formed in 1999 and 2000. 
Apart from that, the pharmaceutical companies remain the most significant 
sponsors of biotechnology companies. However, the number of inter-
biotechnology alliances has increased as well, and some of the biotechnology 
companies even acquire product rights from pharmaceutical companies in a 
reverse transfer deal.  
Figure 15: New Alliances between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
Having a closer look at the geographical distribution of pharmaceutical partners 
for biotechnology companies, there are both, U.S. and European pharmaceutical 
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companies that are active in establishing alliances with biotechnology companies. 
In fact, all major pharmaceutical companies have alliances with biotechnology 
companies. In this context, the U.S. pharmaceutical companies are still the 
dominant partners, accounting for 52% of all pharmaceutical-biotech alliances in 
2000, up from 49% in 1999 and 46% in 1998. The percentage of European 
partners stayed essentially flat. Moreover, the percentage of Asian partners is also 
steady at 9%. The following Figure 16 gives an overview of the development of 
the geographic distribution, differentiated according to the U.S., Europe and 
Japan. 
Figure 16: Geographic distribution of pharmaceutical partners for biotechnology  
                 companies 
Having seen that the overall number of strategic alliances has increased and that 
pharmaceutical companies are still the dominant sponsor and partner of 
biotechnology companies, it is now necessary to analyze which part of the 
strategic alliances took place in the form of mergers and acquisitions. In this 
context, mergers and acquisitions are considered as part of strategic alliances.  
This also follows the classification of Greis, Dibner & Bean (1996). Figure 17 
shows that the number of M&A activity – as part of strategic alliances – has 
increased steadily, implying that the industry is gradually consolidating and that 
the importance of mergers and acquisitions increases as well. 
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Figure 17: Gradual consolidation of the biotechnology industry through increased  
                 M&A activities 
The analysis of the development of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industry in the sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 has already come to the conclusion that 
both industries will notice a significant and continuous increase in M&A activity. 
After that, section 3.1.3 has tried to support and prove this argumentation by 
analyzing this development from an empirical perspective by highlighting major 
M&A activities between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies as well as 
among biotechnology companies. Apart from that, the development of the M&A 
activities has also been confronted with other forms of collaborations in order to 
show the increasing importance of M&A. Thus, this analysis has made clear that 
there is an increase in the number of M&A activities between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that – up to now 
– there has not been that much of M&A activity in this sector than could perhaps 
be expected. Instead, biotech companies try to form a lot of alliances with many 
different pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies – as shown in the figures 
before – in order to ensure their survival. But, when the contribution of a biotech 
company to the success of the pharmaceutical company becomes more and more 
crucial – as the development in Figure 12 indicates – it is obvious that big 
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pharmaceutical companies will try to internalize this knowledge by acquiring this 
specific biotechnology company. And when this takes place, it is very important 
for the pharmaceutical company to ensure a smooth organizational integration of 
the biotechnology company in order not to endanger their innovative capability 
and the loss of their key knowledge holders. 
The following section turns to the description and analyses of the different M&A 
and subsequent post-acquisition integration activities of the cases mentioned in 
Table 1. It is hoped that the analysis of the M&A activities in this section serves 
as a useful background for the rich understanding of the cases, but has also made 
clear why M&A deals between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are 
worthwhile analyzing. 
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3.2 The case of Pharmacia Corp. – SUGEN, Inc. 
The objective of this case is to describe the post-acquisition integration activities 
of Sugen, Inc. into the organizational structure of Pharmacia Corp. First, a brief 
general corporate profile of Pharmacia as well as of Sugen will be presented. 
Second, the case will focus on describing the integration and collaboration 
activities between Pharmacia and Sugen, and finally the within-case analysis will 
be carried out.22 
Corporate profiles 
Pharmacia Corp., listed at the New York Stock Exchange, is a leading global 
pharmaceutical company created through the merger of Pharmacia & Upjohn 
with Monsanto, under the direction of its 1997 appointed CEO Fred Hassan. The 
roots of Pharmacia date back almost one hundred and fifty years to 1853, when a 
leading Italian pharmacist, Carlo Ebra, started his own company, which later 
became Farmaitalia Carlo Ebra and was united with Kabi Pharmacia in 1931. 
These two companies along with Pharmacia Aktiebolag, a Swedish-based 
company and a main part of Pharmacia & Upjohn, form the three main points of 
origin for Pharmacia AB. The Upjohn Company began in 1886 when W.E. 
Upjohn established The Upjohn Pill and Granule Company of Kalamazoo in 
Michigan. In November 1995, Pharmacia & Upjohn was formed through the 
merger of Pharmacia AB and The Upjohn Company. After the successful 
completion of this post-merger-integration process, which was characterized by 
cultural conflicts between the company’s Swedish, Italian, and American 
components, profit warnings as well as a drop in share price, Pharmacia headed 
towards its next merger with Monsanto. Monsanto was formed in 1901, when a 
                                              
22  This case study draws on an exploratory conversation with Dr. Hans Melbinger (Former 
head of Pharmacia & Upjohn Germany) and on a transcribed interview with Dr. Peter 
Hirth (Former CEO of SUGEN, Inc.). The appendix includes an overview of the 
affiliations and job titles of all interviewees. Furthermore, this case is based on annual 
reports, public speeches, press releases by all companies named herein, the biotechnology 
information service Recombinant Capital (http://www.recap.com) as well as analysts’ 
reports. 
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high-school drop-out and entrepreneur, John F. Queeny, founded the company in 
St. Louis and began producing saccharin, an artificial sweetener. 
For the later within-case analysis it seems reasonable and is indeed necessary to 
make some remarks about the different deals, their problems and their subsequent 
integration processes, because this also explains some of the rationale behind the 
acquisition of Sugen. On the one hand, Upjohn was a rather mid-sized company 
that had some promising tools, but had suffered a prolonged period of poor 
productivity in its R&D. Furthermore, all processes from R&D over Marketing 
and Sales did not work together well. On the other hand, Pharmacia was some 
kind of collection of small Europe-focused boutiques with regional marketers of 
products focused on specialty customers and little research. This situation forced 
both companies to act and to become a strong player in the U.S. Because 
Pharmacia & Upjohn regards the U.S. market as the key market of the 
pharmaceutical industry or as Hassan said “the center of gravity in the 
pharmaceutical business”, it moved its headquarter from London to Peapack, 
New Jersey – while maintaining its strength in Europe. Fred Hassan was the 
central figure for the successful integration and can really be considered as an 
active integration manager who scheduled many time-consuming one-on-one 
meetings with managers from Pharmacia & Upjohn around the globe. In addition 
to that, he centralized and streamlined the organization. Pharmacia & Upjohn 
considered itself as being a globally networked company, which is one that has a 
global attitude, a kind of cross-functional, boundary-less behavior, shares 
information and works seamlessly across geographical regions. The 
organizational integration involved a high degree of interdependence which is 
required to create the expected value but has low needs for organizational 
autonomy. Integration in the case of Pharmacia & Upjohn implied, over time, a 
full consolidation of the operations, organizations, and culture of both 
organizations. The central idea behind this reorganization is expressed in the 
following Figure 18 at the example of the seamless product flow system of 
Pharmacia & Upjohn. This is a concept in which the whole organization is 
considered as being a product owner and the worldwide responsibility for R&D, 
Global Business Management and Global Pharmaceutical Operations lays in the 
hands of three executives, reporting directly to Hassan. 
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Figure 18: The seamless product flow system of Pharmacia  
The merger between Pharmacia & Upjohn and Monsanto that resulted in the 
formation of Pharmacia Corporation was announced in December 1999 and 
finally completed on March 31st, 2000. The company estimates the total merger 
and restructuring costs at approximately $2.0 to 2.5 billion for a period of three 
years. The complimentary drug portfolio of both companies reduces Monsanto’s 
reliance on Celebrex by adding several new therapeutic areas, and increases 
Pharmacia & Upjohn’s exposure to new growth products, primarily Celebrex. 
Pharmacia & Upjohn has a broad international presence, while Monsanto derives 
the majority of its pharmaceutical sales from the U.S. Moreover, there are 
potential synergies in the area of marketing and sales as Pharmacia & Upjohn and 
Monsanto only have one key growth product (Detrol and Celebrex, respectively) 
for primary care physicians. The combined company has indicated it would have 
a R&D budget of more than $2 billion, representing approximately 19% of 
pharmaceutical sales, which is ahead of the average of the industry, estimated at 
16%. Furthermore, from the point of view of Monsanto the major benefits are an 
immediate Earnings per Share accretion for their shareholders, a near-term 
segregation of their agricultural business, an opportunity for overhead reduction, 
a stronger balance sheet, and, especially, a strengthening of their drug business. 
Monsanto provides Pharmacia & Upjohn with vast genetic research capabilities 
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and especially with more exposure to the U.S. market, which is perfectly in line 
with Pharmacia & Upjohn’s geographic strategy. During the integration process 
with Monsanto Hassan also scheduled a lot of one-on-one meetings with 
Monsanto employees and came up with two ‘Hate-to-Loose Lists’ for the most 
valued executives from both companies. The integration process was organized in 
the way that the two organizations first coexisted and then became increasingly 
interdependent. 
As a result of these M&A activities Pharmacia has become one of the world’s 
fastest-growing pharmaceutical company, with a strong portfolio of products, one 
of the best patent positions in the industry, and a robust pipeline.23 Pharmacia’s 
cuttings-edge research and development organization, with more than $2 billion 
spent on pharmaceutical R&D in fiscal 2000, representing 18.5% of total sales in 
the pharmaceutical segment of $12 billion, is responsible for an ever-increasing 
portfolio of new therapeutic compounds and medicines. At the same time, 
Pharmacia has become a leader in its ability to forge strategic partnerships, 
enhancing its research and development activities, and strengthening its products 
offerings. E.g., Pharmacia has established more than 100 R&D collaborations 
(alliances and partnerships) with external biotechnology partners worldwide. In 
fiscal 2000 the company reported with more than 59,000 employees worldwide 
total sales of $18 billion, of which 58% are attributable to North America, 20% to 
Europe/Africa, 12% to Asia/Pacific and 10% to Latin America. The company 
operates in three main business segments: Prescription Pharmaceuticals 
(including primary care, hospital care, cancer care, ophthalmology, endocrine 
care), Other Pharma Business (consisting of consumer healthcare, animal health, 
pharmaceutical commercial cervices, diagnostics) and the Monsanto Company 
(agricultural productivity, seed and genomics). Although the acquisition of Sugen 
was initiated and carried out by Pharmacia & Upjohn before merging with 
Monsanto, the name Pharmacia as well as Pharmacia & Upjohn will be used 
                                              
23  Pharmacia’s current strength reflects the exceptional success of recent product 
introductions, such as Celebrex (osteoarthritis, adult rheumatoid arthritis, familial 
adenomatous polyposis), Xalatan (open-angle glaucoma) and Detrol (overactive bladder). 
But also, near and long term projects, including e.g. Axert (migraine), Parecoxib (pain), 
Valdecoxib (arthritis and pain) and Camptosar (lung cancer), will drive growth in the 
future. A detailed overview and evaluation of Pharmacia’s pipeline can be found in Smith 
(2001). 
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synonymously during the case discussion, as Pharmacia is the actual name of the 
company and the integration process also overlaps. 
Sugen, Inc., headquartered in San Francisco, CA, was founded in July 1991 by 
International Technology Investment Managers and grew out of a research 
collaboration between the New York University Medical Center and the Max-
Planck-Institute for Biochemistry in Munich. The company’s research and 
development efforts are based upon the pioneering accomplishments of the 
company’s founding scientists, Dr. Axel Ullrich of the Max-Planck-Institute for 
Biochemistry in Munich and Dr. Joseph Schlessinger of New York University 
School of Medicine. Their initials also make up the ‘S’ and ‘U’ in Sugen. The 
company is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the discovery and 
development of small molecule drugs which target specific cellular signal 
transduction pathways. These signaling pathways are regulated by cell surface 
receptors. Focusing on this critical cellular process, Sugen employs an integrated 
array of drug discovery and development technologies to create a broad pipeline 
of novel pharmaceuticals to fight cancer and other illnesses. The company has 
used its understanding of the systems that regulate cell metabolism – in particular 
growth receptor tyrosine kineases (RTKs) and the receptor tyrosine phosphatases 
(RTPs) – to develop a number of products that may inhibit angiogenesis and halt 
tumor growth. 
Before the takeover, Sugen was pursuing two business strategies for the 
commercialization of its products and technologies. In the cancer field, the 
company intended to build a vertically integrated oncology business in North 
America, with the objective of bringing to market a family of target-specific 
signal transduction inhibitors. Because of this, Sugen had also formed an 
European affiliate in Schaffhausen, Switzerland, in order to build a strong and 
profitable cancer business in Europe. Nevertheless, the company has also entered 
into collaborative agreements with different corporate partners such as Taiho 
Pharmaceutical Ltd., ASTA Medica AG, or Zeneca Ltd. Outside of oncology, the 
company’s strategy was to seek corporate collaborations or joint ventures to 
which Sugen contributed validated targets, screening technologies and drug leads 
while the partner provided the disease-specific and drug development expertise as 
well as marketing experience. As part of this strategy, Sugen entered into a 
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collaboration with Vision Pharmaceutical, L.P., an affiliate of Allergan, Inc., 
Allergan, Inc., itself as well as ProChon Biotech Ltd. 
3.2.1 Case description 
Acquisition process and motives 
On June 15, 1999, Pharmacia & Upjohn and Sugen announced the signing of an 
agreement under which Pharmacia & Upjohn would acquire complete ownership 
of Sugen with its 210 employees. This first biotechnology acquisition of 
Pharmacia & Upjohn since its formation in 1995 was finally completed on 
August 31st, 1999, and called for the exchange of approximately 12 million shares 
of Pharmacia stock for all outstanding common stock of Sugen. Each share of 
Sugen common stock was exchanged for 0.7248 of one share of Pharmacia 
common stock.24 In addition, terms of outstanding Sugen stock options, stock 
warrants, convertible debt, and warrants on convertible debt were changed to 
convert Sugen shares into Pharmacia shares using the same exchange ratio. The 
transaction was valued at $650 million on a net basis.25 In connection with the 
acquisition of Sugen, Pharmacia reported approximately $70 million in merger 
and restructuring expenses. 
Pharmacia’s decision to acquire Sugen can be put down to several motives. Some 
of the reasons why Pharmacia acquired Sugen are summarized in the following 
statement of Göran Ando, Pharmacia’s Executive Vice President & President for 
Research and Development (Sugen, Inc., 1999, p. 2): 
                                              
24  These are the official exchange ratios reported according to the notice of annual meeting of 
stockholders of June 23, 2000 – subsequent to the merger between Pharmacia & Upjohn 
and Monsanto. In the terms of the original agreement – prior to the merger between 
Pharmacia & Upjohn and Monsanto – it was agreed that each share of Sugen common 
stock was to be converted into 0.6091 of a share of Pharmacia & Upjohn common stock. 
The exchange ratio was based on the volume-weighted average trading prices of Pharmacia 
& Upjohn common stock from July 30, 1999 through August 26, 1999. 
25  From the point of view of Pharmacia, the timing of the acquisition was fairly good, 
because the valuations attached to biotech companies at that particular time were low. This 
means that Pharmacia could acquire Sugen relatively cheaply. 
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“Sugen’s outstanding team of scientists has built a substantial technology 
platform including an impressive intellectual property portfolio, state-of-the-art 
genomics and bioinformatics, a large portfolio of novel targets and novel 
chemistries and a growing pipeline of candidates that will add immediate value to 
our research and development program. Our respective research organizations 
have complementary strengths that provide us with an opportunity to achieve 
significant synergies to build competitive advantage.” 
This quotation reveals the first two major motives for the acquisition. In a first 
step, Pharmacia gained access to an interesting technology platform which could 
also be used in other therapeutic areas of Pharmacia such as dermatology or 
women’s health, which only had some development, but no research activities up 
to that point. The second major reason was Sugen’s promising pipeline with three 
compounds in clinical trials, two of them being already in Phase III trials.26 The 
third reason for the acquisition, the strengthening of Pharmacia’s competitive 
position in the oncology business segment, is reflected in the following statement 
of Fred Hassan, Chairman & CEO of Pharmacia, considering this acquisition also 
as a very valuable strategic move (Sugen, Inc., 1999, p. 1): 
“In addition to enhancing our genomics-based drug discovery capabilities, this 
acquisition strengthens our oncology portfolio by providing us with new 
therapeutic approaches to the treatment of cancer. With the addition of the 
cytostatic platform represented by Sugen, we position Pharmacia & Upjohn to 
become the new challenger in the oncology category. The acquisition of Sugen is 
yet another example of the new strategy to supplement our internal R&D 
initiatives with external innovation.” 
Furthermore, there is a fourth important motive for the acquisition concerning the 
overall growth strategy of the company which lays in the fact that the 
                                              
26  SU101, an inhibitor of the platelet-derived growth facto receptor signalling pathways, was 
Sugen’s most advanced product. The other two very interesting compounds were SU5416, 
an angiogenesis inhibitor, designed to inhibit the growth and spread of cancer, and 
SU6668, an anti-cancer drug candidate, blocking multiple targets involved in the growth 
and spread of tumors.  
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“Sugen acquisition is an important investment in sustaining P&U’s long-term 
growth. Our previously-stated goal of annual double-digit growth remains 
unchanged”. (Hassan; Sugen, Inc., 1999, p. 3) 
Having in mind that the valuation attached to biotech companies at that time was 
rather low it is worth asking why Sugen accepted the takeover bid. Before the 
acquisition the company’s principal sources of financing have been its initial and 
follow-on public offerings of common stock, placements of the company’s 
preferred and common stock and senior custom convertible notes, as well as 
funds received under the company’s corporate collaborations. The total amount 
of capital raised by venture capitalists, public offerings and private placements 
between September 1991 and March 1999 was about $1.9 billion. Despite all 
these sources of financing, Sugen was not able to cover the cost for the clinical 
trials. After the acquisition the financing and liquidity situation changed, which is 
also reflected in the following statement of Stephen Evans-Frake, the former 
Chairman and CEO of Sugen (Sugen, Inc., 1999, p. 2): 
“This agreement with Pharmacia and Upjohn provides Sugen with the resources, 
critical mass and global infrastructure to commercialize the cancer drug 
candidates in our pipeline far more rapidly than we could achieve on our own. It 
will also enable us to apply our unique capabilities to other important disease 
areas in which our efforts to date have been severely resource constrained 
because the hostile environment for financing made it difficult for us to remain 
independent.” 
Apart from the main reason that Sugen simply needed money in order to continue 
its clinical trials, as “the burn rate during our clinical trials was very high” 
(Hirth), they also wanted to bring to fruition what they had already achieved. 
Organizational integration 
After the acquisition it was decided that Sugen remained based at its headquarter 
in San Francisco. Moreover, Peter Hirth, Sugen’s Executive Vice President and 
Chairman R&D Committee, was appointed President of Sugen, because the 
former Chairman and CEO, Stephen Evans-Frake, decided to leave the company. 
The new President, Peter Hirth, reported directly to Göran Ando, Pharmacia’s 
Executive Vice President as well as President of Research and Development. In 
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the following short statement, Göran Ando emphasizes what the overall 
organizational integration of Sugen should look like (Madell & Koberstein, 1999, 
p. 23): 
“We will keep Sugen as an entity and continue with its identity.” 
This makes clear that Sugen should continue to function more or less as an 
independent company, which is also supported by the following quotation of 
Peter Hirth, who had to set this structure in place: 
“There was a clear commitment from Pharmacia to keep Sugen independently – as 
far as possible. They tried to keep up our identity, our name and so on. That’s also 
what we have realized for most of the parts. However, in the long run it is a 
completely other question, because again and again there will be the struggle for 
the same budget in the future and the same rules will apply for us as for the other 
parts within Pharmacia.” 
As far as the strategic integration was concerned, this was some kind of a 
“moving target” (Hirth) during the integration process: 
“At the very beginning, Sugen was totally removed from the strategy process. But, 
the more interactions occurred and the more resources were transferred to Sugen, 
the more involvement was necessary. Moreover, Sugen was integrated into a big 
group which has to take into account the overall interests of the company as well 
as the shareholders and, thus, has to align its strategy, with Sugen being part of 
it.” (Hirth) 
The strategy for the oncology business sector of Pharmacia was shaped by a 
special team in which a representative from Sugen was part of. This strategy was 
developed in close interaction with the Board of Pharmacia, especially with the 
President of Research and Development, Göran Ando. At the beginning, Sugen, 
i.e. the President of Sugen, Peter Hirth, reported directly to Göran Ando and was 
only responsible to him. After a certain time, some kind of dual reporting was 
introduced for late stage development in clinical trials, i.e., that also executives in 
the development area reported directly to their counterparts at Pharmacia. 
However, the information exchange between Peter Hirth and Göran Ando was 
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the dominant connection. The responsibility for Sugen, and along with that also 
the support, laid in the hands of the top management of Pharmacia. 
“I reported directly to Göran Ando and, by this, to the top of the company which 
also had the responsibility for Sugen.” (Hirth) 
In contrast to the overall strategic decisions made at the top of Pharmacia the day-
to-day operational responsibility clearly laid in the hands of Sugen. There was no 
involvement from Pharmacia concerning the way in which the business was run 
at Sugen.  
“It was possible to make local decisions with respect to the overall strategy 
developed at Pharmacia. And, as far as the day-to-day management was 
concerned the people at Sugen had a lot of freedom in which they could realize 
their own ideas. This also resulted in a feeling of independence, because decisions 
could be made locally. That was also something I spoke up for.” (Hirth) 
Within Sugen the reporting structure was not changed, which means that most of 
it was done to the executives of Sugen, who then communicated with their 
respective counterparts at Pharmacia, e.g. at a director-to-director level. Apart 
from that, the financing and controlling instruments at Sugen needed to be 
adjusted to the way these mechanisms did work at Pharmacia. These alignments 
did not affect any critical decision systems at Sugen. Furthermore, aspects such as 
e-mail-addresses or fire walls were standardized, and Sugen also received access 
to information systems, confidential databases as well as libraries provided by 
Pharmacia. Moreover, Sugen could make use of Pharmacia’s contacts to policies 
and health insurances. 
The day-to-day collaboration between the employees of Sugen and Pharmacia 
was organized on a project-base, which means that people worked together in 
project teams. In fact, there was no exchange in the sense that employees of 
Sugen went to a site of Pharmacia in order to work there or vice versa. 
“There was no exchange, there were rather teams coming together in order to 
work on a certain issue. But, an exchange that people from Pharmacia would have 
come to Sugen in a directing capacity, would not have been clever, because in 
most of the cases they would have been observed very critically.” (Hirth) 
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The exchange took place on the project level where different meetings and 
presentations were held. In addition, there is of course a big difference in the 
organizational structure of a small biotechnology company, on the one hand, and 
a big pharmaceutical company, on the other hand, as the following statement 
clearly points out: 
“There are differences between the organizations. In our organization at Sugen, 
we had no border between research and development. We had a target, we had a 
drug, and then we decided to go in clinical trials. There is no ever-lasting decision 
process. In a big company, you find a real handling over between research and 
development. Especially at Pharmacia, there have been several boxes and their 
performance was measured by how many balls have been thrown over the wall 
into the next box. But, nobody cared about the fact that no one caught the balls on 
the other side of the wall. This kind of mentality caused some problems in terms of 
communication and understanding. [...] Because Sugen managed its projects quite 
independently this had almost no repercussions. For some of us, it was evident, 
because we were in those committees and realized what happened. However, the 
average Sugen-employee was not affected by it.” (Hirth) 
This high degree of independence of Sugen is explained by the fact that the 
company was already far in Clinical Phase III and Pharmacia was aware of the 
fact that the know-how and competence for the final development was in Sugen. 
Hence, Sugen was granted the required degree of freedom to finish this project. 
Apart from that, during the integration process Peter Hirth also tried to ensure 
that a structure was set in place which makes it possible “to manage a project 
from A to Z locally without the interposition of any decision-making-bodies” 
(Hirth). After the development has been finished, Sales and Marketing will be 
taken over by Pharmacia. The rationale behind this is shown clearly in the 
following statement of Göran Ando, reflecting some of Pharmacia’s overall 
strategic thinking (Madell & Koberstein, 1999, p. 22): 
“The vast majority of our discovery are external investments. We access other 
companies’ competencies because science is moving so fast. To internalize all of it 
takes too long a time, is too expensive, and will never catch up. This is a much 
more efficient model. I think this will continue.” 
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Concerning the transfer of knowledge a distinction must be made between the 
day-to-day research of Sugen and the more elaborated products in clinical trials. 
The basic research remains with Sugen and there is also no interference from the 
part of Pharmacia. After the acquisition a review process of all projects was done. 
During this process, which was carried out between both parties in a common 
effort and common agreement, a few projects were completely cancelled. Apart 
from that, it was decided that some of the projects and activities that concerned 
certain targets were terminated at Sugen and transferred to Pharmacia’s site in 
Italy. As a countermove, some projects from Italy were transferred to Sugen. 
“All projects that have been cancelled, have been cancelled with the agreement 
and support of Sugen. We had a lot of freedom in this context. There have also 
been a few projects in which we had to realize that it did not make any sense to 
work on targets at two different sites. Hence, some of the targets were moved to 
Italia and these activities had then been stopped at Sugen. Instead, other activities 
from Italy came to us.” (Hirth) 
In such a situation a certain knowledge transfer enabling the people at Pharmacia 
to use part of Sugen’s knowledge was necessary. The focus was more on specific 
genes and targets than on the technology platforms themselves. Moreover, the 
technology was also presented – but not transferred – to other business segments 
of Pharmacia. 
“Indeed, there have been activities carried out that enabled our colleagues at 
Pharmacia to use our technology, especially everything that concerned the genes 
and the targets. All of this was catalyzed by certain project meetings, 
presentations and discussions. The specific focus was put on kineases. [...] There 
have been educational sessions as well as the supply of chemistry, chemical 
processes, databanks,... But, most of that was also done by the project teams.” 
(Hirth) 
From the point of view of Pharmacia, the decision about the knowledge transfer 
was directed by the following rationale: 
“We put together a small group of discovery scientists from all sides and said to 
them, ’Go away and think this through very carefully: What do we have in-house? 
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What do we need in-house? What do we need to access but don’t need in-house?’” 
(Göran Ando; Madell & Koberstein, 1999, p. 22) 
From a cultural perspective there is one major aspect resulting from Pharmacia’s 
history that had an impact on the integration. The company Pharmacia resulted 
from the merger of Pharmacia AB of Sweden having acquired the Italian 
company Farmaitalia, The Upjohn Company and Monsanto, both of U.S.-origin. 
Already the first integration process between Pharmacia and Upjohn was 
characterized by severe cultural conflicts between the company’s Swedish, Italian 
and American components. It took Fred Hassan a lot of time and effort in order to 
get over these cultural differences and to make the different parts of the company 
work together effectively. Because of these experiences he was aware of the fact 
that whatever kind of cultural gap exists between Pharmacia and Sugen it needs 
to be handled very carefully. 
“Of course, there are big cultural differences, which are already embedded in 
Pharmacia’s history. Pharmacia & Upjohn which had acquired Sugen was created 
by the merger between Pharmacia of Sweden and Upjohn of the U.S. – each of 
them having very different cultures. Moreover Pharmacia had bought Farmaitalia, 
leading to a combination of Swedish, Italian and American components. This had 
caused some challenges. And then, Sugen on the top of that, which was in some 
way even far more away from any of them – that was not easy.” (Hirth) 
The question is now what the particular differences between Pharmacia as a big 
integrated group and a small biotech company like Sugen are. Part of the answer 
is given in the following statement by Peter Hirth: 
“People coming to Sugen have a completely different mentality. They know that 
there is no job security and that there are high risks involved in terms of running 
out of money or failures. There is always an inherent risk of being taken over. 
People at Sugen must accept this high-risk proposition and also be able to live 
with it. They have also a different relationship to authority because they are more 
‘rebellious’, are questioning authority and are always saying what they are 
thinking. They are also more focused on innovation. In fact, you cannot really 
compare those cultures. Either you keep the culture as it is or it disappears 
automatically.” 
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Having this two extreme polar types in mind, it is necessary to think about 
possible consequences that might result from it. 
“There is of course the danger that – sooner or later – Sugen will loose the people 
with this specific risk profile. It is possible to accept it for a while, especially as 
long as your are granted a certain autonomy, but then one has to realize that it is 
no longer the same as it is used to be.” (Hirth) 
The acquisition of Sugen resulted in a significant increase in fluctuation, although 
the normal annual fluctuation in biotech companies located in the Bay Area had 
already been between 15 and 18%. Hence, Peter Hirth had the task to ensure that 
as many employees as possible stayed with the company. In order to realize this, 
they were offered a better employee’s total compensation package including e.g. 
an increase in their salary, pension plans, or profit sharing/bonus programs. 
Furthermore, special incentive plans were introduced for people who remained 
longer than two years in the company. E.g., all regular full-time employees are 
eligible for long term service awards. After two years of service they receive 
$5,000, after three years $7,500, after four years $10,000, after five years $12,500 
and after six or more years they receive $15,000. 
“It was my duty to make most of them stay because the value of the company is in 
the people. We made a lot of things such as increased salaries, more benefits, 
bonuses and so on. However, money is not the crucial factor to keep somebody in 
its position – that is something I had to learn. The micro-environment is more 
important as well as the fact of how the position has a positive impact on the 
further personal development or not. In the end, it turned out, that a lot of people 
left.” (Hirth) 
Apart from that, some of the employees also left because of the missing stock 
options. As the average age of people at Sugen was about 28 years, they were not 
yet interested in the pension packages offered – instead, they would have 
preferred to receive stock options. In addition, the top management of Sugen also 
left, e.g. with the closing of the deal, Stephen Evans-Frake, Chairman and CEO 
of Sugen, left and Peter Hirth became President of Sugen. Having completed the 
successful integration of Sugen into Pharmacia after one year, he also decided to 
leave the company in order to start and run a business on its own. 
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“I do not think that Pharmacia is not a good company. However, from my point of 
view there are other things that I personally find much more attractive to do. I 
rather prefer creating and innovating instead of just administering things. That is 
also something people at Pharmacia understand and accept. I left Sugen with a 
very good relationship to Pharmacia and I am still in contact with them.” (Hirth) 
The acquisition of Sugen by Pharmacia provided the acquired company with 
much more opportunities in terms of resources and also gave the company a 
greater stability. The employees could be sure to receive their salary each month 
and some of the employees also considered the pension plans attractive. 
Additionally, the management could take care of other things like e.g. 
establishing stable interaction mechanisms between middle and top management 
or creating business development plans. These are things that had never been 
possible as long as they had been an independent, publicly-traded biotechnology 
company with no time left. Moreover, the scientists received a stable environment 
in which they could continue to do what they always did, research, now even with 
more resources and a better job security. 
“For most of the scientists it is not money that really matters, it is fame and 
glory.” (Hirth) 
Organization of the integration process 
After the conclusion of the deal Peter Hirth was appointed President of Sugen 
and, by this, became responsible for the organization of the integration process 
from the point of view of Sugen. His counterpart at Pharmacia was Göran Ando, 
Pharmacia’s Executive Vice President & President for Research and 
Development. Apart from that, Fred Hassan, Chairman & CEO of Pharmacia, 
was also involved in the integration process and participated regularly in the 
respective meetings. Furthermore, a merger integration team with regular 
meetings every two months was created. This team comprised the top R&D-
people from both companies. In this context, it is worth mentioning that this 
integration needed to “cover a lot of different areas, because Sugen was at that 
point already in the middle of Clinical Phase III” (Hirth). Hence, they did not put 
one single integration manager in charge of it, but an integration team. The 
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following statement gives an impression of the organization of the integration 
process: 
“The integration was carried out under the supervision and the support of Göran 
Ando. The CEO of Pharmacia, Fred Hassan, was also involved. Both of them were 
regularly at Sugen and worked with us. The merger integration team consisted of 
the top executives of R&D from Sugen and Pharmacia. The process itself was 
completely managed in a bilateral way, there was no dominance from either side.” 
(Hirth) 
The integration process itself was not supported by outside consultants, because 
the management at Sugen expected that an internal solution and management of 
the integration process would of course be a little bit slower and somehow more 
painful, but it would definitely contribute to a more stable structure in the long 
run. 
Communication in order to support the integration process played an important 
role. Every week a Lunch-Meeting took place where the people of Sugen were 
informed about the current state of the integration process as well as the 
negotiations about the exchange ratio of their stocks. Furthermore, executives 
from Pharmacia made some presentations in order to inform all of Sugen’s 
employees during general meetings. Hirth also introduced some activities to 
strengthen the common spirit among the people at Sugen. E.g., he brought in 
external persons who reported over the merger between Sugen and Pharmacia 
from their point of view or patients using the drugs developed at Sugen. 
An overall evaluation of this deal between Sugen and Pharmacia can be found in 
the following statement: 
“In the end, I think that it was a good deal for everybody. Such deals are not made 
between companies, they are made between people. Such deals do not produce 
innovation, they only serve as growth drivers. The intellectual capital in terms of 
people emigrates, because it needs its own freedom and wants to earn money. 
Because of this, one should keep biotech as it is, biotech. Innovations emerge there 
and not within big pharma. All of this has also an entrepreneurial element, which 
fosters innovation. With such a deal, know-how can only be acquired.” (Hirth) 
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3.2.2 Within-case analysis 
This section is devoted to the analysis of the case described in the section before, 
the organizational integration of Sugen into the organizational structure of 
Pharmacia & Upjohn respectively Pharmacia Corp. – subsequent to the merger 
between Pharmacia & Upjohn with Monsanto. 
The case description identified four major motives which made Pharmacia 
acquire Sugen: (1) gaining access to Sugen’s technology platform, (2) Sugen’s 
interesting pipeline, (3) strengthening of Pharmacia’s position in the oncology 
business, and (4) supporting the growth strategy of Pharmacia. Remembering that 
a poor period of productivity in R&D was one of the immediate and major 
reasons for the merger between Pharmacia and Upjohn, it becomes clear that the 
first two identified motives can also be attributed to this reason. With the 
acquisition of Sugen, Pharmacia made an important progress in improving its 
R&D and in filling its Phase I/II gap that characterized the company as Sugen 
has, on the one hand, a highly innovative technology platform that can deliver a 
wide range of protein-kinase-based discovery targets and, on the other hand, it 
allows the immediate access to potential blockbusters. Hence, this acquisition 
contributes to a short-term improvement of Pharmacia’s revenue and earnings 
situation. The other two motives – strengthening of the oncology business and 
sustaining Pharmacia’s growth strategy – are rather long-term orientated as they 
focus on the overall strategic alignment of the company. This is also supported by 
the fact that Pharmacia considers the U.S. market as being the most important 
pharmaceutical market in the world. Thus, the acquisition of Sugen strengthens 
its position and presence in this market.  
Apart from that, one statement of Göran Ando revealed that such an acquisition 
can also be regarded as some kind of “external investment” (Madell & 
Koberstein, 1999, p. 22) in order to gain access to the knowledge and 
competencies embedded in such biotechnology companies. Hence, this 
acquisition was part of the overall long-term orientated strategy of Pharmacia and 
clearly supports the further growth of the company. Considering the acquisition 
and the subsequent integration process as a simple investment, the question 
comes up whether this investment pays off or not. From the point of view of 
Sugen, the dominant motive leading to an acceptance of the takeover bid was the 
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lack of financial resources in order to bring their clinical trials to an end and the 
dim financing environment at that time, which made it almost impossible for 
Sugen to raise money in the stock market. 
The analysis of the organizational integration will be done by investigating how 
the important integration topics of organizational/structural integration, 
knowledge/competence integration and transfer, cultural integration as well as 
personnel integration have been realized. The dominant organizational integration 
strategy was to grant Sugen as much autonomy and independence as possible. 
This is also reflected in the fact that Sugen kept its name, its headquarter in San 
Francisco and was also to keep its identity. When having a closer look at the 
combination of the various organizational elements between the two 
organizations it becomes better obvious how this general directive has been set 
up. The overall strategic direction of the group is defined by Pharmacia and is of 
course also valid for Sugen. Consequently, there can be no real independence in 
this context. This means in terms of decision-making, that – although a 
representative of Sugen is part of the team that develops the strategy – the 
strategic decisions are made by Pharmacia under the supervision of Göran Ando. 
Once the strategy is defined, Sugen is granted complete freedom in terms of 
operational decision-making, i.e. during the day-to-day management of the 
company. Thus, as far as the strategic direction is concerned there is a clear split 
in the autonomy, on the one hand, and the operational management of the 
business, on the other hand. Apart from that, the President of Sugen, Peter Hirth, 
reports directly to the President of Research and Development at Pharmacia, 
Göran Ando.  
The financing and controlling mechanisms as well as some basic information 
technology were also adjusted according to the requirements of the systems being 
in place at Pharmacia. The day-to-day collaboration between people from Sugen 
and Pharmacia was more or less on a project-base in which Pharmacia tried to 
support Sugen in carrying out its late-stage clinical trials. As the clinical trials had 
already been far advanced at Sugen, it was decided that they should finish them. 
After that, Pharmacia was supposed to take over the responsibility for Sales and 
Marketing, because this is one of the core competencies of a big pharmaceutical 
company. Such a company has the necessary structure and organization in place 
in order to push very quickly a newly approved drug to the market. This shows 
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that Pharmacia has taken over the control and responsibility in that specific 
moment in which it perceived that it had greater competencies and resources in 
the respective field than Sugen. 
The same logic applies in the area of knowledge and know-how transfer as well. 
The knowledge transfer was more focused on the know-how of certain genes and 
targets, and not on the technology platforms themselves. This is also reflected in 
the fact that the development of certain targets was stopped at Sugen and was 
transferred to a site of Pharmacia in Italy, which in turn transferred a part of their 
targets to Sugen. The decision about the transfer was based on the competencies 
each respective site had. If additional knowledge was needed, it would be 
provided as well. Apart from that, most of the basic exchange of know-how took 
place during the work in the different project teams as well as in different 
meetings or presentations. This process is guided by three important questions 
raised by Göran Ando: “What do we have in-house? What do we need in-house? 
What do we need to access but don’t need in-house?” (Madell & Koberstein, 
1999, p. 22). Consequently, the knowledge of Sugen can be considered as being 
part of Pharmacia and, thus, does not need to be transferred completely to any 
other site. In addition, it is Sugen which has the know-how about these 
technologies and nobody else in the company. Hence, Sugen can provide the 
respective knowledge to any business segment or area of Pharmacia, if necessary, 
and, therefore, it can be considered as being a center of excellence within 
Pharmacia. 
As Pharmacia had undergone several mergers, it was aware of problems that 
might result out of cultural differences and, thus, paid a lot of attention to it by 
giving Sugen as much independence as possible. Hence, this cultural gap also 
explains a big part of the integration strategy applied by Pharmacia. The question 
is now what makes up this difference and what consequences arise. Besides the 
fact, that Sugen was a small, dynamic and highly-innovative biotechnology 
company with a complete different spirit and risk-attitude, there is also one other 
major aspect to consider. Before the acquisition, Sugen was a company with its 
own plans and visions. Originally, Sugen was committed to building a vertically 
integrated oncology business in North America with the objective of bringing to 
market a family of target-specific signal transduction inhibitors. This company 
was characterized by a high level of entrepreneurial spirit. It also attracted people 
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sharing the same goals, vision and spirit being able to identify themselves with 
the spirit and risks involved. After the acquisition, this vision, spirit and goals 
changed and Sugen became part of a larger corporation, leading to a fundamental 
change in its culture. The entrepreneurial spirit which had dominated the 
company before was no longer necessary. This bears also some consequences as 
the following statement reveals: 
“After the acquisition Sugen is part of a bigger ‘picture’ which it does no longer 
control itself. This is of course not a bad picture, but it is a quite different one. 
During the next years, there will be other people joining Sugen. This does not 
mean that these are ‘inferior’ people – that is definitely not true, they will just 
have other characters and qualities than the ones before.” (Hirth) 
This statement in combination with the paragraph before allows two major 
conclusions. First of all, the entrepreneurial spirit that existed in this company 
disappeared, because it was no longer considered necessary. After the acquisition, 
other qualifications and requirements play a more important role, because there is 
a clear shift in the company’s focus. The ultimate goal of the company Sugen is 
no longer to bring a drug to the market – its goal and main strategy, while being 
an independent company, instead, it is now aiming at doing research and 
development as part of a big pharmaceutical company while sales and marketing 
will be carried out by Pharmacia. Therefore, the further emphasis of Sugen will 
be put on doing good science and identifying promising compounds. Although 
Pharmacia has been aware of the cultural gap and has decided to preserve the 
autonomy and independence of Sugen as far as possible, this analysis reveals that 
this strategy cannot preserve the change in the company’s culture as well as the 
leaving of their entrepreneurial driven top management, which goes along with 
that.  
As already indicated in the paragraph above, the acquisition and the respective 
changing cultural environment lead to an increasing fluctuation, although Peter 
Hirth tried to convince as many employees as possible to stay in the company – 
keeping in mind that a normal annual fluctuation in a Bay Area biotech company 
is between 15 and 18%. Most of the top management left the company, even 
Peter Hirth decided to do so after having successfully completed the integration 
process due to the fact that he is driven by an entrepreneurial spirit striving for 
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new challenges and the creation of innovation. However, this is a process 
Pharmacia could not prevent from happening and, to some extent, had also 
expected. Another issue that made people leave was the missing of stock option 
programs after the acquisition, since people working at Sugen preferred to 
receive stock options instead of pension plans. Although Pharmacia has become a 
U.S. company, in which stock options are much more widespread than in 
European companies, it did not decide to offer stock options to everybody at 
Sugen. In order to make people stay they were offered increased salaries as well 
as interesting profit sharing or bonus programs. In contrast to this, some of the 
employees also appreciated the advantages Pharmacia could deliver such as job 
security or much more resources for research. Because of that, scientists were 
able to continue to do what they have always been doing, namely research – and 
even much better due to the access to the vast resources of Pharmacia. These 
people are not that much driven by an entrepreneurial spirit, their motivation 
rather stems from a spirit of discovery, which is also to become the new major 
driving force at Sugen. Confronting the reflections of this paragraph and the one 
before with the motives that Pharmacia made acquire Sugen, one can draw the 
conclusion that – despite the severe change in the culture and the fact that many 
employees left – the short-term (improving its R&D gap) as well as the long-term 
objectives (strengthening the oncology business and the presence in the U.S. 
market) of Pharmacia could be fulfilled. 
Apart from the analysis of the different integration topics, it is also necessary to 
briefly investigate the organization of the integration process itself. The overall 
responsibility for the integration process was taken over by Göran Ando, 
Pharmacia’s Executive Vice President & President for Research and 
Development. Furthermore, the Chairman and CEO of Pharmacia, Fred Hassan, 
was also involved in the integration process. There can be absolutely no doubt 
that the very top of the company was responsible for the acquisition and 
subsequent integration of Sugen. In fact, there could have been no better starting 
point. The integration process itself was not carried out by a single integration 
manager, instead by an integration team which was co-headed by Göran Ando 
and Peter Hirth. This team approach was chosen, because the integration covered 
nearly all steps of the pharmaceutical value chain with the exemption of Sales 
and Marketing. The latter steps were to be taken over by Pharmacia after the 
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respective drug has received its FDA approval. Apart from that, the integration 
process was managed without external consultants resulting in a slower, but at the 
same time also more stable integration process. Communication was also 
considered to be a pillar for the integration process as it was used to strengthen 
the corporate identity at Sugen and, by this, an attempt to make people stay. 
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3.3 The case of Merck KGaA – Lexigen Pharmaceuticals Corp. 
In this case the organizational integration activities of Merck’s acquisition of 
Boston-based Lexigen Pharmaceuticals Corp. will be described and analyzed. 
Firstly, a brief corporate profile of the two companies will be presented.27 
Secondly, the emphasis will be put on the integration activities, which is followed 
by the within-case analysis. 
Corporate profiles 
The roots of Merck KGaA reach back into the 17th century, when in 1668, 
Friedrich Jacob Merck purchased the ‘Engel-Apotheke’ in Darmstadt. In 1827 
Heinrich Emanuel Merck started with the large-scale production of alkaloids, 
followed by plant extracts and many other chemicals. At the end of the 19th 
century, Merck offered about 10,000 articles, exported in many countries and also 
founded subsidiaries throughout the world. In 1889, Georg Merck took over the 
office in New York and established Merck & Co., which started the local 
production of chemicals in the U.S. ten years later. After World War I, Merck lost 
many of its foreign affiliates, among them its U.S.-affiliate Merck & Co., which 
became an independent American company and in the meantime is one of the 
largest pharmaceutical companies in the world. Both companies agreed that the 
name ‘Merck’ is exclusively used in the U.S. and Canada by Merck & Co. and in 
Europe as well as in the rest of the world by Merck KGaA. In 1999, EMD 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. was founded by Merck KGaA in order to manage the North 
American pharmaceutical operations. In 1995, the legal form of Merck – until 
then managed as an OHG (open partnership) – was transformed into a KGaA 
(partnership limited by shares). The Merck Group’s operating activities are 
grouped under Merck KGaA, in which E. Merck holding the Merck family’s 
                                              
27  This case study draws on exploratory conversations with Dr. Fred Harms (Project Manager 
Pharma Project Management Oncology, Merck) and Dr. Sven Rohmann (Head of Pharma 
Project Management Oncology, Merck) as well as transcribed interviews with two 
executives from Lexigen Pharmaceuticals Corp., one of them being Dr. Knut Sturmhoefel 
(Project Manager) and the other interviewee referred to as Anonymous interviewee was 
granted anonymity. In addition to the two interviews, this case is based on annual reports, 
public speeches, press releases, the biotechnology information service Recombinant 
Capital (http://www.recap.com) as well as analysts’ reports. 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
95
equity interest in Merck KGaA is a general partner with a 74% stake, while the 
shareholders have a 26% stake in the company.  
Today, the Merck Group, still headquartered in Darmstadt, conducts its 
international business in four business sectors: Pharmaceuticals, Laboratory 
Products, Laboratory Distribution and Specialty Chemicals with sales of EURO 
6.7 billion in 2000. Merck is represented by 209 operating activities in 52 
countries and employs 33,000 people worldwide. 52% of its employees work in 
Europe, 30% in North and Latin America and 18% in Asia, Australia and Africa. 
In fiscal 2000 Merck reported an operating result of EURO 0.7 billion on sales of 
EURO 6.7 billion. Europe accounted for 38% on Sales, North and Latin America 
45% and Asia, Australia and Africa the remaining 17%. The following Figure 19 
provides a simplified overview of Merck’s organizational structure. 
Figure 19: Merck’s organizational structure  
Merck’s Pharmaceutical business sector consists of three main business 
segments: ethicals, generics and consumer health care. In the ethicals segment the 
different therapeutic areas are: cardiovascular, metabolism/diabetes, women’s 
health, central nervous system and especially cancer/oncology. Following a 
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strategic review of its pipeline, the group’s strategic focus in the pharmaceuticals 
business sector lays in cardiovascular diseases and metabolism/diabetes.28 
Moreover, Merck aims at gaining a leadership position in the field of oncology 
and at strengthening its position in the growth market of women’s health. The 
pharmaceuticals business sector invested EURO 453 million in the research and 
development of new drugs in 2000, which represents 16% of the total sales in this 
segment, and around 83% of the total R&D expenditures of the Merck Group. 
Sales in the pharmaceuticals business sector rose by 2% in 2000 to EURO 2,914 
million (previous year: EURO 2.8 billion), representing 43% of the Merck 
Group’s total sales.  
Lexigen Pharmaceuticals Corp. (formerly Fuji Immuno Pharmaceuticals Corp.) 
was founded in 1992 by Prof. Susumu Tonegawa, winner of the 1987 Nobel Prize 
for Medicine, and Harvard Professor Lan Bo Chen. The company is engaged in 
the development of drugs and genetically engineered products to treat cancer, 
immune system disorders and other disease. Apart from that, Lexigen develops a 
broad technology platform that is to lead to new therapies. The company develops 
certain immunocytokines as cancer treatments, and simultaneously it also works 
on the immunocytokine concept as a broad, proprietary technology base. Lexigen 
is developing two particular immunocytokines for the treatment of cancer, both of 
which are in clinical trials.29 One is for the treatment of gastrointestinal, 
pancreatic and prostate cancers and a second for the treatment of small lung 
cancer and metabolic. Lexigen has developed an active substance, called FP-
21399, for use in the treatment of AIDS. Lexigen’s anti-AIDS compound inhibits 
fusion of the virus with its target cell. Moreover, Lexigen is also developing a 
                                              
28  Glucophage, the leading drug for oral treatment of type 2 diabetes worldwide, is the star in 
Merck’s drug portfolio. The second major product is Concor, a beta-blocker for heart 
failure. 
29  Immunocytokines are fusion proteins consisting of an antibody attached to a cytokine 
(Cytokines are general stimulators of the immune system). These molecules combine the 
specificity of an antibody with the powerful immune-stimulating features of cytokines. 
Immunocytokines do not cause the side effects of conventional chemotherapy. Most cancer 
chemotherapy agents kill dividing cells, both normal and cancerous, so that the immune 
system is damaged. In contrast to this, the immunocytokines work on a completely 
different principle. They recognize specific molecules found on cancer cells and, by this, 
avoiding collateral damage to other tissues and organs.  
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new diagnostic procedure that is capable of identifying cancer cells in the 
bloodstream with the help of computer-analysis methods. Besides some academic 
relationships with universities in the Boston area, Lexigen had no industrial 
collaborations prior to the takeover. Figure 20 summarizes the most important 
steps of Lexigen’s history. 
Figure 20: History of Lexigen 
3.3.1 Case description 
Acquisition process and motives 
On December 16th, 1998, Merck announced that it had acquired 57% of Lexigen 
Pharmaceuticals Corp., located in Lexington, MA. The purchase comprised the 
exclusive rights of new technologies and important fundamental patents for 
pharmaceutical research, including a new diagnostic process to identify cancer 
cells in blood with the help of computer analysis. At that moment, Lexigen had a 
total of 27 employees on its payroll. Merck did not disclose the purchase price for 
the shareholding. 
The acquisition of Lexigen was carried out because of several reasons. In a first 
step, this acquisition must be regarded from a broader strategic perspective, 
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which can be best expressed in the words of Hans Joachim Langmann, Member 
of Merck’s Executive Board (Merck KGaA, 2000, p. 4): 
“The 23% increase in our research expenditure [...] was used to boost the 
development of new drugs for treating cancer in particular. The same strategy was 
also behind the acquisition of the U.S. research company Lexigen and the 
conclusion of key license agreements. We aim to become one of the leading 
companies in the oncology sector – and we shall to achieve this goal.” 
Thus, Merck is striving to become a leader in the area of cancer research in the 
future and attacks cancer with four completely diverse therapeutic approaches: 
angiogenesis inhibitors, monoclonal antibodies, immunotherapeutics, and 
immunocytokines.30 Besides this general motive, the second major motive for the 
acquisition was that Lexigen had an interesting technology platform in the field 
of immunocytokines, to which Merck wanted to gain access. With respect to this 
technology, it needs to be mentioned that Lexigen had two oncology products 
undergoing Phase I clinical trials at that point in time, and Merck hoped to launch 
them by 2005 as a potential blockbuster. One of the products is designed for the 
treatment of gastrointestinal, pancreatic and prostate cancer, and the other one is 
for the treatment of small cell lung cancer and melanoma. Apart from that, 
Lexigen also develops a new diagnostic procedure that is able to identify cancer 
cells in the bloodstream with the help of computer-analysis methods. The third 
major reason was that Merck wanted to strengthen its pharmaceutical position in 
the U.S., which it considered as one of the most important markets. By this, it 
also was expected that Lexigen’s integration in the Boston research community 
and its links to renowned research centers would lead to an increase in creativity 
and innovative capacity.  
“Lexigen, respectively the President of Lexigen, had a patent issued on a certain 
technology, the technology of immunocytokines. This was a technology Merck 
                                              
30  This expansion in the oncology sector is supported by some other acquisitions such as 
Monaco-based Théramex, a French specialist in hormone therapy, or Biovation Ltd., a 
biopharmaceutical company located in Aberdeen, Scotland, specialising in antibody and 
protein engineering technologies. Together, Biovation and Lexigen, represent a world-
class research force in the field of immunology and should develop innovative 
biotherapeutic cancer treatments to patients worldwide. 
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wanted to get a license for, because Merck needed it for its own oncology 
research. Then it turned out, that Lexigen itself had some financial problems and 
was even up for sale. At Merck, it was decided to acquire the company with the 
aim of establishing a pharmaceutical pillar in the U.S., more precisely, in the 
Boston area.” (Sturmhoefel) 
For Lexigen, this acquisition provided the access to vast resources that only can 
be offered by a big pharmaceutical company. Lexigen desperately needed these 
resources due to the fact that they were in the middle of clinical Phases I/II 
requiring a lot of money, that Lexigen did not have. Therefore, the company was 
on the search for a potential buyer or investor. Because of the fact, that there had 
already been some preliminary negotiations between Merck and Lexigen 
concerning a specific patent in the field of immunocytokines, these negotiations 
finally resulted in the acquisition of Lexigen by Merck. 
Organizational integration 
As far as the organizational integration is concerned a distinction between the 
originally intended plan and the finally resulted structure must be made, as the 
structure of Merck’s pharmaceutical business itself changed only a few months 
after the acquisition. Thus, the description of the organizational integration and 
the different organizational elements mainly focuses on the structure which was 
finally set in place, using the original plans – as they never have been carried out 
– only as a reference point if necessary. This overall situation, which also reveals 
some problems, is referred to by an executive of Lexigen as follows: 
“In reality, there is not a very good definition of what the responsibilities and 
structure are, or how the interaction should be. It is about two years since the 
acquisition of Lexigen by Merck and more than one and a half since the creation 
of EMD. And yet, there is still a lot of time and effort being spent on defining what 
the roles are, and what the responsibilities will be.” (Anonymous interviewee) 
In the context of the original plan, Lexigen was to cover nearly the whole 
pharmaceutical value chain including basic R&D as well as clinical development 
and marketing. In addition, the company should also retain a lot of autonomy, as 
the following quotation indicates: 
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“When the small company was first acquired there was a very clear statement 
from the CEO of Merck that the small company should retain some of the 
attributes that make it small, dynamic and very fast. That these, by themselves, are 
assets to Merck and that they should not become the same operating procedures as 
Merck. The same day that this comment was made, we begun to receive 
instructions from other divisions within Merck how we should operate to be like 
Merck. [...] So, it continues to be expectations within Merck that we will do things 
in conformity as it is done in Merck, but also expectations that we operate with a 
high level of independence and some level of separateness.“ (Anonymous 
interviewee) 
This first decision did not last very long, in fact, it was never really implemented, 
because half a year later Merck announced a reorganization of its pharmaceutical 
business with a special focus on its presence in the U.S. Thus, the further 
organizational integration must be described with keeping this reorganization in 
mind. This reorganization changed the role that was to be attributed to Lexigen in 
a fundamental way. Merck had set up a separate company to focus on growth in 
its pharma business in the U.S. EMD Pharmaceuticals, Inc., located in Durham, 
N.C., serves now as the new North American Headquarter for the Merck Pharma 
Division and, as of June 1, 1999, Matthew Emmens has been named President 
and CEO of the newly created company. The new headquarter, located near 
Research Triangle Park, has the task of creating meaningful relationships with 
researchers at important centers of influence and of coordinating the North 
American drug development, marketing and sales activities, including Lexigen. 
To enhance the organizational effectiveness, the management structure of the 
Pharma Division was streamlined and the number of board members was 
reduced. Knut Sturmhoefel comments on this reorganization: 
“It was decided that most of the biologic research is to be with Lexigen. Their 
main responsibility lays in the biologic research, especially everything that has to 
do with proteins. It can be seen as a center of excellence. From that point of view 
it was not a bad decision to separate research from clinical development. If a local 
separation really was necessary or not, I don’t know. However, the separation and 
to say, that Lexigen should do this, what it can best, was an appropriate decision. 
But, it wasn’t the original intention at the beginning. And this reorganization has 
created quite a stir.” 
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Thus, at this specific moment – with the creation of EMD as the new North 
American Headquarter for the Merck Pharma Division – the role of Lexigen has 
been redefined. From then on, Lexigen has been considered as being one of 
Merck’s key research facilities as well as an entry-point into the U.S. 
pharmaceutical market and the Boston scientific community. Henceforth, 
Lexigen is viewed as Merck’s worldwide center of excellence for biological 
entities. Lexigen is to generate drug candidates through its research, while EMD 
provides the development and commercialization expertise and Merck supplies 
its global presence and management capabilities. Now, the role of Lexigen lays 
on the basic research and on acting as some ‘kind of supplier’: 
“At the beginning, everything was supposed to be in the hands of Lexigen 
including clinical development. Now, one can rather call it a ‘desintegration’. 
Lexigen is an important research facility for Merck, one of the most important 
suppliers for the biotech platforms. The research unit Lexigen will only play a 
supportive role for the clinical development of the projects, which will be done at 
Durham.” (Sturmhoefel) 
From a strategic point of view, only the President of Lexigen, Stephen Gillies, is 
involved in the process of clinical development, because he is also VP for 
Research at EMD, and, by this, participates in the respective strategy meetings. 
Lexigen itself is ‘only’ a research unit and, thus, is not really involved in the 
overall strategy-making process. However, as far as their research activities are 
concerned, Lexigen has a high degree of autonomy with its own research budget. 
They only have to undergo a general review process and have to fulfill certain 
objectives, but carry out their research completely on their own. 
“People at Lexigen are part of the worldwide research team at Merck. Lexigen 
itself – besides Stephen Gillies – is not part of the strategy-making process. A 
decision has been made, that EMD will take over that part and coordinate the 
further development.” (Sturmhoefel) 
In terms of reporting and controlling systems Lexigen has no responsibility at all, 
because everything is centrally managed by EMD. Lexigen only disposes over the 
research budget, which is also granted via certain mechanism by EMD. 
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“As far as reporting and controlling is concerned, everything is managed by 
EMD. Lexigen receives its money from EMD over certain mechanism. Lexigen is 
now part of EMD and doesn’t belong directly to Merck any longer. At Lexigen, 
there are no controlling or reporting structures in place. A company like Lexigen 
which has started with 15 people has not the necessary departments in order to 
handle 80 people. Lexigen has its own research budget and its own President, and 
that’s it.” (Sturmhoefel) 
As far as the general collaboration between Lexigen and Merck is concerned, 
there is really a wide gap between both sides’ expectations. Lexigen wants to 
continue to work efficiently as it has done before, which means working with 
very little expenditures but at high risk. In contrast to this, Merck wants to make 
everything as secure as possible, which has led to some delays in terms of 
decision-making. Although Merck provides the necessary know-how and 
resources for the further steps of the development process, this obvious 
contradiction has already caused severe problems from the point of view of 
Lexigen as the following quotation reveals: 
“Biotech is not operating by being conservative. Biotech operates by taking risks, 
by being dynamic, by moving very quickly, by trying different ideas on a trial base. 
If it works, you continue. If it doesn’t work, you try something else. In the 
movement it is very, very quick. The expectations for the development of ideas, the 
development of products have both gone faster than the operational tempo of a 
large corporation or the operational tempo of a large conservative corporation.” 
(Anonymous interviewee) 
This shows, that the day-to-day business of the biotech company changed 
completely. This implies one important advantage, but at the same time also a 
very severe drawback for the future management of such a company. On the one 
hand, the company has more resources than ever before, but, on the other hand, 
there is a clear change in the way of doing business: 
“Well, for a small biotech company to fail to achieve a goal for two years means 
the death of the company. In the structure of a big company that is not true, it is 
acceptable to continue to fail this goal, because it is just not a small biotech 
company anymore, it is also part of a large corporation. There is money to 
support. So, the effect having the structure behind it allows the failure to take 
place, that could not take place when we are on our own. [...] This is good and 
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bad. On the one hand, it allows time which is necessary to develop ideas, but, on 
the other hand, it also allows us to take a slower operational tempo and not to 
accomplish goals that would otherwise have been done. That is not necessarily a 
benefit.” (Anonymous interviewee) 
At the beginning, the responsibility for Lexigen laid in the hands of the oncology 
business area team, especially in the hands of its head Klaus Hoenneknoevel. In 
addition to that, the decision to acquire Lexigen was also fostered by this area. 
The reorganization of the Phama Division had been decided at the top of the 
company and not by the oncology area. Apart from that, this reorganization 
resulted in a change of responsibility for Lexigen, because the company was put 
under the responsibility of EMD in Durham. Hence, the reporting structure is that 
the President of Lexigen, Stephen Gillies, reports directly to the President and 
CEO of EMD, Matthew Emmens, who reports directly to the Chairman of 
Merck’s Executive Board in Darmstadt, Bernhard Scheuble. This is the ultimate 
structure which has been set in place, but also provoked some discontent at 
Lexigen, because “in that case, you have three different visions of how one area – 
the oncology area – should work and within the space of one and a half years 
there are three different major structural changes” (Anonymous interviewee). 
With regard to a possible transfer of knowledge or a specific technology from 
Lexigen to Merck it can be said that there was no real transfer, because the 
biotech expertise is at Lexigen. Instead, some of the projects in the field of 
biologics at Merck were stopped and were transferred to Lexigen: 
“Most of the biotech-expertise is at Lexigen. Part of it has also been transferred, 
i.e. the things that have been done at Merck were reduced and transferred to 
Lexigen. Merck decided to focus on small-molecules whereas Lexigen is supposed 
to be responsible for biologics. [...] The immunocytokines are a pilot project, they 
have been developed here and the know-how is also here.” (Sturmhoefel) 
From a cultural point of view different levels must be distinguished. In a first 
step, there is a difference in terms of country cultures between the U.S. and 
Germany which is reflected in different ways of working: 
“In the U.S. – irrespective of what industry – you think much more in a matrix 
structure and work together in a team neglecting the lines than you do in 
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Germany. In Germany, the matrix-structure is well known, but it is the line 
function which gives the directives and defines roles and responsibilities. [...] 
Interactive communication and collaboration as a team is very difficult in such a 
surrounding where the line function is dominant. It took me a lot of time and effort 
to get the team members – who were really top-people in their respective field – 
effectively to work together. But in the end, it worked out quite well.” 
(Sturmhoefel) 
Apart from this general difference, people also expected problems resulting from 
the fact that big pharma needs to collaborate with small biotech which is reflected 
in different statements made such as ‘Oh, now we have to cope with the Germans 
and big pharma’ from the Lexigen part and ‘Those at Lexigen have no clue about 
what it really means to develop a medicament’ from the Merck-part. They had 
different approaches of doing business. If Lexigen had remained independent, it 
would have pursued the strategy of developing a medicament and then building 
up the corresponding organization. In contrast to this biotech strategy, Merck 
takes its big pharma approach consisting of first building the respective structure 
and organization and then developing the product. This is what one of the 
executives at Lexigen leads to the conclusion that “because of the corporate 
structure and culture within Merck there is an inability to make decisions” 
(Anonymous interviewee). 
At the moment of the acquisition, Lexigen had 27 employees of whom nobody 
left after the deal was done. There are several reasons for that. Lexigen itself was 
mainly dominated by one person, its President and owner of the major patents, 
Stephen Gillies. The whole organization was more or less tailor-made for him 
and he had everything under control. For the people at Lexigen nothing really 
changed after the acquisition, because Lexigen had been granted autonomy in the 
field of research with Stephen Gillies remaining in charge of everything at 
Lexigen. By this, he also remained their boss and only contact person. Apart from 
the fact that the few other important persons were contractually bound, the 
overall situation for the company became better as they had now access to 
resources they never had before. Thus, they continued to do what they had always 
been doing, research. 
“Stephen Gillies continued to be their boss. They did not care about the 
integration, because they were not affected. Only those involved in the 
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development project, about four-five people, were affected, but they were bound by 
contract.” (Sturmhoefel) 
Organization of the integration process 
The organization of the integration process is not that simple and straightforward 
as it is in some of the other cases. The main reason for this lays in the fact that 
there was some kind of integration process immediately after the acquisition. 
However, because of the reorganization decision of Merck’s Pharma Division 
this integration never became really effective. Thus, the following description 
tries to combine both approaches by comparing some of the immediate actions 
with the decisions made and set up afterwards.  
The original integration was a relatively short process, due to only 27 people at 
Lexigen being involved. A merger team was created under the direction of Klaus 
Hoenneknoewel, head of the oncology business area team, consisting of four 
people from Darmstadt from the oncology area and four people from Lexigen. 
This team carried out the integration by bringing the people in the different areas 
together and preparing the collaboration. Most of the integration was to be done 
on a day-to-day-working relationship. In this context, Knut Sturmhoefel had to 
take over a leading role. He served as some kind of integration and interface 
manager between Lexigen and Merck, in a first step, as well as between Lexigen 
and EMD in a second step. His special role becomes obvious if it is taken into 
account that he is a German scientist, having worked in the U.S. and employed by 
Lexigen on behalf of the recommendation of the headquarter in Darmstadt. 
Irrespective of what point in the integration, respectively the reorganization 
process, is considered his task is getting the people to work together in teams. By 
this, he has to ensure the exchange of the relevant skills and knowledge.  
Apart from that, there was no real transfer of employees of both sides during the 
integration process. No executive from Darmstadt was sent to Lexigen in order to 
make them familiar with the systems and structure in place, because with the 
creation of EMD a new structure was created changing also the role and 
expectations with regard to Lexigen. This decision was not made (and also not 
really supported) by the oncology business area team, but made by the Executive 
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Board of the company. In the words of an executive at Lexigen this situation is 
perceived as follows: 
“I do know that there has been a series of indecisive events as well as some 
decisions that are made were short-lived. So, a particular vision is defined, is 
discussed. The vision is made, we pursue that vision and then a few months later it 
changes. And a few months after that it changes again. And a few months later it 
changes again, which of course prevents effective integration. [...] And I think that 
within the different companies people are finding it difficult, because they don’t 
know what their sphere of operations is and how it is related to the others. So, the 
goal at the individual level, at the group level within the company here, within the 
company EMD, these goals for those personnel may change all of a sudden.” 
(Anonymous interviewee) 
This quotation reveals that people at Lexigen were not content with the decisions 
made at the top of the group. Moreover, it also shows one of the major lessons 
Merck experienced concerning this acquisition and especially the subsequent 
integration process. Decisions must be made as quickly and as clearly as possible 
in order to prevent insecurity at the individual level. Moreover, there was also no 
clear communication about these issues which again fostered the feeling of 
insecurity. Another problem was the different perception in how to run the 
business. While the big pharmaceutical companies prefer the ‘big strategy’, 
which implies first to establish the necessary organization and then to develop the 
product, the small biotech companies does it vice versa. Hence, it is absolutely 
necessary to ensure a smooth transition from the early phases of the development 
process which had already been carried out at Lexigen to the later ones which 
were subsequently under the control of Merck. In the deal between Merck and 
Lexigen this was not really done effectively. 
“The first integration process was carried out quickly. [...] O.k., a few experts 
were missing, which were neither at Merck nor at Lexigen and the responsibility 
for them was also not well defined. That was a mistake, but the integration process 
itself has been initiated as quickly as possible and could also have been running 
that way, if there had not been the creation of EMD. But in the end, that is another 
story – which of course clearly affects the integration of Lexigen and needs to be 
taken into account. Hence, it is difficult to say, whether the original plan would 
have been successful or not.” (Sturmhoefel) 
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3.3.2 Within-case analysis 
This section now focuses on analyzing the integration story between Merck and 
Lexigen, depicted in the section before, and tries to make some concluding 
remarks as some kind of intermission towards theory building from case study 
research. The specialty of this case lays in the fact that the original integration 
plans had never really been put into action, but were replaced by a major 
reorganization within Merck a few months after the acquisition. 
In this analysis, the first thing to point out is the question of which motives led to 
the acquisition of Lexigen. As the case description revealed, Merck had the 
intention to foster its position in the oncology sector and to strengthen its 
presence in the U.S. pharmaceutical market by gaining access to the Boston 
research community. From this, the first major motive can be derived by 
concluding that the acquisition of Lexigen contributes to the long-run strategic 
objectives of Merck. Apart from that, Lexigen had a very interesting technology 
platform and also two oncology products undergoing clinical trials with a 
promising sales potential, perhaps even the chance of becoming a blockbuster 
and, by this, having a substantial positive impact on operational results. 
Furthermore, Merck needed the patent of the immunocytokines in order to be 
allowed to continue the work on its own research. Putting this all together, the 
second major motive is definitely more short-term orientated. In contrast to this, 
Lexigen accepted the takeover bid, because it desperately needed money in order 
to push its clinical trials and also got access to the resources provided by a big 
pharmaceutical company. 
While analyzing the organizational integration along with the different 
integration elements of organizational/structural integration, knowledge/ 
competence integration and transfer as well as cultural and personnel integration, 
it is necessary to keep in mind the identified two major motives, because they 
explain an important part of the integration and also the decision for the 
subsequent reorganization. As far as this case is concerned, it is very difficult to 
say whether there are two basic organizational integration strategies or whether it 
is one organizational integration strategy at two different levels. In the original 
plan of the oncology business area team, it was intended that Lexigen should 
retain a very high degree of autonomy in nearly all steps of the pharmaceutical 
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value chain. This means that Lexigen was to take over responsibility for R&D, 
clinical development as well as sales and marketing in the U.S. In fact, it is 
almost impossible to be granted more autonomy and responsibility.  
In this context, two things are very important to notice: (1) the focus at Lexigen 
was only on oncology, and (2) Lexigen was a small biotechnology company with 
only 27 employees at that time and had absolutely no experience with clinical 
development or how to run a bigger pharmaceutical business. From this, the 
rationale for the reorganization decision is quite easy to understand. The crucial 
question for Merck’s Executive Board was whether the company Lexigen – given 
its specific situation – would be able to ensure the long-run objective of 
strengthening the U.S. position of Merck in the whole pharmaceutical business 
segment, not only oncology, or not. The Executive Board obviously answered this 
question with ‘no’ and decided to set up a separate company, EMD 
Pharmaceuticals. After that decision, Lexigen was considered as playing the role 
of a center of excellence for biological entities with the aim of doing basic 
research and generating promising drug candidates. These drug candidates are 
then developed and commercialized by EMD in the U.S. with Merck supplying 
global presence, management capabilities and support. By establishing this 
structure, the Board at Darmstadt hoped to better contribute to the long-term 
objective of Merck’s presence in the U.S. 
What does this mean for the overall organizational integration strategy? The 
organizational integration strategy must be considered in close connection with 
the respective degree of autonomy granted. In fact, there has been a split or, in 
other words, a clear cut concerning the separation of research from development 
and commercialization. As far as the basic research and the generation of 
potential drug candidates were concerned, Lexigen is still granted the maximum 
degree of autonomy and is in full charge of that part. This is also reflected in the 
fact that the President of Lexigen is at the same time Vice President (VP) at EMD 
and responsible for the U.S.-wide research. After some promising drug 
candidates have been identified, it is EMD which takes over the responsibility for 
the further development and commercialization of the product, while Lexigen is 
completely left out of this process. Therefore, it is possible to draw the 
conclusion that the responsibility differs depending on what step of the 
pharmaceutical value chain the focus lays. During the early stages of research the 
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overall responsibility going along with a high degree of autonomy is at Lexigen. 
However, as soon as the promising drug candidate is identified – which 
represents a progress when having the pharmaceutical value chain as a reference 
point – the responsibility is no longer at Lexigen, but taken over completely by 
EMD. Lexigen only delivers some support, if necessary. From this it follows, that 
the current projects which are in clinical trials are now managed by EMD at 
Durham, and, therefore, the second major motive of the acquisition will be 
realized in accordance with the overall strategic direction.  
In terms of strategy-making as well as reporting and budgeting, the decisions are 
made at EMD in agreement with Merck. Lexigen itself does not even have the 
respective departments. In these processes Lexigen is only involved to the extent 
in which Stephen Gillies in his function as VP for research at EMD – but not 
primarily as President of Lexigen – is part of. Furthermore, everything that has to 
do with reporting, controlling and human resources issues is managed by EMD at 
Durham for Lexigen. 
With regard to a possible knowledge transfer it must be stated that there was 
simply no transfer of knowledge from Lexigen to Merck. Instead, projects at 
Merck with a clear link to biologics and proteins had been reduced and were 
transferred to Lexigen. Lexigen was considered as being the center of excellence 
within Merck for everything that has to do with biologics because “they had 
people who had much more experience and knowledge in the field of proteins 
than the people at Merck” (Sturmhoefel). Thus, it was a question of who is the 
best in this field and disposes over the necessary knowledge, know-how and 
competencies within the company. It was decided that it is Lexigen which has 
this position. This decision makes also perfectly sense, because it reflects one of 
the motives for the acquisition, the specific know-how and technology, which 
Lexigen can provide. Another question which comes up now is, how the people 
at Durham get the necessary knowledge to carry out the clinical development of 
the promising drug candidates. The answer to that question results of the 
reorganization process and has nothing to do with the originally intended plans. It 
is now the task of Knut Sturmhoefel whose role changed over time. At the 
beginning he was more an integration manager, whereas after the reorganization 
he took over the role of an interface manager, being responsible for the transfer 
of the knowledge needed at Durham. Apart from that, Stephen Gillies, the holder 
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of the major patents will also support the further development activities at EMD. 
In addition, the so-called ‘Translation Research Teams’ will be introduced in 
order to support the development at Durharm. 
The cultural analysis can be subdivided in two different dimensions. Firstly, there 
is the obvious cultural gap on a country level between U.S.-based Lexigen and 
the German company Merck. In this context, some problems arose due to the 
different kind of thinking in terms of command and control structures. In the 
U.S., the matrix-structure and teamwork across different line functions is the 
dominant structure, whereas in Germany the matrix structure also exists, but it is 
the line function which is in control of everything. This contradiction resulted in 
a few coordination and communication problems. After having detected and 
becoming aware of these problems they had been quickly solved due to the 
interference of Knut Sturmhoefel.  
Secondly, there is a much wider gap between the structure and thinking of big 
pharma, like Merck, and the way business is done at a small biotechnology 
company, like Lexigen. Big pharmaceutical companies always try to avoid risk as 
much as possible or, at least, to reduce it as far as possible. This thinking also 
reflects the approach in which Merck tackles a project or the development of a 
drug, because it first builds-up the necessary structure and organization covering 
the whole value chain and, after that, focuses on the development of the product. 
However, small biotech, in this case Lexigen, would do it vice versa by first 
developing the product and then establishing the necessary organization. One of 
the important reasons why they would do it that way is the fact that a small 
biotechnology company does not have the necessary resources to build-up such a 
structure before having a potential revenue generator. In fact, it is a completely 
different approach which implies some severe consequences. Lexigen as a part of 
Merck is no longer the fast acting, highly-dynamic and high-risk taking small 
biotechnology company. It is now part of a much bigger entity that acts according 
to totally different rules. Having this in mind employees’ complaints at Lexigen 
about the fact that “it is the expectation of a large corporation that the small 
company operates like them” (Anonymous interviewee) can be easily understood, 
because this company is no longer regarded as being a small, independent 
company. Its role within Merck needs to be newly defined. Of course, this should 
not take that much time as it took in this case – more than two years –, but it 
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definitely takes much more time than the decisions made in an independent small 
biotechnology company.  
Besides these problems that come up due to the cultural gap between big pharma, 
Merck, and small biotech, Lexigen, there are also some clear advantages for both 
sides that go along with that liaison. On the one hand, Lexigen gets the money it 
definitely needs in order to continue its research and to push the products through 
clinical trials. This is now done with the help of Merck, as Lexigen itself never 
went through regulatory approval before. On the other hand, Merck gets access to 
new technologies and some promising drug candidates. The question now is, how 
do these two organizations get along with each other in order to get the best out 
of the deal. The decisions for the realization of these advantages are made at 
Merck and not at Lexigen. The reorganization of Merck’s pharma business 
segment resulted in the definition of Lexigen’s role as a center of excellence for 
research within Merck. Thus, Lexigen is expected to do basic research and to 
generate promising drug candidates which then will be developed by EMD.  
Hence, this reorganization has an effect on the way Lexigen sees itself, and it 
takes some time until such a change in mind is accepted. Trying to define this 
role change a little bit more precisely, one can draw the conclusion that Lexigen 
is no longer supposed to act in the same entrepreneurial way as it did before the 
acquisition as an independent company in the sense that it needs to develop a 
product, push it through clinical trials, bring it to the market, and generate 
revenues. Provided that Merck had not taken over Lexigen, this would have been 
necessary. However, after the acquisition Lexigen is expected to do basic 
research and generate promising drug candidates. Because of these expectations, 
Lexigen rather needs a spirit of discovery than an entrepreneurial spirit. 
Accepting this argumentation and the fact that somehow the cultural gap between 
Merck and Lexigen becomes smaller, it is possible go one step further and 
conclude that in this case Lexigen – because its activities are reduced to the 
research field and do no longer cover the rest of the pharmaceutical value chain – 
loses some of its former identity. This brings it closer to Merck and, in turn, 
brings Merck closer to the fulfillment of the goals it had in mind with the 
acquisition of Lexigen and the subsequent reorganization of its pharma business 
segment.  
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Due to the fact that Lexigen had only 27 employees at the time of the takeover 
and it was not listed at any stock exchange, which implied that stock option 
programs did not exist, the analysis of the personnel integration issues is 
relatively short and straightforward. After the acquisition nobody left the 
company, because for most people in research nothing changed as they kept their 
boss Stephen Gillies, and they could continue to do what they had always been 
doing. Moreover, they even had better access to vast resources provided by 
Merck. The top scientists were bound by specific contracts. Relocation problems 
as well as special incentives for the loss of stock options did not occur in this 
deal. 
After the analysis of the different integration topics, the analysis of the 
organization of the integration process needs to be taken into account. In this 
context, it is again necessary to point out that this integration process cannot be 
separated from the subsequent reorganization process. Thus, both dimensions are 
covered in this analysis. To start with, the case description reveals one major 
problem in terms of responsibility. The acquisition and the early integration 
efforts were fostered and carried out by the oncology business area team. At the 
beginning, this team was also in charge of Lexigen. However, the subsequent 
reorganization decision of the Pharma Division was made at the very top of the 
company – and not at the oncology business segment level. This reorganization 
led to a change in responsibility for Lexigen, because the responsibility was taken 
away from the oncology business area team and transferred to EMD. This makes 
clear that the original plans of the oncology business area team did not have the 
full support from the Executive Board. This change in responsibility is one of the 
major reasons why the final integration of Lexigen following the reorganization 
decision took so much time and created uncertainty among Lexigen’s employees. 
This uncertainty is reflected in the following statement: 
“Even though, the problem can be solved, if someone is willing to craft a vision, 
having the support of Top-Management within Merck, make decisions around 
creating that vision and then implementing those decisions from the top down.” 
(Anonymous interviewee) 
This statement reveals, on the one hand, the discontent of the people at Lexigen 
with the delay in decision-making and, on the other hand, points out where one of 
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the major problems was. It was the missing support from the top of the group that 
partly made occur these problems. Most of the resulting problems are a 
consequence out of this undecidedness. E.g., the original integration efforts of the 
first merger team under the direction of Klaus Hoenneknoewel, head of the 
oncology business area team, never became really effective.  
Additionally, the role of Knut Sturmhoefel also changed over time. At the 
beginning, he could rather be considered as being part of the integration team in 
the role of an integration manager, and after the reorganization, he is rather a kind 
of interface manager ensuring the translation of knowledge between the different 
sites or, in other terms, between the research done by/at Lexigen and the 
development carried out by/at EMD. The first integration process itself was 
carried out rather quickly, but the subsequent reorganization which implied some 
kind of ‘reintegration’ took much longer and was not communicated clearly. 
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 3.4 The case of Novartis AG – SyStemix, Inc./Genetic Therapy, Inc. 
The objective of this case is to describe the post-acquisition integration activities 
of SyStemix, Inc., and Genetic Therapy, Inc., in the following referred to as GTI, 
into the organizational structure of Novartis. Firstly, a brief general corporate 
profile of Novartis as well as of SyStemix and of GTI will be presented. 
Secondly, the case will focus on the integration activities of the latter two 
companies into the structure of Novartis.31 Finally there will be the within-case 
analysis.  
Corporate profiles 
Novartis AG was created by the merger of Sandoz AG and Ciba-Geigy AG in 
December 1996 in a deal worth $30 billion.32 Prior to the merger, Sandoz AG and 
Ciba-Geigy AG were both global participants in the pharmaceutical and 
agrochemical industries. At the time of the merger, they were both health 
companies with some market-leading products, including Sandoz’s Sandimmune 
and Neoral for organ transplants and Ciba’s Clorazil for schizophrenia. The 
predecessor companies merged in order to realize sales, cost and cross-sector 
synergies, and in order to create a combined entity with the resources and abilities 
to compete in the long run in an increasingly competitive environment. In 
addition to a new name,33 Novartis’ management spun off the $7 billion specialty 
chemicals business that had given birth to Sandoz, Ciba and Geigy. Thus, 
                                              
31  This case study draws on one preliminary discussion with an executive from Novartis as 
well as on two transcribed interviews with executives from Novartis who have been active 
on both sides, the pharma and biotech one. Because of the huge amount of money lost in 
connection with the acquisition and integration of SyStemix and GTI, the persons 
interviewed were granted anonymity. Apart from that, this case is based on annual reports, 
public speeches, SEC Filings, press releases by all companies named herein, the 
biotechnology information service Recombinant Capital (http://www.recap.com) as well as 
analysts’ reports. 
32  On May 8, 2001, Novartis announced that it had acquired 20% of the pharmaceutical giant 
Roche’s voting shares for $2.8 billion. This move is considered as being a prelude to the 
creation of the world’s second largest drug company by a merger between Switzerland’s 
two leading drug groups. 
33  The name ‘Novartis’ is derived from the Latin novae artes, meaning ‘new skills’, which is 
to reflect the Group’s focus on research and development. 
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Novartis would not only be bigger, but also more focused on life sciences. Before 
the merger, both companies had created a network of partnerships with small 
biotechnology companies to augment their internal research efforts. Ciba-Geigy 
had mostly minority equity positions in its partners and refrained from active 
management, e.g. as it is the case with Chiron Corporation of Emeryville, CA, in 
which Ciba-Geigy acquired 49.9% ownership for $2.1 billion in November 
199434. In contrast to this, Sandoz had typically taken larger stakes, often 
involving board seats, and had, in several cases, subsequently acquired the 
company. 
Headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, Novartis employs over 67,000 people 
worldwide, operates in over 140 countries and has been listed on the Swiss Stock 
Exchange as well as on the New York Stock Exchange with American Depositary 
Shares since May 11, 2000. Thus, 43% of the company’s employees work in 
Europe, 40% in North and Latin America, and 17% in Asia, Australia and Africa. 
Novartis operates in five principal industry sectors: pharmaceuticals, generics, 
eyecare products and medicines (‘CIBA Vision’), consumer health and animal 
health. The operation in a sixth industry sector, agribusiness, was spun off and 
merged with Zeneca Agrochemicals to create Syngenta in November 2000.35 In 
fiscal 2000 Novartis reported a net income of CHF 7.2 billion on sales of CHF 
35.8 billion. North and Latin America accounted for 50% of sales, Europe for 
33% and Asia, Australia and Africa for the remaining 17%. The group’s overall 
strategic priorities lay in focusing on healthcare with pharmaceuticals at its core, 
establishing mega brands, supporting innovation, attracting and retaining talented 
people and strengthening the U.S. presence. 
                                              
34  In the deal between Ciba-Geigy and Chiron, Ciba-Geigy was granted as a minority 
shareholder, a so-called ‘first-rider-refusal’, which permits Ciba a preferred access to any 
of Chiron’s research findings, if Chiron does not want to develop and market them on its 
own. 
35  On December 2, 1999, the Boards of Novartis and AstraZeneca announced that they both 
agreed to spin off and merge Novartis’ Crop Protection and Seeds businesses and Zeneca 
Agrochemicals to create the world’s first dedicated agribusiness company with pro forma 
combined sales in 1998 of approximately $7.9 billion. The new company will be named 
Syngenta AG. This as well as the already mentioned separation of the agribusiness at 
Pharmacia or the sale of Aventis Crop Science are the first indications that companies are 
no longer strive to realize the integrated Life-Sciences-Strategy. Instead, companies like 
Novartis will concentrate their future efforts on their healthcare business. 
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Novartis Pharmaceuticals, which is responsible for the activities in the gene 
therapy sector is a world leader in discovering, developing, manufacturing and in 
marketing prescriptive medicines. The goal of Novartis Pharmaceuticals is to 
provide a broad portfolio of effective and safe products and services to patients 
around the world.36 This goal is supported by a global organization, operating in 
more than 140 countries. In 2000, Novartis Pharmaceuticals employed over 
37,000 people and had CHF 17.6 billion in sales, which represented 49% of the 
Group’s sales, and reported an operating income of CHF 5.4 billion. In 2000, the 
sector invested approximately CHF 3.2 billion in R&D, which represents 18,2% 
of total pharmaceutical sales. Novartis Pharmaceuticals has also entered into 
long-term research agreements with various institutions totalling CHF 1.6 billion. 
The product portfolio includes a wide range of products in seven major disease 
areas: cardiovascular/metabolism/endocrinology, central nervous system, 
dermatology, oncology/hematology, respiratory, rheumatical/bone/hormone 
replacement therapy and transplantation/immunology. In July 2000, Novartis 
announced a new organizational structure for its pharmaceutical operation, 
designed to serve specific customer groups. The new groups – primary care, 
specialty business and mature products – create focused and entrepreneurial 
business units, integrating all business functions. The primary-care unit focuses 
on the launches of new, potential blockbuster brands. The specialty business 
consists of three separate units: oncology, transplantation, and ophthalmics. The 
mature product unit will have the key responsibility for optimizing the economic 
value of older products, using new models to optimize their sales potential. The 
managers of the newly created business units report directly to the new global 
head of pharmaceuticals, Thomas Ebeling. Their task is to access cutting-edge 
technologies and novel compounds, to accelerate product development, and 
successfully launch new products on a global basis. This new organizational 
structure is to increase ownership, accountability, and speed, while at the same 
time retaining the advantages of economies of scale in basic technologies, skills, 
and knowledge, as well as in production.  
                                              
36  Besides the two top-products in 2000, Sandimmun/Neoral (transplantation) and Voltaren 
(inflamation), the five key growth drivers of Novartis Pharmaceuticals are Diovan 
(hypertension), Lotrel (hypertension), Lamisil (fugal infections), Miacalcic (osteoporosis), 
and Exelon (Alzheimer’s disease). 
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Genetic Therapy, Inc. (GTI), based in Gaithersburg, MD, is a leader in the 
development of human gene therapy products for the treatment of genetic and 
acquired diseases. GTI is a pioneer in the development of vector technology. 
Using this novel approach, based on extensive, innovative basic vector research, 
genes are inserted into cells to produce therapeutic proteins in the body. Founded 
in 1986, GTI represents one of the largest group of scientists dedicated to 
research and development in this field. The company’s product development 
programs include cancers, hemophilia, and gaucher disease. The total amount of 
capital raised by venture capitalists, public offerings and private placements 
before the final acquisition by Novartis in July 1995 was about $700 million. 
Besides collaborations with different universities like Harvard or the University 
of Texas, GTI had collaborative agreements with Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
StemCells, Alexion, Advanced Therapies, and Human Genome Sciences. 
Since its inception in 1986, GTI has been a global leader in the development of 
novel gene therapy products for the treatment of debilitating and potentially life-
threatening genetic and acquired diseases. GTI’s research is directed at basic 
vector research and the development of novel potential products. Before the 
acquisition by Novartis, the company had just started with Phase III clinical trials 
for brain cancer. The tradename for this was called GLI-328. Besides this, GTI 
was undergoing clinical Phases I/II for breast cancer, gaucher disease and fanconi 
anemia. 
SyStemix, Inc., founded in 1988 and based in Palo Alto, CA, is (was) a 
biotechnology company leading in the development of therapies for major 
disorders of the blood and immune system based on the use of its patented, 
isolated, expanded and gene-modified human hematopoietic stem cells.37 Besides 
the different investments made by Novartis, SyStemix only raised $64 million of 
venture capital and $240 million by going public. Because Novartis had already 
acquired 60% of SyStemix in 1992, the company had no major relationships with 
                                              
37  The hematopoietic stem cell is the only hematopoietic cell which is pluripotent, capable of 
differentiating into all types of blood an immune cells, and capable of self-renewal. Many 
existing cancer therapies, such as chemotherapy and radiotherapy, compromise the body’s 
immune system and its ability to create new cells. By reinfusing hematopoietic stem cells 
after these therapies, it is expected that patients will achieve timely recovery as well as 
sustained hematopoietic function over the long term.  
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other industrial partners. They had only collaborations with universities like e.g. 
Stanford. SyStemix is targeting on diseases, such as cancer and AIDS, combining 
sophisticated cell biology with advanced molecular biology techniques (genetic 
manipulation), as well as device and process technologies to develop novel 
healthcare products. In addition to the important and patented hematopoietic stem 
cell, SyStemix has developed a high speed cell sorting system that separates 
viable and functional hematopoietic stem cells at higher speeds and levels of 
purity than cell doses obtained with a number of other cell separation methods. 
By this, the company is able to effectively eliminate certain types of tumor cells, 
providing a cell population that is disease-free.  
SyStemix initiated its first Phase I/II clinical trial of hematopoietic stem cell 
transplants to support multiple myeloma patients undergoing chemotherapy in 
June 1995. This study was terminated in July 1996 due to concerns related to cell 
viability associated with procedures used for handling and storage of cells at the 
clinical site. In March 1996, SyStemix initiated its first European Phase I/II 
human clinical trials in cancer. In September 1996, additional clinical trials in 
cellular therapies for breast cancer and indolent non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma were 
initiated. Although these human clinical trials had been initiated, full 
commercialization of its R&D programs would not have occurred for several 
years. Furthermore, in October 1996, SyStemix filed an investigational new drug 
application for cell-based gene therapy for the treatment of HIV.  
3.4.1 Case description 
Before starting with the case description, it is necessary to mention that this case 
– compared with the other cases – has a certain specialty. This case is about two 
acquisitions by one company in a complementing technological field, Novartis’ 
acquisition of SyStemix and Genetic Therapy (GTI), both involved in gene 
therapy, which finally were consolidated under one roof. The case description as 
well as the subsequent within-case analysis following this section, however, lays 
on the integration and collaboration activities subsequent to each respective 
acquisition and not on the analysis of the consolidation process between 
SyStemix and GTI. However, the consolidation process is also referred to in 
order to add a further perspective when making a useful contribution and to give 
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the appropriate, overall picture of these two cases. Apart from that, one must be 
aware of the fact that the initial steps of the acquisition have already been carried 
out by Sandoz before the formation of Novartis. Hence, the point of view of the 
acquirer is either represented by using the name ‘Sandoz’ or afterwards 
‘Novartis’ which are used synonymously. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that 
by the end of the year 2000 SyStemix, Inc., ceased to exist and was finally shut 
down. 
Acquisition process and motives 
The acquisition of SyStemix was carried out in several steps. On February 19, 
1992, Sandoz acquired a 60% interest in SyStemix and paid a total of $625 
million for the company, which specializes in cellular therapy. Besides this 
acquisition, in April 1993, SyStemix and Sandoz formed an equally owned joint 
venture, named Progenesys, to research and develop hematopoietic cell-based, 
somatic gene therapies against HIV infection. This joint venture was dissolved in 
August 1995 and replaced by the HIV Gene Therapy Collaboration. On January 
30, 1995, SyStemix and Sandoz entered into a stock and warrant purchase 
agreement, whereby SyStemix issued to Sandoz additional stock in exchange for 
proceeds of $80 million that increased its share holding to 71.6%. This 
investment was supposed to give SyStemix a solid financial base for their clinical 
trials as well as their R&D efforts, and reflected Sandoz’ belief in the 
technological edge provided by SyStemix in oncology and gene therapy. On 
October 29, 1996, SyStemix announced that its Independent Directors on behalf 
of the minority shareholders had rejected the unsolicitated offer by Sandoz to 
acquire, at $17.00 per share, the outstanding shares of SyStemix that Sandoz did 
not already own. Finally, on February 19, 1997, this transaction was approved by 
SyStemix’s independent directors and Novartis acquired the remaining 27% of 
the shares at $19.50 per share. The offer price represents a 77% premium over the 
closing price of $11.00 per share on May 23, 1996, the last full trading day prior 
to Novartis’ (Sandoz’) original offer. This final part of the acquisition cost CHF 
108 million ($76 million).  
In contrast to the different and complex investment steps in SyStemix, the deal 
with Genetic Therapy was much more simple. After the initial acquisition of a 
small equity stake of $10 million in Genetic Therapy, in November 1991, Sandoz 
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made no further equity investment until the final acquisition of the remaining 
shares in July 1995 for $283 million. 
The collaboration and subsequent acquisition of both companies, SyStemix and 
GTI, must be considered from an overall strategic perspective. First, Novartis 
puts a special emphasis on the area of biotechnology that can best be expressed in 
the words of Daniel Vasella, Chairman and CEO, who said that “biotechnology is 
an area of particular importance for Novartis” (Novartis AG, 2000, p. 2) or in a 
statement made by Wolfgang Samo, Novartis’s former head of agribusiness 
(Novartis AG, 1999, p. 2): 
“We think that companies that do not have basic biotech know-how will not be 
able to play this game in the long term.” 
More specifically, gene therapy – as a part of biotechnology – is a type of genetic 
engineering that combats disease by replacing missing or defective genes or by 
conferring a new function on treated cells. This research is supposed to 
revolutionize the practice of medicine by translating breakthroughs in cell 
biology and genetics into superior therapeutics. Therefore, part of the motivation 
for the final acquisition of the remaining shares of SyStemix can best be 
presented in the words’ of Daniel Vasella, Chairman and CEO of Novartis 
(Novartis AG, 1997, p. 1):  
“Novartis and SyStemix are engaged in promising discovery activities in the 
development of cell and cell based gene therapies for cancer, AIDS, autoimmune 
and genetic diseases. With SyStemix fully integrated in Novartis, I am confident 
that we will accelerate the pace of our cutting-edge work with hematopoietic stem-
cell technology.” 
Thus, the second major motive for the first part of the acquisition of SyStemix 
was that it had a promising technology creating the expectation that gene therapy 
will provide interesting products in a period of five years from that time on. 
SyStemix had a patent issued that was expected to become very valuable. In close 
connection with this, the third motive needs to be considered. The acquisition of 
a big equity stake in SyStemix was also carried out because of the intention of 
getting a critical mass in gene therapy. This offer was accepted by SyStemix 
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because “the outstanding promise of SyStemix’ technology can be realized more 
broadly and rapidly as part of Novartis” (Dr. John Schwartz, President and CEO 
of SyStemix; Novartis AG, 1997, p. 1). The fourth reason, referring especially to 
the final, complete takeover of SyStemix, was the need to get control over 
SyStemix, because – up to that point in time – Novartis only had a stake of about 
71.6%. Although Sandoz had bought a huge part of equity, they did not really get 
to control the company, but only got a chance to take a close look at it. In fact, 
they had many problems with SyStemix, because it was still a publicly traded 
company in the U.S., which implies all kinds of protection for minority 
shareholders. Hence, Sandoz was currently confronted with the statement from 
SyStemix’ management that (1) they need to act in the interests of all 
shareholders, not just in the interests of Sandoz, and (2) it was difficult to do 
deals with other companies due to Sandoz holding so much stock. Thus, part of 
the motivation for the final acquisition of SyStemix was that Novartis could gain 
control and run the company on its own. 
The acquisition of GTI took place when this company was in the middle of a 
Phase II/III clinical study for brain tumors. Therefore, the acquisition enabled 
Sandoz to get access to the technology of GTI and also to a potential blockbuster. 
Before the final takeover, Sandoz only put in $10 million, got a seat on the board 
and signed a three-year R&D agreement. This kind of relationship is described by 
a former top executive of GTI as follows: 
“At GTI, they [Sandoz] didn’t have that much of control, but in fact a lot of 
influence. It gave us a chance to begin to work together, to get to know each other 
and get the people involved. And there wasn’t the burden of this excessive control. 
Instead, it was much more possible to build a constructive relationship.” 
(Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
The acquisition of GTI by Sandoz provided them not only with financial support, 
but also with the access to resources, such as disease expertise and knowledge 
about how to best carry out a Phase III, so-called pivotal, clinical study. Here, 
Novartis’ knowledge about regulatory issues and their contacts with regulatory 
authorities and medical doctors all over the world was an important asset for GTI. 
This is also reflected in the following statement: 
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“There are a lot of resources that a big pharma company can bring to the table, 
and that’s what I see now. Novartis has a product with great results in cancer and 
they are pushing that product to the market, faster than a biotech company could 
possibly ever do. When I see the kind of things Novartis can do, I think there is a 
real powerful engine in big pharma companies that biotech companies simply 
don’t have. It is very powerful in the most positive sense.” (Anonymous 
Interviewee 2) 
Organizational integration 
In the following, the organizational integration of SyStemix and GTI will be 
depicted by (1) having a closer look at each case separately, (2) shortly discussing 
the reasons for the consolidation process, and (3) describing the outcome of this 
reorganization. After that, the integration of the different organizational elements 
will be described together. 
Before the final takeover of SyStemix’ outstanding shares, the company acted – 
more or less – completely on its own due to the fact that in the period from 1995 
to 1997 Sandoz only had a stake of 71.6%. Thus, there were still some minority 
shareholders whose rights needed to be protected. As a consequence of this, just 
some kind of management review took place once a year. Apart from that, there 
were only a few Senior Managers from Sandoz sent to SyStemix. They had two 
major tasks: the first one was to establish an interface management between 
SyStemix and Sandoz in order to provide them with know-how about the 
processes within Sandoz. The second one was to gain a deeper insight into 
SyStemix in order to recognize the problems and to come up with an appropriate 
strategy. In the words of a responsible executive: 
“They were more or less left on their own, with two or three Senior Managers 
from Sandoz, who were there. But, they did not change and realign the whole 
organization, instead they were responsible for an exchange of information. They 
provided them with the know-how about the processes and procedures. And, until 
you really know what is going on in such a company, so that you are able to shape 
a strategy, it takes at least two years.” (Anonymous Interviewee 1) 
After the final acquisition of SyStemix, it was completely integrated into the 
matrix structure of Novartis including processes, financial, and strategic reviews. 
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The people of SyStemix were also integrated into international project teams 
combining people from both sides, who then took over the common responsibility 
for the projects already started at SyStemix. In order to ease the integration and to 
make people at SyStemix better and faster familiar with the structure, processes 
and procedures at Novartis, they brought in a few senior managers from Basel. 
From a legal and human resource point of view SyStemix was subordinated to 
Novartis U.S. In terms of R&D projects and budgets they had to report directly to 
the responsible board member for R&D in Basel. After the final merger, the 
project pipeline of SyStemix was reviewed and reduced significantly by 
concentrating and focusing their efforts on those that were the most promising 
ones. This was carried out in a common review which involved people from both 
sides, SyStemix and Novartis. The projects which were to be continued were 
identified. The rationale behind this is expressed in the following quotation: 
“Furthermore, an independent company cannot focus just on one project. Thus, 
SyStemix was engaged in a number of various projects, because they could reduce 
and diversify their risk. One major project breaks down and one can show the 
investor, there we have another one. They had lots of projects in very early stages, 
which are not yet that expensive. After the final merger, the project pipeline of the 
company was reduced significantly by concentrating and focusing their efforts on 
those that were the most promising ones. Novartis gave the order to focus the 
efforts and in a common review which involved people from both sides, the 
projects which were to be continued were identified.” (Anonymous Interviewee 1) 
As far as the transfer of knowledge or technology was concerned, there was in 
fact no transfer of know-how or technology from SyStemix to Novartis. 
“It has never been the goal to transfer knowledge or technologies. If it [gene 
therapy] is interesting, you are going to do it there. However, there were two 
levels of interaction. Between the scientists there has been some exchange, 
because of their personal interests in each others research. Sandoz has also 
transferred one project to SyStemix. Apart from that, there is the Research 
Management Board, which meets every month and all research projects are 
presented and discussed there. This provides also some kind of exchange. But, the 
transfer of knowledge was not promoted, it was only in the interest of the 
scientists. As a global company, we can keep the knowledge where it is.” 
(Anonymous Interviewee 1) 
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After having depicted the initial steps of the SyStemix integration, there will now 
be the description of the first steps in the GTI integration. At the beginning “there 
was a lot of talk about keeping it relatively independent, but in fact very quickly 
it became ‘rather’ fully integrated” (Anonymous Interviewee 2). The most 
important project at that time was the Phase III clinical study for the brain cancer 
project. In order to realize this, a joint team with people from GTI, providing the 
knowledge about the technology and the product, and Novartis, being responsible 
for the regulatory affairs, was put together. With the creation of this project team, 
people got to know each other, and felt that they were pulling into the same 
direction as well as sharing the same goals. GTI was integrated into the structure 
of Novartis consisting of different international project teams organized by a 
central project management function in Basel, Switzerland. However, this 
process also caused some problems for the employees of GTI as the following 
quotation depicts: 
“The systems are in place in a big pharmaceutical company and the people who 
are working in these systems are used to know them, accept and understand them 
through their work in accordance with them. However, we didn’t know them. It 
took some time for us to figure out what we needed to do.” (Anonymous 
Interviewee 2) 
In order to realize the integration and to help them to understand and work within 
these systems an executive from the project management function was sent to 
Gaithersburg. Moreover, GTI’s head of research joined the research management 
board and the head of clinical study became part of the clinical group. As time 
went by, the people at GTI became more and more involved and acquainted with 
the structure, the reporting, and review systems of Novartis. However, “we 
floated around a little bit, and also at the beginning we resisted, because we 
thought at first it was gonna be more independent” (Anonymous Interviewee 2). 
During the integration process there was also no real transfer of know-how or 
technology from GTI to Novartis. 
“We didn’t transfer know-how or technology from GTI to Novartis. We were 
rather acting as a center of excellence.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
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Apart from that, there was also the first consolidation process between SyStemix 
and GTI announced at the end of 1998. It took place because of two major 
reasons. First, there was a clear underestimation of length of gene therapy until a 
marketable product was expected to come up. Second, genomics and protenomics 
came up and offered also many opportunities making Novartis feel a strong need 
to participate in this market. As a consequence of this, the budget for gene 
therapy was cut down by 50%. In order to optimize Novartis’ cell and gene 
therapy research and development efforts, SyStemix and GTI were to be 
combined under the leadership of Michael Perry, CEO of SyStemix at that time. 
It was also decided that the headquarter should be at SyStemix’ site in Palo Alto, 
CA. Jörg Reinhardt, Head of Preclinical Development and Project Management 
at Novartis Pharma at that time, stated (Novartis AG, 1998, p. 1): 
“This consolidation allows us to maintain critical mass and eliminate overlap. The 
free resources will be channeled into value-adding activities to tackle the scientific 
hurdles to gene therapy, which we have identified through our broad experience, 
including clinical trials. At the same time, we will retain access to the scientific 
communities and expertise on both coasts.” 
At that time, the two companies employed together 450 people. Their 
consolidation made it possible to streamline administration, development and 
functions by reducing approximately 90 positions. The combination, however, 
did not touch on each company’s research unit, which retained their autonomy 
and continued to operate at full strength at each site.  
One and half year later, however, in mid-2000, the whole consolidation process 
was changed again. Now, GTI in Gaithersburg was chosen as headquarter and it 
was even decided to shut down SyStemix completely. All projects with SyStemix 
were stopped and GTI was henceforth considered as one of Novartis’ research 
facilities, concentrating on oncology projects. At SyStemix, the value in terms of 
technologies or intellectual property one could bring to the market was reduced 
towards zero from 1992 to 1999. With the following quotation the description of 
the subsequent reorganizations will be terminated by giving a little insight in this 
process and the rationale behind it: 
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“When you are in a small company it feels more disruptive for example to be 
merged with SyStemix. Especially for them, because one year it looked that they 
were going to get the lead, because the headquarter was set up there. Then one 
and a half year later, they get shut down completely. This is incredible from their 
standpoint and I think there are a lot of bad feelings from the SyStemix-side. And 
certainly, it was also not easy to explain people at GTI why the headquarter was to 
be with SyStemix and not GTI. Then one and a half year later, people at GTI feel 
over-syndicated, because in the end they were getting the part of the company. It is 
complicated, because decisions were not straightforward due to the fact that you 
were always making decisions under uncertainty.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
After having described the different stages of the overall organizational 
integration and consolidation process, it is now necessary to look at how the 
different organizational elements were combined. Considering the aspect of 
culture there are two different points of view. The first obvious cultural gap is in 
terms of different country cultures between the U.S. and Europe. At SyStemix, 
however, there have been many Non-U.S.-Citizens, who have been trained in 
Europe. 50% of the PhDs and the management (representing one third of the 
staff) came from all over Europe. There were also a lot of Asians with a Bachelor 
degree in the Sciences field, approximately one third of the staff. This mixture of 
different people from different cultures, who had already been used to work 
together, simplified the collaboration after the acquisition, because it reduced the 
cultural gap in terms of communication and decision-making. In the case of GTI, 
there were also no difficulties in terms of different country cultures. The second 
point to consider is the difference between a small biotechnology start-up and a 
big pharmaceutical company. Here, the focus lays on the company perspective, 
and a closer look clearly reveals a bigger gap: 
“Nearly everybody [of the senior management at GTI] left, because they 
[Novartis] no longer looked for a local management team. We were used to make 
common decisions, taking much more risk and common responsibility. And they no 
longer looked at the local management to really do that so much. In some ways I 
feel a sense of lost in the culture of the company. [...] You won’t get 
entrepreneurial behavior in the future out of a company like GTI. It does still not 
longer expect to act that way.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
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There can be no doubt that there is a clear shift in the overall culture of GTI and 
the expectations concerning the way the management is supposed to act. The 
question which comes up now is, what happens to the small company? 
“Now it is more like a Novartis research facility. I must say that whatever 
entrepreneurial spirit that exists at the research facilities of Novartis all around 
the world, the same spirit exists at GTI. That’s different from being an independent 
company. I am not saying that the spirit of discovery is gone. I am not saying 
that.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
These two quotations clearly demonstrate that the culture of the acquired 
company, GTI, definitely changed, and the company itself turned more into a part 
of Novartis acting according to the way business was made at Novartis. The final 
question which arises is whether it is worth changing or not. The answer to this is 
given in the following statement. 
“It [the entrepreneurial spirit of the company] definitely changes. I think you need 
to discuss, if this change is for better or for worse. And in the end your objective is 
to bring products to the market, and maybe, you need to sacrifice it for this goal. 
[...] I think one view of these kinds of relationships is the failure that they kill the 
entrepreneurial spirit of these companies. But, I don’t think that it is the correct 
view, because I think there is a bigger picture – even though I come out of this 
company. Of course, my feelings sometimes are a little bit sad, because their 
culture is so different now, but I recognize toward the ultimate objective of 
developing a therapy for a disease it is probably better.” (Anonymous Interviewee 
2) 
As a consequence of such a cultural change a lot of people from the senior 
management of SyStemix left on a voluntary base, because they did not want to 
be part of a big organization, instead, they preferred being at the top of a smaller 
organization. As far as middle management and scientists were concerned, there 
was far less turnover, because they felt that their job was more secure by being 
part of a big group. Moreover, they also got access to new resources and could 
continue to do what they always liked to do: research. Besides, a “fluctuation up 
to 20% in a US-biotechnology company is a normal phenomenon” (Anonymous 
Interviewee 1). The same happened in the case of GTI. Nearly everybody from 
the senior management left, whereas nearly all of the researchers and scientists 
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stayed in the company, because “under Novartis the money that was available for 
good programs was much more than the money that we were able to raise in the 
public stock market” (Anonymous Interviewee 2). More generally speaking, if a 
special biotechnology company – as long as not being integrated into a big group 
– has a failure in clinical trials than it will get in big trouble, perceive pressure 
from the capital markets, and is also forced to lay off people. Later, if there is 
again a positive development, they will have to hire again. A big group like 
Novartis can provide much more stability. Before the final merger with Novartis, 
there had been several rounds of ups and downs for SyStemix as well as for GTI.  
“Besides the management group, few people left, because they felt they had good 
opportunities. Perhaps we had a little increase in turnover at GTI, I don’t know, 
except for the senior level. For research scientists it was good, because of the 
better resources they received.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
The human resource management at both companies was adjusted according to 
the specific Novartis’ conditions in the U.S. market. This bears one important 
problem. SyStemix as well as GTI had stock option programs, in which “virtually 
everybody in the company participated” (Anonymous Interviewee 2). In contrast 
to this, a big pharmaceutical company has far less, more restricted stock options 
programs, but better pension plans. In the case of SyStemix, it was observed that 
especially younger people rather go for stock options, whereas the older ones 
prefer secure pension plans and a securer job. Consequently, as far as the 
recruitment was concerned, one third of the applicants wanted to get stock 
options, which they did not receive, and hence, rejected the job offer. At GTI, 
people were in a first step quite happy with ‘losing’ their stock options, because 
all the options were immediately vested and people received a lot of money at 
once, they otherwise would have had to wait for five years. After that ‘stock 
options’ were limited to about 20% of the people. Moreover, these were not real 
stock options but stock appreciation rights. People also started to complain about 
it, because 
“stock options are part of the culture in the U.S. In fact, it was something that 
changed the culture, because before everybody at GTI had stock options. You got a 
new secretary and after six months she got stock. [...] Having Sandoz coming in 
made everybody vesting immediately, that was a big deal. [...] But then, the fact 
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that only a small percentage of the people got stock options, and it wasn’t real 
stock options, it was called stock appreciation rights, it was a sour point that not 
so many people got them.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
Further realignments took place during the consolidation between SyStemix and 
GTI. Again, there have been a few replacements on a voluntary and unvoluntary 
base. A few senior managers had to leave the company due to the fact that some 
departments were harmonized by establishing bigger units. E.g., at GTI two units 
existed, Development and Operations & Manufacturing, and each of them had a 
VP and 30-40 employees. At SyStemix, there were two similar units in which 30 
employees worked in Development and approximately 100 employees worked in 
Operations. This leads to a total number of four VPs, not really communicating 
with each other, because of everybody trying to be the most successful and 
important one among them. During the consolidation between SyStemix and GTI 
these four separate units were put together to one unit. What is interesting in this 
context is that all employees who got an offer to move to the other site preferred 
to remain at the same location. Novartis had to recognize that people did not want 
to move from the west to the east coast or the other way round. 
“This is really an important aspect. You can acquire people with their knowledge 
and technology, but both are very closely related to a specific site. You can’t 
transfer neither people nor technology. [...] As long as you keep up the site 
knowledge remains more or less within the site.” (Anonymous Interviewee 1) 
Organization of the integration process 
The next interesting topic is the organization of the integration process itself. In 
the case of SyStemix – as well as in the case of GTI – there was no real big 
integration plan or integration structure set in place.  
“After the acquisition, there was no real integration plan. A few people were sent 
to Palo Alto in order to ensure a smooth transition. At the final consolidation 
between SyStemix and GTI there we had a strict integration plan, but not at the 
first integration after the acquisition.” (Anonymous Interviewee 1) 
As already pointed out during the description of the organizational integration at 
the beginning, a few senior managers from Novartis were sent to SyStemix in 
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order to make the people familiar with the processes, procedures and systems in 
place. Some of them became part of the board, and they were also the persons 
responsible for the organization of the integration process. This was realized by 
sending experienced senior managers from Novartis to SyStemix in order to help 
them to adjust their organization according to the specific needs of the mother 
company and learn from each other by working together on a day-to-day base. 
This exchange did not only take place on a top and senior management level, but 
also included middle management as well as scientists – although this was not 
really part of the integration process, but in fact made the whole process easier. In 
this context, Novartis realized that is not that easy to find the right persons, 
because many of them have children required to attend school and are not truly 
ready to leave. Moreover, the younger ones do not have enough experience and 
knowledge about the organization in order to do this kind of job and to ensure a 
smooth organizational integration. In the case of GTI, the situation was quite 
similar. There were also some executives coming from Novartis to GTI helping 
them on a day-to-day base to get acquainted with the systems and structures in 
place.  
In addition to the different topics mentioned there are also some other important 
points to consider. First, it is very difficult or even almost impossible to say 
whether the companies would have been more successful without having been 
acquired and integrated in Novartis or not. 
“I often thought: If we had not been bought by Sandoz/Novartis, I probably would 
have had to lay off people anyway, because of the stock markets. It was very 
difficult to raise money and if you look at all the other gene therapy companies, 
they all went through that. So, I don’t have any illusions about how it would have 
been so much easier without the acquisition. I think you can say that in some ways 
it could have been worse, if Novartis didn’t have bought the company. [...] Without 
question with the help of Novartis we were able to set up some packages in order 
to ensure a reasonable transition without panicking about it.” (Anonymous 
Interviewee 2) 
What becomes clear from that statement is that Novartis could give some stability 
to that situation. The second point, which is in close connection with the first one, 
is that it is really very difficult to evaluate a specific technology and make 
reliable projections about their potential development. It is always a decision 
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under high uncertainty, because one does not know about the outcome of a 
technology. In the case of SyStemix, Novartis also had to realize that they created 
a very positive image of themselves during the Due Diligence process as part of 
the selling. Novartis has more than 1000 academics in Research all over the 
world. There is at least one million of researchers and every company can only 
cover a certain (small) percentage of the possible research. And by this, the 
probability for a discovery in external research facilities is of course higher than 
internally. Thus, one has to observe where the major trends are and to decide 
where it is worth starting to engage, while being aware of the fact that there is a 
lot of risk involved in such a decision. Third, if one looks at the know-how, the 
patents and the technologies before and a few years after the merger, then it is 
undeniable that a lot of knowledge and technologies simply has been stopped and 
thus is lost, because it was decided to focus on the most advanced projects. 
Fourth, comparing these two acquisitions Novartis learned “that you can do such 
an acquisition [the acquisition of GTI] with far less money than they did in the 
deal with SyStemix” (Anonymous Interviewee 2). Thus, the two overall questions 
for evaluating such a deal are: 
“I think a company like Novartis is still evaluating: ‘Do we need to control the 
whole company in order to get the maximum benefit?’ And the other question is: 
‘When do you need control?’ But, you can’t make a straight statement about that. 
You need to look at each company case by case, what is the technology, what is the 
timing etc.” (Anonymous Interviewee 2) 
3.4.2 Within-case analysis 
This section – again – tries to analyze and draw some conclusions from the given 
data as a step towards building theory from case study research. The framework 
for performing the within-case analysis is the same as already used in the two 
within-case analyses before. Compared with the other cases the specialty of this 
case is the analysis of two acquisitions by one company in a complementing 
technological field, Novartis’ acquisitions of SyStemix and Genetic Therapy 
(GTI), which finally were consolidated under one roof. The analytical focus of 
this section, however, lays on the integration and collaboration activities 
subsequent to each respective acquisition and not on the analysis of the 
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consolidation process between SyStemix and GTI. However, the latter integration 
process is used in order to add a further perspective when making a useful 
contribution and to give the appropriate, overall picture of these two cases.  
As far as the motives for the acquisition were concerned, the one major, 
underlying motive for both acquisitions lays in the fact, that biotechnology is a 
very important area for Novartis, in which they will play an important role. 
Furthermore, in the case of SyStemix, Novartis considered gene therapy as a very 
promising technology with great growth potential, in which it wanted to get a 
critical mass immediately. In other words, they had a patent which was expected 
to become very valuable and thus a potential blockbuster. Apart from that, 
Novartis needed to gain control over SyStemix after having had some serious 
problems in handling the company. Besides the access to the technology, the final 
acquisition of GTI took place, because it was in the middle of a clinical Phase 
II/III and Novartis hoped to get another potential blockbuster. Taking all this into 
account, the two major motives for the acquisitions emerge. First, there is the 
more general motive for the acquisitions, the perceived need of being active in 
the biotechnology sector and, by this, participating in the expected growth 
potential of this industry. Thus, this can be considered as the overall, long-term 
orientated strategic rationale behind these decisions. The second, more short-term 
orientated motive was the hope of getting a blockbuster within a shorter period 
time and, by this, making more profit and paying off the investments made.  
From the point of view of the biotechnology companies the reasons why they 
accepted the takeover bid was: (1) getting access to vast research resources and 
knowledge provided by Novartis, (2) getting financial support in order to stabilize 
the company’s situation, and (3) receiving help with regulatory authorities while 
carrying out a Phase III clinical study. 
Having analyzed and accepted these motives on both side, the question is how to 
manage the integration and encourage the two parties in their collaboration that 
these motives also turn into reality. This needs to be done in realizing the relevant 
integration topics of organizational/structural integration, knowledge/competence 
integration and transfer, cultural integration, as well as personnel integration.  
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Although not quite obvious at a first glance, there are two different levels of 
organizational integration that can be distinguished. After the final acquisition of 
SyStemix as well as GTI they were both integrated into the international project 
teams, which combined people from them, as well as Novartis, and these teams 
also reported directly to the Board in Basel. However, this kind of integration was 
only focused on the most advanced projects of GTI as well as SyStemix, those 
projects which were in Phase II and III of clinical trials and thus had the potential 
of becoming a blockbuster. Following this kind of integration strategy Novartis 
tried to gain a certain degree of control over the last steps during clinical trials. 
The major task in this context was to manage the combination effectively. As a 
result, the project teams combined the technology and product know-how from 
SyStemix respectively GTI with the knowledge about regulatory affairs and 
Phase III clinical trials of Novartis. With this combination they were able to carry 
out the Phase III clinical studies much faster than the small biotechnology 
companies could have ever done on their own. This integration approach was 
chosen in order to realize Novartis’ short-time motive of getting a blockbuster.  
Apart from that, there was also a second strategy, which was indeed not quite 
obvious. During the first consolidation step between SyStemix and GTI, all areas 
were supposed to be combined – development, operations, functions and 
administration – with the exception of the research units. It was explicitly stated 
that they should retain their autonomy and continue to operate at full strength at 
each site as they did before. This integration strategy tries to preserve the 
independence of the two research units. Furthermore, this integration approach is 
perfectly in line with the second major, long-time orientated motive of the 
acquisition, the goal of being active in the biotechnology industry and 
participating in its growth potential. This strategy can only be realized if some 
parts of Novartis, in this case SyStemix and GTI, carry out research on their own 
and, by this, retain access to the scientific communities and expertise on both 
coasts. 
Having these two different integration approaches in mind, it is now necessary to 
have a closer look at how the various organizational elements were combined 
during the integration process. From a strategy-making and financial 
reporting/budgeting perspective both acquired companies, SyStemix and GTI, 
were directly responsible to the respective board member in Basel and they also 
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had to undergo the same review processes for their projects as they were part of 
the Research Management Board, where all projects needed to be approved. Of 
course, freedom is granted in how they perform the basic research on a day-to-
day base. However, the overall strategic decision about what projects in which 
therapeutic field will be continued is made during these board meetings. This also 
reveals that there is a kind of cut in responsibility depending on what step of the 
pharmaceutical value chain is looked at. During the early stages of research the 
responsibility laid in the hands of the acquired biotechnology companies. But the 
closer a product gets to the final phases in clinical trials the more control and 
responsibility is taken over from the headquarter in Basel which is also very well 
reflected in the two different integration approaches. Hence, the degree of 
autonomy granted depends on the position of the project in the pharmaceutical 
value chain.  
At Novartis, the management was aware of the fact that the introduction of the 
project management and the reporting system is not that easy. In order to make 
the people at SyStemix and GTI familiar with the systems, processes and 
procedures in place at Novartis, experienced managers from the headquarter went 
to the different sites and trained and helped the people locally to handle these 
new things. 
Another important topic in the post-acquisition context is the possible access and 
transfer of knowledge. Referring to the quotation of Wolfgang Samo, Novartis’ 
former head of Agribusiness, in which he emphasizes that every company in this 
industry needs to have a basic biotech know-how, one might draw the obvious 
conclusion that the acquired knowledge and technologies will be transferred from 
the acquired biotech companies to Novartis. Instead, in both cases the transfer of 
knowledge was not carried out, it was not even intended. Both interview partners 
stated that there was neither a technology nor a knowledge transfer. Of course, 
there was some kind of ‘basic exchange’ by the presentations held at the meetings 
of the Research Management Board or by scientists from Basel being at 
SyStemix or GTI on job rotation, because they had a personal, scientific interest 
in it. However, there was never the idea of systematically transferring the 
knowledge or the technology.  
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Having a closer look at this phenomenon the explanation is relatively easy. 
Through the acquisitions GTI and SyStemix became integrated in Novartis, 
which means that they were part of the structure and that every unit within 
Novartis might get access to their knowledge and technologies, if necessary. This 
is also stated in the quotation of Anonymous Interviewee 1 who pointed out that 
Novartis as an global company can keep the knowledge wherever it is. E.g., GTI 
considered itself as a center of excellence for gene therapy and vector technology 
within Novartis. If another unit of Novartis has a request linked with gene 
therapy or possible applications of vector technology in a different segment, it is 
GTI who will support them by solving a specific technological problem for them. 
This was e.g. done in the field of transplantation from animal organs to humans. 
But, the basic knowledge and technology remained within GTI.  
Apart from that, Anonymous Interviewee 1 made another very important remark 
concerning the transfer of knowledge. The value of a specific knowledge and 
technology is closely related to a specific site which emphasizes the importance 
of the geographical aspect of knowledge and the fact that the special knowledge 
and technology applied in biotechnology are embedded in some kind of local 
network. Without this embeddedness it will get lost. In other words, this would 
even deny any possible flow and transfer of knowledge and technology beyond 
such a local network. 
The above paragraphs have already contained some surprises as far as the non-
transfer of knowledge and technologies is concerned. From a cultural point of 
view there are also two dimensions which need to be distinguished, one of them 
providing a big surprise. First, there is the difference in the country culture 
between the U.S. and European based Novartis. In both cases this difference did 
not play an important role, because both sides were used to work in an 
international environment consisting of different people from different cultures. 
What is even a little bit more surprising was the fact that there were difficulties in 
both consolidation efforts between SyStemix and GTI in which people from both 
sides were reluctant in moving from the east to the west coast, in the first 
consolidation, or the other way round, in the second consolidation step.  
Second, this case analysis reveals that the cultural gap between big pharma and 
small biotech is much more important and also provides some interesting 
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insights. As a result of the acquisition by Novartis most of the top/senior 
management of the small biotechs left, because the local management was no 
longer expected in making common decisions, taking huge risks and acting in an 
entrepreneurial way. The question which consequently arises is why they are no 
longer expected to act that way. During the case description two quotations were 
cited which give a preliminary answer to that question. First, both companies – 
and after the consolidation only GTI – have finally turned into Novartis research 
facilities as far as the research field is concerned. Here, they were granted a 
relatively high degree of autonomy in carrying out their research, while the 
overall research strategy is agreed upon during the meetings of the Research 
Management Board. Carrying out this basic research does not necessarily imply 
that the researchers need to have an entrepreneurial spirit. In fact, they do not 
need to have that spirit. However, what they definitely need to have is the spirit 
of discovery. This basic spirit of discovery is independent from the fact of being 
entrepreneurial or not, which is also emphasized in the quotation of the 
Anonymous Interviewee 2 who stated that  
“whatever entrepreneurial spirit that exists at the research facilities of Novartis 
all around the world, the same spirit exists at GTI. That’s different from being an 
independent company. I am not saying that the spirit of discovery is gone”. 
It is obvious that the entrepreneurial spirit and the spirit of discovery are two 
separated things. The entrepreneurial spirit of the company was gone at that 
moment when Novartis took over the responsibility and control over the Phase 
II/III clinical trials and the senior management of GTI left, because they were no 
longer needed to carry out this task. Furthermore, Novartis was aware of the fact 
that this was a development which cannot be stopped. In some way, it even was 
expected and of course also accepted due to the fact that the ultimate goal was to 
carry out the clinical Phase III with all regulatory requirements as quickly as 
possible and, by this, bringing a new therapy for a disease to the market. That is 
indeed something in which Novartis is by far better than a small biotechnology 
company, because in this field it has a lot of experience a small biotechnology 
company simply does not have, because they have never done this before. This 
special kind of entrepreneurial spirit is no longer needed, because now it is ‘only’ 
a question of efficiently and effectively carrying out these clinical trials in a given 
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framework. This is also perfectly in line with the short-term motive and the 
corresponding integration strategy Novartis applied. They aimed at getting a 
blockbuster as quickly as possible and therefore voted for the immediate 
integration of these steps, i.e. as far as these late-stage projects of clinical trials 
were concerned. Thus, they sacrificed the entrepreneurial spirit for the goal of 
bringing a product to the market. That is a simple trade-off question and from the 
strategic point of view of Novartis, probably the best they could do. It is a 
completely other question whether such a decision is for better or worse for the 
future survival or the entrepreneurial spirit of the small biotechnology company. 
In this case the question is not about keeping up the entrepreneurial spirit of the 
biotechnology companies, instead, it is about the ultimate objective of how 
developing a therapy for a disease and bringing it to the market as quickly as 
possible. From this point of view, the entrepreneurial spirit does not matter 
anymore. For the realization of their long-term goal of being active in 
biotechnology and retaining access to the scientific communities and expertise in 
biotechnology, the existing spirit of discovery is sufficient. 
This cultural change is also reflected in the reactions of the employees at both 
companies. In order to evaluate this it is necessary to mention again that a 
fluctuation of up to 20% is a common thing in a U.S. biotechnology company. As 
far as the top management of GTI and SyStemix was concerned nearly all people 
left, except one or two persons who were needed in order to ensure a smooth 
transition. These executives received good offers in order to make them stay. 
Besides this, some senior managers were sent from Novartis to the newly 
acquired companies in order to make their staff familiar with the new systems in 
place. The reaction of the top management of the small biotech companies is 
quite normal and comprehensible, since they do not want to be part of a large 
organization and only ‘implement the orders’ provided by the headquarter in 
Basel. Instead, they want to keep up their entrepreneurial drive, make decisions 
on their own, and take over the necessary responsibility. Thus, it is not very 
surprising that many of them preferred to leave in order to look for a new 
challenge. And in fact, with the regard to the ultimate objective of bringing a new 
product to the market they are no longer needed. Novartis only needed to make 
sure that there were one or two of the former top executives who remained in the 
company in order to act as some kind of integration managers and to realize a 
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smooth transition by providing some stability and continuity – and that was what 
they did.  
From the point of view of the researchers there was no big change anyway. These 
people were not really driven by an entrepreneurial spirit, but by a spirit of 
discovery hoping to receive the Nobel laureate. Hence, they could continue to do 
what they had always been doing, research. Furthermore, their situation got even 
better, because they had access to the vast resources at Novartis which made their 
work more efficient and easier. By this, the researchers perfectly fulfilled the 
expectations Novartis had vis-à-vis them. To sum up, these cultural alignments 
and the reactions of the employees fit absolutely with Novartis’ motives 
connected with the acquisitions. 
Another crucial issue which needs to be discussed in this context is the question 
of stock options. Both companies, SyStemix as well as GTI, had issued stock 
option plans as incentive systems. In fact, it was even more as an incentive 
system, because stock options are rather considered as being part of the culture in 
U.S. companies, especially in entrepreneurial driven biotechnology start-ups. Not 
having or not offering stock options makes it difficult for an acquirer, because – 
and that is also an important point – it affects afterwards the general atmosphere 
in the company. In the concrete moment when the company is taken over and 
people ‘lose’ their stock options by immediately vesting all of them, they may 
receive a lot of money, as  they otherwise – if anyway – would have to wait for a 
more few years. At that particular point in time, they like vesting their stock 
options. But, when all the options are gone and only a few people from senior 
management receive some kind of options, it changes the overall atmosphere and 
relationships in the company.  
In addition to that, SyStemix had also a problem in recruiting young people, 
because they expected to get stock options. However, this is a general problem 
for European groups acquiring a U.S.-based company which cannot easily be 
solved. Thus, that is something these companies have to live and cope with. Apart 
from that, it is also a consequence from the change in ownership which goes 
along with a change in the company culture and, of course, also in the way people 
get paid. On the other hand, big pharmaceutical companies have of course 
something else to offer. Being employed by a big pharmaceutical company 
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implies that people’s job security is higher and that they also provide better 
pension plans. These are two things some of the employees do appreciate. In the 
end, it is therefore a trade-off question. 
Having discussed and analyzed the different integration topics it is also necessary 
to depict the organization of the integration process itself. First, there is the 
subject of responsibility and support for the acquisition decisions. From the case 
description it became obvious that there was full support from the headquarter’s 
management board. The reporting was also done to the respective board member. 
The integration itself was carried out by sending two to three senior managers 
from Novartis to the acquired companies, who partly became member of the 
respective board in order to make them familiar with the systems and processes in 
place at Novartis. In fact, these persons took over the tasks of an integration 
manager. However, there was no real integration plan established, instead, the 
people of SyStemix and GTI were trained on a learning-by-doing base. Moreover, 
their heads of Research and Clinical trials joined the Research Management 
Board, respectively the clinical trial group. The decision about what projects were 
to be continued and what projects were to be terminated was carried out in a 
common review, so that both sides agreed upon that. Nonetheless, the problem 
was that they were floating around and people at the two companies also resisted 
to become part of Novartis at the beginning, which reveals that an integration 
plan with clearly defined measures and targets was missing. Apart from that, they 
resisted, because they expected to be more independent, a fact which also was 
either not really decided upon, at the very beginning, or was not communicated. 
The existence of an integration plan could have made that much easier.  
At the end of this within-case analysis a few more remarks are necessary, because 
in the end it turned out that the acquisition of SyStemix did not pay off. This 
shows that it is very difficult to evaluate such a technology and their potential 
during the Due Diligence process. Furthermore, the Phase III clinical study of 
GTI had to be stopped as well. As a consequence of these failures, Novartis 
decided to consolidate the two companies and finally even came up with the 
decision of closing SyStemix completely. Only Novartis was able to carry out the 
decision of shutting down SyStemix, because this is a decision SyStemix itself – 
as a publicly traded company – could never have made. The senior managers of a 
publicly traded company could never do that, instead they would keep ‘running 
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around and trying to muddle through’. Under Novartis’ ownership it was possible 
to make that decision, because from their perspective it is ‘just a question of an 
effective resource allocation’ and, hence, the decision about further investments 
in a specific project or not. From Novartis’ point of view it was not a question 
about the future survival of the company. They had to take a bigger picture into 
account and had to decide about a good resource allocation bringing them closer 
to the ultimate goal of developing a new therapy or medicament/remedy for a 
disease. This leads to the conclusion that such an acquisition is in some way only 
considered as an investment project that pays off or not. Provided that this project 
does not pay off, there will be no further money and the project will be 
terminated. 
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3.5 The case of Bayer Diagnostics Corp. – Chiron Diagnostics Corp. 
The objective of this case is to describe the post-acquisition integration of Chiron 
Diagnostics into the organizational structure of Bayer Diagnostics Group. Firstly, 
a brief general corporate profile of Bayer with a specific focus on its Diagnostics 
Group will be presented. The corporate profile of Chiron Diagnostics and its 
parent company Chiron Corp. will be depicted along with the history of Bayer 
Diagnostics. Secondly, the case will focus on the description of Chiron 
Diagnostics’ integration into the structure of Bayer’s Diagnostic business group.38 
Thirdly, there will be the within-case analysis. This case is in some ways 
different, but, at the same time, also very similar to the other three cases. It is 
similar, because, at least to a certain extent, it treats the integration of a 
biotechnology company in the structure of a big health-care focused company. 
However, it diverges, because the integration of the specific biotech business is 
only one particular part of it, as most of the integration is about the integration of 
the more ‘traditional’ diagnostics business of Chiron Diagnostics, which 
consisted to 90% of the former Ciba Corning Diagnostics Corporation. 
Nevertheless in each statistic or overview, either from Goldman Sachs (2000), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999a), Burrill & Company (2000) or Recombinant 
Capital about M&A activities between pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies, this case is referred to as being a pharma-to-biotech deal. Thus, this 
case even combines two different perspectives, one dealing with the ‘common’ 
integration activities of a big integration and the other emphasizing the biotech 
integration activities, which – as we will see during the case description and the 
within-case analysis afterwards – can be very well compared with the other cases. 
 
 
                                              
38  This case study draws on one preliminary discussion with an executive from Bayer as well 
as on a transcribed interview with two executives from Bayer Diagnostics. Furthermore, 
this case is based on annual reports, form 10-Ks/Qs, public speeches, press releases by all 
companies named herein, the biotechnology information service Recombinant Capital 
(http//:www.recap.com) as well as analysts’ reports. 
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Corporate profiles 
Originally, Bayer was founded in 1863 under the name ‘Friedrich Bayer et 
comp.’ in the town of Barmen, situated in the industrial Ruhr region. In its early 
years, the company developed and produced dyestuffs, but quickly added other 
chemicals to its product line. The year 1888 marked the entry into 
pharmaceuticals, when a by-product of dyestuffs was marketed as medicine. In 
1896 systematic pharmaceutical research began with the establishment of the 
company’s first pharmaceutical laboratory. European as well as North American 
markets were entered early in the company’s history. In 1865, only two years 
after its establishment, Bayer purchased an interest in a coal tar dye plant in 
Albany, NY. Like most German companies, Bayer experienced setbacks in its 
international operations after World War I and World War II. After World War I 
Bayer’s name, the Bayer-Cross trademark, and the product name Aspirin were 
confiscated by the United States. Only in 1994 did Bayer regain the rights to its 
name in the U.S. through the acquisition of the OTC drug business of Sterling 
Winthrop. 
Nowadays, Bayer is represented with about 350 companies in virtually every 
country of the world. Business activities are concentrated in Europe, North 
America and the Far East. Of the company’s 120,000 employees about 58% work 
in Europe, 20% in North America, 8% in Latin America, and 14% in Asia, 
Australia, and Africa. In fiscal 2000 Bayer reported a net income of EURO 1.8 
billion on sales of EURO 31 billion. Europe accounted for 42% of Sales, North 
America for 31%, Asia/Pacific for 16% and Latin America, Africa and Middle 
East for 11%. In 2000, Bayer spent a total of EURO 2.4 billion on research and 
development, of which EURO 1.4 billion was spent in the Health Care segment. 
The annual reports for fiscal 1998 and 1999 emphasize that continued growth in 
the important markets of North America and Asia is expected relative to Europe. 
Moreover, by 2010 Bayer expects to generate 25-30% of global sales in Asia. 
Bayer is organized as a diversified chemical and pharmaceutical group offering 
over 10,000 different products in four business segments. The responsibilities for 
the business operations rest within different business groups. Figure 21 provides 
an overview of the group’s organization.  
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Figure 21: Bayer AG organization 
The diagnostics business of Bayer has its U.S. roots in the 1978 acquired Miles, 
Inc., a company having been among the pioneers of the diagnostics industry. 
Already in 1941, Miles revolutionized in vitro diagnostics, when it launched 
Clinitest effervescent urine sugar testing tablets as the first convenient and 
accurate test to detect the presence of sugar in urine. In 1964, Miles scientists 
developed Dextrostix, the first dry reagent blood sugar test, enabling people with 
diabetes to monitor blood sugar levels quickly at home. Also at the beginning of 
the 1940s, Technicon Instruments Corporation developed the Autotechnicon, a 
tissue processing instrument, that introduced automation to the histology 
laboratory. Later, in 1957, the first fully automated blood chemistry analyzer 
(Autoanalyzer) was developed based on a newly discovered continuous flow 
technology.  
In 1989, Miles, Inc., acquired Technicon in order to expand its existing range of 
diagnostics systems. Miles provided the ability to take complex chemistry and 
make it available in a series of simple, easy-to-use test systems, whereas 
Technicon offered a wealth of engineering and electronic capabilities that allows 
a sophisticated piece of equipment to perform thousands of tests quickly and 
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accurately. The 1994 acquisition by Miles of Sterling Winthrop’s North America 
over-the-counter drug business – as already mentioned before – returned to Bayer 
the rights of the Bayer cross and the Bayer name in North America. 
Ciba Corning Diagnostics was already formed in 1985 as a joint venture between 
Corning, Inc., and Ciba-Geigy. The company was acquired by Chiron Corp. in 
1995 as part of a strategic partnership formed between Ciba Geigy (now: 
Novartis) and Chiron, a leader in successful commercialization of biotechnology 
products. Chiron Corp., headquartered in Emeryville, CA, is a leading 
biotechnology company that participates in three global healthcare markets: 
therapeutics, vaccines and blood testing. In support of these businesses, Chiron 
conducts research and development in the fields of biological proteins, gene 
therapy and combinatorial chemistry. In contrast to this, Ciba Corning had 
revolutionized critical care diagnostic testing by creating the first automated 
blood gas system. Moreover, the company’s technological track record includes 
innovations such as the first immunoassay using glass beads as a solid phase and 
a magnetic separation method. Chiron’s scientific and medical leadership 
provided Chiron Diagnostics with the opportunity to bring exciting new 
proprietary molecular diagnostic technology, such as branched DNA probe 
diagnostics, to the healthcare market. These bDNA assays are expected to 
enhance significantly patient treatment by measuring the level of virus or viral 
load in the body. This technology is currently used with patients infected with 
HIV or the Hepatitis C Virus. Chiron Diagnostics was headquartered in Walpole, 
MA, employed approximately 3,300 people, had 22 sales subsidiaries and had 
revenues of $500 million in 1997. Finally in 1998, Bayer Diagnostics and Chiron 
Diagnostics combined to form the new Bayer Diagnostics.  
Bayer Diagnostics has a decentralized organization with five business segments 
having the worldwide responsibility for their specific segment and product lines 
and also focusing on product development, marketing strategies, and global 
business strategies. These organizational structure is already the result of the 
integration with Chiron Diagnostics. The business segments are Self-Testing, 
Near Patient Testing, Critical Care Testing, Nucleic Acid Diagnostics (NAD) and 
Laboratory Testing. By this, Bayer Diagnostics covers the three major industry 
market segments Self-Testing, Point-of-Care Testing and Laboratory Testing, 
which means that five business segments are serving three customer segments. 
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Furthermore, four regions have the responsibility for defined geographic areas 
including products and services of all business segments. These four regions are 
Europe, Japan, North America and Regions of the World (ROW). The different 
functional areas include Finance/Controlling/Administration, Strategic 
Planning/Business Development/Communications, Human Resources, Quality 
Assurance/Regulatory Affairs and Legal support. The company has more than 50 
branch offices, seven major manufacturing plants and an extensive distribution 
network covering over 100 countries. In fiscal 2000, the Bayer Diagnostics 
Group increased sales by 17% to EURO 2 billion compared with EURO 1.7 
billion in 1999. 
3.5.1 Case description 
Acquisition process and motives 
The merger between Bayer Diagnostics and Chiron Diagnostics was announced 
in mid-September 1998 and finalized on the 30th of November 1998. Bayer 
Diagnostics bought Chiron Diagnostics in a deal worth $1.1 billion in cash plus 
licensing and royalty fees from certain intellectual property pertaining to hepatitis 
C and HIV for use in nucleic acid diagnostics worldwide. This deal enabled 
Bayer to increase its share of the world diagnostics market from 6.5% to 10% by 
consolidating its position in the medical laboratory diagnostics, emergency 
healthcare and diabetes self-monitoring markets. Bayer and Chiron have 
complementary ranges. Chiron is present in the immunodiagnostics, molecular 
biology, infectious diseases diagnostics and blood gas monitoring markets. Bayer 
covers the whole diagnostics market, with the exception of microbiology. The 
diagnostics market is characterized by an overall growth of 5-6% per year, while 
several high-growth segments such as NAD with +20%, cancer with +15% and 
Diabetes with +13% can be identified. In 1999 – after the acquisition – Bayer 
Diagnostics ranked 4th on the world in the in-vitro diagnostics market behind 
Roche Diagnostics (16.8% of the market), Abbott (15.8%) and Johnson and 
Johnson (11.7%). It ranked 5th on the laboratory analysis market, which – 
although being the largest market – is the least profitable one. On the health care 
and emergency care market it ranked 3rd, as it did on the promising self-
monitoring market (where growth is 13% per year). However, until 2003 Bayer 
Diagnostics hopes to achieve a total of 15% market share.  
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The acquisition of Chiron Diagnostics was part of an overall strategic planning 
project, which had been carried out a few years before and which led to the 
conclusion that Bayer Diagnostics needed to get a broader portfolio by some kind 
of partnership agreement or acquisitions in order to remain competitive in the 
future. This plan had also been approved and was supported by the Management 
Board of the Bayer Group in Leverkusen. The importance and contribution of the 
Diagnostics Business for the health-care segment can best be expressed in the 
words of Dr. Gerald Wagner, previous Head of Laboratory Diagnostics in 
Bayer’s Diagnostics Business Group (Bayer AG, 1999, p. 85): 
“Early diagnosis of a disease can mean considerably lower treatment costs, a 
shorter hospital stay, or can even make the difference between life and death in an 
extreme case.” 
From the point of view of Bayer Diagnostics the merger between Bayer 
Diagnostics and Chiron Diagnostics was carried out because of several reasons, 
which also represent the strategic rationale behind the decision. First, it was a 
question of getting a critical mass. Due to a consolidation process the diagnostics 
market has become less fragmented with Roche’s acquisition of Boehringer 
Mannheim, the merger between Beckman and Coulter, Johnson & Johnson’s 
purchase of Kodak’s diagnostics business, as well as the merger between Dade 
and Behring. In order to remain a global player and to become among the top-
three players, Bayer Diagnostics had to react. Second, Bayer Diagnostics had 
some new products coming along and, hence, they intended to broaden the 
customer base, especially in the area of Point-of-Care Testing. Third, Chiron 
Diagnostics was active in several business areas, particularly the Nucleic Acid 
Diagnostics (NAD)39 based on Chiron’s know-how in biotechnology, in which 
Bayer was not in. By this, Bayer could get access to new, valuable technologies 
and enter a fast-expanding and very promising field, which is based on 
biotechnology know-how and is expected to play a dominant role in the detection 
                                              
39  ‘Branched DNA technology’ is the basic technology used for nucleic acid diagnostics, also 
referred to as NAD-business in the following paragraphs. With the help of these 
technologies it is possible to determine the viral load in serum and plasma much quicker 
than before. 
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and monitoring of infectious diseases and cancer in a market with estimated 
annual growth rates of 20%. Fourth, there were also many synergies and 
complementarities between the two companies which were to bring annual cost 
savings of about $120 million from 2001 on by consolidating manufacturing and 
R&D activities and locations in order to increase efficiency and reduce 
manufacturing costs.  
Chiron Corp., the mother company, on the other hand, wanted to refocus their 
activities on their core business (biotechnology) and improve their long-term 
performance, so that they were divesting some specific businesses (Chiron Vision 
to Bausch & Lomb, the controls business to BioRad and its electrophoresis 
business to Helena Labs), established cost improvement programs, started with 
the rationalization of manufacturing capacities and launched a program to focus 
on R&D activities. For Chiron, which received its diagnostics unit through the 
deal with Novartis, the diagnostics business provided two advantages. On the one 
hand, this business unit served as a revenue earner, because, in contrast to the rest 
of the company, it made money from the very beginning on. On the other hand, 
Chiron also had the branched DNA technology, but had no vehicle to bring it to 
the market, until they got the diagnostics arm. However, after their first drug 
started to kick-off and earn revenues, the diagnostics business took too much 
management attention and was even a completely different sort of business with 
far lower margins than the pharmaceutical business, so that they finally lost their 
interest in diagnostics and came up with the decision to refocus on what they 
were really good at – biotechnology.  
Organizational integration 
The organizational integration of Chiron Diagnostics was carried out for each 
segment (NAD, Immunodiagnostics, Point-of-Care) in a different way. But, 
before focusing on the integration of the different segments a few other things 
such as the organization of the first layer of management needed to be done. 
After that, the turn was at the three segments of Chiron Diagnostics. In order to 
realize this they were putting teams together in all segments, regions, disciplines 
and functions which closely worked together. Although it was Bayer Diagnostics 
who acquired Chiron Diagnostics there was no predominance from the part of 
Bayer during the integration process. The merger was rather carried out as a 
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‘merger of equals’ than a straightforward acquisition with a dominance from the 
part of Bayer. As far as the organizational integration of the three segments is 
concerned, it quickly became quite clear that each of these segments needed to be 
handled in a different way.  
First, there was the decision about the integration of the Immunodiagnostics, 
segment located in Walpole, MA. It was quite obvious that these activities would 
be put together very quickly due to the fact that Bayer and Chiron Diagnostics 
complemented each other especially well in this respective field. On the 
immunoassay side the instruments were complementary as well as the market 
focus, and the applied technologies were quite similar. In this segment, 
Tarrytown, NY, the headquarter of Bayer Diagnostics, was chosen as the 
headquarter, and two plants had to be closed. As far as the manufacturing in the 
critical care segment was concerned the manufacturing activities were transferred 
from the Chiron plant in Medfield, MA, to the former Chiron facility in Sudbury, 
England, whereas in the field of the automated lab testing instruments the Bayer 
plant in Oberlin, OH, was closed and the manufacturing was transferred to 
Chiron’s manufacturing site in Walpole, MA. Apart from that, Bayer sold its 
facility in Middletown, VA, with the possibility of continuing a Bayer supply 
agreement for reagents. This plant has manufactured chemistry, 
immunodiagnostics and hematology reagents, most of which is after the 
acquisition produced in the Walpole, MA, site. Furthermore, there was also a 
very good cultural fit between these two parts, which facilitated and enabled such 
a quick integration, because this site was dominated by the former Ciba-Corning 
people and not by the Chiron people. After the successful integration of these two 
parts the company now has about 40 immuno acid test systems in the areas of 
fertility, thyroid function, oncology, cardiology, anemia, therapeutic drug 
monitoring, bone metabolism and allergy – all under one roof.  
Second, the decision about how to integrate the Point-of-Care business segment, 
which included the blood gas electrolytes from Chiron and the urine chemistry 
from Bayer, took a little bit longer. One manufacturing facility was located in the 
Boston Area and the other one in Indiana. At the beginning, it was decided that 
the activities of both sides should not be combined. Then, after some time, the 
management in the headquarter at Tarrytown felt that these activities could also 
be combined, because of some perceived synergies, both of them being about the 
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same size and a duplication of management. The responsibility for this business 
segment, which was also part of the former Ciba-Corning piece of Chiron 
Diagnostics, and, by this, also very close to the culture at Bayer Diagnostics, lays 
now in the hands of a former Chiron-Executive. The Chiron site in Boston has 
been chosen as the headquarter for this segment. 
Third, there was the Nucleic Acid Diagnostics (NAD) segment, located in 
Emeryville, CA, in the Bay Area which was the former Chiron, pure 
biotechnology driven part and, hence, quite different from the rest of the 
company. They kept the same boss as they had before the merger. Bayer 
Diagnostics’ Headquarter decided not to really interfere in the day-to-day 
business and, by this, not trying to tell them how to run that part. It was decided 
to leave the NAD business alone, as it is until today. Considered from the point of 
view of the main business areas of Bayer Diagnostics they have a ‘complete 
different life cycle in business’. This business is still very research-orientated, 
and is still very heavily influenced by the biotechnology part. Moreover, sales 
have just begun to grow from a very low basis. These people are indeed some 
kind of a little group by themselves. In the two other segments there is no longer 
the talk about ‘I am from the Bayer side and you are from the Chiron side’. 
However, this small group is quite different and much more difficult to integrate 
as they are (1) not in the same area and (2) have a completely different culture 
than the rest of the company due to the fact that they represent the original Chiron 
culture which is much more Californian, biotech- and research-orientated, and 
has nothing in common with the traditional diagnostics business. The only thing 
that has been transferred from that part was the manufacturing from Emeryville, 
CA, to Walpole, MA, but no R&D, especially core technologies. 
After the integration – irrespective of what approach was chosen – each of the 
three segments has been completely integrated in the strategy-making process as 
it is the case with each other segment of Bayer. The company is run from the 
headquarter in Tarrytown, NY, by the President of Bayer Diagnostics, Rolf 
Classon. Most of the people reporting to Mr. Classon are located in Tarrytown, 
but some are also in different locations, as it is e.g. the case for the NAD-
Business in California. From a financial, business reporting point of view every 
segment is treated alike. They all come to the same business meetings and they all 
have the same reporting systems. Nevertheless, the NAD-segment is granted 
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much more freedom on the day-to-day management, as well as on the operational 
part of the business and, to some extent, also in the decisions about strategic 
directions. As far as the IT infrastructure was concerned there had been some 
difficulties at the beginning, so that for a certain period of time both systems, 
from Bayer and Chiron, were kept parallel before they were finally integrated. 
After some adaptations and a few alignments these problems could be solved 
quite well. This was also supported by sending experts in reporting and the IT 
infrastructure from Bayer Diagnostic’s headquarter in Tarrytown to the respective 
segments in order to make the staff there familiar with the systems in use. 
Bayer Diagnostics expected that it would not be difficult to relocate some people 
in R&D from Walpole to Tarrytown. However, they made the experience that 
people prefer to stay in the same area. They have known that people do not like to 
move from the West Coast to the East Coast – and, in fact, never do that, so 
nobody from Emeryville, CA, has even been asked to – but they had been 
surprised that people were reluctant in moving from Boston to Tarrytown. 
Finally, they came up with the conclusion that such a decision was easy for them 
to make, because, in a booming economy in a booming area as the Boston area, it 
is not very difficult to find a new job. 
This relocation of people must also be considered in close connection with the 
transfer of knowledge, because the major part of the knowledge transfer was 
supposed to take place by consolidating the R&D activities. All in all, they got 
most of the knowledge they wanted to get. The biggest issue was that they lost a 
few key people. Apart from that, the transfer of knowledge was only limited to 
two of the three segments, the Immunodiagnostics and the Point-of-Care 
business. As far as the NAD business was concerned there was no knowledge 
transfer from Chiron to Bayer, because this knowledge is very specific and Bayer 
was not familiar with that kind of technology. The only thing – as already 
mentioned before – that has been transferred from Emeryville, CA, to Walpole, 
MA, were the manufacturing activities for NAD products. Thus, Emeryville will 
continue to be the home for Bayer’s NAD segment and its marketing, business 
development and R&D activities. 
During the merger Bayer did not have to lay off people. One reason for that was 
that there was a natural rate in terms of staff turnover and Bayer reacted by 
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holding back with new recruitment and replacements when people left. 
Moreover, some people left the company as already indicated in the paragraph 
above because of the planned relocation and some were offered good jobs by 
headhunters. Furthermore, Bayer had the best productivity ratio in the diagnostics 
business, whereas Chiron had a higher people to sales ratio. So, it was a good 
opportunity for Bayer to take a medium. Moreover, Bayer wanted also to keep 
Chiron’s senior management and top scientists with key knowledge in the 
company. In order to realize this these persons were offered some incentives in 
terms of bonuses, operational and financial support. One of the most crucial 
issues were stock options, because Chiron offered stock option programs, 
whereas Bayer did not. As a consequence of this, Bayer needed to offer very 
good packages in terms of salary and bonuses. In addition, they also paid some 
money in order to bridge the gap of financial losses people were facing when 
forced to exercise their stock options. The Management at Bayer Diagnostics was 
aware of the fact that stock options are part of the whole business process and 
culture in the U.S., making such an acquisition more difficult for them compared 
to some of their competitors, as such stock option programs were missing. 
Organization of the integration process 
Another major topic is how the organizational integration process itself was 
carried out. After the announcement of the acquisition a steering committee was 
established by Rolf Classon, the President of Bayer Diagnostics, that included 
Mr. Classon, some other executives from Bayer Diagnostics and from 
Leverkusen, as well as from Chiron Diagnostics. The steering committee, which 
comprised three people from Bayer and three people from Chiron, put a senior 
person in charge of the integration process, who acted as a full-time integration 
manager and reported directly to this committee. This person was the former 
Senior Vice President Finance of Bayer Diagnostics and the number ‘two’ behind 
the President. The integration process itself was carried out by 20 integration 
teams which delivered monthly reports to the integration manager. These teams 
which corresponded to the different functions and segments made 
recommendations either to the integration manager or directly to the steering 
committee. Then, the steering committee made the necessary decisions. Each of 
these teams was co-headed by one person from Bayer and one person from 
Chiron.  
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Apart from that, the integration process, whose two major tasks were (1) to 
ensure a smooth organizational integration and (2) to realize the planned 
synergies, was supported by a few outside consultants. One of them was focusing 
on the problems related to Human Resources issues, one was responsible for the 
communication and one was in charge of realizing the cost savings. The cost 
synergies were estimated at $120 million per annum by the year 2001. In order to 
realize this they brought in external consultants using a special tool and focusing 
on each specific cost synergy separately which then was assigned to the 
responsibility of one consultant. By this, the process was formalized in terms of 
clarity, objective and responsibility. Bayer is also on target with the realization of 
its costs synergies. Nevertheless, on the sales side e.g. it was much more difficult, 
because these synergies depend more on customers, competitors and the way 
people have been integrated, whereas costs synergies are more or less only an 
internal issue that can be controlled easier.  
Even if Bayer Diagnostics was double the size of Chiron in terms of sales and 
approximately also of people, the integration process was managed more like a 
merger of equals. In order to build-up and foster the common spirit between the 
two merging parts, a new vision was developed which was granted a lot of time 
and effort. The major aspect of this vision was that it was developed bottom-up 
by both parts in a common effort. By this, it was considered as being the first, 
common and successful project, which created the new and future vision, mission 
and values of the company developed by all employees.  
Bayer Diagnostics was following two basic rules or, in other words, guiding 
principles while carrying out the process of integration. First, speed in terms of 
decision-making was considered as a very crucial issue, meaning that employees 
were informed as soon as possible whether they kept their job, what kind of job 
this was and where this job was to be located. Because, if people are worried 
about their jobs, they are not focusing on customer service, instead, they are only 
focusing on the inside. Hence, the top 100 positions of the company were filed 
within 75 days and 80% of the organizational integration was done in four 
months. Second, communication was the other important point, internally as well 
as externally. Bayer had to communicate very quickly how the integration was 
supposed to take place and what the strategy was going to be, so that, on the one 
hand, employees knew and were convinced about what they were doing and, on 
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the other hand, existing as well as potential customers were very quickly aware 
about what the new company intends to do and how the new company looks like. 
Internally, there were two kinds of communication, the first one took place during 
general meetings in which Mr. Classon, the President, informed about the overall 
development of the integration process and the second one, which was considered 
more important, was the early personal face-to-face communication between the 
employees and their respective superiors in order to inform the people about their 
future tasks and position within the newly created company. 
As far as lessons learned or major problems were concerned, one subject to 
mention is that there was a product of Chiron which was about to be launched, 
but which was not ready yet, meaning technically robust enough for the market. 
Consequently, the product had to be withdrawn and it took twelve months to get 
everything fixed, which revealed Bayer that it is difficult to make projections 
during the Due Diligence process about a product in an area with which they 
were not 100% familiar. In the NAD business they acted more carefully and 
brought in some outside consultants. A few other problems occurred in the sales 
area. There, they made a few changes, relocated and refocused some sales people 
too early and underestimated the transfer of their respective expertise. Moreover, 
during the integration process the company was targeted by its competitors, 
because this integration period was regarded by them as a typical time of 
disruption, insecurity and insight focus.  
Although communication was considered as one of the most crucial issues and 
also a lot of communication was done during the first six months, it could have 
been better, because, after these first months it slowed down a bit and people on 
lower levels still waited for information about their future within the newly 
created company. Moreover, Bayer did not expect the problems in terms of 
relocation. In this case, earlier interviews and reactions from people to be 
relocated could have improved this process. Nevertheless, the overall evaluation 
from the Bayer-side was that it went as smooth as it could and that they achieved 
almost 90% of what they had set up in the beginning. 
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3.5.2 Within-case analysis 
As already mentioned at the beginning of this case, the acquisition of Chiron’s 
Diagnostics business by Bayer Diagnostics is a little bit different compared with 
the other cases. The integration and acquisition of Chiron’s biotechnology 
business is only a particular part and most of the deal is about the more 
‘traditional’ former Ciba-Corning Diagnostics. The Emeryville, biotechnology 
piece of Chiron Diagnostics only makes up about 10% of the company. Taking 
into account that Chiron Diagnostics employed approximately 3,300 employees 
and that 10% of these employees were coming from the Californian, 
biotechnology-driven part, it is just a question of using the right expression and to 
speak about the integration – not of a small biotechnology company – but about 
the integration of a small biotechnology ‘part’. Hence, this does not differ from 
the other cases. It is just another way of looking at it. This point of view is also 
supported by the fact that the three parts of what was former Chiron Diagnostics 
are treated in a more or less completely different way, as far as their basic 
integration strategy is concerned. Thus, the special analytical focus of the 
following section will be put on the integration activities concerning the 
biotechnology business. Of course, the integration of the two other parts will also 
be depicted along with that and will provide an added value by a supplementary 
perspective. 
The case description revealed four motives for the acquisition of Chiron 
Diagnostics by Bayer Diagnostics: (1) getting a critical mass, (2) broadening the 
customer base, (3) cost savings of about $120 million and (4) getting access to 
new, valuable technologies in a very promising and fast expanding segment, the 
NAD business. At a first glance, it may appear that these are four single motives. 
However, there is also another possible way of summarizing these motives by 
combining the first three motives together to one major motive and leaving the 
fourth motive as the second major motive.  
On the one hand, the first three motives combined can be considered as being a 
kind of ‘operational’ rather short-term orientated motive, because they aim at 
improving and fostering the current position of the company by reacting to the 
consolidation process in the diagnostics industry, getting access to new customers 
for products that were coming along, increasing efficiency and reducing 
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manufacturing costs. On the other hand, the NAD business did not promise any 
kind of short-time benefits. On the contrary, this business is still in the research 
phase, which means that it needs a lot of money, and has only very little sales. 
This was also quite clear to the managers at Bayer Diagnostics, who were aware 
of the fact that the NAD business has a completely different life cycle. But, the 
NAD business is considered as a fast expanding and very promising field of the 
future. Thus, the acquisition of the NAD business can be regarded as a ‘strategic’, 
rather long-term orientated motive in order to ensure the future survival and 
growth of the company. To sum up, the acquisition of the ‘traditional’ diagnostics 
business was primarily intended to improve the short-term position of the 
company, whereas the acquisition of the biotechnology part which provided 
access to new valuable technologies was to contribute to the long-term growth 
and survival of the company. 
Having analyzed the two major motives for the acquisition the question now 
arises how the integration and collaboration between the two companies were 
organized in order to meet the requirements for realizing these motives. The first 
step, before any kind of further organizational integration activities was put in 
place, was the integration of the first layer of management in each of the three 
segments. In each segment a few of the top-tier management people left, but this 
was made clear from the very beginning, so that with the remaining top 
management the organizational integration process could be planned and set in 
place.  
The organizational integration was carried out for each segment in a different 
way, so that considered from the point of view of a basic integration strategy, 
different integration strategies applied. For the first segment, Immunodiagnostics, 
it was decided that there was an immediate integration, or in other words, a 
combination of the former Chiron part into/with Bayer Diagnostics, because there 
was a perfect fit as far as markets, technologies and the culture of the people were 
concerned. As a consequence of this, two plants had to be closed, some activities 
needed to be transferred and Tarrytown was chosen as the headquarter for this 
segment. This kind of integration strategy implies a full consolidation of the 
operations and culture, because there is no need for organizational autonomy. 
Instead, a high degree of interdependence is needed in order to realize the 
planned synergies.  
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The ultimate decision about the second segment, the Point-of-Care business, took 
a little bit longer. It was clear from day one that there were natural synergies 
between the blood gas electrolytes business of Chiron and the urine chemistry 
business of Bayer. However, in the very beginning it was not clear how to 
combine those two parts. Thus, they first started with a preservation approach and 
let each of the company’s parts run separately. After that, the two parts were 
combined successfully by transferring management and manufacturing tasks to 
the segment’s new headquarter at Walpole.  
The third segment, the NAD business, located in Emeryville, CA, which is the 
former Chiron, pure biotechnology driven part and, hence, the main subject of 
interest of this study received a special treatment. This part was – at least up to a 
certain extent – not to be integrated. This decision was made, because this part 
was in all regards quite different from the rest of the company as it has a 
completely different business life cycle, is still very research-orientated and 
heavily influenced by biotechnology. Indeed, this segment operates with a very 
high degree of autonomy and independence. Besides the fact that a few 
executives left, they kept the same boss as they had before the merger and the full 
responsibility for the NAD business was also left in their hands. There is no real 
interference in the day-to-day business of this segment, meaning that they were 
granted the maximum of possible autonomy.  
Keeping the fundamental difference of the applied integration strategies in mind, 
it is now necessary to have a closer look at how the different organizational 
elements were combined. From a strategy-making and reporting point of view all 
segments were treated alike. They have been all completely integrated in the 
overall strategy-making process of Bayer Diagnostics, which in turn is integrated 
in the long-term strategy of the Bayer Group. This implies, that all respective 
executives of each segment must attend the same business meetings in which the 
future strategy of Bayer Diagnostics is shaped. To a certain extent, the NAD 
segment is granted a little bit more freedom, because the headquarter is not 
completely familiar with all the specific biotechnology know-how needed to 
make detailed decisions. So, compared to the other segments they have a bigger 
leeway, but nevertheless, need to make the necessary reporting and presentations 
in the strategy meetings. This freedom in strategic decision-making is particularly 
granted in the area of R&D, whereas the few manufacturing activities have been 
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transferred to Walpole. Thus, there is a clear cut in responsibility between the 
early stages of the value chain and the latest ones.  
As far as the reporting systems and the integration of the IT infrastructure were 
concerned a few problems occurred in the first step, because these systems were 
different and tailored specifically to the needs of each company. But, after some 
adaptations and a few alignments these problems could be solved quite well by 
sending experts from Bayer Diagnostic’s headquarter in Tarrytown to the 
respective segments in order to make the staff there familiar with the systems in 
use. It is worth pointing out that people from the acquired segments did not need 
to come to Tarrytown in order to get trained there and afterwards return to their 
sites, where they then would have been on their own. Instead, trained and 
experienced people from the headquarter went to the different sites and locally 
trained and helped the people at the face of the new systems. To sum up, the 
central responsibility and ultimate decision-making for finance, IT and strategy 
over all segments lay in the hands of the headquarter in Tarrytown. However, the 
NAD segment has been granted some special freedom in its R&D activities. 
One of the most frequent cited issues in the context of mergers and acquisitions 
and especially in close connection with everything that has to do with 
biotechnology is the acquisition, access and transfers of knowledge. Analyzing 
the case study from this perspective, the consolidation of R&D activities and, by 
this, also the transfers of the respective knowledge into a common unit only took 
place in the first two segments, the Immunodiagnostics and Point-of-Care 
segment, but not – as one might have expected – in the biotechnology-driven, 
NAD-segment with its special knowledge. Remembering that with the acquisition 
of the NAD business, Bayer wanted to get access to new, valuable technologies 
in a fast-expanding and very promising field, it is indeed very surprising that they 
did not intend to transfer that knowledge. Instead, they even granted the NAD 
segment the maximum of possible autonomy.  
The reason and explanation for this obvious contradiction is much easier than it 
appears at a first glance. This business which only has small sales is still 
dominated by research connected with very specific know-how and knowledge 
embedded in the people working at the Emeryville site, which represent also a 
particular group of people very different from the rest of the company. Hence, 
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there is a very special knowledge created by a particular group of people, both of 
which are very different from the rest of the company. The logic question which 
comes up is: What to do with that knowledge and these people? The answer is 
nothing easier than that: keep the knowledge and the people where they are, do 
not try to transfer the knowledge or even to move the people and, by this, trying 
to transfer part of the knowledge. That was also the decision Bayer Diagnostics 
made, they decided neither to transfer the knowledge nor the people. They were 
quite well aware of the fact that this knowledge was very specific and very 
special and that nobody and nowhere else in the company somebody could make 
use of it except the people in Emeryville. Thus, they made the only reasonable 
decision they could do: they granted the NAD business as much autonomy as 
possible.  
The following paragraph will also support this explanation by emphasizing again 
the difference in culture and, thus, the difference in people. Nevertheless, a little 
transfer took place, which was the transfer of the manufacturing activities. But, 
this did not affect the specific knowledge in biotechnology. This makes also clear 
why the NAD business is granted much more freedom in the strategic decision-
making as far as R&D is concerned; that is their playground whereas ‘traditional’ 
manufacturing is rather a core competence of companies being already longer in 
the business and covering the whole value chain for years such as the former 
Ciba-Corning Diagnostics or Bayer Diagnostics. 
The above paragraph has tried to give a first explanation for the chosen 
integration strategy of the NAD business and the decision not to transfer any 
knowledge from them. From a cultural point of view there are also some points 
which need to be mentioned in this context and which support this explanation as 
well. It is quite evident, that already within Chiron Diagnostics two different 
kinds of cultures existed. On the one hand, 90% was the former Ciba-Corning 
piece of what was formerly Chiron Diagnostics. This culture was shaped – 
considered from a company cultural point of view – (1) by a traditional 
diagnostics type of culture, because Ciba as well as Corning have already been in 
the diagnostics business for decades and – regarded from a regional point of view 
– (2) by a north-east coast culture. On the other hand, 10% of Chiron 
Diagnostics’ culture was influenced by (1) a biotech, research-driven and 
entrepreneurial kind of culture as far as the company culture is concerned due to 
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the fact that this part came originally from the biotechnology mother company 
Chiron, and (2) by a Californian, west-coast kind of culture because this segment 
was located in Emeryville. As far as the integration and collaboration of the 90% 
of Chiron Diagnostics was concerned, there have been few cultural problems, 
because both companies were working in the same business and they were even 
located in the same region. In addition to that, these 90% even appreciated the 
merger with Bayer Diagnostics, as they were coming back to a diagnostics 
company from a biotechnology company, which in their opinion never really 
understood and supported them very well.  
In a big contrast to that, the cultural gap between Bayer Diagnostics and the Ex-
Chiron part of Chiron Diagnostics was enormous. Looking at this from a 
different perspective this cultural gap was even already present in Chiron 
Diagnostics before its acquisition by Bayer. Before the acquisition, it was the 
biotech, Californian culture that played a dominant role, because the mother 
company, Chiron, was a biotechnology company. However, both sides acted 
independently and preserved their respective culture. After the acquisition there 
was only a change in the cultural dominance, because now the mother company, 
Bayer Diagnostics, was a more ‘traditional’ diagnostics company. The situation 
per se did not change, both sides still act on their own and preserve their 
respective culture. 
The last paragraph has discussed the importance of a different perception in terms 
of company and regional culture by the people involved, so that this paragraph 
analyzes how people reacted and were treated during the integration. Nobody 
would deny that people are among the most difficult and important issue to deal 
with. Hence, the first thing made before any kind of integration activities were 
started, was the decision about the first layer of management, because it needed 
to make clear who will stay in the company and who will not, because, as a result 
of such a M&A deal, there is always an increase in fluctuation. This also 
happened in the deal between Bayer Diagnostics and Chiron Diagnostics. This 
very first step is absolutely necessary, because the organization of a reasonable 
and reliable integration strategy needs to build upon the available executives. 
Only they are considered as trustworthy persons, because they are also going to 
stay in the newly created company. Consequently, there are two major questions 
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that need to be taken into account: (1) why do people leave and (2) how can this 
be prevented. 
In the case of the Bayer-Chiron integration, there was a normal fluctuation at the 
top, because some of these people did not feel comfortable in the new company 
and, in addition, were offered very good jobs by headhunters. As a consequence 
of this, they could not be persuaded to stay within the company. However, it was 
very important to determine in a very first step who was going to stay and who 
was going to leave. Moreover, some people, especially those in R&D of the 
Immunodiagnostics business, were supposed to be relocated from Walpole to 
Tarrytown. The management at Bayer expected that the relocation would not 
cause severe problem, because the company culture as well as the regional culture 
were quite similar. Instead, the management at Bayer had to realize that it was a 
big deal for these R&D people to move from Walpole to Tarrytown. They did not 
want to do that, because they preferred to stay in the Boston area. Consequently, 
those people decided to leave the company, a decision easy for them to make, 
because it is not difficult for highly trained people to find a new job in a booming 
area as Boston and particularly in times of a booming economy as it was at that 
time. In contrast to this unexpected and unhappy surprise, the management at 
Bayer Diagnostics was aware of the fact that people mostly refuse to move from 
the west to the east coast. They prefer to stay in the Bay area and would rather 
look for a new job there than move to the east coast. Additionally, there was also 
the big cultural gap between the biotechnology part in California and the rest of 
the company. This made the management in Tarrytown not even ask people from 
Emeryville, if they accepted a relocation. Besides the fact that some of the top 
management left, the rest of the company’s employees, mainly research staff, 
stayed with the company, because for them not so many things changed and they 
could still do the research they had already done before.  
Another very important issue which made some people leave was the lack of a 
stock option program. Chiron Corp., the mother company of Chiron Diagnostics, 
offered a stock option program, whereas Bayer did not. This bears two important 
consequences. One, all employees of Chiron Diagnostics who participated in this 
program needed to exercise their options as they were leaving the company since 
the participation in such a program is linked to the ‘membership’ in that 
company. The need to early exercise their options meant that people lost money. 
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Two, Bayer has no stock option program which made it be a less attractive 
employer and thus made people leave the company.  
After having analyzed the reasons why people left the company after the merger, 
there is now a clear need to state what Bayer Diagnostics did in order to prevent 
the staff from leaving. As far as the first problem, the need for the early exercise 
of stock options, was concerned, Bayer Diagnostics offered some payments and 
bonuses in order to bridge the gap of financial losses and, by this, trying to reduce 
that problem. The second problem, the missing of a stock option program could 
not be solved. The management at Bayer Diagnostics was aware of the fact that 
stock options are a very important part of the U.S. culture. But this can not be 
solved satisfactory from their part, as the mother company, the German Bayer 
Group, does not offer such programs. Hence, this is a problem they have to life 
and cope with. In order to do make up for the loss of the stock options Bayer 
Diagnostics offers very good packages in terms of salary and bonuses. Apart 
from that, Bayer of course also wanted to keep some of the senior management 
and top scientists with key knowledge in the company. They were offered special 
incentives in terms of bonuses and other operational and financial support, 
especially for those who lost money by exercising their stock options or who 
needed to be relocated. 
After having discussed and analyzed the different elements that needed to be 
integrated it is now necessary to have a closer look at how the integration itself 
was organized and carried out. To start with, one of the first things that needed to 
be clarified were the questions of responsibility and support. The decision for the 
acquisition of Chiron Diagnostics was part of the overall strategic planning of the 
Bayer Group and, by this, was also approved and supported by the Board in 
Leverkusen. Hence, there was a clear support from the very top of the group. This 
decision provides the general framework and setting in which the acquisition and 
subsequent integration was placed. The more specific implementation of the 
integration process was carried out by Bayer Diagnostics itself which set a special 
structure in place. After the announcement of the acquisition a steering 
committee was established by the President of Bayer Diagnostics. This committee 
comprised three people from Bayer Diagnostics including a person coming from 
Leverkusen, which again emphasizes the overall support from the group’s 
headquarter, and three people from Chiron Diagnostics. After that, this committee 
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under the direction of Mr. Classon, the President of Bayer Diagnostics, put a full-
time integration manager in charge of the whole process, who reported directly to 
the steering committee. This implies that there was full support for this 
acquisition and integration as the responsibility for the integration laid in the 
hands of the top management of Bayer Diagnostics, the president as the leader of 
the steering committee and his former Senior Vice President Finance as a full-
time integration manager. Furthermore, there was even the support from the 
Group’s headquarter, which was sending one person to the steering committee. 
All in all, there were clear responsibilities for the process and also strong support 
from the top. 
The integration process itself was carried out by 20 integration teams who 
corresponded to the different functions and segments. Each of these teams was 
co-headed by one person from Bayer and one from Chiron, revealing the spirit of 
the ‘merger of equals’. These teams made monthly reports as well as 
recommendations either to the integration manager or directly to the steering 
committee. This process was also supported by outside consultants in the areas of 
human resources, communications and cost synergy issues. E.g., the 
responsibility for a specific cost synergy was assigned to one consultant who was 
responsible for its realization and directed this process. 
During the integration process two fundamental rules, or guiding principles, were 
followed: speed and communication. Speed was especially necessary for 
determining the future filing of top positions of the company, i.e. for the first and 
second layer of management in order to have at least some people the integration 
process can be built upon. After that, every position was to be filed from top to 
down, step by step, and everybody in the company was to be informed as soon as 
possible about his future, by a face-to-face conversation with his respective 
superior. This also leads up to the second important topic, communication. 
Communication was supposed to take place on two different levels. The first one 
was the general communication given in speeches of the President or any other 
person from the top management. The second, more important kind of 
communication, was the early face-to-face communication between the 
employees and their respective superiors. For the upper levels of employees this 
was done quite well, whereas for the lower levels it sometimes took even more 
than six months, before they had been informed about their future within the 
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company, which was definitely too long. In this case, speed and communication 
were not only two fundamental rules or guiding principles, but they must rather 
be considered as having been two integration pillars on which the successful 
integration was built upon. 
Looking back at major difficulties Bayer Diagnostics were facing during the 
M&A process there is just one further major point which needs to be mentioned 
besides the communication problems discussed in the previous paragraph. Before 
the acquisition, Chiron Diagnostics was supposed to have a product which was 
about to be launched and which was also analyzed during the Due Diligence 
process. However, after the deal was done it turned out that this product was not 
truly ready for the market and needed to be withdrawn in order to get fixed. This 
shows that one only gets to know the new products and technology after the deal 
is done. From this it follows, that a Due Diligence process needs to be carried out 
very carefully and that it is sometimes even better to bring in outside consultants 
as Bayer e.g. did in the NAD segment. 
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3.6 Cross-case analyses and building a set of tentative hypotheses 
After having analyzed each respective case on its own using case description and 
within-case analysis, this final section of the case study chapter turns to the 
comparative analysis of the five case studies of organizational integration and 
collaboration after the M&A deal. The analytical focus will be on the detection of 
commonalities or differences concerning (1) acquisition motives, (2) realization 
of the organizational integration according to the different integration topics of 
organizational/structural integration, knowledge/competence integration and 
transfer, cultural integration as well as personnel integration, and (3) the 
organization of the integration process itself. Finally, this section and, indeed, the 
entire case study chapter, is devoted to shaping a set of tentative hypotheses. 
These tentative hypotheses constitute the basis for an extensive unfolding of the 
literature in the next chapter, leading to a creation of a new integration 
framework – the ultimate aim of this study. 
However, before starting to shape these tentative hypotheses one may ask the 
question whether the five case studies discussed so far can serve as the basis for 
generalizing the findings. Certainly not, since the problem remains that the 
sample consisted of only five cases. However, the point is that generalization 
should not be the goal for a case-based study at all, because sample size are 
almost too small for claiming that findings can be generalized.40 It is the big 
advantage of case-based studies that their are able to generate rich narrations 
(stories) and analyses in order to develop grounded hypotheses and theory 
extension. Still, the issue of external validity is of course not irrelevant for case 
study research. Thus, an increase in sample size and a replication of findings 
across a higher number of units of analyses makes such findings more robust. 
Because resource restraints prohibit the execution of large sample case studies, 
Leonard-Barton (1990) recommends the use of ‘replicated multiple sites’ in order 
to overcome the problem of external validity. By this, the findings of a case study 
approach based on one or more in-depth cases can be corroborated by the use of 
supporting evidence from additional ‘mini-cases’. In the context of this study, 
                                              
40  This issue has also already been addressed in Chapter 2. 
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Leonard-Barton’s (1990) advice is followed by presenting several brief examples 
of post-acquisition integration activities of high-technology companies. 
Mini-case 1: Cisco Systems and its acquisition management 
Cisco Systems, Inc., founded 1984 by a group of computer scientist from 
Stanford University, is the worldwide leader in networking for the Internet and 
provides the broadest line of solutions for transporting data.41 In fiscal year 2001 
(ending 7/31/2001) the company accounted revenues of $22.2 billion and had 
over 38,000 employees worldwide. Cisco has frequently used acquisitions to 
obtain new technologies as well as know-how embodied in people and, thus, has 
completed more than 65 acquisitions between 1993 and 2000. This reflects the 
underlying growth strategy that whatever research and development its engineers 
cannot create in-house, it buys. The company prefers to focus on smaller firms 
that excel in specific technological areas, so that the deal amounts typically range 
from $40 million to $450 million.  
Throughout the acquisition process, Cisco constantly screens the target against 
five principles it needs to fulfill: (1) presence of a shared vision, (2) likelihood of 
a short-term win for both the acquired company and Cisco, (3) long-term win for 
all parties, (4) right chemistry or cultural compatibility, and (5) reasonable 
geographic proximity, which means Silicon Valley, the Research Triangle in 
North Carolina and the Route 128 corridor outside Boston. Cisco tries to create 
value by combining the technical expertise of target companies with its own 
marketing, distribution and manufacturing expertise. Obviously, Cisco is buying 
resources that are based on highly tacit and rare technological knowledge 
embedded in organizational routines and people’s know-how – like the 
knowledge in biotechnology companies. Because of this, the technical teams of 
acquired companies are often left unchanged in terms of composition, people they 
report to and projects they work on. Usually, the technical and sales organizations 
of the acquired company become a business unit within one of Cisco’s line of 
businesses. Although Cisco aims at transforming the target company employees 
                                              
41  This ‘mini-case’ is based on information from http://www.cisco.com as well as O’Reilly & 
Pfeffer (2000), Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000), Singh & Zollo (2000), Goldblatt 
(1999), Drexhage (1998), Daly (1999), Holson (1998), Nee (1996) and Plotkin (1997).  
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into ‘100 per cent Cisco employess’, the company is careful not to change things 
that may disrupt the productive functioning of research and development teams. 
This clearly shows that the R&D area is granted a high degree of autonomy 
whereas the target’s manufacturing, finance, sales, and distribution activities are 
centralized. Moreover, Cisco tries to ensure that top people in the target firm are 
given key positions in the new organizations in order to make them stay. 
Moreover, Cisco continues to give stock options to an acquired company in order 
to retain the staff.  
Cisco believes in early, honest and clear communication to employees in the 
target company about their roles in the merged organization. Apart from that, 
Cisco also believes in fast integration and tries to integrate an acquired company 
usually within 100 days. The integration itself is carried out by integration teams, 
which are composed of Cisco employees and members of the new unit. These 
teams ensure that the management information and communication infrastructure 
of the target company is matched with the systems at Cisco. Besides this, these 
teams hold orientation sessions in order to explain Cisco’s values. Moreover, 
special orientation sessions involve employees from previously acquired 
companies who offer their insights, as well as change management sessions to 
assist the people within the acquired firm in supporting the transition. Cisco 
measures the success of every acquisition first by employee retention, then by 
new product development, and finally by return on investment. 
 
Mini-case 2: The post-acquisition integration of Agouron Pharmaceuticals 
Agouron Pharmaceuticals, a biotechnology company founded in 1984 and located 
in La Jolla, California, working in the areas of AIDS and Cancer, was acquired in 
May 1999 by Warner-Lambert in a deal worth $2.1 billion.42 Six months later, 
Pfizer staged a $92 billion hostile takeover of Warner-Lambert, which created the 
world’s largest pharmaceutical company. Although, Agouron had brought a drug 
to the market (Viracept, an HIV protease inhibitor) that generated hundreds of 
                                              
42  This ‘mini-case’ is based on information from Copeland (2001) and Goldman Sachs 
(2000). 
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million of dollars in annual sales each year, it was not enough to sustain the long-
term and expensive development of a new blockbuster. Short of cash, Agouron 
was looking for a buyer. By acquiring Agouron, Warner-Lambert (and 
subsequently of course also Pfizer) gained an immediate presence in Agouron’s 
specialities, antiviral and oncology research, something that Warner-Lambert 
lacked. The deal also gave Warner-Lambert access to Agouron’s extensive library 
of chemical compounds as well as Viracept. After the acquisition, there was a 
modest restructuring that involved the elimination of Agouron’s treasury and 
investor-relations departments. Furthermore, Warner-Lambert took over the 
purchasing as well as the manufacturing of Viracept, which Agouron had 
outsourced. But beyond that, not much changed. Agouron was essentially left 
alone to do its job and also kept its name. Agouron’s scientist received a 
significant increase in their R&D budget, but were not forced to adopt the way of 
the larger pharmaceutical company. Instead, they were left independent. Only, 
Agouron’s two top manages reported to the parent company. Apart from that, it 
was also decided that Agouron should take the lead in the areas of antiviral and 
oncology research, because even though it was smaller than the parent company, 
it had more expertise in these areas. Thus, Agouron was designated by Warner-
Lambert as a center of excellence for oncology and antiviral research. Besides, 
Warner-Lambert also never intended to move Agouron or some of its employees 
to the Midwest, because they were aware of the fact, that people would leave the 
company in this case. Nevertheless, the collaboration between the acquired 
biotechnology company and Warner-Lambert’s scientist turned out to be very 
difficult, because the culture of both companies was so different. The people at 
Agouron were viewed as ‘those guys out in San Diego’.  
In November 1999, after the first integration was done, Agouron received the 
news that Pfizer had mounted a hostile takeover to prevent Warner-Lambert from 
completing a planned merger with American Home Products. With this 
acquisition it was clear that Agouron’s days of complete freedom were ending as 
Pfizer announced from the beginning that it would not take the same kind of 
hands-off approach that Warner-Lambert had used with Agouron. Less than one 
year after the merger was closed, Pfizer has imposed new financial, marketing, 
and research controls on Agouron. In practice, losing that autonomy meant that 
several layers of Pfizer Management would now be involved in decision making, 
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because Pfizer likes to have central command and control, which often leads to 
some delays. That is a fact, people at Agouron are constantly complaining about 
because they have a much more biotech-orientated mind-set in which speed is the 
only thing that is important. However, large pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer 
have the luxury of time as they have much deeper R&D resources. People at 
Agouron had to realize that there is no such thing as complete freedom and 
autonomy when being part of a large corporation. Agouron is now considered as 
one of Pfizer’s four major R&D centers with an R&D budget of $300 million in 
2001. Moreover, Agouron gets access to Pfizer’s high-speed technology for drug 
screening and its vast genomic databases. The day-to-day management of the 
business lays still in the responsibility of the management at Agouron as Pfizer 
intends only to intervene when it feels it must. Otherwise, it will simply put its 
resources at Agouron’s disposal. E.g., one intervention area will be marketing, 
where Pfizer thinks that it has a lot of things to offer. It becomes obvious that 
there is a certain balance between autonomy and integration, Pfizer hopes to 
strike with Agouron. However, it is too early to predict the substantive effects of 
Pfizer’s acquisition of Agouron.  
 
Mini-case 3: How GE Capital integrates acquisitions 
GE Capital, founded 1933 as a subsidiary of the General Electric Company, has 
become one of the world largest financial-services organization as a result of 
dozens of acquisitions. Therefore, the top management at GE Capital perceives 
the need that executives learn how to manage the integration of an acquired 
company as a replicable process and not as a onetime-only event.43 Because of 
this, GE Capital has been working to make acquisition integration a core 
capability and a competitive advantage that will enable it to continue its growth 
in the future. The acquisitions come in different shapes and sizes and range from 
simple asset purchases without adding people to completely new businesses. 
                                              
43  This case study is primarily based on an article of Ashkenas, DeMonaco & Francis (1998). 
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Based on its various experiences, GE Capital has developed a model for 
acquisition integration which is also called ‘Wheel of Fortune’ or ‘Pathfinder 
Model’. This model divides the process into four ‘action stages’, starting with the 
work that goes on before the acquisition is completed. Each stage consists of two 
or three sub-processes. Stage one, the pre-acquisition stage, consists of due 
diligence, negotiation and announcement as well as the closing of the deal. The 
second stage is called foundation building and comprises the launch of the 
integration process, the acquisition integration workout and the strategy 
formulation. Rapid integration, stage three, involves the implementation process 
as well as course assessment and adjustment. The fourth stage, assimilation, 
consists of the long-term evaluation and adjustment as well as capitalizing on 
success. Moreover, each action stage includes several best practices. The 
‘Pathfinder Model’ recommends a particular sequence of leveraged actions, but 
there are of course aspects of every acquisition integration process that are new or 
unique.  
Apart from that, GE Capital has identified and learned four major lessons from its 
acquisition activities which are of course reflected in the ‘Pathfinder Model’. 
First, acquisition integration is not considered as a discrete phase of a deal and 
does not begin when the documents are signed. It is rather a process that starts 
with the due diligence and runs through the ongoing management of the newly 
acquired company. Second, integration management is a full-time job and, thus, 
needs to be recognized as a distinct business function. In this context the role of 
designated integration managers evolved who are to build a connective tissue 
between GE Capital and the new organization. Third, decisions about 
management structure, key roles, reporting relationships, layoffs and restructuring 
should be made, announced, and implemented as soon as possible. If not, slow 
changes, uncertainty and anxiety among employees that last for months might 
start to drain value from the acquisition. Fourth, a successful integration 
combines not only the various technical aspects of the businesses but also the 
different cultures. The best way to do that is to get people working together 
quickly, to solve business problems, and to accomplish results that could not have 
been achieved before.  
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Mini-case 4: Post-acquisition integration management of small German start-up 
companies in the information technology sector 
This mini-case is based on the findings of a master’s thesis (Henninges, 2001), 
that analyzes the post-acquisition integration activities of three German high-
technology Start-up companies (Heyde AG, Brokat Infosystems AG, Bechtle 
AG) listed at the ‘Neuen Markt’, the German equivalent to the NASDAQ in the 
U.S. and the ‘Nouveau marché’ in France. The analysis includes the post-
acquisition integration of acquired small high-technology companies with 
German as well as U.S. origin.  
Henninges (2001) identified two major motives for the acquisition activities of 
the three companies. First, these companies pursued a growth strategy and, thus, 
wanted to gain a bigger market share. Second, they also wanted to get access to 
the specific know-how and the technologies of the target companies. As far as the 
overall organizational integration strategy was concerned, each of the companies 
had a different approach. In the case of Brokat the acquired companies were 
completely absorbed which made Brokat establish a new organizational and 
personal structure. In contrast to this, companies that were acquired by Bechtle 
were granted as much autonomy and independence as possible. Nevertheless, 
financing and controlling as well as logistics are managed and coordinated by 
Bechtle’s headquarter. The overall post-acquisition integration strategy of Heyde 
was also to keep up the independence and autonomy of the acquired company, 
which in the context of the study of Henninges (2001) was Atzlinger GmbH. 
However, in the course of a subsequent reorganization this company was 
completely integrated into Heyde. The different overall post-acquisition 
integration strategies must be considered in close connection with the knowledge 
transfer. In the cases of Brokat and Heyde, there was some kind of systematic 
knowledge transfer from the acquired to the acquiring company. In contrast to 
this, there was no real knowledge transfer in the case of Bechtle, because the 
acquired companies were turned into centers of excellence that provide their 
knowledge and competencies to all parts of Bechtle. 
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Although there are some differences in the basic post-acquisition integration 
strategy, there are still some similarities as far as the handling of major post-
acquisition integration topics is concerned. In terms of reporting and controlling 
mechanisms, all acquired companies had to introduce the systems of the 
acquiring companies. Apart from that, they also tried to make the management 
and employees of the acquired companies stay by offering them interesting career 
perspectives, financial incentives as well as the participation in the existing stock 
option programs. In order to manage the integration process, all three companies 
– Heyde, Brokat and Bechtle – established a specific integration structure, i.e. 
integration teams consisting of top executives from both sides – the acquiring as 
well as the acquired companies. This also shows the support from the top of the 
companies. These integration teams took over the responsibility for the efficient 
management of the post-acquisition integration process. Apart from that, 
communication, such as written statements or personal talks, was also considered 
as a very important pillar for a successful management of the integration process. 
If necessary, these integration teams were supported by external consultants. 
These short mini-cases may suffice as supportive evidence that the five in-depth 
cases of this study about the post-acquisition integration of small biotechnology 
companies into the structure of large pharmaceutical companies do not just 
represent idiosyncratic examples taken from a population whose post-acquisition 
integration strategies generally follow different patterns. Indeed, the motives, the 
analysis of the different post-acquisition integration topics and the organization 
of the integration process itself that were discussed in the different case studies 
are – as shown with the help of the four mini-cases – quite typical. Therefore, this 
section returns to the cases of this study and tries to summarize the findings of 
this study’s analyses by developing a set of tentative hypotheses. 
In each case study about the acquisition of small biotechnology companies by 
large pharmaceutical companies, several motives have been identified which had 
led to the acquisition of the biotechnology company by the bigger pharmaceutical 
and health-care orientated company. As part of the different within-case analyses 
these motives turned out to be differentiated in short-term and long-term 
orientated motives in each case.  
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To start with, as far as Pharmacia is concerned, the acquisition of Sugen 
contributed to a short-term improvement of Pharmacia’s competitive position due 
to the fact that it could fill its Phase I/II gap as well as it got access to potential 
blockbusters. Furthermore, the strengthening of its oncology business in the U.S. 
market and the sustaining of its growth strategy supported the overall long-term 
strategy and motives of the company.  
At Merck, the short-term orientated motives were the access to an interesting 
technology platform, the existence of two very promising oncology products with 
a chance of becoming a blockbuster as well as the patent of immunocytokines 
that Merck needed in order to continue with its own research. The long-term 
strategic objectives connected with this acquisition were the fostering of Merck’s 
position in the oncology sector as well as a strengthening of its presence in the 
U.S. pharmaceutical market, similar to Pharmacia, and the access to the Boston 
research community.  
Novartis’ short-term interest in acquiring SyStemix and GTI was the hope of 
getting a blockbuster as both companies had very promising patents. Besides this, 
Novartis also tried to gain control over SyStemix, because – in contrast to the 
other cases – it only had acquired a part of SyStemix at the beginning. The 
overall long-term rationale behind these engagements can be found in the 
perceived need of being active in the biotechnology sector and, by this, 
participating in the expected growth of this industry.  
At Bayer Diagnostics, the short-term motivation for the acquisition of Chiron 
Diagnostics, more precisely the acquisition of the major and more traditional 
diagnostics business, was that it wanted to improve its actual competitive position 
by reacting to the consolidation process in the industry, getting access to new 
customers and increasing its efficiency. In addition to that, the acquisition of the 
NAD business was to contribute to the long-term growth of the company by 
accessing new valuable technologies. Compared with the other cases, the case of 
Bayer was special in that the acquisition did not only concern the biotechnology 
segment, but also included the bigger diagnostics business of Chiron Diagnostics. 
Tentative hypothesis # 1: Pharmaceutical companies acquire biotechnology 
companies with the short-term orientated motives of improving their current 
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competitive position by filling up their R&D pipelines and getting access to new 
promising products having the potential of becoming a blockbuster. 
Tentative hypothesis # 2: Pharmaceutical companies acquire biotechnology 
companies with the long-term orientated motives of strengthening their positions 
in a specific business sector by getting access to new knowledge and 
technologies, supporting the overall growth strategy of the company and 
strengthening their presence in the U.S. pharmaceutical market. 
Besides considering the motives of the pharmaceutical company, it is also 
necessary to have a look at the reasons why the biotechnology companies agreed 
to the takeover. Sugen accepted the takeover bid of Pharmacia, because it 
desperately needed money in order to secure the further survival of the company 
and the continuation of its clinical trials as it could not raise money in the 
financial markets at that time. In the deal between Merck and Lexigen, the 
biotech company was also on the search for a potential partner providing money 
for the clinical trials. SyStemix and GTI appreciated the acquisition, because they 
received the financial and regulatory support needed in order to carry out their 
late-stage clinical studies. In the case of Bayer and Chiron, Chiron wanted to get 
rid of its diagnostics business and refocus its resources. 
Tentative hypothesis # 3: Biotechnology companies accept the takeover bid of 
pharmaceutical companies, because they need financial and regulatory support 
in order to finish their clinical trials. 
As far as the organizational integration is concerned, the different integration 
elements will be discussed in a first step before the other topics of 
knowledge/competence transfer, cultural and personnel integration will be 
compared across the cases.  
The overall integration strategy of Pharmacia – as well as in the other cases – was 
to grant the acquired biotechnology company, here Sugen, as much autonomy and 
independence as possible. However, the strategic decision-making for Sugen was 
in the hands of Pharmacia, while Sugen had its freedom on the day-to-day 
management of its business in which Pharmacia did not interfere. Thus, there is a 
clear cut in responsibility between the overall strategy and the operational 
management. In this specific case, the freedom is granted until the clinical trials 
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are finished due to the fact that Sugen was already far advanced in clinical Phase 
III. After that, Pharmacia will take over the responsibility for sales and marketing 
as these are core competencies of a big pharmaceutical company.  
A similar handling can be found in the relationship between Merck and Lexigen. 
The overall strategy was also to grant Lexigen a very high degree of autonomy. In 
contrast to the other cases, there was, however, a change in the original 
integration plans after the acquisition became effective. At the beginning, this 
autonomy was to cover more or less the complete pharmaceutical value chain – 
which however had never been set in place – and was then reduced to basic 
research, considering Lexigen more as a center of excellence within Merck. Thus, 
Lexigen has all freedom in doing basic research and generating promising drug 
candidates, which are then developed and commercialized by EMD, Merck’s 
pharmaceutical subsidiary in the U.S. This decision was based on the fact that 
EMD is considered as having more experience than Lexigen with clinical 
development and bringing a drug to the market. In fact, Lexigen – as well as most 
other biotechnology companies – has no experience at all in this area.  
The same picture also comes up at Novartis and its integration of SyStemix and 
GTI. The overall strategy is shaped during the meetings of the Research 
Management Board, in which a representative of both biotechnology companies 
is part of. The same procedure was also observed in the cases of Merck and 
Pharmacia. During the integration processes of GTI and SyStemix, two kinds of 
integration strategies had been in place. For the late-stage, in clinical trials 
advanced projects there was a full integration, meaning that Novartis tried to gain 
the control and took over the responsibility for them as these are tasks a big 
pharmaceutical company sees its competencies in. The second integration 
strategy was applied to the research functions of both companies, which should 
retain their complete autonomy and continue to operate at full strength. Hence, 
the degree of autonomy granted or, in other words, the respective integration 
strategy in place depended on the position of the project with respect to the 
pharmaceutical value chain. This position also pre-determines the further 
collaboration and allocation of responsibility between Novartis and the two 
biotechnology companies.  
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In the case of Bayer Diagnostics and Chiron Diagnostics there have been 
different integration strategies in use depending on the specific segment. As this 
study is about the integration and collaboration between biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies after the M&A deal, the cross-case analysis of Bayer 
and Chiron will primarily focus on the biotechnology part of Chiron Diagnostics, 
the NAD segment. The NAD business was to be granted a very high degree of 
autonomy and independence in the day-to-day management of its business, 
because this part is still very research-driven and no product has yet been 
developed. From a strategy-making point of view all segments were treated alike 
and were completely integrated in the overall strategy-making process of Bayer 
Diagnostics, which in turn is integrated in the long-term strategy of the Bayer 
Group. It becomes obvious that there is also a clear cut in terms of responsibility 
between the early steps of the value chain focusing on basic research at the NAD-
site in Emeryville, CA, and the further developed products of Chiron Diagnostics 
which have been more or less completely integrated into Bayer Diagnostics. 
Tentative hypothesis # 4: The overall organizational integration strategy of 
pharmaceutical companies is to grant the acquired biotechnology companies a 
very high level of independence and autonomy. 
Tentative hypothesis # 5: The respective organizational integration strategy in 
place depends on the position of the different biotechnology projects in the 
pharmaceutical value chain. The more advanced a project is in the 
pharmaceutical value chain, the more control and responsibility is taken over by 
the pharmaceutical company. 
Tentative hypothesis # 6: The decision about when to take over the control of a 
certain project depends on the perceived core competencies of the 
pharmaceutical company with respect to the proven and expected competencies 
of the biotechnology company. 
Tentative hypothesis # 7: The more competence is expected to be within the 
biotechnology company, the more autonomy and responsibility will be granted. 
In the field of research, an acquired biotechnology company is granted a very 
high level of autonomy. 
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The next important issue is to analyze the collaboration between the acquired 
biotechnology companies and the pharmaceutical companies after the acquisition. 
The different case analyses revealed that the collaboration between the acquired 
biotechnology companies and the pharmaceutical companies is carried out by 
project teams. Furthermore, all case studies made clear that financing, budgeting 
and reporting are done according to the requirements of the acquiring 
pharmaceutical companies. This implies, that the specific processes and systems 
in the acquired biotechnology companies had to be adjusted in accordance with 
the processes and systems in place at the bigger pharmaceutical companies. The 
reporting of Sugen to Pharmacia was done directly to a board member at 
Pharmacia. The financing and controlling mechanisms were adjusted according to 
the requirements of Pharmacia. In the case of Lexigen and Merck all reporting, 
controlling, human resources and budgeting decisions are made at and managed 
by EMD in agreement with Merck. From a financial, reporting and budgeting 
point of view SyStemix and GTI were directly responsible to the respective board 
member in Basel. Apart from that, the respective systems and processes of 
Novartis were set in place at both companies by sending experienced senior 
managers to both sites. In the relationship between Bayer Diagnostics and Chiron 
Diagnostics, the central responsibility and ultimate decision-making for finance, 
IT and strategy for all segments laid in the hands of Bayer Diagnostics’ 
headquarter in Tarrytown. The respective systems and processes had also been 
transferred from Bayer to Chiron with the help of experienced people from the 
headquarter going to the different sites and training people locally.  
Tentative hypothesis # 8: The organizational collaboration between the 
pharmaceutical companies and the acquired biotechnology companies functions 
on a project base and not by amalgamating the respective units. 
Tentative hypothesis # 9: After the acquisition, the ultimate responsibility for 
finance, controlling, human resources and budgeting remains in the big 
pharmaceutical companies. The necessary processes and systems are transferred 
from the pharmaceutical company to the acquired biotechnology company by 
sending experienced managers from the pharmaceutical to the biotechnology 
company . 
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Tentative hypothesis # 10: The responsibility for the acquired biotechnology 
company lays in the hands of a board member. The reporting is also done 
directly to him, mostly on a president-to-president base. 
Another crucial issue in the context of the post-acquisition integration is the 
transfer of knowledge, capabilities and know-how. However, in the deal of 
Pharmacia and Sugen – like in the other cases – a general know-how and 
knowledge transfer did not take place. Some of the projects at Sugen as well as at 
Pharmacia were stopped and then transferred from one site to the other. In 
connection with this transfer, people at Pharmacia received information about the 
transferred genes and targets, necessary for the continuation of their work. Apart 
from that, a natural, basic exchange of knowledge took place during the 
collaboration in the different project teams. After the integration, Sugen was 
rather considered as some kind of center of excellence within Pharmacia, having 
the necessary expertise in a particular field, not existent in any other part of the 
company.  
A quite similar picture did occur in the collaboration between Merck and 
Lexigen. Here, there was absolutely no transfer of knowledge from Lexigen to 
Merck, instead some of the projects at Merck were stopped and then transferred 
to Lexigen, which was henceforth considered as being a center of excellence 
within Merck for everything that has to do with biologics. Thus, Lexigen – more 
or less – plays the same role as Sugen does henceforth. The necessary knowledge 
for the further development at EMD/Merck will be provided by Knut 
Sturmhoefel in his function as an interface manager.  
During the integration of SyStemix and GTI no systematic transfer of knowledge 
was carried out and was even never intended. Of course, there was also some 
basic exchange of knowledge during the presentations held at several meetings or 
by scientists from Basel being at SyStemix or GTI on job rotation. Both 
companies – and after the consolidation process only GTI – were considered as a 
center of excellence for gene therapy and vector technology within Novartis. 
Another important reason why there was no real transfer of knowledge was the 
awareness of the fact that the value of this specific knowledge was closely related 
to the specific sites of the companies stressing the importance of local networks. 
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Bayer Diagnostics also had never the intention of transferring the knowledge 
from the NAD segment located in Emeryville, CA, to any other site of Bayer, 
because they considered this knowledge as very specific and special, embedded 
in the people working at the site in Emeryville. This point of view is very similar 
to the attitude observed at Novartis. 
Tentative hypothesis # 11: During the integration process no systematic 
knowledge, capability or competence transfer in terms of know-how and 
technology from the biotechnology to the pharmaceutical company is carried out.  
Tentative hypothesis # 12: After the acquisition, the biotechnology company 
takes over the role of a center of excellence within the bigger pharmaceutical 
company – as the knowledge remains within the biotechnology company. 
Consequently, some of the projects at the pharmaceutical company may even be 
stopped and transferred to the smaller biotechnology company. 
Tentative hypothesis # 13: Even after the acquisition, the only way of keeping 
up the value of the biotechnology know-how is not to transfer it, but to keep it in 
the site of the local network where it emerged. Thus, no need for relocation of 
people or functions arises. 
In the acquisition between Pharmacia and Sugen, the management at Pharmacia 
was aware of the negative impact cultural differences might have and, thus, tried 
to grant Sugen a very high level of autonomy. Despite this, the acquisition and 
subsequent integration of Sugen resulted in a fundamental cultural shift from 
being a high-risk-taking, innovative- and entrepreneurial-driven small 
biotechnology company to a more research-driven organization with a clear focus 
on doing good science and identifying promising compounds. A similar trend 
became obvious in the other cases as well. 
In the collaboration between Lexigen and Merck some problems occurred due to 
country specific, cultural differences like e.g. working in the matrix structure, 
which did not show up in the other cases. Once detected, these problems could 
have been solved quite easily. More problems were caused by the cultural 
differences between big pharma and small biotech, because Lexigen was no 
longer expected to be the fast acting, highly-dynamic, high-risk-taking and 
entrepreneurial-driven company. It is now expected to do basic research and 
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generate promising drug candidates and, by this, Lexigen rather needs a spirit of 
discovery than an entrepreneurial spirit. After the acquisition, it has become part 
of a ‘bigger’ picture and thus needs – at least to a certain extent – to follow the 
rules of a different game, namely the approach of big pharma. By this, it loses of 
course some of its former identity. Thus, the development of Lexigen is in no 
way different from the one observed at Bayer or SyStemix/GTI, which will be 
depicted in the following paragraphs. 
In the collaboration between Novartis, on the on hand, and SyStemix as well as 
GTI, on the other hand, differences in terms of country culture did not play a 
major role. However, the gap between big pharma and small biotech had a greater 
impact. After the acquisition, the management at SyStemix and GTI was no 
longer expected to take huge risks and act in an entrepreneurial way, because 
these companies turned into research facilities of Novartis, which were not 
dominated by an entrepreneurial spirit, but by a spirit of discovery. Novartis, was 
also aware that such a change would take place. Hence, their goal was never 
really to keep up the entrepreneurial spirit as it did exist before the acquisition, 
instead, they rather focused their efforts on the ultimate objective of bringing a 
drug to the market as quickly as possible.  
In the case of Bayer Diagnostics and Chiron Diagnostics, Bayer was also aware 
of the big cultural gap between Bayer and the biotechnology-driven NAD 
business segment. Therefore, they decided to apply the respective integration 
strategy and tried to preserve the independence and autonomy of this segment. 
Tentative hypothesis # 14: Because of the big cultural gap between big 
pharmaceutical companies, on the one hand, and small biotechnology 
companies, on the other hand, the pharmaceutical companies try to set an 
integration strategy in place that grants the biotechnology companies the highest 
level of independence and autonomy. 
Tentative hypothesis # 15: Although this independence and overall autonomy 
strategy is applied in order to preserve the culture of the acquired biotechnology 
company, the pharmaceutical companies are aware of the fact that the 
entrepreneurial and high-risk taking spirit of the biotechnology companies will 
get lost. This will also negatively effect their innovative capability. 
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Tentative hypothesis # 16: After the acquisition, the biotechnology companies 
develop from entrepreneurial-driven companies into more research and 
discovery orientated centers of excellence, integrated into the structure of big 
pharmaceutical companies. This alters the culture of the formerly independent 
biotechnology companies in a fundamental way.  
After the acquisition of Sugen by Pharmacia, a significant increase in fluctuation 
was noticeable, which also took place in the other cases. Besides Peter Hirth, who 
was supposed to manage the integration process, most of the top management left 
due to the cultural changes discussed in the paragraphs before, but also because 
of missing stock option programs subsequent to the acquisition. Moreover, the 
lack of a stock option program resulted in some problems in attracting younger 
employees, who expect to receive stock options while being employed in a U.S. 
biotechnology company. In order to make people stay they were offered an 
increase in salary as well as interesting profit sharing and bonus programs. Some 
employees at Sugen, especially scientists, also appreciated the job security and 
the better resources available for doing research that were provided by 
Pharmacia.  
As Lexigen was a very small start-up company with only 27 employees that was 
not listed on any stock exchange, stock options did not play a role. Moreover, 
nobody left the company, because they kept the same boss and part of the 
employees were also bound by specific contracts. As in the other cases, some of 
the employees at Lexigen appreciated the job security and the better access to 
resources which were provided by Merck.  
After the acquisition of SyStemix and GTI, the whole top management left – 
besides one or two people. These people were needed in order to ensure a smooth 
organizational integration of the biotechnology companies into the structure of 
the big pharmaceutical company by providing some stability and continuity. This 
could be observed in the other cases as well. To make them stay, they – as well as 
the key knowledge-holders – were made good offers. As far as the scientists were 
concerned there was no big change as they continued to do what they had always 
been doing. Instead, their situation even got better as they received access to vast 
resources at Novartis, making their work much more efficient and easier. Like 
Sugen, Novartis also had to notice that the missing of a stock option program 
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made some of the employees leave and caused some problems in recruiting 
younger people, because they expected to get stock options. In contrast to this, 
some employees valued the job security and better pension plans offered by 
Novartis.  
At Bayer Diagnostics, which also noticed an increase in fluctuation, the first 
personnel decision was to make clear the first layer of management in order to 
know who stayed and who left the company, because they wanted to know on 
whom the organizational integration could be build upon. In order to make good 
people stay they offered them special incentives in terms of bonuses and other 
operational and financial support – like the other acquiring companies did as 
well. Apart from that, Bayer like the other big pharmaceutical companies had to 
realize that the lack of a stock option programs provided them with some 
problems in attracting and retaining people. 
Tentative hypothesis # 17: After the acquisition of the biotechnology companies 
by the pharmaceutical companies there is a significant increase in employees 
fluctuation on every level, especially on the top management level, partly because 
their entrepreneurial aspirations can no longer be satisfied. 
Tentative hypothesis # 18: After the acquisition, the acquiring pharmaceutical 
companies try to make sure that at least some of the top management people of 
the biotechnology companies stay in order to let them manage the organizational 
integration while providing some stability and continuity. 
Tentative hypothesis # 19: The missing of a stock option program after the 
acquisition causes severe problems in attracting and retaining employees as 
stock option are considered as being part of the culture in U.S. biotechnology 
companies.  
Tentative hypothesis # 20: In order to make people stay after the acquisition has 
been carried out and to make up for the loss of the stock option programs, they 
are offered special incentives and bonus programs. 
Tentative hypothesis # 21: Employees at the acquired biotechnology companies 
welcome the takeover as they appreciate the job security and especially the 
CASE STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRATION   
 
182
access to the vast resources big pharmaceutical company can offer, enabling 
them to do better research. 
Apart from the more content-orientated perspective of the organizational 
integration, which has been discussed in the paragraphs before, it is also 
necessary to consider the process-perspective of the organizational integration 
process. This means, that an analysis of the organization of the overall integration 
process, allowing the different integration issues to be set in place, needs also to 
be taken into account. 
From Sugen-side the responsibility for the organization of the integration process 
laid in the hands of its Executive Vice President & President for Research and 
Development and was also supported by Pharmacia’s Chairman and CEO, 
reflecting the support from the very top of the company. At Sugen, its newly 
appointed President took over the responsibility for the integration process. The 
integration itself was not carried out by a single integration manager – although 
one might even attribute this role to Sugen’s President – but by an integration 
team co-headed by Pharmacia’s Executive Vice President and Sugen’s President. 
This mutual responsibility, reflecting the common spirit and the interpretation of 
the acquisition as some kind of ‘merger of equals’, could also be observed in the 
other integration processes. In addition to that, no external consultants were 
involved leading to a slower integration process, but at the same time to a more 
stable organizational structure emerging – more or less – out of a natural 
evolution, which was unique to that case. Communication took place on two 
different levels. The first one was the overall communication given in speeches to 
all employees at Sugen either by executives from Pharmacia or from Sugen, and 
the other one was in smaller groups or via face-to-face communication and, by 
this, had a more personal touch.  
Compared with the other cases, the integration process between Merck and 
Lexigen was no real integration process as it was rather part of a reorganization 
process. The reason for this laid in the fact that in this case, the acquisition was 
not supported by the very top of the group as it was in the other cases. Instead, it 
was the oncology business area team which fostered the acquisition and 
subsequent integration of Lexigen. The change of the original integration plans 
was based on the reorganization decision and, with the creation of EMD, made 
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also the role of Knut Sturmhoefel change. At the beginning, he was considered as 
being an integration manager as part of an integration team and after the 
reorganization decision his role turned more into that of an interface manager. 
Although the first integration process was carried out rather quickly and 
straightforward, this structure never became really effective and was replaced by 
a rather slow reorganization or, in other words, adjusted integration process. 
Furthermore, there was also not enough clear communication.  
The responsibility for the acquisition and integration of SyStemix and GTI was 
also taken over by a board member of Novartis. Compared with the other cases, 
the integration was not carried out by an integration team, but by one or two 
senior executives from Novartis who went to the biotechnology companies and 
acted there as some kind of integration managers. As in the case of Lexigen and 
Merck, the acquisition of GTI and SyStemix was influenced by a subsequent 
reorganization and consolidation process, in which some communication 
problems occured. However, this consolidation process only started after the first 
integration process had been finished and the respective collaboration also had 
been effective.  
As in the cases of Pharmacia and Novartis, the decision for the acquisition and 
subsequent integration of Chiron Diagnostics was approved and supported by 
Bayer’s board in Leverkusen. Due to the fact that this acquisition did not only 
include the small biotech-dominated NAD segment at Emeryville, CA, but also 
the much bigger diagnostics business, a special, more elaborated structure 
consisting of a steering committee, a full-time integration manager as well as 20 
integration teams was set in place. However, the same basic approach as used in 
the other cases was applied, i.e. there was an integration manager and different 
integration teams in charge of the process. In some areas this process was 
supported by outside consultants. Speed, especially in the context of filling the 
top positions at the newly created entities, as well as communication were 
considered as being two guiding principles for the integration process. The 
communication structure was the same as it was in the Pharmacia-Sugen deal and 
took place on two different levels. The first level was the kind of general 
communication given in speeches and information to all employees, whereas the 
second level of communication focused on the early, personal face-to-face 
communication between the employees and their respective superiors.  
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Tentative hypothesis # 22: The acquisition and subsequent integration of the 
acquired biotechnology company is approved and supported by the top 
management of the pharmaceutical company. 
Tentative hypothesis # 23: The integration process is carried out by a few 
integration managers or by an integration team which are co-headed by people 
from the pharmaceutical and the biotechnology company, reflecting the spirit of 
a ‘merger of equals’. Due to the small size of the acquired biotechnology 
company it is not necessary to set a separate integration structure in place. 
Tentative hypothesis # 24: If necessary, external consultants are involved in the 
integration process in order to support it. 
Tentative hypothesis # 25: Communication plays an important role during the 
integration process and is carried out on two different levels. The first level 
concerns the overall information of all employees given in general speeches, 
whereas the second level focuses on the personal face-to-face communication 
between the employees and their respective superiors. 
Tentative hypothesis # 26: Speed plays an important role in the integration 
process as there is a clear need for the filling of the top positions of the acquired 
biotechnology companies. These people are supposed to carry out and take over 
the responsibility for the integration process. 
Besides these cross-case topics discussed in the paragraphs above which could be 
attributed either to the acquisition motives, the integration topics or the 
organization of the integration process itself, a few more very interesting issues 
emerged that cannot really be put into these categories. At some points during the 
case descriptions as well as the within-case analyses it turned out that the 
acquisition of the biotechnology company is – more or less – considered as being 
some kind of a ‘simple’ investment that pays off or not. This becomes especially 
obvious in the deal between Novartis and SyStemix/GTI as well as the 
acquisition of Sugen by Pharmacia, which was explicitly characterized as some 
kind of ‘external investment’. Apart from that, it was the Novartis case that 
revealed best – although it also appeared in the deal between Pharmacia and 
Sugen – that the nature of the acquired biotechnology company changed in a 
fundamental way. It is not only the culture, it is even the existence of the 
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company which develops from an independent, publicly traded company into a 
division or unit of a big pharmaceutical group. This step is necessary in order to 
consider and treat such a company or, in other words, acquisition as an 
investment. If this investment does not create value, it will be stopped. In fact, 
that is what Novartis did with the consolidation of SyStemix and GTI. It had to 
decide about an effective resource allocation decision and not about the future 
survival of a (former) independent, publicly traded company. Such a decision 
could never be made by the executives of a publicly traded company. In order to 
make such a decision the nature of the company must change as it has happened 
subsequent to the acquisition and post-acquisition integration of the small 
biotechnology company into the structure of the big pharmaceutical company. 
Tentative hypothesis # 27: The acquisition of a biotechnology by a big 
pharmaceutical company fundamentally changes the nature of the biotechnology 
company, because it is no longer an independent, publicly traded company, but 
ultimately turns into a center of excellence of a big pharmaceutical company. 
Tentative hypothesis # 28: The acquisition of a biotechnology company is 
considered as an investment that pays off or not. If it does not create value, the 
pharmaceutical company will simply decide to close or sell the respective site as 
part of a resource allocation decision. 
Based on the different contextual case descriptions, this section has carried out 
the comparative analyses of the five case studies of organizational integration and 
collaboration after the M&A deal and summarized these findings by developing a 
set of tentative hypotheses. They are tentative due to the fact that they still have 
to be confronted with the existing literature for further refinement and because 
the theory extension, which will build on the tentative hypotheses, will eventually 
have to be subject of large-sample quantitative testing. Apart from that, these 
tentative hypotheses are not yet mutually exclusively as they still have clear 
overlaps. 
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4 Theoretical perspectives of the post-acquisition integration and 
collaboration process 
“Unless the acquired company is integrated functionally, financially, or 
managerially, the likelihood of shareholder wealth creation is very low. At the 
other extreme, careless and insensitive integration can wipe out the culture of the 
acquired company, destroy its skill base, and cause losses in market share.” 
(Hoover, 1994, p. 225) 
After having described and analyzed the different cases of organizational 
integration and collaboration in the previous chapter, this chapter aims at refining 
the findings of the case study chapter. Although this is a new chapter, it does 
definitely not constitute a break from the previous chapter, it rather represents a 
continuation of the process of case-based research. As already pointed out in the 
discussion of the methodological foundations of this study (section 2.1), case 
descriptions and analyses should ideally be ‘theory-free’, allowing the researcher 
to capture the richness of the cases without any kind of bias. Only after tentative 
hypotheses have been drawn from the cases should theory or, in other words, the 
existing literature, be enfolded (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is an essential component of 
case-based hypothesis formation and theory extension that the tentative 
hypotheses are juxtaposed with conflicting and similar theoretical findings. 
Hence, it is the overall goal of this chapter that the tentative hypotheses can be 
challenged, corroborated and, eventually, refined in such a way that together they 
serve as an extension to theory or even result in the formulation of a new theory. 
The literature to be enfolded by confrontation with the case study results consists 
of a broad body of theoretical writings in the fields of M&A, post-merger/post-
acquisition as well as some internationalization literature. All these streams of 
scholarly work are well-established fields. 
Section 4.1 confronts the extant studies of M&A motives and reasons with the 
case findings. Section 4.2 turns to a discussion of how post-merger and post-
acquisition integration literature might contribute to the understanding of the 
observations made in the previous chapter, and also presents some thoughts on 
how concepts of the organization of the post-acquisition process can offer 
support for the insights gained in the case studies. The discussion of these fields 
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will have to be restricted to the most prominent theoretical approaches due to the 
large size of these different disciplines. Having proved that the extant theory is 
unable to explain large parts of the observations made, Chapter 5 is devoted to 
the construction of a new approach with the help of other interesting concepts 
such as the famous value chain concept of Porter or the concept of core 
competencies.  
4.1 Confronting extant M&A theories with the case findings 
“Consider the waves of mergers that have swept across the United States during 
the past century, first to consolidate firms of single industries into giant trusts, 
then to extend the operating chains of these firms forward and backward in so-
called vertical integration, and in more recent times to agglomerate all kinds of 
diversified businesses into single corporations. Some of the forces that drove these 
were no doubt economic. But many have also been political, when not 
representing a sheer lust for power then at least reflecting the reality that to avoid 
being taken over by another organization, you had better take it over first. How 
many small, healthy organizations have been destroyed over the years by having 
been gobbled up by the big bureaucracies (which immediately bureaucratized 
them – ‘What, no organization chart?’ say the technocrats)? Unless, of course, 
they voluntary forfeited that small size to become those voracious bureaucracies 
themselves.” (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 341-342) 
The introductory quotation of Mintzberg makes evident that there have been 
different merger waves (Müller-Stewens, Spickers & Deiss, 1999; Jarrell & 
Poulsen, 1994; Gaughan, 1994; Jansen, 1998 & 2000; Dymski, 1999) during the 
last century, which also indicates that different motives and M&A strategies exist 
that might explain why takeovers have been carried out. The question is whether 
the existing studies or theoretical approaches can explain why pharmaceutical 
companies acquired biotechnology companies and, in turn, may of course also 
reveal why biotechnology companies accepted the takeover bid of the larger 
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pharmaceutical companies. During the 1990s the fifth merger wave44 took place 
whose two major objectives were an increase in Shareholder Value as well as 
globalization. Besides an emphasis of horizontal acquisitions, the overall focus 
was put on the strengthening of core competencies (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990; 
Gut-Villa, 1997). Bleeke et al. (1994, p. 80) refer to this in the sense that 
“a successful cross-border acquirer buys targets in its core business”. 
Besides looking at the motives that make companies participate in the M&A 
game, Cartwright & Cooper (1990) have identified a number of factors they later 
refer to as ‘merger climate’, which might facilitate the increase in M&A activities 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1992): 
(1) Certain market conditions bring about a need to consolidate or capture new 
markets. 
(2) There is an increasing availability of capital, within organizations as well as 
within financial institutions. 
(3) More companies are at sale as the successful entrepreneurs of post-war years 
reach retirement age. 
(4) The easing of regulations has also a positive impact on acquisition activities. 
(5) The need to share risks, particularly in capital-intensive industries, often 
results in the formation of joint ventures or mergers. 
(6) There are also complex indivisible problems (Aldrich, 1976) that are 
considered to be too big to be resolved by any single organization. 
                                              
44  The first merger wave started in 1897 and ended in 1904 and featured mainly horizontal 
mergers that often resulted in monopolies or near monopolistic industry structures. The 
second merger wave, from 1916 to 1929, was characterized by mostly vertical transactions 
with the aim of taking advantage of economies of scale. The third merger wave, which is 
also called the conglomerate era, began in 1965 and ended in 1969. Companies expanded 
into dissimilar lines of business. The fourth merger wave lasted from 1984 until 1989 and 
featured many unique characteristics which separated it from previous waves such as 
aggressive takeover tactics, leveraged buyouts and junk bond financing (Müller-Stewens, 
Spickers & Deiss, 1999; Gaughan, 1994). 
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(7) Moreover, unrecognized psychological motives for merger and acquisition 
activities such as fear of obsolence (Levinson, 1970) or a CEO’s decision to 
play a new game and create some excitement among senior managers 
(McManus & Hergert, 1988; Hunt, 1988) may have a certain influence. 
Comparing these factors with the situation found in the case studies and the 
industry analysis of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry at the 
beginning of Chapter 3, one can draw the conclusion that besides the 
consolidation in the pharmaceutical as well as biotechnology industry, none of 
these factors really has an impact or can explain why M&A activities between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have occurred. E.g., Zimmermann, 
Mekler & Steinmezu (1998) consider the market surrounding, the product 
portfolio in terms of current products as well as the project portfolio in terms of 
future cash generators as drivers for M&A activities in the pharmaceutical 
industry. But, they do no take the relationship between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies into account. 
Apart from that, one may also consider the ‘follow-the-leader’-discussion 
(Ansoff & Stewart, 1967; Maidique & Patch, 1988), because e.g. in 1990, the 
Swiss pharmaceutical giant Roche acquired a 60% equity stake in the Californian 
biotechnology Company Genentech in a deal worth $2.1 billion. One and a half 
year later, the Swiss competitor of Roche, Sandoz AG (now: Novartis), acquired 
a 60% interest in SyStemix for a total of $625 million. Thus, the ‘follow-the-
leader’ strategy may also be a possible explanation – at least for the M&A 
activities of Novartis. However, none of the identified motives (Tentative 
hypotheses #1, #2 and #3) can be explained with the help of this theory. A study 
of McKendrick (2001) about the global strategy and population-level learning at 
the example of the hard disk drive industry has come to the conclusion that firms 
from the same nation are likely to adopt similar global strategies initially, but 
that, over time, the industry as a whole converges on the same blueprint for 
action. 
Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß & Zaby (2000) have developed the industry-life-cycle-
model (cf. Figure 22) which is based on the findings that patterns of 
internationalization during the early stages of a high-technology industry diverge 
considerably from the patterns – based on observations in mature industries – 
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that are described in traditional theoretical approaches. They argue that the lack 
of adequate ‘social systems’45 in a firm’s home country leads to 
internationalization to host countries where such ‘social systems’ are in place. 
This argument matches quite well with the specific industry situation, because 
the U.S. biotechnology industry – as already discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 
3 – is more advanced than the European biotechnology industry, so that U.S. 
biotechnology companies are per se more interesting as potential targets than 
their European competitors. This kind of internationalization follows the motive 
of tapping into the relevant clusters within the host country.46  
                                              
45  Their idea of ‘social systems’ is based on the ‘social systems framework of industry 
emergence’ by Van de Ven & Garud (1989 & 1993) that provides an overview of 
important elements that serve as necessary preconditions for the emergence of new 
technology-based industries. These elements include proprietary functions such as an 
entrepreneurial base that has an interest in commercializing technological knowledge, 
resource endowments such as mechanisms for the transfer of scientific research, venture 
capital or a pool of competent human resources, and institutional arrangements such as 
government research funding, patent systems and the societal legitimation of new 
technologies and new industries. 
46  E.g., companies of the information technology industry often invest in the Silicon Valley 
whereas banks concentrate their activities on financial centers (zu Putlitz, 2001). This view 
is also supported by Porter (1990) who states that “the other reason for a foreign 
acquisition is to gain access a to highly favorable national ‘diamond’” (p. 612). The 
‘diamond’ consists of four broad attributes of a nation (factor conditions, demand 
conditions, related and supporting industries, as well as firm strategy, structure, and 
rivalry) that shape the environment in which local firms compete and that promote or 
impede the creation of competitive advantage. 
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Figure 22: Industry-life-cycle-model 
Their model contains three aspects that are neglected in traditional theoretical 
approaches. The first aspect is the role of resource-orientated internationalization 
motives which are supposed to be dominant compared to market-seeking 
internationalization in emerging high-technology industries. Compared with the 
case findings, tentative hypotheses #1 and #3 can be explained by that, whereas 
tentative hypothesis #2 is rather dominated by the market-seeking motive and, 
thus, is not covered by this model. The second aspect of the industry-life-cycle-
model is the full incorporation of ‘cooperative agreements’ as one of the most 
important forms of internationalization. As this study is about the M&A 
activities between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, this second 
issue does not play a role and is not covered by any tentative hypotheses. The 
third aspect is the unconventional two-step pattern of internationalization, in 
which foreign direct investments are considered as being a first step of 
internationalization. The second step consists of the establishment of a dense 
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web of alliances. Zaby (1999) argues that M&A can serve as a basis for 
subsequent alliances within a cluster and characterizes this sequential approach 
as a ‘hub’ and ‘spoke’ system of tapping into foreign industrial infrastructures of 
emerging high-technology industries. In this sense, M&A is considered as being 
a first step of internationalization. Nevertheless, this third aspect cannot be really 
explained by the case findings (Tentative hypotheses #1, #2 and #3). 
It is now necessary to have a look at the more general reasons or, in other words, 
motives and, by this, the corresponding M&A strategy that made the 
pharmaceutical companies acquire the biotechnological companies. E.g., a simple 
approach is that of Robers (1994) who mentions the four most usual motives for 
acquisition: pure diversification, improved market position, turnaround situation 
and acquiring technology. Of these four motives two motives, improved market 
position as well as acquiring technology, can be identified in this study (Tentative 
hypothesis #2). In another study, Krallinger (1997) also considers buying 
technology as one of the major drivers for foreign investors in the U.S. Already 
Mace & Montgomery (1962) have identified several reasons for the acquisition of 
one company by another. They consider acquisitions as a means of achieving a 
company’s plan for growth, as investment, to serve the market needs, to buy time, 
to acquire technical know-how, to achieve product diversification, to achieve 
integration as well as bigness for bigness’ sake. Compared with this study, the 
overall growth motive (Tentative hypothesis #2) as well as the acquisition of 
technologies (Tentative hypothesis #1) are identical. Nevertheless, Mace & 
Montgomery (1962) do not distinguish between short-term and long-term 
orientated motives that makes up the difference between tentative hypothesis #1 
and tentative hypothesis #2. 
Seth (1990) develops a conceptual framework and an empirical methodology to 
assess the value creation in acquisitions. In this context, she distinguishes 
between value-maximizing and non-value maximizing acquisitions. In value-
maximizing acquisitions, the value for stockholders is created by an increased 
market power of the combined company, economies of scale and scope, 
coinsurance diversification as well as financial diversification. In non-value 
maximizing acquisitions, the management tries to maximize their own utility 
striving only for sales or growth maximization, but not for value maximization. 
Based on this distinction which is – slightly modified – also applied by Dabui 
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(1998) or Rohloff (1994) some performance studies have been carried out. E.g., 
Capron (1999) focuses on value maximizing acquisitions and shows that asset 
divestiture and resource redeployment can contribute to acquisition performance, 
with, however, a significant risk of damaging acquisition performance when the 
divested assets and redeployed resources are those of the target. In comparison 
with the findings of the case studies, no tentative hypothesis can be covered. 
Schoenberg & Reeves (1999) take another approach by asking what determines 
acquisition activity within an industry. They emphasize the idea that industry 
profitability, industry growth, industry concentration, capital intensity as well as 
industry deregulation must be looked at separately, while analyzing and 
comparing M&A activities within different industries. This idea is also relevant 
for this study, because this study analyzes the M&A and especially the 
subsequent post-acquisition integration activities between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies, having the particular industry development in mind, 
which has been devoted two sections in Chapter 3. E.g., Pisano (1997b) has 
examined the relative performance of vertically integrated projects versus 
collaborative projects in the biotechnology industry by using Akerlof’s (1970) 
model of the impact of asymmetric information on quality. Pisano (1997b) 
suggests that a potential ‘lemons’ problem exists in the market-for-know-how 
which means that only poor quality projects (‘lemons’) become available in the 
market. His analysis shows evidence of an apparent ‘lemons’ problem in the 
market-for-know-how in the biotechnology industry, because the rate of 
termination for partnered projects is significantly higher than the failure rate for 
projects undertaken via vertical integration. This may also be an indication why 
pharmaceutical companies are increasingly operating through mergers and 
acquisitions instead of collaborative agreements when dealing with biotechnology 
companies. 
There exist also some studies that have been carried out by consulting companies 
or investment banks, either focusing on mergers and acquisitions in a more 
general way or even with a specific emphasis on the pharmaceutical/health-care 
orientated industry, some of which are discussed shortly. In a study carried out by 
the London Business School & Egon Zehnder International (1987), the 
distinction is made between financial, business, political and personal reasons as 
the motivators behind the acquisition decision of the acquirer. The dominant 
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motive in the field of financial and business reasons was market share, which has 
been mentioned by all buyers as a reason. However, in the relationship between 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, market share does not matter as 
shown in tentative hypotheses #1 and #2. The second major motive with 35% was 
the access to technical capabilities, which is relevant for this study (Tentative 
hypothesis #2). The dominant political and personal reasons, playing no role in 
the context of this study, were sending signals to the city as well as the 
chairman’s insistence to acquire. In a survey carried out by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), based on interviews with 125 top executives 
worldwide who completed a merger or acquisition in the last four years, they 
have come to the conclusion that companies are doing deals primarily to build 
revenue and market position by gaining access to new markets (76%), new 
products (54%) and a bigger share of market (74%). The first two motives are 
supported by tentative hypotheses #1 and #2. Interestingly, in contrast to the 
developed tentative hypotheses, access to new technologies accounted only for 
26%. A study of Bain (Duelli, 2000) has identified four major reasons for M&A 
activities: increase in turnover and profit (80%), supplementing the existing 
product/project portfolio (70%), increase in market share (62%) as well as the 
access to new technologies (62%). Compared with this study, the motives two 
and four observed by Bain match with the tentative hypotheses #1 and #2. 
However, no distinction is made concerning short-term and long-term orientated 
motives as well as a separation into the motives of the acquirer, on the one hand, 
and the target, on the other hand. 
Gerpott (1993) also provides a good overview of acquisition motives mentioned 
in the literature. Compared with the other studies he even goes one step further, 
distinguishing between the motives from the point of view of the acquirer and the 
target. Among motives of the acquirer the access to new technologies and new 
markets as well as the support of the overall growth strategy are mentioned – as 
identified in the case studies (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2). The need for 
financial support is one of the motives for the target, however, the support as far 
as regulatory affairs were concerned as well as the access to other resources 
provided by big pharmaceutical companies (Tentative hypothesis #3) are not 
mentioned by Gerpott (1993). In addition, his analysis of literature did not reveal 
that acquirers distinguish between short-term and long-term orientated motives of 
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their acquisition. However, this distinction is crucial for the understanding of the 
different integration strategies being applied at the same time in the integration of 
biotechnology companies in the structure of big pharmaceutical companies. 
These different sources of literature considered so far do not really provide a 
systematic overview or classification, they can rather be considered as some kind 
of more or less complete collection or enumeration of M&A motives. One 
attempt to close this gap is an article of Trautwein (1990), which surveys theories 
of merger motives and relates them to prescriptions for merger strategies. In his 
approach the theories of merger motives (cf. Figure 23) can be classified into 
seven groups: efficiency theory, monopoly theory, raider theory, valuation theory, 
empire-building theory, process theory, and disturbance theory.  
Figure 23: Trautwein’s theories of merger motives 
On a more general level, Trautwein differentiates between those theories that 
regard merger consequences as the moving cause behind mergers (first category) 
from those that do not, like Gort’s (1969) disturbance theory, and those 
approaches that view mergers as process outcomes (second category). In the 
context of this study, the second category has no explanatory power. In the first 
category, most theories focus on shareholders’ interests, while one group puts its 
emphasis on managers’ interests and their deviations from shareholder value 
Source: Trautwein  (1990),  p. 284
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maximization. The M&A activities observed and described in the case studies 
definitely aim at increasing shareholder value and are not initiated for the sole 
benefit of managers.47 Those theories dealing with shareholders’ gains can be 
distinguished according to the postulated source of merger gains. These are either 
net gains through synergies or private information or wealth transfers from a 
target’s shareholders or from customers. However, neither the monopoly theory 
nor the raider theory or the valuation theory can explain the observations made in 
the case studies (Tentative hypotheses #1, #2 and #3). Only the efficiency theory, 
especially with its operational synergies, may help to explain a small proportion 
of the observed activities, because Trautwein (1990) states that they can stem 
from combining separate units (which however did not really take place in the 
analyzed cases) or from knowledge transfers. Only the knowledge transfers 
interpreted the way that it focuses on the access to new knowledge might 
contribute to classify the analyzed cases. All in all, the classification of Trautwein 
(1990) is surely one of the best reviews of merger motives.48 However, it 
definitely lacks to classify the analyzed cases as there is no distinction between 
short-term (Tentative hypothesis #1) and long-term orientated (Tentative 
hypothesis #2) objectives connected with the acquisitions. Moreover, he also does 
not distinguish between the motives of the acquirer (Tentative hypotheses #1 and 
#2) and the target (Tentative hypothesis #3). 
One of the latest and best overviews about the rationale behind M&A deals is 
presented by Bower (2001). In order to determine the relative importance of the 
rationale, he analyzed all U.S. M&A deals over $500 million made between 1997 
                                              
47  E.g., an analysis of Schmidt & Schettler (1999) has come to the conclusion that most of the 
mega-mergers among pharmaceutical companies have been carried out due to economic 
reasons. 
48  There are also abundant other sources that try to analyze, explain and classify merger 
motives, e.g., Kuhner (2000). Other researchers (Porter, 1985; Coenenberg & Sauter, 1988; 
Reißner, 1992; Chatteerjee, 1986 & 1992; Ehrenberger, 1993; Ossadnik, 1995; Perin, 
1996; Ziegler, 1997; Eccles, Lanes & Wilson, 1999) heavily rely on the different synergy 
motives and build their argumentations upon that. Reduced to its simplest equation, the 
idea of synergy is 1 + 1 = 3, which means that the new combination is greater than the sum 
of its parts (Robers, 1994). A good overview of the different synergy concepts can be 
found in Gerpott (1993) or Gertsen, Søderberg & Torp (1998). However, the synergy 
concept is not undisputed. A very good and critical analysis of the synergy concept is 
provided by Sirower (1997). 
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and 1999. As a result of this analysis, he identified five major reasons for M&A 
activities to occur and, along which that, five different M&A strategies resulting 
in different challenges. First, there is the overcapacity M&A in which the 
acquiring company as part of an industry with excess capacity intends to 
eliminate capacity, gain market share and create a more efficient operation. 
Second, the geographic roll-up M&A aims at expanding the existing business 
geographically, while keeping the operating units locally. Third, one can find the 
product or market extension M&A in which the acquiring company tries to 
extend its product line or its international coverage. Fourth, there is the M&A as 
R&D meaning that an acquisition is used instead of in-house R&D in order to 
build a market position. Fifth, the industry convergence M&A aims at exploiting 
eroding industry boundaries, i.e., a new industry is emerging and the company 
tries to establish a position in this emerging industry by culling resources from 
existing industries.  
Comparing these strategies with the insights gained in the case analyses 
concerning the short-term and long-term orientated motives for the acquisitions 
of biotechnology companies by pharmaceutical companies, it becomes obvious 
that two of the identified M&A strategies by Bower (2001) are always applied at 
the same time. On the one hand, the short-term orientated motive of improving 
the current competitive position of the pharmaceutical companies by filling up 
their R&D pipelines and getting access to potential blockbusters (Tentative 
hypothesis #1) clearly corresponds to the product extension M&A. On the other 
hand, the long-term orientated motive of strengthening the overall growth 
strategy of the company (Tentative hypothesis #2) by considering the 
biotechnology company as a center of excellence in a particular technological 
field corresponds to the M&A strategy as R&D. Considering also the 
development of the pharmaceutical industry in close connection with the 
biotechnology industry, the industry convergence M&A plays a role as well and 
may, to some extent, refer to the motives why the biotechnology companies 
accepted the takeover bids (Tentative hypothesis #3). However, this strategy only 
explains the overall consolidation in the industry, whereas the product extension 
M&A as well as the M&A as R&D strategy can help to explain the motives of the 
companies. Moreover, the framework of Bower (2001) lacks to explain the 
distinction between the short-term and long-term orientated motives, which have 
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occurred at the same time. Of course, each single motive is explained, but clearly 
not the combination of both. Nevertheless, it is very crucial to consider that both 
motives – and in the terminology of Bower, M&A as R&D and M&A as product 
extension – are in place at the same time and, thus, they also need to be realized 
simultaneously. The fact that both motives/M&A strategies need to be realized at 
the same time has tremendous repercussions on the subsequent post-acquisition 
integration and collaboration strategies, as will be shown in the following section. 
Because, without a clear cut and separation between these two motives with its 
corresponding M&A strategy, an understanding of the integration process is not 
possible.  
The contribution of Bower is that he makes an important first step by linking the 
M&A motive or rationale with a specific M&A strategy. This study goes even 
one step further, because it does not only link M&A motive and M&A strategy 
with each other, but it also includes a second very crucial step by explicitly 
linking M&A motive and M&A strategy with the necessary post-acquisition 
integration strategy. Without a reasonable post-acquisition integration strategy, 
the goal of the acquisition can never be realized. The peculiarity of the M&A 
activities between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies analyzed in this 
study is that there are two motives with two M&A strategies and consequently, 
also two different post-acquisition integration strategies in place. How this works 
and if extant post-merger integration literature is able to explain that phenomenon 
is part of the following section. 
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4.2 Confronting extant post-merger integration literature with the case 
findings 
“Big fish versus little fish: the target business may be a small division of its 
original parent; when acquired, it may find itself among the larger operating units 
of the newly formed organization. Or, conversely, a one-time whale may suddenly 
feel itself in a minnow in a mega-corporation.” (Bohl, 1989, p. 24) 
This section will now confront the dominant theories in the field of post-
acquisition and post-merger integration with the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
3.6. Although the introductory quotation taken from a study of the American 
Management Association (Bohl, 1989) concerning the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions seems not to be directly linked with the issues discussed in this 
study, it nevertheless clearly reveals the underlying contradiction that motivated 
this study. It is the big contrast between a large company, on the one hand, and a 
very small and young company, on the other hand. The interesting question is 
how to get these two organizations to work together after the acquisition. The 
following section will deal with the analysis of the organizational integration and 
collaboration after the M&A deal focusing on a smooth organizational integration 
which tries to enable both organizations, the big and the small fish, to work 
together effectively and not to let the small fish be eaten by the big one. An 
inherent problem of the following section is that – ideally – the different concepts 
should be handled and discussed simultaneously. However, a written study 
imposes the author a sequential procedure. The logic of the following section is 
as follows. To start with, the determination of the overall integration 
approach/strategy will be analyzed, because that predetermines how the future 
steps of the integration process will be processed. Before analyzing the different 
organizational integration topics of organizational/structural integration, 
knowledge/competence integration, cultural as well as personnel integration, 
there will be a short look at the different ‘fit-concepts’, which mainly serves as an 
illustration for the importance of an organizational fit and, by this, also the 
relevance of analyzing the post-acquisition organizational integration issues. 
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4.2.1 Determination and concepts of the overall integration strategy 
The remark mentioned in the introduction to this chapter about the small and the 
big fish is also supported by Magnet (1984), who states that one of the toughest 
question in M&A management is: 
“How to acquire a company and fold it into its new parent without smothering the 
vital spark that made the acquired company good enough to buy in the first 
place.” (Magnet, 1984, p. 56) 
Following the question of this quotation the first crucial decision in the post-
acquisition integration strategy is to determine the overall integration 
approach/strategy with regard to the degree of autonomy provided by the 
acquiring company to the management of the acquired firm in managing post-
acquisition operations (Tentative hypothesis #4). This is absolutely necessary in 
order to plan the subsequent steps in the post-acquisition integration process 
(Hase, 1996). One interesting empirical study about the issue of autonomy that 
has explored the importance of the autonomy decision and its impact on the 
success of an acquisition has been carried out by Datta & Grant (1990). 
Autonomy in the context of acquisitions can be described as the amount of day-
to-day freedom that the acquired firm management is given to manage its 
business. This understanding of autonomy implies that the management of the 
acquired firm has the freedom of influencing events and making the day-to-day 
operating decisions without close control by the parent company (Hayes, 1979). 
The results of their study show that acquiring firms give greater autonomy to the 
acquired firm management in unrelated acquisitions than in related acquisitions. 
Moreover, autonomy is associated with superior performance in such unrelated 
acquisitions, but the relationship is not significant in related acquisitions.  
The question now is to decide whether the acquisition of biotechnology 
companies by pharmaceutical companies can be considered as related or 
unrelated acquisitions. Of course, there are as many arguments that favor judging 
such acquisition as a related acquisition as well as an unrelated acquisition. Thus, 
one should rather consider these acquisitions as being both at the same time, 
which means that one part of the acquisition takes place in a related field and 
another part belongs to an unrelated field. In fact, that is one of the peculiarities 
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of the relationships between pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies. 
Thus, the result of the study by Datta & Grant (1990) that granting autonomy is 
associated with superior performance supports tentative hypothesis #4, which 
states that the overall integration strategy is to grant the acquired biotechnology 
company a very high level of autonomy. However, tentative hypotheses #5, #6 
and #7 can neither be explained nor supported by the study of Datta & Grant 
(1990). The reason for this is the ambivalent character of biotechnology’s 
acquisitions by pharmaceutical companies, being related and unrelated at the 
same time. In the area in which the pharmaceutical company perceives an 
unrelated acquisition, as it is in the field of research and partly also in 
development, it grants the biotechnology company as much freedom as possible 
and, by this, applying the results of the study by Datta & Grant (1990). However, 
in the areas in which the competencies are in the hands of the pharmaceutical 
company, such as sales and marketing, it grants no autonomy at all, instead takes 
over complete control. To sum up, the study of Datta & Grant (1990) is implicitly 
able to explain the basic strategies chosen by the pharmaceutical company 
(Tentative hypothesis #4), but does not come up with any hint that an acquisition 
can have two different integration strategies at the same time (Tentative 
hypotheses #5, #6 and #7). 
A study by Chakrabarti & Souder (1987), based on the analysis of 31 
acquisitions, focuses on the managerial perceptions of the success of corporate 
mergers and acquisitions as a means of acquiring new technologies. This study 
also supports the results of the study carried out by Datta & Grant (1990). 
Chakrabarti & Souder (1987) have come to the conclusion that corporations 
ought to be careful about imposing a bureaucratic process on a newly acquired 
division, due to the fact that organizational integration without an excessive 
increase of formalization was found to be the key to enhance the performance of 
the acquired division. Moreover, red tape turned out as stifling the innovative 
spirit of the acquired companies. Again, their recommendations reflect the 
behavior of the pharmaceutical companies by granting the acquired 
biotechnology businesses as much autonomy as possible (Tentative hypothesis 
#4), but do not consider the use of two different integration strategies at the same 
time (Tentative hypotheses #5, #6, and #7). In a subsequent study, Chakrabarti 
(1990) has analyzed the importance of organizational factors in post-acquisition 
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performance. This research was guided by the question of what factors lead to a 
success or failure of mergers and acquisitions. This study concludes that post-
acquisition success of firms does not only depend on the strategic fit between the 
merging firms, but also on the organizational integration between them, as 
organizational factors intervene and essentially determine which of the pre-
merger potentials are finally achieved and which are not. Integration in his study 
is – in accordance to the view of Lawrence & Lorch (1967) – defined as the 
quality of the state of collaboration between the organizational units. Chakrabarti 
(1990) shows that intensive communication between the acquired division and 
the other organizational units on technology or joint projects are key elements in 
sharing the strategic capabilities. Furthermore, an increased level of formalization 
in resource allocation and other management decision areas adversely affects 
post-acquisition performance. In addition to that, he also points out that 
“management of acquired units need more understanding and an attitude of 
investment in future”. (Chakrabarti, 1990, p. 259) 
This corresponds also to one tentative hypothesis of this study, which states that 
the acquisition of a biotechnology company is rather an investment that pays off 
or not (Tentative hypothesis #28). Apart from that, the study of Chakrabarti 
(1990) shows that organizational factors are of crucial importance and that it is 
worth analyzing in detail how these factors are combined in the post-acquisition 
integration process.  
After having seen that organizational integration plays an important role in the 
post-acquisition integration process and that the autonomy approach should serve 
as the overall guiding principle in a first step, which is also supported by the 
results of some empirical studies, one should always keep in mind that the within-
case analyses revealed that pharmaceutical companies used two integration 
approaches at the same time. In this context, the autonomy strategy is the 
dominant one (Tentative hypothesis #4), however, as far as certain aspects of the 
integration are concerned, this autonomy strategy is gradually replaced by a more 
‘total control’ strategy from the point of view of the pharmaceutical companies 
(Tentative hypotheses #5, #6 and #7). Therefore, it is now time to take a look at 
the contributions different post-acquisition integration concepts can make. 
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These concepts can be classified into different groups. One group deals explicitly 
with the content of what is to be integrated and, by this, has a more operational 
focus. These concepts are usually summarized under the heading of ‘fit-concepts’ 
and often just name the different areas which need to be taken into account 
without linking them to any specific M&A strategy. The other group tries to 
distinguish between the basic strategies of integration and, thus, has a more 
strategic view on the integration process. This study will first take a look at the 
more strategic-orientated approaches, because this is considered to be the relevant 
perspective, and it is necessary to define the overall strategic directions before 
detailed post-acquisition integration instruments can be applied in order to realize 
the fit between the companies. The respective integration strategy needs to be 
tailored to each specific integration.  
These few reflections make evident that it is not enough to have a look at the 
concepts or frameworks which simply state that there needs to be a ‘fit’ between 
strategy, structure, culture and management. (Of course there will be a few 
remarks about these concepts as well, in a sub-section with the title fit-concepts.) 
It is by far more important to analyze the concepts that explicitly link the means 
for the realization of the fit with the corresponding integration strategy and, by 
this, give clear recommendations how to handle a specific post-acquisition 
integration task. After this overall strategic link between M&A motives, M&A 
strategy and integration approach has been pointed out, we can have a look at the 
different organizational integration topics and analyze whether and how they 
support the overall strategic concept. 
Shrivastava (1986) has developed one of the first classifications for post-merger 
integration, determining the extent of post-merger integration according to the 
acquisition motives in combination with the size and type of the acquired 
business. As far as this last point is concerned, a distinction between small single-
unit firms, functional, divisionalized conglomerate types of businesses was made. 
Shrivastava (1986) has identified six identified acquisition motives: (1) increase 
market share in a limited product/market domain, (2) reduce competition, (3) 
impulse purchase, (4) buying technology, (5) rapid growth, and (6) exploit 
multiple synergies. However, only two of these motives are relevant for this 
study: buying technology and rapid growth (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2). His 
recommendation for the motive ‘buying technology’ is to completely integrate 
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physical assets. The motive ‘rapid growth’ is not discussed, because it is 
considered as a rare occurrence. Confronting these recommendations with the 
hypotheses developed from the cross-case analysis, none of these 
recommendations matter, because there is no complete integration of the acquired 
technology (Tentative hypotheses #5, #6 and #7). Moreover, having in mind that, 
e.g., Pharmacia had to fill its Phase I/II gap (Tentative hypothesis #1), these 
acquisitions pursued the goal of supporting the growth of the pharmaceutical 
companies. All in all, the classification of Shrivastava (1986) is not able to 
explain the motives observed in the cases (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2) and 
does also not distinguish between the motives of the acquiring and the acquired 
company (Tentative hypothesis #3). However, the basic idea, that there needs to 
be a certain link between the acquisition motive and the subsequent post-merger 
integration, is of course relevant to this study and becomes obvious in the 
following quotation: 
“Diverse motives complicate post-merger integration, because each motive 
requires a different extent of integration.[...] Non-integration of the acquired 
business can be satisfactory in some situations, overintegration can be expensive, 
and underintegration can be unproductive. Therefore, it is important to determine 
the optimal degree of integration for each situation” (Shrivastava, 1986, p. 66 and 
p. 73) 
It has been revealed that the extent of post-merger integration according to the 
two factors of ‘objectives of mergers’ and ‘size and form of merging companies’ 
has not much explanatory power for the observations made in this study. Apart 
from that, Shrivastava (1986) has also developed an overview of different post-
merger integration tasks, which is shown in the following Figure 24. 
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Figure 24: Post-merger integration tasks 
In this context, he identifies three central problems of integration – coordination, 
control and conflict resolution – the management at both companies needs to deal 
with. Coordinating activities are necessary in order to achieve overall 
organizational goals. The monitoring and controlling of individual departmental 
activities is to ensure that they are complementary and are performed at adequate 
levels of quality and output. Conflict resolution is necessary in case of 
fragmented interests of specialized departments, individuals, and inconsistent 
subgoals among them. Besides these three central problems of integration, he also 
identifies three different types of integration – procedural integration, physical 
integration and managerial/sociocultural integration (cf. Figure 24) – which he 
analyzes with respect to the three central problems. The following paragraphs 
will discuss this and compare it with the tentative hypotheses developed in this 
study. Shrivastava (1986) does not link the post-merger integration tasks with 
specific actions necessary to be undertaken in connection with the respective 
M&A and integration strategy. He just mentions what needs to be done and keeps 
the realization open. 
First, procedural integration involves combining systems and procedures of the 
merged companies at the operating, management control, and strategic planning 
levels (Anthony, 1965), and aims at homogenizing and standardizing work 
Source: Shrivastava  (1986), p.  67
Coordination Control Conflict Resolution
Procedural Design accounting Design management Eliminate contradic-
systems and proce- controlling system tory rules and proce-
dures dures
Rationalize systems
Physical Encourage sharing of Measure and manage Resource allocations
resources the productivity of
resources Asset redeployment
Managerial and Establish integrator Design compensation Stabilize power
Sociocultural roles and reward systems sharing
Change organization Allocate authority and
structure responsibility
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES   205
procedures. In this study, the ultimate responsibility – in terms of coordination 
and control – for finance, controlling, human resources and budgeting issues was 
taken over by the pharmaceutical companies (Tentative hypothesis #9) and, thus, 
corresponds to the point of view of Shrivastava (1986). Second, physical 
integration of resources and assets usually accompanies procedural integration 
and involves the consolidation of product lines, production technologies, plant 
and equipment, and real estate assets. As this study is about the integration of 
small biotechnology companies into the structure of big pharmaceutical 
companies, physical integration does not play an important role, because there 
was no combination of sites (Tentative hypothesis #13), as every biotechnology 
company was to preserve its independence. However, Shrivastava (1986) does 
also include R&D projects as part of the ‘physical’ integration. As far as the 
transfers of some research projects from the larger pharmaceutical companies to 
the smaller biotechnology companies is concerned (Tentative hypothesis #12) 
physical integration may have a certain importance. Third, the managerial and 
sociocultural integration involves the selection or transfer of managers, the 
changes in organizational structure including compensation and reward systems 
as well as the development of a consistent corporate culture. Compared with the 
experiences gained in the case studies, the aspect of managerial and sociocultural 
integration really matters (Tentative hypotheses #8, #10, #14, #15, #16, #18, #19 
and #20) and will be analyzed in more detail during the discussion of the 
respective integration topics. To sum up, of the three different types of physical, 
procedural and managerial/sociocultural integration, only the latter two could be 
really identified as relevant in the relationship between biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies – although to some extent the physical integration is 
also concerned. However, the focus of Shrivastava (1986) clearly lays on the 
integration of product lines, plants, equipment and real estate assets and not on 
R&D projects. The integration of R&D projects is only a side-effect. Apart from 
that, Shrivastava (1986) does not consider the fact that two post-acquisition 
integration strategies could be in use at the same time as revealed in tentative 
hypothesis #5. 
Birkinshaw, Bresman & Hakanson (2000) developed a framework focusing on 
the task integration and the human integration process and their effect on the 
success of the acquisition. In their view, the task integration process deals with 
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the identification and realization of operational synergies, whereas the human 
integration process focuses on the creation of positive attitudes towards the 
integration among employees on both sides. Hence, the task integration process 
views value creation as the objective of the acquisition, measured in terms of 
transfers of capabilities and resource sharing. The human integration process, 
however, is concerned with generating satisfaction and a shared identity among 
the employees from both companies. They argue that the processes of ‘task 
integration’ and ‘human integration’ are conceptually distinct, but, of course, not 
independent from one another, and that the overall acquisition success is 
contingent on the effective management of both sub-processes: 
“The sub-processes of task integration and human integration are separated out 
and it is shown that effective integration in the cases was achieved through a two-
phase process. In phase one, task integration led to a satisficing solution that 
limited the interaction between acquired and acquiring units, while human 
integration proceeded smoothly and led to cultural convergence and mutual 
respect. In phase two, there was renewed task integration built on the success of 
the human integration that had been achieved, which led to much greater 
interdependencies between acquired and acquiring units.” (Birkinshaw, Bresman 
& Hakanson, 2000, p. 395) 
The quotation reveals that their recommendation focuses on a smooth human 
integration process in a first step, which afterwards would make the task 
integration process easier. The results of their study and the underlying logic of 
their argumentation are depicted in the following Figure 25: 
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Figure 25: Framework for post-merger integration management  
Following the logic and rationale of Birkinshaw, Bresman & Hakanson (2000) 
would imply that the two companies involved in the acquisition should keep their 
autonomy at the beginning with only a little amount of integration while 
concentrating on the human integration process. The ‘real’ integration – in the 
terminology of Birkinshaw, Bresman & Hakanson (2000) the task integration 
process – in terms of combining different units and working together more 
closely should take place in a further step – after having successfully completed 
the human integration process. As convincing as this approach may sound, it 
cannot explain the integration of the biotechnology companies into the structure 
of the big pharmaceutical companies observed in the cases. One major reason for 
that is that biotech companies have a ‘normal’ annual fluctuation between 15 and 
18% and after the acquisition this has even increased (Tentative hypothesis #17). 
Moreover, most of the top management left the company after the takeover, due 
to the fact that they can no longer strive for the fulfillment of their entrepreneurial 
spirit and goals (Tentative hypotheses #15 and #17). Hence, it is not really 
possible to realize a smooth human integration process lasting a few years, simply 
because too many people leave the company – irrespective of how ‘smooth’ this 
process ever might be.  
Source: Birkinshaw, Bresman & Hakanson  (2000),  p.  421
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Apart from that, pharmaceutical companies want to profit from their acquired 
biotechnology companies and aim at getting the best return as quickly as possible, 
which reflects their perception of such an acquisition as an investment that has to 
pay off (Tentative hypothesis #28). Furthermore, the overall integration strategy 
chosen by the pharmaceutical companies is to grant the acquired biotechnology 
company as much autonomy and independence as possible (Tentative hypothesis 
#4). In addition, pharmaceutical companies do not strive to convergent the 
cultures between both companies (Tentative hypothesis #14) as it is the aim of 
the human integration process by creating a shared identity. In fact, the 
pharmaceutical companies would be very content, if the biotechnology companies 
could preserve as much of its former entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture as 
possible. They definitely do not want to streamline the culture of both 
organizations. Unfortunately, it is not possible to keep the two cultures separated, 
as part of the biotechnology culture gets lost and the biotechnology companies 
gets closer to the pharmaceutical company due to the acquisition and subsequent 
integration process (Tentative hypotheses #15 and #16). These few remarks make 
clear that the concept of Birkinshaw, Bresman & Hakanson (2000) cannot serve 
as an explanation for the observations made during the post-acquisition 
integration process between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. 
Considering the existing post-acquisition integration literature, the work of 
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) is among the most prominent ones. The 
importance of post-merger integration becomes obvious in the following 
statement: 
“Many acquisitions look great on paper. Yet, no matter how attractive the 
opportunity, value is not created until after the acquisition, when capabilities are 
transferred and people from both organizations collaborate to create the expected 
benefits or to discover others.” (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, p. 11) 
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) adopt a process perspective in analyzing 
acquisitions that shifts the focus from an acquisition’s results to the drivers that 
cause the results. Value creation is considered as a long-term phenomenon that 
results from managerial action and interactions between the firms. From their 
point of view the transfer of capabilities will lead to competitive advantage or, in 
other words, value creation. However, this argument contradicts to the overall 
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observations made in the deals between pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies, because a real transfer of capabilities did not take place (Tentative 
hypothesis #11). 
Their overall perception of the value-creation process is to consider firms as a set 
of capabilities embodied in the organizational framework, which can create and 
sustain elements of competitive advantage for the company, when applied in the 
marketplace. From their capabilities-based perspective, they suggest that a firm’s 
competitive advantage results from applying a wide range of capabilities and, 
especially, a set of core capabilities, defined as being central to competitive 
advantage. As markets are sufficiently varied to provide room for different 
competitors with different capability profiles to exist, the only real distinctive 
competence is the ability to mobilize an organization to continually form new 
combinations of capabilities and to renew them. From their point of view, 
mergers and acquisitions are considered as part of a corporate strategy for 
renewing such capabilities. Thus, the heart of integration is the transfer and 
application of strategic capabilities.  
They distinguish the transfer of general management skills, functional skill 
transfer, operational resource sharing and combination benefits. These issues will 
be discussed in more detail when having a look at the integration topics, or more 
precisely the knowledge and competence transfer. Comparing their fundamental 
view of the organization with the results from the case studies, it becomes 
obvious that pharmaceutical companies do not necessarily follow the logic of 
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991). Of course, they consider competencies at the 
biotechnology companies as some kind of capabilities, but these capabilities are 
not transferred from the biotechnology to the pharmaceutical company (Tentative 
hypothesis #11). These competencies are rather ‘added’ to the competence 
portfolio of the pharmaceutical company, as the biotechnology company is now 
part of the pharmaceutical company. However, these competencies of the newly 
acquired biotechnology company are not spread across the whole pharmaceutical 
company in order to stimulate the renewal process (Tentative hypotheses #11 and 
#13). Instead, these units rather remain independent and turn into centers of 
excellence within the whole pharmaceutical organization (Tentative hypothesis 
#12). Thus, the underlying logic of Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) cannot explain 
the observations made in the relationships between pharmaceutical and 
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biotechnology companies after the M&A deal. Nevertheless, it already needs to 
be mentioned at this point that the pharmaceutical companies apply the concept 
of capabilities in order to determine the degree of integration (Tentative 
hypotheses #6 and #7). This insight – as well as the argumentation of the 
capability concept – will be used and also further elaborated, while discussing 
and developing the new integration approach as the result of this study. But for 
now, this study turns to the classification of the different integration approaches 
developed by Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), because the perception of how and 
what is to be integrated varies considerably as the following quotation reveals: 
“Some managers had a starkly simple view of integration. For some, integration 
meant ‘making them like us’; others managed as if ‘nothing should change’ in 
either firm. Other managers saw integration as a ‘black box’ in which things just 
seemed to happen after the acquisition, but most of those we studied realized they 
were immersed in a complex process, full of subtleties and pitfalls.” (Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991, p. 105) 
Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) distinguish three acquisition integration 
approaches (cf. Figure 26).49 These approaches to integration can be understood 
by considering two central dimensions of the acquisition. The first dimension is 
the relationship to the acquiring firm, which relates to the nature of the 
interdependence that needs to be established between the companies in order to 
realize the type of strategic capability transfer that is expected. The second 
dimension is the way in which value is expected to be created. This is associated 
with the need to preserve intact the acquired strategic capabilities after the 
acquisition. The following Figure 26 positions integration approaches in the light 
of the relationships between these two dimensions, having in mind that some 
acquisitions have a high need for strategic interdependence, whereas others do 
not, and some acquisitions have a high need for organizational autonomy, 
whereas others do not. 
                                              
49  Following the overall idea of Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), Sinatra & Dubini (1994) refer 
to these three modes of integration as ‘Colonisation’, ‘Marriage’ and ‘Imprinting’. 
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Figure 26: Types of acquisition integration approaches 
Absorption acquisitions are those in which the strategic task requires a high 
degree of interdependence to create the expected value, but has only a low need 
for organizational autonomy. This kind of integration is what most naturally 
comes to the mind of people, when they think of what happens after an 
acquisition, the true consolidation of two companies. This means that integration 
implies a full consolidation, over time, of operations, organization, as well as the 
culture of both organizations. According to the research outcomes of Haspeslagh 
& Jemison (1991), a successful absorption is characterized by four basic tasks: 
• The first task involves drawing a blueprint (a plan) for a consolidation. This 
task should have already started long before the acquisition is completed and 
ideally involves managers from both sides. 
• The second major task deals with managing the rationalization of both 
organizations, which is normally seen as the essence of the integration 
process. 
• The third set of tasks aims at getting the combined company to move to best 
practice in all areas of complementarity, whether they be systems, 
manufacturing practices, or human resource management.  
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Source: Haspeslagh & Jemison  (1991),  p. 145
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• The final objective is harnessing the complementarity between the two 
companies in order to create long-term competitive advantage. 
Having a look at these four major tasks it becomes obvious that the ultimate 
objective of an absorption acquisition is to dissolve the boundary between both 
units. Confronting the absorption approach with the case findings, one can easily 
draw the conclusion that an absorption acquisition is definitely not the kind of 
acquisition pharmaceutical companies had in mind when deciding to acquire a 
biotechnology company. However, a certain movement to best practice could be 
observed as far as finance, controlling and human resource issues were concerned 
(Tentative hypothesis #9), but these are not the areas in which value is supposed 
to be created. Thus, none of these four basic tasks of an absorption acquisition 
can be found in the deals between big pharma and small biotech, because the 
overall integration strategy in use was to grant the biotechnology company a very 
high level of autonomy (Tentative hypothesis #4). 
The second type of integration strategy identified by Haspeslagh & Jemison 
(1991) is the so-called preservation acquisition in which a high need for 
autonomy and low need for interdependence among the combining firms exist. In 
this case, the primary task of management is to keep the source of the acquired 
benefits intact, because a change in the acquired company’s ways of managing, 
practices, or even motivation would endanger success, because the capabilities 
require protection from the embrace of the acquiring organization. The overall 
strategy is to manage the acquired operations at arm’s length beyond those 
specific areas in which interdependence is to be pursued. This overall approach 
seems to be consistent with tentative hypothesis #4, stating that the acquired 
biotechnology companies are granted as much independence and autonomy as 
possible. The areas in which interdependence is to be pursued typically consist of 
financial and general management capabilities, which would also correspond to 
the observations made in the case studies in which finance, controlling, budgeting 
and human resource issues were taken over by the big pharmaceutical company 
(Tentative hypothesis #9). In addition, Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) argue that, 
according to the preservation concept, the main benefit is to be derived from the 
ability to bring funding to the acquired company. Moreover, they have identified 
four basic tasks by which a preservation acquisition can be characterized: 
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• Continued boundary protection is considered as being the first fundamental 
task in a preservation acquisition. This aims at preserving a distinct culture in 
which the acquired capabilities are embedded and remain unchanged. 
• The second task consists in nurturing the acquired company, because the 
value that is directly created in this kind of acquisition stems from accelerated 
business development. 
• The third task is to accumulate learning about and from the business. First, the 
management group of the acquiring company tries to learn about the industry 
as a prospective new business domain. Second, learning may result from the 
exposure of the acquiring firm to a different business that may be relevant to 
the company’s existing core business. 
• The fourth task is closely related to the third one. This task involves to 
champion resource commitments to that new domain of business and to 
combine them with internal development projects. 
Trying to summarize the goal of the preservation acquisition, one may conclude 
that the major integration task is to establish the proper gatekeeping structure. As 
mentioned earlier, the preservation approach may be able to explain the tentative 
hypotheses #4 and #9 and, thus, may fit quite well in order to explain the case-
study observations. Unfortunately, it is not that easy, because pharmaceutical 
companies do not just apply one overall integration strategy. Tentative 
hypotheses #5 and #6 reveal that the choice of the appropriate integration strategy 
for each project of the biotechnology company – and not just for the 
biotechnology company as a whole – depends on the position of the project with 
respect to the pharmaceutical value chain as well as the perceived core 
competencies of the pharmaceutical company with respect to the proven 
competencies of the acquired biotechnology company. Hence, deciding which 
integration strategy to use is much more complex and involves the application of 
different integration strategies according to the specific requirements (Tentative 
hypothesis #7). To put it in a nutshell, the preservation acquisition does not 
completely and satisfactory explain the integration activities observed in the 
cases.  
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Symbiotic acquisitions are the third type identified by Haspeslagh & Jemison 
(1991). This kind of integration involves high needs for both, strategic 
interdependence and organizational autonomy. The two organizations first 
coexist and then gradually become increasingly interdependent. This coexistence 
and mutual dependency are slowly achieved despite the tension arising from the 
conflicting needs for strategic capability transfer and the maintenance of each 
organization’s autonomy and culture. Thus, symbiotic acquisitions have a clear 
need for both, boundary preservation and, at the same time, boundary 
permeability. In their research, Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) have identified four 
evolving patterns of interaction managers need to cope with: 
• The first pattern is to start with a preservation of the acquired company, while 
the acquiring company makes changes in its own organization in order to be 
better juxtaposed to the acquisition. 
• The next step is called ‘reaching out rather than reaching in’, which reflects 
gradually increasing interactions between the acquiring and the acquired 
companies, preferably on behalf of the acquired company. This step tries to 
pursue the real purpose of the acquisition, the achievement of a rich capability 
transfer between both sides. 
• The next process, swapping operating responsibility for strategic control, 
focuses on gaining strategic control over the acquired company, while, at the 
same time, increasing the operating responsibilities of the managers of the 
acquired company. 
• The final step is the gradual amalgamation of the organizations, being the 
essence of symbiotic acquisitions, which leads to a combination of the two 
organizations to become a new, unique entity. 
The overall goal of a symbiotic acquisition is to find a viable way through the 
need of preserving the acquired company’s culture, while, at the same, 
encouraging interdependence to fulfill the acquisition purpose. At a first glance, 
the symbiotic approach seems to be the strategy that best fits with the activities 
observed in the cases, because it seems to combine both strategies. Superficially 
regarded, this may also have occurred in the deals between pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies. But, starting with the preservation strategy is only a 
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mean by itself, because in a symbiotic acquisition it is never the ultimate goal to 
preserve the independence and autonomy of the acquired company. It is more or 
less only some kind of a ‘roundabout’ way, as a direct absorption approach would 
lead to a failure of the acquisition. Thus, this strategy cannot explain the 
observations that came up in the cross-case analyses. In fact, pharmaceutical 
companies apply two different strategies at the same time. On the one hand, they 
grant the acquired companies as much independence and autonomy as possible in 
everything that has to do with research (Tentative hypotheses #4 and #7). On the 
other hand, they apply an immediate absorption for the products in late-stage 
clinical trials (Tentative hypotheses #5 and #6). That is not done via a symbiotic 
acquisition, which calls for some kind of transition period, starting with 
preservation and then gradually amalgamating the two organizations. In this 
context, that is simply not a viable solution, because they immediately need to do 
both, ensure the long-term autonomy in the field of research and make sure that 
the clinical trials get under control of the big pharmaceutical company as quickly 
as possible. Hence, pharmaceutical companies apply two completely different 
integration strategies at the same time, depending on the position of the project 
with regard to the pharmaceutical value chain.  
As the current strategies for post-acquisition integration are unable to explain the 
observations made in the case studies and, due to the fact, that it is very difficult 
to handle and realize this complex integration strategies, one of the main 
objectives of this study is to depict how pharmaceutical companies can handle 
this balance. This will be done by analyzing the different integration topics of 
organizational/structural integration, knowledge/competence transfer, cultural 
and personnel integration as observed in the cases and by comparing them with 
the propositions made in the existing literature. Before this study turns to that 
section, there will first be a brief look at possible contributions, the so-called ‘fit-
concepts’ may make. 
Fit-concepts 
In sum, these ‘fit-concepts’ only serve as an illustration emphasizing the need for 
a certain fit between the acquiring and the acquired company, but, beyond this, 
provide no further insights. 
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Krüger & Müller-Stewens (1994) have developed a general framework in order 
to create the required general post-acquisition fit based on a hierarchy of six 
crucial success factors. In a first step, there needs to be a strategic fit, which is 
realized by gaining a strategic orientation for the combined company. Based on 
the developed strategy, two basic requirements must be secured. First, the people 
responsibility must be answered, which mainly refers to the question whether or 
not the management of the acquired/acquiring company possesses the necessary 
knowledge to run the business. Second, the various kinds of implementation 
resources have to be checked, because reaching strategic goals demands 
appropriate human, financial, and technical resources. Of course, building up or 
varying the ‘people responsible’ and ‘implementation potential’ are both 
necessary conditions for reaching success, however, they are not sufficient ones. 
Based on these assumptions the necessary systems and structures need to be set in 
place in order to reach success and diminish failure. Apart from that, the impact 
of the acquisition on the philosophy and culture of the acquired, but also on the 
acquiring company, needs to be taken into consideration. To sum up, Krüger & 
Müller-Stewens (1994) have developed this framework with six areas of 
acquisitional fit as a background for the content of the post-acquisition 
integration.  
Comparing this framework with the different integration topics that will be 
discussed next, it becomes clear that, besides the knowledge/competence transfer, 
all of these areas are covered by the framework of Krüger & Müller-Stewens 
(1994). However, this framework can rather be considered as a checklist that 
points out which areas are to be considered. It does not allow to establish a link 
between the M&A motives with its corresponding M&A strategy and the 
necessary integration strategy. 
Apart from this framework of Krüger & Müller-Stewens (1994), there are also 
many other authors who have developed similar frameworks in order to structure 
the post-acquisition integration process, some of which are briefly mentioned in 
the following. Spickers (1995) as well as Grüter (1991) differentiate between 
structural, political, personnel, and cultural aspects. Kirchner (1991) makes a 
distinction between strategic fit, on the one hand, and organizational fit, on the 
other hand. In his approach organizational fit consists of an interplay between 
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strategy, structure, systems, culture, and shareholders. Hase (1996) distinguishes 
between strategy, structure, personnel, and culture. 
Besides these general frameworks, already in the mid 1980s, Jemison & Sitkin 
(1986a) have tried to link the (strategic and organizational) fit concept with a 
process perspective, considering both as potentially important determinants of the 
activities and outcomes of an acquisition. In their view, strategic fit is defined as 
the degree to which the target firm augments or complements the parent’s 
strategy and, hence, makes identifiable contributions to the financial and 
nonfinancial goals of the parent. In contrast to this, organizational fit is 
considered as the match between administrative practices, cultural practices, and 
personnel characteristics of the target and parent firm. Moreover, their paper 
argues that acquisitions should be regarded as a discontinuous and fractionated 
process with distinctive characteristics that may affect important organizational 
activities and outcomes (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b). For an acquisition to be 
successful, the decision-maker must make the right choices about the strategic 
and organizational fit, while at the same time having in mind the process 
character of the acquisition.  
Comparing this concept with the hypotheses generated in this study it becomes 
obvious that the strategic fit between the biotechnology and the pharmaceutical 
companies does not seem to be the problem (Tentative hypotheses #1, #2 and #3). 
However, there is clearly no good organizational fit between these two kinds of 
companies, as there is a rather big and bureaucratic pharmaceutical company, on 
the one hand, and a small, young and dynamic biotechnology company, on the 
other hand. Thus, the analysis and the realization of the organizational fit are of 
crucial importance for a successful acquisition outcome. As there is such a wide 
gap between both sides, pharmaceutical companies have consequently voted for 
an autonomy strategy (Tentative hypothesis #4) as their overall integration 
concept. How this strategy is realized will be shown, when the different 
integration topics will be discussed. 
There are also some empirical studies that try to analyze the relationship between 
organizational fit and post-acquisition performance. Datta (1991) has examined 
the impact of organizational differences between acquiring and acquired firms on 
post-acquisition performance. In his study, the organizational fit, which 
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influences the ease with which two organizations can be assimilated after an 
acquisition, is assessed along the differences in ‘management styles’ and in 
‘organizational reward and evaluation systems’. He shows that differences in top 
management styles have a negative impact on post-acquisition performance, 
whereas no such impact exists between differences in the reward and evaluation 
systems. To sum up, the ‘fit-concepts’ have only served as an illustration for the 
need of an organizational integration. 
Apart from considering the post-acquisition integration literature one should also 
have a look at the contribution other research streams may make. In the field of 
internationalization Schmidt, Bäurle & Kutschker (1999) stress the increasing 
importance of foreign subsidiaries as centers of competence. In this context, 
Jarillo & Martinez (1990) propose a framework to characterize the different roles 
that subsidiaries of multinational corporations can play within the firm’s overall 
strategy.50 Based on Porter’s (1986) conclusion that the essential structural 
characteristic is the degree of interrelationships among competitive environments 
in different countries and on Ghoshal’s (1987) argument that a company may 
implement very different strategies in each of its subsidiaries, Jarillo & Martinez 
(1990) add a third step. They develop a framework (cf. Figure 27).in order to 
analyze the strategy at the subsidiary level: 
                                              
50  The importance of a national subsidiary of a multinational corporation is also supported by 
a study of Furu (2000) who examines the relationship between a competitive environment, 
the development of subsidiary competencies, and the integration of subsidiary 
technological competencies into the rest of the multinational corporation. His findings 
suggest that national subsidiaries are able to tap into local knowledge and develop 
distinctive technological competencies that are of use for the rest of the corporation. A 
very good and brief overview of the literature about the different roles of foreign 
subsidiaries can be found in Schmidt, Bäurle & Kutschker (1999). 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES   219
Figure 27: Different types of subsidiary strategy 
The two basic dimensions are the ‘degree of localization’ of activities (i.e. 
whether R&D, purchasing, manufacturing, etc. are performed in the country) and 
the ‘degree of integration’ of those activities that are performed in the country 
with the same activities in other subsidiaries of the company. These two 
dimensions are considered as being independent. Jarillo & Martinez (1990) draw 
the following conclusions: if a subsidiary is following an ‘autonomous strategy’, 
it will carry out most of the functions in a manner that is relatively independent of 
its parent organization. This strategy is supposed to be typical for subsidiaries of 
multinational firms (Bartlett, 1986), competing in ‘multidomestic’ industries.51 In 
case of a ‘receptive strategy’, few functions are performed in the country and they 
are also highly integrated with the rest of the multinational corporation. Such a 
strategy will be followed by subsidiaries of global firms, operating in global 
                                              
51  Following the classification of Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) a global company is orientated 
towards the world market, seeking competitive advantage in the economies of scale 
attendant to a standardized product design, global scale manufacturing, and centralized 
control. A multinational organization tries to profit from the firm’s ability to differentiate 
its product in each country in order to satisfy local tastes and needs. The transnational 
organization tries to coordinate operations in all countries where the company is present in 
order to obtain as many economies of scale and scope as possible, on the one hand, while 
maintaining the ability to respond to national interests and preferences, on the other hand. 
Receptive
Subsidiary
Active
Subsidiary
Autonomous
Subsidiary
Degree of
integration
Degree of Localization
Low High
Low
High
Source: Jarillo & Martinez (1990),  p. 503
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industries. An ‘active strategy’ will be applied, if many activities are located in 
the country and they are carried out in close coordination with the rest of the firm. 
‘Active’ strategies will be applied by subsidiaries of transnational firms (Ghoshal, 
1987). Comparing the conclusions of Jarillo & Martinez (1990) with the case 
findings, it is in fact very difficult to explain the roles of the acquired 
biotechnology with the proposed framework. Considering the ‘degree of 
localization’ in the original intention of Jarillo & Martinez (1990), i.e. how many 
steps of the value chain are covered by the subsidiary, one would have to draw 
the conclusion that there is a low ‘degree of localization’. In the case of the 
‘degree of integration’ in the meaning of Jarillo & Martinez (1990) there is rather 
a high ‘degree of integration’, because the research done in the biotechnology 
companies is of crucial importance for the subsequent development as well as 
sales and marketing. Applying the framework of Jarillo & Martinez (1990), the 
biotechnology company would need to follow a ‘receptive strategy’ and not an 
‘autonomous strategy’ as the tentative hypotheses #4 and #7 clearly demand. 
Consequently, the two dimensions are not able to capture the nature of the 
acquired biotechnology, because the focus of the biotechnology company lays on 
doing basic research and developing promising technologies or products. This 
makes clear that the acquired biotechnology companies need to be treated with a 
complete different logic and strategy. On the one hand, there is a need to control 
a part of the value chain and integrate it into the larger company. But, at the same 
time, there is a need to preserve the autonomy and independence of the high-tech 
company in order no to endanger the innovative capabilities and the tacit 
knowledge embedded in the small company. To sum up, the framework of Jarillo 
& Martinez (1990) is not able to handle that problem. 
The transnational model of Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) describes several generic 
roles to foreign subsidiaries. In a later article Bartlett & Ghoshal (1990) establish 
a link between differentiated subsidiary roles and different innovation processes. 
Figure 28 shows a framework for the allocation of such differentiated roles based 
on the strategic importance of the local environment, on the one hand, and the 
levels of local resources and capabilities, on the other hand. The different local 
level capabilities are represented by small letters in Figure 28 with (s), (r), and (i) 
standing for sensing, response, and implementation, respectively. In contrast to 
this, the global scale capabilities of the subsidiaries are represented by capital 
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letters, (S),(R), and (I) respectively. However, it needs to be mentioned that these 
roles only apply to the specific function or product, the global scale sensing, 
response, and implementation capabilities are built in these units with regard to 
the specific activities for which they carry the leadership role.  
Figure 28: Managing innovations in the transnational organization 
Some subsidiaries that are located in challenging and stimulating environments 
and which posses high levels of technological and managerial capabilities are 
allocated the role of strategic leaders. These subsidiaries serve as the 
transnational’s innovative spark plugs. This is also the role the acquired 
biotechnology companies are supposed to play as they turn into centers of 
excellence for a specific field or activity within the context of the worldwide 
operations of the pharmaceutical companies (Tentative hypotheses #7 and #12). 
The role of contributors is attributed to subsidiaries in which competence is high, 
but the strategic importance of the market is limited. Organizations with 
relatively low levels of resources in relatively non-strategic market are allocated 
the implementer role. Their principal task is considered as adapting and 
implementing central and global innovation in the local context. Moreover, there 
may be strategically important markets in which a worldwide operating company 
has only minimal capabilities which are inadequate to exercise the lead role. In 
this case, the role attributed to the subsidiary is the black hole. One response to 
Black hole Leader
Implementer Contributor
Source: Bartlett & Ghoshal  (1990),  p. 244
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this challenging situation has been to create a small sensory capability in order to 
exploit the learning potential of the environment. 
This section now turns to a more detailed look at how the organizational topics in 
the post-acquisition process between pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies are realized. 
4.2.2 Discussion of the different organizational integration topics 
This section discusses the realization of the different organizational integration 
topics. This will be done by analyzing the different integration issues of 
organizational/structural integration, knowledge/competence transfer, cultural 
and personnel integration as observed in the cases and by comparing them with 
the propositions made in the existing literature. 
4.2.2.1 Organizational collaboration after the acquisition 
The integration of organizational elements is of course very much predetermined 
by the choice of the overall organizational integration. As already pointed out in 
the sections before, the overall organizational integration strategy was to grant the 
acquired biotechnology companies as much independence and autonomy as 
possible with respect to its proven core competencies (Tentative hypotheses #4, 
#5, #6 and #7). Thus, the overall collaboration between the acquiring and the 
acquired company is reduced to a minimum level. This means, that from an 
organizational point of view, the acquired organizations were integrated into the 
matrix structure of the big pharmaceutical company, however, the interaction 
between both sides was reduced to a minimum and worked more on a project 
base than on close daily interactions (Tentative hypothesis #8). Nevertheless, this 
overall autonomy strategy is only applied for the primary activities of the 
pharmaceutical value chain, which is expected to create value. As far as the 
support activities like infrastructure, human resource management, financing, 
controlling or budgeting are concerned, they are completely taken over and 
controlled by the pharmaceutical company (Tentative hypothesis #9). This 
observation corresponds to the third task of Haspeslagh’s & Jemison’s (1991) 
absorption acquisition, which aims at getting the combined company to move to 
best practice in all areas of complementarity. Apart from that statement, there is 
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no existing concept that states and analyzes how this combination is supposed to 
be set in place. These concepts, similar to the already discussed ‘fit-concepts’ 
only state that a certain combination needs to be realized, but do not really 
describe how to do that. 
For the purpose of illustration, one of these concepts (Scheiter, 1989; Habeck, 
Kröger & Träm, 2000; Gerds, 2000; Lajoux, 1998; Wall & Wall, 2000; Shea, 
1999; Picot, 2000; Böttcher, 1996) will be looked at in more detail. Galpin & 
Herndon (2000) have written a book about process tools to support M&A 
integration at every level. They identify thirteen organization design parameters 
that need to be taken into consideration: 
(1) The first parameter is the strategic business focus, representing the strengths, 
capabilities, or business drivers that uniquely distinguish a particular 
department or unit from another. In this study, the strategic business focus is 
quite obvious as it is part of the acquisition motives (Tentative hypotheses #1, 
#2 and #3), but is not considered as being part of the organization design 
parameters. 
(2) The reporting structure is defined as the formal reporting relationship or 
arrangement for an individual, a process team, or a function. In this study, the 
responsibility for the newly acquired biotechnology company lays in the 
hands of a board member to whom the respective reporting is done as well 
(Tentative hypothesis #10). 
(3) Departmentation is the process of clustering work activities into business 
units or departmental areas of responsibility, that follows the principle of 
labor division as a mechanism of organizational influence (Simon, 1976). It 
does not play a role in the context of the case studies. 
(4) The determination of the staffing level, which means the quantity of 
personnel occupying the same job, same process, same team, or same 
function, is not really relevant in the context of this study, as it was by far a 
much bigger problem to keep the employees in the acquired biotechnology 
companies (Tentative hypotheses #17, #18 and #20). In fact, duplication 
merely does exist.  
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(5) The depth of control comprises the number of levels or steps of review, 
endorsement and approval in an organization. As the small biotechnology 
companies have become part of large pharmaceutical companies with specific 
review processes for budgeting, the biotechnology companies of course have 
to undergo the same reviews as the other units within the pharmaceutical 
companies. Because of the simple fact, that big pharmaceutical company is 
much bigger than the small biotechnology company, the biotechnology 
company needs now to follow the longer review process of the 
pharmaceutical company (Tentative hypothesis #9). 
(6) The span of control reflects the number of individuals who report to a 
manager or supervisor. As the overall decision was to grant the biotechnology 
company a high degree of autonomy and independence, especially in the day-
to-day management of its businesses, the span of control within the acquired 
company did not change (Tentative hypothesis #4). 
(7) Job content/vesting is the degree to which the responsibilities for completing 
an activity is specified, understood, and accepted by an individual, team, or 
function. Again, as the overall decision was to grant the biotechnology 
company a high degree of autonomy and independence, the responsibility for 
the important tasks of the activities, with respect to the pharmaceutical value 
chain remained with the acquired biotechnology companies (Tentative 
hypotheses #4, #5 and #7). As far as the secondary activities (e.g. finance or 
human resources) were concerned, the ultimate responsibility was transferred 
to the pharmaceutical company (Tentative hypothesis #9). 
(8) Concerning the issue of job content/breadth, which refers to the degree to 
which an individual performs a broad array of activities, the same conclusions 
as under the previous point can be drawn. 
(9) Analyzing the alignment of responsibility and authority, that is the degree to 
which the level of authority granted to an individual, team or function is 
sufficient to accomplish the majority of tasks, one can conclude the same as 
already under point (7). 
(10) The issue of geographical location deals with the specific physical location 
of a job, process, or location and the people performing the work. In the 
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analyzed case studies, this point did not really matter, because there has 
never been any geographical relocation intended (Tentative hypothesis #13). 
(11) In the terminology of Galpin & Herndon (2000), the subject of ‘integration’ 
means the extent to which business units, departments, or individuals share 
information, gain cross-functional involvement/responsibility, and 
coordinate decision-making with other units. As the overall integration 
strategy is to grant a high degree of autonomy (Tentative hypothesis #4), 
there is no need for much cross-functional coordination and communication. 
(12) Personnel capabilities refer to the set of competencies and skills required to 
perform the job. As both companies remain autonomous (Tentative 
hypothesis #4) and people, especially at the biotechnology companies, 
continue to do what they have been always doing (Tentative hypothesis 
#21), this problem does not really matter. 
(13) As far as bench strength is concerned, which is the degree to which 
individuals with the right skills or competencies are available to back up or 
fill positions in both, short-term and long-term, the same conclusions as 
under the previous point (12) apply. 
To sum up, the thirteen organizational design parameters of Galpin & Herndon 
(2000) correspond to some of the points identified in the cases. However, the 
parameters of Galpin & Herndon (2000) more or less only ‘mention’ the different 
parameters, but do not give any recommendations of how to cope with these 
parameters in a specific integration situation such as the post-acquisition 
integration of biotechnology companies in the organizational structure of 
pharmaceutical companies as analyzed in this study. Thus, Galpin & Herndon 
(2000) provide only a checklist, but no clear recommendations for a specific 
integration situation. 
Diven (1984) considers the aspect of organization planning as a success factor for 
the successful implementation of mergers and acquisitions. He differentiates 
organizational planning according to the issues of (1) planning for organizational 
change, (2) culture and policy considerations, (3) management resource 
inventory, and (4) reporting channels and control. In the context of this study, the 
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last point, dealing with reporting channels and control, will be looked at more 
closely. This issue is characterized by two central questions: 
“First, questions arise about who is in control of the new unit. Second, questions 
arise about the controls that the new unit will operate under.” (Diven, 1984, p. 7) 
Defining who is in control of the new unit requires that well defined reporting 
channels will be established depending on the extent of integration of the two 
parties to be achieved and the organizational form that the new unit has to take. 
Diven (1984) points out that in many mergers and acquisitions, the goal is not a 
significant degree of integration, but the continued relatively autonomous 
operation of the acquired unit, which is also the case in the analyzed deals 
between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies (Tentative hypothesis #4). 
In such a situation, one reporting channel turns out to be most important, which is 
the contact between both presidents of the acquired and the acquiring company. 
This can also be observed in the cases in which the president of the newly 
acquired biotechnology company reports to a designated responsible board 
member at the very top of the pharmaceutical company (Tentative hypothesis 
#10). Related to the establishments of reporting channels is the realization of 
controls for an acquired company. Diven (1984) suggests that the reports should 
be kept to the minimum needed, and, if possible, they should be kept within the 
capability of the existing reporting system. However, this suggestion is not 
conform with the observations made in the M&A deals, as the necessary 
reporting processes and systems were transferred from the larger pharmaceutical 
companies to the smaller biotechnology companies, as they need to fulfill the 
overall group requirements (Tentative hypothesis #9). 
Martinez & Jarillo (1989) have tried to cluster the range of coordination 
mechanisms used in multinational corporations by reviewing the literature on 85 
empirical studies of coordination mechanisms between 1953 and 1988.52 They 
broadly define a coordination mechanism as 
                                              
52  In a subsequent study, Martinez & Jarillo (1991) have tried to show a connection between 
the strategy of the subsidiaries of multinational corporations and the use of different 
mechanisms of coordinating. Their main finding is that subsidiaries that pursue strategies 
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“any administrative tool for achieving integration among different units within an 
organization”. (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989, p. 490) 
Roughly, coordination mechanisms can be divided into two groups: structural and 
formal mechanisms, and less formal, more subtle mechanisms. As a result of their 
review, Martinez & Jarillo (1989) clustered major kinds of coordination 
mechanisms as shown in the following Figure 29: 
Figure 29: The most commonly used mechanisms of coordination 
As most of these coordination mechanisms have already been explained during 
the discussion of the concept of Galpin & Herndon (2000), only those 
coordination mechanisms will be explained that have not yet been included there. 
In the context of the analyzed case studies, departmentalization did not occur. As 
far as the centralization and decentralization of decision-making is concerned, 
there is a cut in responsibility. All supportive activities like finance, controlling or 
budgeting were centrally managed by the acquiring pharmaceutical companies 
(Tentative hypothesis #9), whereas the day-to-day management of the 
                                                                                                                                    
with a ‘high degree of integration’ with their corporate parent make much more extensive 
use of both ‘formal’ and ‘subtle’ coordination mechanisms than others.  
Structural and formal mechanisms
1. Departmentalization or grouping of organizational units, shaping the formal structure
2. Centralization or decentralization of decision making through the hierarchy of formal 
authority
3. Formalization and standardization: written policies, rules, job descriptions, and standard 
procedures, through instruments such as manuals, charts, etc.
4. Planning: strategic planning, budgeting, functional plans, scheduling, etc.
5. Output and behavior control: financial performance, technical reports, sales and marketing 
data, etc. and direct supervision
Other mechanisms, more informal and subtle
6. Lateral or cross-departmental relations: direct managerial contact, temporary or permanent 
teams, task forces, committees, integrators, and integrative departments
7. Informal communication: personal contacts among managers, management trips, 
meetings, conferences, transfer of managers, etc.
8. Socialization: building an organizational culture of known and shared strategic objectives 
and values by training, transfer of managers, career path management, measurement and 
reward systems, etc.
Source: Martinez & Jarillo (1989),  p. 503
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biotechnology company and its research activities were completely in the hands 
of the local management (Tentative hypothesis #7). The same conclusion also 
applies for the third mechanism, standardization and formalization, which only 
played a certain role in the supportive area, but not in the core activities of the 
biotechnology company. The aspect of planning was only touched in the sense of 
budgeting (Tentative hypotheses #8, #9, and #10). Output and behavioral control 
(Ouchi, 1977; Ouchi & Maguire, 1975) was primarily done via the reporting to a 
board member of the acquiring company (Tentative hypothesis #10). Apart from 
that, the acquired biotechnology company remained its autonomy for the day-to-
day management of the company (Tentative hypothesis #7).  
The group of more informal and subtle mechanisms consists of three kinds of 
managerial tools. Lateral relations that cut across the formal structure, including 
direct contact among managers or teams, did not play a major role as the overall 
strategy was to grant the acquired biotechnology company a high level of 
independence and autonomy (Tentative hypothesis #4). Informal communication 
was used in the way that experienced managers from the acquiring companies 
were sent to the acquired companies in order to make them familiar with the 
necessary processes and systems (Tentative hypothesis #9). The development of a 
common organizational culture through a process of socialization was never 
intended as it was the explicit goal of the acquirers to keep up the specific 
organizational and innovative culture of the acquired companies (Tentative 
hypothesis #14). This brief discussion of the analysis of Martinez & Jarillo 
(1989) has shown that some of the coordination mechanism play a role in the 
post-acquisition integration and subsequent collaboration between biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical companies, whereas others are completely neglected. Thus, 
some of these aspects will be taken up again in the next sections. 
4.2.2.2 Aspects of knowledge and competence transfer after the 
acquisition 
As far as the transfer of capabilities or knowledge is concerned, the four analyzed 
case studies led to the straightforward – but nevertheless very surprising – 
conclusion that there was no systematic transfer in terms of know-how or 
technology (Tentative hypothesis #11). This is in clear contrast to the overall 
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opinion – already briefly mentioned in the context of the discussion of the 
integration concept of Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) – that the main goal of 
integration is the transfer and application of strategic capabilities: 
“The heart of integration [...] is the transfer and application of strategic 
capabilities. Capabilities may be transferred in several ways: They may be given 
to the new sister firm; they may be shared for common use; or they may be taught 
to people in the other firm. Three types of capability transfer were discussed – 
operational resource sharing, functional skill transfer, and general management 
skill transfer. Each type involves different organizational challenges.” 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, p. 107) 
Operational resource sharing includes, e.g., combining sales forces, sharing 
manufacturing facilities, brand names, or distribution channels. In such cases, 
value is created through economies of scope or scale. Hence, the integration 
challenge in sharing resources typically involves combining assets or 
coordinating their joint use. Resource sharing creates value, if the benefits of 
sharing outweigh the combining and coordinating costs. However, as the 
acquired biotechnology companies kept their independence (Tentative hypothesis 
#4) and no operational resource sharing took place, this plays no role in analyzing 
the observed cases.  
The transfer of general management skills involves, e.g., resource allocation, 
financial planning, controlling and budgeting, as well as human resource 
management. This issue has already been discussed during the analysis of the 
absorption acquisition in which a movement towards best practice can be 
observed. Of course, a transfer in these areas takes place (Tentative hypothesis 
#9), but is not considered as being the source of value creation in the deals 
between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, if it is compared with the 
underlying M&A motives (Tentative hypotheses #1, #2, and #3). 
The transfer of functional skills such as product development or R&D 
capabilities53 seems to be the natural source of value creation in a deal between 
                                              
53  Teigland, Fey & Birkinshaw (2000) have carried out an empirical examination about the 
knowledge dissemination in global R&D operations in the high technology electronics 
industry and have come up with an overview of knowledge dissemination mechanisms. 
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pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, because pharmaceutical companies 
gain access to the knowledge and know-how incorporated in these companies, 
which they then may use in their own research facilities. It seems that this would 
be the main reason why pharmaceutical companies carry out such a takeover, 
especially getting access to this knowledge is one of the major motives for their 
M&A activity. However, exactly at this point, there is a clear discontinuity in the 
argumentative logic. It is because of the wish of getting access to these skills that 
they do not even intend to transfer them. Instead, they rather support the 
biotechnology company in transforming themselves into a center of excellence 
within the pharmaceutical company (Tentative hypothesis #12), because it is the 
biotechnology company that knows best how to use its knowledge. Apart from 
that, this knowledge is very specific and embedded in some kind of local 
knowledge network, so that it is almost impossible to transfer it without losing it 
(Tentative hypothesis #13). 
Having seen that conventional post-acquisition integration theory is unable to 
explain the observations made in the context of this study, the question arises 
how value is created in these deals. One of the values for the pharmaceutical 
company is the access to promising products they can sell. Thus, at a first glance, 
one may also interpret such a deal as a pure product deal with the sole goal of 
getting a potential blockbuster. However, this conclusion does not hold through, 
as there are also other important reasons that motivated pharmaceutical 
companies to acquire biotechnology companies (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2). 
Biotechnology companies were acquired in order to ensure the long-term growth 
of the pharmaceutical company. This goal can only be achieved, if the 
biotechnology companies support an increase in the pharmaceutical companies’ 
innovation. In fact, that is also the explanation why they try to keep up the 
                                                                                                                                    
Moreover, Gupta & Govindarajan (2000) have developed a framework for the 
incorporation of knowledge transfer within multinational corporations. They predict that 
knowledge outflows from a subsidiary are positively associated with the value of the 
subsidiary’s knowledge stock, its motivational disposition to share knowledge, as well as 
the richness of transmission channels. Another study of Subramaniam & Venkatraman 
(2001) also provides evidence that the transfer and deployment of tacit overseas 
knowledge is associated with greater transnational new product development capabilities. 
Bendt (2000) gives a good overview about the knowledge transfer in multinational 
corporations. 
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autonomy and independence of the biotechnology company. The underlying 
rationale for that is the assumption that the probability for innovations to occur 
are much higher in small biotechnology companies than in a large pharmaceutical 
company.54 A similar perspective is taken by Hitt, Hoskissen & Ireland (1994), 
who suggest that an acquirer should search for target firms that will complement 
R&D projects and/or enhance the acquirer’s core competence. However, the 
acquisition of biotechnology companies must rather be considered as ‘adding’ – 
more or less – new core competencies to the acquiring pharmaceutical company, 
as they consider the acquired biotechnology companies as centers of excellence 
(Tentative hypothesis #12). 
If the acquired biotechnology companies are perceived as centers of excellence 
within the pharmaceutical companies, the question comes up of how the acquired 
biotechnology companies fit into the R&D strategy of the pharmaceutical 
companies. In fact, an increasing number of companies in technologically 
intensive industries have abandoned the traditional approach of managing the 
majority of their research and development activities in their home country and 
are establishing global R&D networks (Gerybadze & Reger, 1999; Teigland, Fey 
& Birkinshaw, 2000; Peng & Wang, 2000). Because of this, there are also more 
studies that deal with the globalization of the R&D process (Westney, 1993; 
Gerybadze, Meyer-Krahmer & Reger, 1997; De Meyer & Mizushima, 1989; 
Florida, 1997; Kenney & Florida, 1994). Kümmerle (1997) points out that 
                                              
54  A longitudinal study that analyzes the relationship between technological acquisitions and 
the innovation performance of acquiring firms has been carried out by Ahuja & Katila 
(2001). 
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“a centralized approach to R&D will no longer suffice – for two reasons. First, as 
more and more sources of potentially relevant knowledge emerge across the globe, 
companies must establish a presence at an increasing number of locations to 
access new knowledge and to absorb new research results from foreign 
universities and competitors into their own organizations. Second, companies 
competing around the world must move new products from development to market 
at an ever more rapid pace. Consequently, companies must build R&D networks 
that excel at tapping new centers of knowledge [...].” (Kümmerle, 1997, p. 61) 
The quotation of Kümmerle (1997) depicts quite well the given situation in the 
pharmaceutical industry and explains again the rationale for the acquisition of the 
biotechnology companies (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2). Kümmerle (1997) 
identifies two different types of R&D sites. The home-base-augmenting 
laboratory site is established in order to absorb knowledge from the local 
scientific community, to create new knowledge, and transfer it to the company’s 
central R&D site.55 The home-base-exploiting laboratory site is created in order 
to commercialize knowledge by transferring it from the company’s home base to 
the laboratory site abroad and from there to local manufacturing and marketing. 
Comparing these two types of R&D sites with the case findings, it becomes 
obvious that they do not correspond to the center of excellence character that is 
contributed to the acquired biotechnology companies (Tentative hypotheses #12). 
Moreover, no systematic transfer of knowledge has been observed in the case 
studies (Tentative hypothesis #11) as it takes place in the concept of Kümmerle 
(1997). Thus, his classification is unable of explaining the observations made in 
the case studies. 
Gerybadze & Reger (1999) are also considering the globalization of R&D as a 
major topic and have analyzed the R&D internationalization in 21 large 
corporations. They argue, that in recent years the R&D strategies and 
international location decisions of transnational corporations have changed 
substantially. Because of the identified changes in the management of R&D and 
innovation as well as driving forces for locating R&D and competence centers 
                                              
55  An empirical study of Hakanson & Nobel (2000) based on a questionnaire survey directed 
to foreign R&D units in Swedish multinational corporations shows that more than half of 
the foreign R&D units actively transfer locally developed new technical knowledge to the 
home country. 
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abroad, they have developed a framework for the management of competence 
centers. This framework (cf. Figure 30) consists of four generic types of 
transnational R&D innovation and serves as a basis for analyzing predominant 
patterns of globalization as well as for the assessment of the related coordination 
and control issues. 
Figure 30: Four generic types of transnational R&D and innovation 
In a first step, Gerybadze & Reger (1999) distinguish between two generic 
innovation regimes: dynamic, fast-cycle businesses, on the one hand, and less 
dynamic, slow-cycle businesses, on the other hand. The analytical focus of their 
study was mainly concentrated on the more dynamic, innovation-intensive 
businesses. In this context, they differentiate between dynamic businesses that are 
science-based (such as biotechnology) and dynamic businesses characterized by 
patterns of lead market induced innovation, and by novel ways of demand 
articulation. Based on this distinction, Gerybadze & Reger (1999) have identified 
the following four generic types of transnational innovation: 
• In the context of Type A, the corporation needs to get access to advanced 
R&D and is at the same time located in a large, highly developed home 
country with strong R&D capabilities in the respective field. 
Source: Gerybadze & Reger (1999),  p. 265
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• A corporation that is characterized as Type B depends on excellent R&D, but 
is located in a small country and/or in a country with a less developed R&D 
capability in the particular field. This kind of companies have strong 
incentives to locate critical parts of their research base abroad.  
• A Type C corporation can benefit from the proximity to a world-class lead 
market, and is able to establish an effective coupling of lead marketing, R&D 
and innovation in the home country.  
• A corporation that is strongly dependent on the access to a foreign lead 
market is characterized as Type D. Because of the limited size of its home 
country and/or the level of market sophistication, the company needs to 
perform critical functions abroad.  
In a subsequent step, Gerybadze & Reger (1999) try to classify the R&D and 
innovation activities according to the type of innovation pursued (science-/ 
research-based or coupling of lead market and innovation) and the location of the 
critical resources (i.e. whether critical resources are found at home or abroad). 
This results in a 2x2 matrix (cf. Figure 31) that classifies the different types of 
companies and their dominant patterns of transnational innovations: 
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Figure: 31: Types of corporations and their dominant patterns of innovation 
Applying this framework and the classification matrix on the case findings is 
relatively easy, because Gerybadze & Reger (1999) present the necessary 
interpretation themselves: 
“US pharmaceutical and health corporations would have little incentive to go 
abroad for access to scientific results and research talents in this field. This is 
different for transnational corporations from small countries such as Switzerland, 
Sweden or the Netherlands. All Swiss corporations in our sample (Ciba-Geigy and 
Sandoz, now being renamed Novartis as well as Roche) have made strong inroads 
into US-based biotechnology research. The same was true for corporations from 
larger countries (Germany and Japan), who felt that the research infrastructure or 
regulatory conditions were less developed at home than in the US. Both types of 
corporations pursued a B-type strategy.” (Gerybadze & Reger, 1999, pp. 266-267) 
This quotation56 clearly supports the case findings as far as the motives for the 
acquisition of the U.S. biotechnology companies are concerned (Tentative 
hypotheses #1 and #2). Moreover, the concept of Gerybadze & Reger (1999) 
                                              
56  This quotation corresponds also quite well to the argument of zu Knyphausen-Aufseß & 
Zaby (2000) about the lack of adequate ‘social systems’ in a firm’s home country that 
leads to internationalization to host countries where such ‘social systems’ are in place. 
Source: Gerybadze & Reger (1999),  p. 267
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makes clear why the acquired biotechnology companies are considered as centers 
of excellence (Tentative hypothesis #12). However, the fact that no knowledge 
transfers between the acquired biotechnology company and the acquiring 
pharmaceutical company in the post-acquisition integration process takes place 
(Tentative hypothesis #11) is neither explicitly stated nor explained in this 
concept.57 
Another interesting theoretical approach that provides some explanations for the 
fact that there is no real transfer of knowledge and capabilities from the 
biotechnology to the pharmaceutical company is presented by Teece (2000). His 
concept is based on the overall assumption that 
“access complementary assets is stripping away traditional sources of competitive 
advantage, leaving knowledge and competence, coupled with dynamic capabilities 
(the firm’s entrepreneurial and strategic asset orchestration capabilities) as the 
foundation of competitive advantage”. (Teece, 2000, p. 3) 
This concept follows the logic that knowledge assets are grounded in the 
experience and expertise of individuals, while firms are providing the physical, 
social, and resource allocation structure, so that knowledge can be shaped into 
competencies.58 This explains also why the people of the acquired biotechnology 
companies are an important asset and why pharmaceutical companies did not try 
to transfer this knowledge or relocate the people (Tentative hypotheses #11 and 
#13). In a further step, Teece (2000) points out that “the creation and use of 
                                              
57  In their last section concerning implications for further research, Gerybadze & Reger 
(1999) ask the question why and when do multinational companies establish lead centers 
with global technology responsibilities at locations outside the home country. One answer 
to that question is provided by the case findings, because attributing the role of 
independent centers of excellence to the acquired biotechnology companies is the only 
way of keeping up the value of the biotechnology know-how and part of their innovative 
capabilities (Tentative hypotheses #12 and #13). 
58  Gupta & Govindarajan (2000) point out that one of the primary reasons why multinational 
companies exist is due to their ability to transfer and exploit knowledge more effectively 
and efficiently in the intra-corporate context than through external market mechanisms 
(Caves, 1971 & 1982; Ghoshal, 1987; Kindleberger, 1969; Porter, 1986; Teece, 1981). 
Despite this argument and the existing empirical studies that support this argument, the 
case findings revealed a complete different picture as there was no systematic knowledge 
transfer from the acquired biotechnology companies to the acquiring pharmaceutical 
companies. 
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know-how is what innovation is all about” (p. 35). Thus, it is also necessary to 
understand the institutional environment in which the creation and use of new 
industrial knowledge takes place best. 
The general approach by Teece (2000) involves four different steps. First, the 
fundamental characteristics of technological development needs to be specified. 
Teece (2000) identifies seven basic factors of technological development: 
uncertainty, path dependency, cumulative nature along the path defined, 
irreversibilities, technological interrelatedness, tacitness, as well as imitability. 
Second, the factors that affect innovation and the creation of knowledge assets at 
the level of the firm need to be determined.59 Teece (2000) has developed a 
framework that presents the various classes of variables having a potential impact 
on the rate and direction of firm level innovation, which is shown in the 
following Figure 32: 
                                              
59  Frost (2001) has carried out a study about the geographic sources of foreign subsidiaries’ 
innovations and has come to the overall conclusion that “innovative search in foreign 
subsidiaries is driven by the interplay between the subsidiary’s innovation strategy, its 
evolving technical capabilities, and its membership in the local knowledge sharing 
community” (Frost, 2001, pp. 120-121). 
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Figure 32: Determinants of the rate and direction of firm level innovation 
This framework reveals that e.g. organizational structure or internal culture and 
values are considered as having a certain impact on the rate and direction of firm 
level innovation. For the further analysis, it is worth noticing that most of these 
determinants change due to an acquisition and the subsequent integration of the 
acquired company in the structure of the acquiring firm. Hence, this also affects 
the rate and direction of innovation. The question which then comes up is how 
different organizational structures and cultures do affect innovation and what 
kind of impact an acquisition does have.  
In a third step Teece (2000) identifies distinctive archetypes and governance 
modes for firms. In this context, he focuses on four different archetypes that later 
will be matched with innovation. Multiproduct, integrated, hierarchical firms are 
the first archetype. Such companies can take on large projects and can help to set 
standards important to the continued evolution of a technology. Apart from that, 
they need any kind of alliance structures in order to tap into external sources of 
new knowledge. This explains also the M&A motives of large pharmaceutical 
companies (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2) as they belong to this first archetype. 
The second archetype are high-flex ‘Silicon Valley’-type firms, which are 
characterized by shallow hierarchies and significant local autonomy. Decision 
making in these firms is usually simple and informal. Communication and 
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Source: Teece (2000),  p. 50
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coordination among functions is relatively quick and open and these firms are 
very likely to be highly innovative. Thus, by providing considerable autonomy 
and strong incentives, this organizational form has demonstrated that it can 
flourish in the context of rapid technological change. Biotechnology companies 
belong to this kind of archetype. The third archetype identified by Teece (2000) 
are virtual corporations that may have the capacity to be very creative and to 
excel at early-stage innovation activities. However, the virtual corporation is not 
seen to be a viable long-run organizational form, except in limited circumstances. 
The fourth archetype are conglomerates characterized by disparate units only 
loosely coupled through some kind of holding company structure. This archetype 
is not considered to offer distinctive advantages in environments with rapid 
technological changes. The further analytical focus of this study is limited to the 
first two archetypes as these are the two kinds that have been identified as 
relevant in the context of this study. 
The fourth step of Teece’s (2000) approach is to chose from available alternatives 
the organizational form that is better suited to deal with the necessary type of 
innovation and, by this, to match innovation and organizational archetype. This 
step is based on the distinction between autonomous and systemic innovation. On 
the one hand, autonomous innovations create improved products and processes 
that fit into existing systems and take place with known technologies. On the 
other hand, systemic innovations change the technological requirements and offer 
new opportunities as these innovations span current technology boundaries. Thus, 
the resulting configuration of both, the innovation and its related technologies, 
are different from what existed before. In addition to the distinction between 
autonomous and systemic innovation, the question of where the necessary 
capabilities exist must be taken into account. Combining these two dimensions 
with the different organizational forms the following matrix (cf. Figure 33) 
results: 
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Figure 33: Matrix of innovation, capabilities and preferred organizational forms 
For the purpose of this study only two organizational forms are of analytical 
interest: on the one hand, the ‘Silicon Valley’-type of firm that represents the 
acquired biotechnology companies, and, on the other hand, the multiproduct, 
integrated, hierarchical companies, that represent the pharmaceutical companies. 
Accepting the argumentation and derived classification of Teece (2000), it 
becomes quite obvious that small, independent biotechnology companies can be 
considered as being stars as far as innovation is concerned. In contrast to this, the 
innovational power of pharmaceutical companies is rather ‘limited’ to systemic 
innovations based on capabilities that exist in-house. If a ‘Silicon Valley’-type of 
company, in this specific case biotechnology companies, is acquired by a 
multiproduct, integrated, hierarchical company, which in the context of this study 
are represented by large pharmaceutical companies, the question comes up of 
what happens to these companies and their innovative capabilities. As a result of 
the acquisition, the biotechnology company becomes part of the pharmaceutical 
company and, thus, is no longer the small, dynamic, high-flex ‘Silicon-Valley’-
type of company. It has become part of the structure of a large, multiproduct, 
integrated, hierarchical firm, initiating a change in the determinants of the rate 
and direction of firm level innovation. This company is no longer characterized 
by shallow hierarchies and significant local autonomy in combination with simple 
Source: Teece (2000),  p. 63
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and informal decision making. Apart from that, this company no longer provides 
considerable autonomy and strong incentives, which represent the main 
characteristics that made it a company which was very likely to be highly 
innovative. After the acquisition, there is a clear evolution towards a 
multiproduct, hierarchical company which also has severe repercussions on the 
rate and direction of firm level innovation. In terms of innovation, the acquired 
biotechnology company develops itself to the field of the multiproduct, 
hierarchical company (cf. Figure 33) and provides no longer the different 
innovative capabilities that made the pharmaceutical company acquire it. 
There are two subsequent questions that result from this analysis: (1) Are 
pharmaceutical companies aware of this problem? (2) What do they do in order to 
solve this dilemma? The answer to the first question simply is ‘yes’, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are both aware of that problem that 
result as a consequence out of the acquisition (Tentative hypotheses #15 and 
#16). Because of this, they try to grant the acquired biotechnology company as 
much autonomy and independence as possible (Tentative hypothesis #4). In 
addition to that, they are also aware of the big cultural gap between both kinds of 
companies (Tentative hypothesis #14). With the help of the overall autonomy 
strategy they try to set a structure in place that pretends the biotechnology 
company to still be an independent company. By this, the management of the 
pharmaceutical company hopes to preserve the innovative capabilities of the 
acquired biotechnology company as long as possible and to prevent them from 
transforming their structure and culture into that of a multiproduct, hierarchical 
company (Tentative hypotheses #4, #13, #14, #15, and #16). This attitude and 
strategy of the pharmaceutical companies also explain why they do not intend to 
transfer knowledge (Tentative hypotheses #11 and #13) and rather support and 
prefer the transformation of the acquired biotechnology company into centers of 
excellence within the structure of the pharmaceutical company (Tentative 
hypothesis #12). However, it cannot be ignored that, in the end, it is just a 
question of time until the acquired biotechnology company has become part of a 
large, multiproduct, hierarchical and integrated company. It can only be 
suppressed for a certain period of time (Tentative hypothesis #16). That is what 
pharmaceutical companies try to achieve by granting their acquired biotechnology 
company as much independence and autonomy as possible. The concept of Teece 
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(2000) has in fact no direct link to the literature about post-acquisition 
integration. However, this concept largely explains the logic and rationale behind 
the behavior of acquiring pharmaceutical companies. Thus, this concept will also 
be used when constructing the new approach of post-acquisition integration of 
small, high-tech companies in the structure of large corporations in the 
subsequent Chapter 5. 
The argumentation of this theoretical concept of Teece (2000) can be supported 
by two empirical studies. Miller (1987) has carried out an empirical study that 
examined the relationship between strategy making and structure and their 
implication for performance. The structure of an organization heavily influences 
the flow of information and the context and nature of human interactions. 
Moreover, it channels collaboration, specifies modes of coordination, allocates 
power and responsibility, and prescribes levels of formality and complexity 
(Bower, 1970). Miller (1987) comes to the conclusion that when a firm is small, 
it may have a good deal of leeway in selecting and matching strategy making and 
structure and, by this, is more successful in terms of innovation. It was found that 
the relationships between strategy making and structure were usually strongest 
among successful and innovative firms and seemed to contribute the most to the 
performance in small and innovative firms. This view is related to the 
organizational structure in the sense of Teece (2000), which is one of the 
determinants of the rate and direction of firm level innovation. The leeway 
mentioned by Miller (1987) is gone after the acquisition by the large 
pharmaceutical company has been carried out. Hence, it might be expected that 
the acquired biotechnology company is less innovative as there is no real match 
between strategy making and innovation. The study of Chakrabarti & Souder 
(1987), which has already been briefly discussed before, has also come to the 
conclusion that corporations should be careful about imposing a bureaucratic 
organization on a newly acquired company, because organizational integration 
without an excessive increase in formalization was found to be the key to 
enhance the performance and not to endanger the innovative capability of the 
newly acquired company. 
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4.2.2.3  Cultural issues in the context of the post-acquisition integration 
strategy 
The issue of culture is a widely discussed topic in the context of post-merger and 
post-acquisition integration, because ignoring a potential clash of cultures can 
lead to a failure of the acquisition (Engelhard, 1997). Too often, many 
acquisitions that initially appeared to be very promising from a number of 
viewpoints subsequently fail or require major surgery and extensive hand-holding 
as a result of neglecting critical cultural, personnel or organizational issues. 
However, this study is unable to cover the whole field in which a large number of 
concepts has been developed (Gertsen, Søderberg & Torp, 1998; Rohloff, 1994; 
Cartwright & Cooper, 1992 & 1993; Krystek, 1991; Körting, 1989; Reinecke, 
1989; Buono, Bowditch & Lewis III, 1985; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi, 1981; 
Peters & Waterman, 1982; Sathe, 1985; Smircich, 1983; Callahan, 1986). In this 
context, the focus can only be put on the most prominent and relevant concepts. 
The majority of the researchers within this field builds upon Schein’s (1985)60 
classic understanding of culture as 
“a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems”. (Schein, 1985, p. 9) 
The cross-case analyses revealed that differences in terms of country cultures as 
e.g. extensively analyzed by Hofstede (1980) does not play a role in this context. 
Because of this and also based on the globalization thesis of Levitt (1983), the 
                                              
60  The concept of Schein (1985) is considered as being a very useful and practical way of 
analyzing cultures, which is to divide into three levels. Level one are artifacts which 
includes e.g. the architecture and design of the building or the office layout. This level is 
composed of the visible artifacts and behaviors within an organization. The second, deeper 
level of culture is composed of values held by members in an organization, that indicate 
what ought to be and determine what is considered acceptable. Some of these values are 
clearly stated and defined, whereas others are more fuzzy and less accessible. The third 
level of culture is composed of the basic assumptions resulting from an organization’s 
success and failures in dealing with its environment. These assumptions make up the 
organization’s basic philosophy and worldview and are the paradigm that guide all 
decisions and behaviors. 
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dimension of country cultural differences will not be discussed in the context of 
this study.61 However, e.g. a study of Morosini, Shane & Singh (1998) provides 
empirical support for the notion that national cultural distance enhances cross-
border acquisition performance. The case findings have only revealed that 
company cultural differences between the small, entrepreneurial-driven and high-
risk-taking biotechnology companies, on the one hand, and the large, rather slow 
pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand, constituted a source of various 
problems. 
As a starting point, it is worth having a look at Senn (1994) who has summarized 
some of the classic features as far as potential conflicting cultural qualities are 
concerned. He distinguishes between two different styles. The culture of Style A 
is highly participative, non-directive, informal and decentralized, whereas the 
culture of Style B is characterized as hierarchical, directive, formal and 
centralized. Applying these two styles on this study, Style A clearly corresponds 
to the culture of the biotechnology companies, whereas Style B depicts the culture 
of pharmaceutical companies. This big cultural gap between Style A and Style B 
does also exist between the biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies that 
have been part of this study (Tentative hypothesis #14). As a result of the M&A 
activity the cultures of both companies get – more or less – in contact with each 
other. Thus, the concept of acculturation is of interest in this context as it is 
central to the study of contacts between different cultures. The following 
quotation tries to give a definition of acculturation, a term that has been borrowed 
from anthropology and cross-cultural psychology: 
“Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of 
individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with 
subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups.” 
(Redfield, Linton & Herskovits, 1936, p. 149) 
The concept of acculturation consists according to Barry (1980) of different 
forms of adaptations: 
                                              
61  A little exception will be the brief discussion of the stock option issue, in which some 
differences between the U.S. and Europe matter. 
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• Assimilation implies that the non-dominant group relinquishes its identity. 
• Integration means that the non-dominant group maintains its cultural 
integrity, but becomes at the same time an integral part of the dominant 
culture. 
• Rejection occurs when the non-dominant group withdraws from the dominant 
culture.62 
• In the case of deculturation, the non-dominant group loses cultural and 
psychological contact with both, its own original culture and the dominant 
culture. 
Several management researchers (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; Sales & Mirvis, 
1984; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988 & 1993; Buono & Bowditch, 1989; 
Forstmann, 1994; Larsson, 1989 & 1990) have tried to transfer the basic idea of 
this concept to problem complexes linked to the cultural dimensions of mergers 
and acquisitions, some of these concepts will now be looked at a little bit more 
detailed. 
In the study of Buono & Bowditch (1989) cultural differences are considered as 
one of the major reasons why mergers and acquisitions fail: 
“One of the underlying reasons why mergers and acquisitions often fail to achieve 
the level of operational and financial performance predicted by precombination 
feasibility studies is the conflicts and tensions that emerge when companies try to 
combine disparate and frequently dramatically different cultures.” (Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989, p. 134) 
From their point of view, organizational culture tends to be unique to a particular 
organization. Moreover, it is a powerful determinant of individual and group 
behavior. Thus, organizational culture affects practically every aspect of 
organizational life, from the way in which people interact with each other, 
perform their work, and dress to the types of decision and strategy making in a 
                                              
62  In other concepts such as e.g. Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988 & 1993) rejection is also 
called separation. 
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firm. The full potency of organizational culture may be seen during a merger or 
acquisition when two disparate cultures are ‘forced’ to become one. Buono & 
Bowditch (1989) identify four main types of cultural merger or acquisition 
outcomes that also reflect typical organizational and operational merger 
implementation strategies at the same time: 
• In the approach of cultural pluralism, based on the assumption that strength 
comes from diversity, cultural diversity and cultural subgroups are allowed to 
exist within the context of a shared strategy for growth and organizational 
success.  
• Cultural blending attempts to create a blending or assimilation of two 
previously distinct cultures into a new, unified culture. 
• In cultural takeovers, merger integration requires replacing the culture of the 
acquired company with the dominant culture of the acquiring company. 
• Cultural resistance often emerges when there is a lack of mutual 
understanding of or attention to the cultures of the merger partners, resulting 
in a high level of management turnover, market-share shrinkage, and 
difficulties in achieving the desired synergies. 
Buono & Bowditch (1989) discuss different recommendations and models of 
organizational culture change, mainly based on Sathe (1985), which however are 
not relevant in the context of this study as the acquiring pharmaceutical 
companies even attempted to do everything in order to preserve the culture of the 
acquired biotechnology companies (Tentative hypothesis #15). That is the main 
reason why they tried to grant the acquired biotechnology company as much 
autonomy and independence as possible. Thus, having a look at the different 
cultural strategies or outcomes that result from the acquisition, cultural pluralism, 
meaning that the acquired biotechnology company should keep their culture, is 
the desired outcome (Tentative hypotheses #14 and #15). Nevertheless, applying 
this strategy cannot sufficiently explain why the acquired biotechnology 
companies lose some of its culture, especially their entrepreneurial spirit. This 
happens just because of the simple fact that they have been acquired and are no 
longer an independent, sometimes publicly traded company. Consequently, even 
if – theoretically – there is no contact at all between the acquiring pharmaceutical 
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company and the acquired biotechnology company and, by this, no exchange 
between the two cultures, the biotechnology company will lose its entrepreneurial 
spirit, simply because their nature of existence changes (Tentative hypothesis 
#16). This is something that cannot be prevented from happening. Pharmaceutical 
companies can only try to slow down this transformation  process by granting the 
acquired biotechnology company as much autonomy and independence as 
possible (Tentative hypotheses #14, #15, and #16).  
Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988 & 1993) have developed another interesting 
framework for analyzing the role of organizational culture in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions as they consider it as a potential risk to the success of 
mergers and acquisitions which becomes clear form the following statement: 
“It is essential, however, to consider cultural and human factors as part of the 
definition of success of a merger. [...] The influence of culture on organizations is 
difficult to measure and predict. [...] That culture represents the shared values and 
norms of the employees. It is what makes the company unique, the glue that bonds 
people together. Giving it up is equivalent to surrendering one’s identity, and 
consequently, employees often fight to preserve it.” (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 
1993, p. 3) 
In order to handle this problem, they have developed a model for the three types 
of cultural adaptation processes preferred by the acquired and acquiring firms. 
Obviously, a lack of agreement between the preferences of the acquirer and the 
acquired might result in problems. Based on Barry’s (1980) concept of 
acculturation the same different modes of acculturation can be distinguished. 
Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988 & 1993) suggest that the choice of the mode of 
acculturation for the acquired company will depend (1) on the strength and 
success of its own culture and on how much its employees and managers want to 
preserve it, and (2) on the perception of the attractiveness of the acquirer. The 
second factor refers to the question to what extent do members of the acquired 
firm admire and value the culture, managerial style and philosophy, and 
performance of the acquirer. The different options for the acquired firm are 
summarized in the following Figure 34: 
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Figure 34: The acquired firm’s preferred adaptation process 
From the point of view of the acquirer, the selection of the appropriate mode of 
acculturation depends (1) on its strategy and (2) on its culture. The second factor 
refers to the degree to which the acquirer is multicultural. The combination of the 
two factors, depicted in the following Figure 35, determines which mode of 
acculturation should be implemented. 
Integration Assimilation
Separation Deculturation
Perception of the
attractiveness of
the acquirer
How much do members of the acquired
company value the preservation of their
own culture?
High Low
Not at all
attractive
Very
attractive
Source: Nahavandi & Malekzadeh  (1993),  p. 66
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Figure 35: The acquiring firm’s preferred adaptation process 
At this point, it is necessary to apply this concept to the biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies observed in the context of this study. On the one hand, 
employees of the biotechnology companies clearly would like to preserve their 
culture. That is of course rather a easy conclusion. However, it becomes more 
difficult, when judging the perception of the biotechnology companies vis-à-vis 
the pharmaceutical companies in terms of attractiveness. The acquirer is neither 
considered as very attractive nor as not attractive at all. In fact, it is a mixture of 
both, because biotechnology companies desperately need the money and support 
by pharmaceutical companies (Tentative hypothesis #3) irrespective of the 
question whether they judge the acquirer as very or low attractive. They simply 
have no choice. On the other hand, pharmaceutical companies know that 
biotechnology companies have a different culture and also want that they 
preserve this culture (Tentative hypothesis #15). Thus, they can be considered as 
multicultural.  
From the point of view of strategy, it is very difficult to say whether the activities 
are related or not. Again, it is a mixture of both, because part of the business and 
the activities of the biotechnology companies such as sales or marketing is very 
related to the business of the pharmaceutical company. However, most of the 
research that is performed at the biotechnology companies is rather unrelated to 
Integration Assimilation
Separation Deculturation
Strategy
What is the degree of multiculturalism?
Multicultural Unicultural
Unrelated
Related
Source: Nahavandi & Malekzadeh  (1993),  p. 67
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the pharmaceutical company as they do not have the necessary knowledge to 
continue these activities. (If they had that knowledge, they would not need to 
acquire the biotechnology companies.) Therefore, irrespective of whether the 
overall strategy is more related or unrelated, they had to opt for ‘separation’ 
(Tentative hypothesis #14).  
The discussion and comparison of this concept with the case findings reveals that 
it is not easy to make clear statements and recommendations. All in all, the 
concept of Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988 & 1993) seems not to be appropriate 
for the cases as it cannot really help and explain the observations made in the 
case studies. From the very beginning, both sides were aware of the fact that due 
to the big cultural gap the biotechnology company should be granted as much 
autonomy and independence as possible (Tentative hypothesis #14). In order to 
make that decision they did not have to use such a concept. Moreover, the 
concept of Nahavandi & Malekzadeh (1988 & 1993) is unable to explain the 
transformation (the loss of the entrepreneurial spirit) in the culture of the 
biotechnology company that appears over time (Tentative hypotheses #15 and 
#16). 
After having analyzed two prominent concepts in the context of organizational 
culture in combination with mergers and acquisitions, it turned out that these 
concepts were not able to explain the cultural transformation from an 
entrepreneurial-driven company into a research- and discovery-focused company 
as postulated by tentative hypothesis #16. The questions which consequently arise 
are whether the loss of the entrepreneurial spirit even matters and why it is not 
possible to continue the entrepreneurial spirit in large, multiproduct and 
integrated pharmaceutical companies. These questions can be answered by 
relying on an empirical study of Covin & Slevin (1988), which examined the 
influence of organization structure on the relationship between top management’s 
entrepreneurial orientation and financial performance. The entrepreneurial style is 
of course a multidimensional concept which applies to organizations as well as  
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to individuals (Stevenson, Roberts & Grousbeck, 1985).63 The entrepreneurial 
orientation, or in other words spirit, of a company is demonstrated by the extent 
to which the top managers are inclined to take business-related risks to favor 
change and innovation in order to obtain a competitive advantage for their firm, 
and to compete aggressively with other firms (Miller, 1983). Hence, 
entrepreneurial spirit may – from the point of view of this study – be 
characterized by a risk-taking and an innovation dimension which corresponds to 
tentative hypothesis #15.  
In a further step, Covin & Slevin (1988) follow the differentiation of Burns & 
Stalker (1961). On the one hand, the organizational structure according to organic 
structures is characterized by aspects such as flexibility and informality which 
facilitate innovation, whereas on the other hand, mechanistic structures are 
characterized by rigidity in administrative relations and formality, and were said 
to impede innovations. In the context of this study, biotechnology companies 
would be attributed an organic structure, whereas pharmaceutical companies 
would rather be judged as having a mechanistic structure. The findings of Covin 
& Slevin (1988) suggest that an entrepreneurial top management style has a 
positive effect on the performance of organically-structured firms and a negative 
effect on the performance of mechanistically-structured firms. This conclusion 
explains why it is even better for the acquired biotechnology company to lose 
some of its entrepreneurial spirit as it does not fit with the mechanistic structure 
of a big pharmaceutical company. Moreover, it also explains why a lot of the 
entrepreneurial orientated top management people leave (Tentative hypothesis 
#17). They do not longer fit into the new structure which launches this adaptation 
process. Furthermore, the results of their study indicate that organic structures 
promote entrepreneurial activities and innovation. Because of this, it becomes 
also clear why pharmaceutical companies try to keep up the specific 
entrepreneurial spirit of the biotechnology companies by granting them the 
necessary autonomy (Tentative hypotheses #4 and #14). However, as the case 
                                              
63  Of course, this study cannot cover the complete literature that exists in entrepreneurial 
research. However, it is necessary to point out the importance of these entrepreneurial 
concepts as the change in the entrepreneurial spirit ultimately affects the nature of the 
biotechnology company. In order to demonstrate its importance the study of Covin & 
Slevin (1988) was chosen as an appropriate reference. 
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findings reveal, the pharmaceutical companies are in a dilemma situation, 
because this is only a temporary solution (Tentative hypotheses #15 and #16) and 
the nature of the biotechnology company ultimately will change over time, 
irrespective of what means are set in place. 
Apart from the concepts studied so far, there are also some other empirical 
studies that show the importance of culture in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. Most of these studies (Graves, 1981; Levinson, 1970; Costello, 
Kubis & Schaeffer, 1963) examined the cultural fit of the buying and selling 
firms and its impact on the combination of both companies, but they have not 
examined the effects of cultural fit on the corporate financial performance. These 
studies have only selected a fragmented set of criterion variables such as 
employee motivation or attitudes. This gap is closed by a study of Chatterjee et. al 
(1992) which has analyzed the relationship between shareholder gains and the 
relatedness of merging firms upon the compatibility of the two firms’ top 
management culture. The findings suggest (1) that the management of a buying 
firm should pay at least as much attention to issues of cultural fit during the pre-
merger search process as they do to issues of strategic fit and (2) that the 
integration needs to proceed carefully in order to reap any anticipated synergies. 
The findings of this study support the outcomes of the cases analyzed in the 
context of this study. Both sides, biotechnology as well as pharmaceutical 
companies, are aware of the fact that there is a big cultural gap between them and 
that they cannot really bridge this gap. Moreover, they know that the specific 
culture of the biotechnology company is also an asset by itself, which will 
disappear over time (Tentative hypothesis #16). Thus, they vote for the only 
reasonable solution and try to keep both entities separated by granting the 
acquired biotechnology company as much autonomy and independence as 
possible aiming at preserving the culture of the biotechnology company as along 
as possible (Tentative hypothesis #14). 
4.2.2.4 Human resources related issues of the post-acquisition integration 
process 
The human side of mergers and acquisitions is too often glossed over or ignored; 
yet nothing is more important to successful acquisitions, because one can 
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purchase capital shares of a target company, but one cannot purchase people – at 
best, one can only rent them for a time. Marks (1982) depicts this situation as 
follows: 
“Buying a corporation means acquiring capital, equipment, buildings, products, 
and patents; it also means acquiring organizational structures with their people, 
attitudes, behavior, management styles, policies, and climate.” (Marks, 1982, p. 
40) 
This is even better expressed in the following quotation: 
“And since the best and brightest find it easiest to land another job quickly, the 
rule of thumb is that the people you can least afford to lose will be the first to go.” 
(Geber, 1987, p. 30) 
Thus, researcher and practitioners have become increasingly concerned about the 
effects of mergers and acquisitions on employees (Bastien, 1987; Buono & 
Bowditch, 1989; Graves, 1981; Hirsch, 1987; Invancevish, Schweiger & Power, 
1987; Marks & Mirvis, 1985; Marks, 1982; Gerpott, 1990; Müller-Stewens, 
1991; Napier, 1989; Napier, Simmons & Stratton, 1989; Davy et al., 1988; 
Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; Cartwright & Cooper, 1990 & 1992; Hunt & 
Downing, 1990; Hermsen, 1994; Jansen & Pohlmann, 2000; Trauth, 2000). As a 
consequence of this, it is necessary to analyze what happens to human resource 
related issues in the post-acquisition integration management. One of the most 
important issues in the context of post-merger analysis deals with people’s 
uncertainty (Davey et al., 1980; Davy et al., 1988; Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; 
Schlieper-Darnich, 2000) which is also reflected in the following quotation: 
“Mergers generate a tendency for employees to shift their focus from day-to-day 
business need to internal politics surrounding a merger process. Enmeshed in the 
insecurity that change presents, they thus become risk averse. At a time when a 
newly formed organization needs its people to be the most creative, the staff 
becomes reluctant to share ideas.” (Mozeson & Gretchko, 1998, p. 15) 
The book ‘The human side of mergers and acquisition’ of Buono & Bowditch 
(1989) is about the impact that mergers and acquisitions have on people in the 
workplace, the psychological difficulties that people experience, the culture 
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clashes that can emerge in organizations during the post-merger integration 
period, and the ways these problems can be managed. In this context, there is also 
an extensive discussion of uncertainty, ambiguity, tension, and anxiety (Marks & 
Mirvis, 1985 & 1986; Mirvis & Marks, 1985; Pritchett, 1985 & 1987) that may 
lead to individual merger traumas and the need to handle the individual stress 
associated with that. However, these often found problems did play absolutely no 
role in the context of the M&A deals between pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
companies, because the acquiring companies wanted to keep all employees of the 
acquired companies. Thus, these issues will not be discussed in further detail. 
Shea & Vaught (1994) consider employee compensation and benefit plans among 
key components of any acquisition strategy. They regard a number of variables 
that must be looked at when integrating the compensation and benefit plans of the 
merged companies. In the context of compensation there are salaries and wages, 
annual incentive and employee bonus awards, long-term incentive and stock 
awards, employment contracts as well as prerequisites. Benefits are such things 
as retirement plans, health care plans, other welfare plans as well as labor 
agreements. Besides the necessity to integrate the different plans of the two 
companies, Shea & Vaught (1994) make an other interesting proposition: 
“If the acquired/merged companies are in totally separate locations and it is 
anticipated that such locations will remain totally separate, it could be argued that 
the benefit and compensation plans for each location should remain as they are 
for competitive reason.” (Shea & Vaught, 1994, p. 249) 
That is more or less the strategy which is applied by the pharmaceutical 
companies, as the overall integration strategy is to keep up the independence and 
autonomy of the biotechnology companies. Thus, besides the change in the stock 
option programs, which will be discussed later, the incentive systems basically 
remain the same and are even improved as additional incentives and bonus 
programs were introduced in order to make people stay (Tentative hypothesis 
#20). 
The importance of the human resource issue in the context of post-merger 
integration becomes clear when analyzing the impact of mergers and acquisitions 
on the turnover (Krug & Hegarty, 2001). In a first study, Walsh (1988) has 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES   255
investigated top management turnover following mergers and acquisitions and 
has come to the conclusion that top management turnover rates following a 
merger or acquisition are significantly higher than normal top management 
turnover rates. This overall conclusion is also supported by an empirical study of 
Crouch & Wirth (1989) which investigated the effects of mergers on the retention 
of managers, or a study carried out by Hayes (1979). In a further study, Walsh 
(1989) has investigated how the merger and acquisition negotiations affect the 
retention of a target company’s top management.64 The results indicate that when 
a buyer approaches an unrelated company which has been subject to previous 
takeover interests with a merger proposal, and an agreement is reached, the 
target’s management team is likely to experience abnormally high turnover four 
years later.  
Comparing the findings of both studies with the case findings, one can state that 
there is also an abnormal turnover which occurs immediately after the acquisition 
has been carried out (Tentative hypothesis #17), because most of the people can 
no longer fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations and, thus, decide to leave the 
company. However, the pharmaceutical companies are aware of that problem 
which has already been pointed out by the introductory quotation of Geber 
(1987). Therefore, they try to ensure that at least one or two key people of the top 
management stay in order to build the post-acquisition integration process on 
them (Tentative hypothesis #18). This problematic situation is also supported by 
the view of Stevenson & Gumpert (1985) who noted that a manager with an 
entrepreneurial focus will favor a flat organization structure with informal 
networks, whereas a manager with a rather administrative or conservative focus 
will prefer an organizational structure characterized by clearly defined authority, 
responsibility and formal hierarchy. This explains why most of the top 
management of the biotechnology companies prefers to leave the company and, 
                                              
64  In a subsequent study of Walsh & Ellwood (1991) the role that mergers and acquisitions 
might play in the disciplining of entrenched and inefficient managers was investigated. 
Their results reveal that the target company’s top management turnover is higher than 
normal in the two years immediately following a merger or acquisition. There was no 
relationship found between the previous target company performance and its subsequent 
top management turnover.  
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by this, gives a possible explanation for the increase in turnover (Tentative 
hypothesis #17). 
So far, the confrontation of theories about the issues of human resources in post-
merger integration with the case findings has neither come up with any kind of 
major problems nor anything particular new. However, one of the major problems 
that pharmaceutical companies encountered during the post-acquisition 
integration was the issue of stock options. In order to understand and explain this, 
an additional dimension needs to be taken into account. It is the fact that the 
acquiring pharmaceutical companies are of European origin while having major 
affiliates in the U.S. and the acquired biotechnology companies are all of U.S. 
origin. That is the only point at which a differentiation according to the origin of 
the companies plays a major role. In U.S. biotechnology companies, stock options 
are part of the culture and are taken for granted. In the U.S., a publicly traded 
biotechnology company without a stock option program that more or less 
involves all employees is in fact unthinkable and does merely exist. As a 
consequence of this, the acquiring pharmaceutical companies had severe 
problems in attracting and retaining employees (Tentative hypothesis #19). Thus, 
they tried to bypass this by offering special incentives and additional bonus 
programs (Tentative hypothesis #20). 
For the time being, there is only one study of Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood 
(2000) that tried to analyze the issue of stock options as part of a larger study 
about cross-border acquisition of U.S. technology assets located in the Silicon 
Valley.65 The goal of their study is to examine cross-border technology 
acquisitions with a focus on post-acquisition integration and corporate 
governance issues, which also makes their analysis as a whole interesting for this 
study.  
In a first step, they try to characterize the companies according to their key 
cultural characteristics. Their first characteristic is their entrepreneurial culture 
                                              
65  Other aspects that are analyzed in the study of Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) can 
also be found in other articles. E.g., Eckert & Engelhard (1999) develop a capital structure 
theory for the multinational company, which is clearly related to the corporate governance 
issues discussed by Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000). 
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driven by innovation and commercialization of new ideas, which fits very well 
with the culture of the biotechnology companies analyzed in the context of this 
study. (In fact, some of the analyzed companies are also located in the Silicon 
Valley.) Second, there is learning through failure and third there is the nature of 
the labor market with an extraordinarily high level of labor mobility which 
corresponds to the high level of turnover observed in the cases (Tentative 
hypothesis #17). In their study, four organizational factors emerged as important 
drivers for successful post-merger integration: speed in integration and the nature 
of decision making, acquirer communication styles and visions, networking and 
socialization, as well as the target employees’ sense of who is in charge. 
Compared with the findings that came up while analyzing the post-merger 
integration between pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, the issues 
identified by Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) did only play a minor role, 
because the overall integration strategy was to grant the acquired biotechnology 
companies as much autonomy as possible. Thus, these topics will not be 
discussed in further detail although occasionally there might have been some 
problems in terms of decision making as far as e.g. the Merck-Lexigen case was 
concerned or in the communication that took place between Bayer Diagnostics 
and Chiron Diagnostics.  
Besides the integration challenges, Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) 
identified four important corporate governance-related issues: differences in 
compensation structures between Silicon Valley firms and the acquiring 
companies, the nature of the acquirer’s ownership structure, the role of M&A in 
the acquirer’s strategy process, as well as the role played by some of the key 
stakeholders, especially banks. In the deals between biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies, the ownership structure, the role of M&A in the 
overall strategy process and the influence of major shareholders had no real 
impact. However, the differences in the compensation system, especially the non-
existence of a stock option program turned out as being very problematic. Hence, 
this will be discussed a little bit more detailed in the following paragraph. 
Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) point out: 
“In a start-up, much of an individual’s compensation is in the form of stock 
options, which align individual and organizational goals and generate intense 
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commitment on the part of the employee for the success of the venture. [...] In 
Silicon Valley, stock option are taken for granted. This has created a major 
problem since few non-Anglo-American firms have stock option plans.” (Inkpen, 
Sundaram & Rockwood, 2000, p. 61) 
Most of this quotation hits the point quite well, because the acquiring 
pharmaceutical companies being of European origin had problems in attracting, 
motivating and retaining employees after the stock option programs disappeared 
(Tentative hypothesis #19). In order to make up for the loss of the stock option 
programs they introduced other programs (Tentative hypotheses #19 and #20) 
like phantom option or stock appreciation right plans (e.g. Novartis), which are 
only of virtual character and did not provide ownership. Again, the case findings 
as well as the conclusions of Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) reveal that 
this mainly created dissatisfaction among employees.  
Nonetheless, their study has also some misleading statements. First and foremost, 
it is not true that only “few non Anglo-American firms have stock option plans”. 
They try e.g. to support their statement with an example of Daimler-Benz (now: 
DaimlerChrysler) taken from 1996. In fact, that is history, because at the 1st of 
September 1998 a law was passed in Germany which makes it much easier for 
German companies to issue stock options. Based on this law, which is called 
KonTraG (Law for control and transparency in companies)66, it is for the first 
time possible for German companies to issue naked warrants (Schweizer, 2000; 
Achleitner, 1999; Achleitner & Wichels, 2000). After this law was passed there 
was a dramatic increase in the number of stock option plans, especially in 
companies that were listed at the ‘Neuen Markt’, the German equivalent to the 
NASDAQ or the ‘Nouveau Marché’ in France (Schweizer & zu Knyphausen-
Aufseß, 2001). 
Moreover, Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000, p. 62) stated that  
“European acquirers that maintained stock option plans had difficulties with the 
structure of the plans. For example, in one company, existing target options were 
converted to options on the European company’s stock, which was worth less per 
                                              
66  KonTraG means ‘Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich’. 
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share and growing at much slower rate than the target company’s stock had been 
growing”. 
As far as the exchange of target options in options of the acquiring company’s 
stock is concerned, that is normally not a question of ‘pure’ numbers, but a 
question of the value of the options. Based on the valuation of the options 
respectively the stock, the corresponding exchange rate is calculated and the 
exchange takes place. That is the normal procedure, by which no loss in value 
occurs. The fact that this stock is growing at a much slower rate than the target’s 
company stock is, in a first step, nothing what one can rally predict and, in a 
second step, it is simply a fact that cannot be changed. But, that is definitely not a 
problem of the structure of such a program, because the stock price is only a 
reflection of the market valuation of the company. Since the acquired company is 
no longer an independent, publicly traded company, this fact simply must be 
accepted. If people cannot accept this, they will have to leave the company, 
which is also consistent with tentative hypothesis #19.  
This reflects also what this whole study is about, because after the acquisition the 
nature of the company changes. The acquired biotechnology companies as well as 
the companies in the sample of Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood (2000) are no 
longer independent companies – although pharmaceutical companies try to 
pretend that – at least at the beginning. They definitely need to face the fact that 
they are no longer the entrepreneurial driven, high-risk taking start-up companies 
as they were before. They are now part of larger corporation and have – at least to 
some extent – to play according to other rules. The change in the incentive 
compensation structure is part of this transformation process, small high-tech 
companies must undergo after the acquisition. 
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4.3  Discussion of the organization of the post-acquisition integration 
process 
After having extensively discussed and analyzed the more content-orientated 
perspective of the organizational integration in the previous sections, the 
analytical considerations and conceptual ideas of this section focus on the 
process-perspective of the organizational integration process. This refers to the 
investigation of how the overall integration process is organized in order to 
realize the different integration issues discussed so far, because the real value 
potentially realized through the acquisition is created by conscious and 
professional management of the newly acquired entity after the act of buying. 
The organization of the integration process has been described in many studies by 
consultants as well as by researchers (Storck, 1993; Clever, 1993; Jansen, 1998; 
Freund, 1991; Rohloff, 1994; Galpin & Herndon, 2000; Spickers, 1995; Deiser, 
1994; Werner, 1999; BCG, 2000; Booz·Allen & Hamilton, 1999; Feldman & 
Spratt, 1999; Habeck, Kröger & Träm, 2000; Picot, 2000). Because of this large 
amount of research, only the most relevant parts can be taken into account in the 
context of this study. All these models and concepts generally distinguish 
between different phases and are more or less relatively similar. The overall 
objectives of the integration process become clear in the following quotation, 
which is taken from BCG guidelines for making a merger work: 
“Manage the merger as a discrete process. Create project teams, separate from 
the core business, to handle the merger. This approach will minimize – but not 
eliminate – the merger’s effects on both customers and business as usual. 
Carefully design a clear structure and set principles for the merger. Give 
managers overseeing the process a mandate to make and implement decisions 
quickly.” (BCG, 2000, p. 5) 
Companies being combined after an acquisition must be coordinated through 
some kind of project team that has been given clear roles, responsibilities, and 
expectations. Such a model that especially puts its emphasis on the organization 
of the post-merger integration process has been developed by Galpin & Herndon 
(2000) and is shown in the following Figure 36: 
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Figure 36: Common planning model for the integration process 
As this model suggests the top executives of the acquiring organization have the 
ultimate accountability for the success of the integration which corresponds to the 
findings in tentative hypothesis #22. They are actively positioned throughout the 
process in order e.g. to provide strategic direction, resolve impasses, and provide 
oversight to the core integration team. The integration’s project team assumes 
primary responsibility for the day-to-day coordination of the task forces and the 
overall process and may also rely on the help of external consultants (Tentative 
hypothesis #24). The job of the integration project team is considered as a full-
time role which involves overseeing the establishment of the task forces, 
managing the selection of the task force leaders, arranging the kick-off sessions, 
as well as ensuring effective coordination between and among the task forces 
(Tentative hypothesis #23).  
In this concept, which is primarily designed for the combination of two larger 
entities, the role of the integration manager is to serve as a support for the 
realization of the tasks of the integration’s project team. In this context, his 
individual knowledge of the business and his ability to lead people and serve as a 
change agent are of crucial importance. Apart from that, the concept of Galpin & 
Herndon (2000) also suggests that if the project manager is selected from the 
acquiring company, the assistant project manager should be selected from the 
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acquired organization, which perfectly goes along with the interpretation and 
realization of such a deal as a ‘merger of equals’ (Tentative hypothesis #23). The 
task forces, like the core team, should include balanced representation from both 
partner companies. Integration task forces make up the majority of the integration 
infrastructure and are primarily responsible for designing transition plans, 
capturing synergies, and implementing the action items required for successful 
business integration. However, in the context of this study integration task forces 
did not play a very important role as the acquired biotechnology companies were 
rather small. Because of this, there were generally only a few executives from the 
acquiring pharmaceutical companies sent to the biotechnology companies in 
order to make them familiar with the structures and processes in place in the 
pharmaceutical companies (Tentative hypothesis #23). 
Once the decision about how to tackle the organizational integration issues has 
been made, the stage needs to be set for the actual organizational implementation 
of the merger. This phase is characterized mainly by initiating, steering and 
monitoring the realization process between all areas of the company and all 
groups of employees concerned. For efficient and effective implementation of a 
merger, it is necessary to systematically plan this process. The following Figure 
37 describes the main steps of the post-merger integration process according to 
the approach of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (1999): 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES   263
Figure 37: Steps of the post-merger process 
In Figure 37 the post-merger integration process is divided up in three major 
steps. The first two steps, ensuring daily business as well as double check due 
diligence, are rather complementary steps in the post-merger integration process 
as they are necessary basic conditions. The third step, the real integration process, 
is the most central one. The following Figure 38 gives a more elaborated picture 
of how the different tasks of the four integration subjects are supposed to look 
like. 
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controlling for 
the new share-
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Source:  Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (1999)
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Figure 38: Detailed steps of the post-merger integration process 
In a first step, the necessary transition project organization needs to be set in 
place and serves as a framework for the total project process. Special attention 
must be paid to the composition of the teams, which should consist of members 
from both organizations. Basically, the set-up of the transition project 
organization is the same procedure as observed in case studies. However, the 
structure that has been set in place in these deals is by far not that elaborated 
since the size of the acquired biotechnology companies is rather small (Tentative 
hypothesis #23). The second step, the design of the target strategy, organization 
and basic business processes, has already been discussed before in the context of 
the organizational integration topics. At this point, the structure, in which these 
decisions are shaped and finally implemented, as pointed out under step three, 
becomes clear. The fourth step refers to the monitoring and control of the post-
merger integration process. The general framework described is one possible way 
for the realization of the organizational integration topics and fits quite well with 
the case findings. In fact, that is not very surprising, as it is a standardized 
procedure or tool that helps organizing such a process. Nevertheless, it needs to 
be tailored to each acquisition, which implies that specific alignments to a given 
situation are always necessary. 
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The issue of communication during the post-merger integration process has also 
been attributed a certain importance (Salecker, 1995; Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; 
Davy et al., 1988; Bastien, 1987; Müller-Stewens, 1991; Habeck, Kröger & 
Träm, 2000; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000), because any failure to communicate 
leaves employees uncertain about their futures. Davy et al. (1988) have pointed 
out some guidelines in order to increase the effectiveness of communication and 
to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity among employees: 
• Information should be timely. 
• Information should be comprehensive and not exceed the facts known to 
management. 
• Information should be repeated in many media such as newsletters, memos or 
meetings. 
• Communication must be perceived as credible by employees. 
• The rationale for organizational changes should be communicated. 
• The communication program needs to be well planned. 
Compared with the case findings, most of these guidelines were followed 
(Tentative hypothesis #25). The empirical study of Schweiger & Denisi (1991) 
reveals that effective and timely communication reduces the dysfunctional 
outcomes of a merger. Due to the fact that the acquired biotechnology companies 
were not that big, most of the communication was done on a personal face-to-
face base. In addition to that, there were of course also general speeches given by 
the top management in order to inform the employees. All in all, the management 
at the biotechnology companies was aware of the importance of the 
communication issue and did handle it effectively. 
There are also differences in terms of speed with which change and integration 
are introduced, once the deal has been formalized (Cartwright & Cooper, 1992; 
Gerpott, 1993; Gut-Villa, 1997; Hermsen, 1994). It is difficult to place any exact 
time scale on the merger or acquisition process. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) 
have conducted a survey of mergers and acquisitions in order to identify the 
factors that separate success from failure. Their findings suggest that speed 
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increases the success rates. From this, the following results and recommendations 
were derived: 
• While all companies in the survey had differences in operating philosophies, 
management practices and information systems, those that made faster 
transitions had significantly fewer problems in each area than those 
transitioning more slowly. 
• Companies using a faster post-deal transition process were far more likely to 
be financially and strategically successful, because a prolonged transition adds 
costs, slows growth, destroys profit, and decreases cash flow. 
• As transition speed reduces the duration and depth of post-deal depression, 
fast-transitioning companies were found to be twice as likely to improve 
performance than slow transitioning ones. 
• A speedy transition improves the work environment as the uncertainty and 
insecurity of the employees about their job are reduced earlier. On a higher 
level, it is easier to define the direction of the acquired or merged company. 
Confronting the findings of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) study with the 
observation made in the case studies, the conclusions are not that straightforward. 
As far as the last recommendation is concerned, the reduction of uncertainty and 
especially the definition of the future direction of the acquired company, this is 
supported by tentative hypothesis #26. However, the overall conclusion that 
speed makes the difference and increases the success rates cannot be supported 
by the case findings. Quite the reverse was observed, e.g. in the deal between 
Sugen and Pharmacia in which a slow integration process intentionally was 
chosen. This was done in order to realize a stable integration process.  
Moreover, the decision for a slower post-merger integration process must be 
considered in close connection with the different M&A motives (Tentative 
hypotheses #1 and #2) and the corresponding integration strategies in order to 
realize these motives (Tentative hypotheses #4, #5, and #6). In case of the short-
term orientated motives (Tentative hypothesis #1) which required an absorption 
integration strategy, a quick organizational integration strategy makes sense and 
perfectly agrees with the findings in the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2000) study. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES   267
However, as far as the realization of the long-term orientated motives (Tentative 
hypothesis #2) is concerned, a preservation integration strategy was applied. In 
this specific context, a slow organizational integration is much more appropriate, 
because it is the aim of this integration strategy to keep up the peculiarities of the 
acquired biotechnology companies such as the innovative and entrepreneurial 
spirit as long as possible. Thus, the decision about the right ‘degree of speed’ 
depends on the corresponding integration strategy (Tentative hypothesis #26), 
which however is not accounted for in the study of PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2000).  
With this concluding remark on the above discussion of the ‘speed topic’ it is 
now warranted to toe together the findings of this chapter. So far, the chapter has 
confronted the case findings with extant post-merger integration theories and has 
discussed various streams of research in hope of discovering new insights. 
However, it has been shown that extant post-acquisition integration theory cannot 
explain most of the crucial observations made in the case studies. In this context, 
two particular topics were always referred to. One topic is the value chain 
configuration which serves as a starting point for each integration of 
biotechnology companies into the structure of pharmaceutical companies. 
However, non of the existing post-acquisition integration theories takes this 
important aspect into account. The second major issue is the importance of 
competencies or capabilities, especially as far as innovation is concerned. Again, 
none of the existing theories includes this subject. Moreover, that was also one of 
the main reasons to consider the concept of Teece (2000). Thus, the following 
chapter aims – by relying on the contributions of two further concepts, core 
competencies as well as value chain configuration – at generating a new 
conceptual framework in order to close the gap in the existing literature. 
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5 Constructing a new approach and directions for further research 
“Successful acquirers usually base the actual level of integration on the type of 
capability being acquired: the greater the innovation, the less the integration.” 
(Chaudhuri & Tabrizi, 1999, p. 130) 
After having analyzed and discussed the contributions and explanations extant 
post-merger and post-acquisition integration can deliver and having come to the 
conclusion that each of them can only explain a small part of the observations 
made in the cases between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies, it is 
now time for reconciling the shortcomings of the extant integration literature by 
constructing a new approach. In the terminology used by case study 
methodologists, Chapter 4 has been engaged in the enfolding of conflicting and 
supportive literature up to the point where further discussions of extant literature 
do not produce additional support for the explanation of the case-based tentative 
hypotheses. Thus, theoretical saturation in the sense of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin 
(1984) has been reached. What remains to be done is to utilize what has been 
learned for constructing a new integration approach, capable of explaining the 
post-acquisition integration of small biotechnology or, more generally speaking, 
high-technology companies into the structure of pharmaceutical companies or, in 
other words, large corporations. This is the ultimate goal of this study. The 
following sections present and discuss this new approach. 
Section 5.1 constructs the new approach by tying together the additional 
contributions of core competencies and value chain configuration with the 
conclusions drawn in Chapter 4. Due to the breadth of the core competence 
literature this study needs to focus on the most relevant literature. Section 5.2 
takes the theoretical arguments back to the level of the case findings, i.e., to the 
set of the tentative hypotheses, in an iterative loop. This step serves to ascertain 
the validity of this study and to detect any potential remaining weakness of the 
new approach. Finally, section 5.3 points out some implications of the new 
concept and presents some potential directions for further research. 
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5.1 Constructing a new approach 
This section is devoted to the ultimate goal of this study, the construction of a 
new framework, that explains the post-acquisition integration of biotechnology 
companies in the structure of big pharmaceutical companies. Before the new 
model will be depicted, two other important theoretical concepts need to be 
introduced: core competencies and value chain. These two concepts provide some 
interesting points necessary to consider when constructing the new framework for 
the post-acquisition integration. 
5.1.1 Implications of core competencies and value chain 
So far, the different analyses and conclusions drawn have often come to a point at 
which two major cornerstones determining the post-acquisition of biotechnology 
in pharmaceutical companies could be identified. The first determinant are the 
core competencies of the biotechnology companies which need to be defined with 
respect to the core competencies of the pharmaceutical companies. In order to 
make this decision it is necessary to use the value chain configuration, the second 
determinant, as a useful method of classification. Thus, it perfectly makes sense 
to briefly introduce these two concepts. 
The concept of core competencies 
The concept of core competencies is part of a larger stream of strategy which is 
referred to as ‘resource-based view’ of strategy. This approach is grounded in 
economics (Schumpeter, 1934; Chamberlin 1935; Selznick, 1957; Penrose, 
1959), and explains how a company’s resources drive its performance in a 
dynamic competitive environment. The terminology within the resource-based 
view of strategy is not clear and straightforward, because different authors use 
different expressions, with which they refer to a company’s resources. Some use 
the term ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Collis, 1991), others 
speak of ‘core capabilities’ (Schoemaker, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992) or 
‘invisible assets’ (Itami & Roehl, 1987) whereas others simply use the expression 
‘capabilities’ (Stalk, Evans & Shulman, 1992) or ‘resources’ (Peteraf, 1993). 
Moreover, Hitt & Ireland (1985) speak of ‘corporate distinctive competencies’ 
whereas Amit & Schoemaker (1993) use the generic term ‘strategic asset’ in 
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order to subsume to ‘resources’ and ‘capabilities’. Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997) 
even speak of ‘dynamic capabilities’. Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995) speaks of 
‘organizational capabilities’. This very brief review of the literature clearly 
reveals that different expressions exist, which however want to express the same 
fact that valuable resources can take a variety of forms and are important for the 
competitive position of a company. On the one hand, these resources can be 
physical, but on the other hand they may also be intangible such as technological 
know-how (Hall, 1992; Hofer & Schendel, 1978). Furthermore, organizational 
capabilities can be embedded in a company’s routines, processes, and culture. 
The umbrella term academics use to describe this work is the resource-based 
view of firm/strategy (Collis & Montgomery, 1995). In this context, the company 
is conceived as a hierarchy or portfolio of core competencies, core products, or 
core capabilities versus a portfolio of distinct businesses. 
This study does not want to further elaborate on the different concepts of the 
resource-based view of strategy,67 because it only needs to focus on the 
underlying argumentation inherent to the resource-based view. Therefore, it is 
absolutely necessary to have a look at the overall logic and argumentation of this 
concept, because this logic in combination with the value chain explains the 
applied integration strategies of the pharmaceutical companies.  
From a resource-based point of view, a sustainable competitive advantage results 
from the possession of relevant capability differentials, which are often intangible 
assets such as specific skills or reputation. These resources are seen as relatively 
immobile, and as strengths to be nurtured and should also guide the choice of 
strategy. However, resources or competencies must be valuable in order to create 
a competitive advantage. Some authors (Barney, 1986 & 1991; Hall, 1992; 
Peteraf, 1993; Ghemawat, 1986; Grant, 1991) have tried to specify the conditions 
under which resources are valuable. Valuable resources are those that are 
superior in use, hard to imitate, difficult to substitute for, and more valuable 
within the firm than outside. Thus, resources or competencies are only 
                                              
67  A good description about the evolution of the resource-based view can be found in 
Mahoney & Pandian (1992), who discuss the role of the resource-based view within the 
conversation of strategic management. Another very good overview can be found in zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß (1993 & 1995). 
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meaningful in the context of performing certain activities in order to achieve 
certain competitive advantages. Linking this to the context of this study, the 
question comes up, what are the unique resources, capabilities or core 
competencies68 of the biotechnology company. However, it is not enough to 
analyze the biotechnology company on its own with regard to its potential core 
competencies.  
Due to the fact that the biotechnology company has been acquired by the 
pharmaceutical company it is instead necessary to analyze the performing of the 
biotechnology company’s activities in relation to the pharmaceutical company. 
This context is generally provided by the value chain concept, and in this study 
more precisely by the value chain of the pharmaceutical company/industry. 
Hence, the determination of the core competencies of the biotechnology company 
needs to be done with respect to the pharmaceutical value chain. Having in mind, 
that core competencies are those that are superior in use, hard to imitate, difficult 
to substitute for, and more valuable within the firm than outside, the definition of 
the biotechnology company’s core competencies will have an immediate impact 
on the choice of the post-acquisition integration strategy. Before combining these 
two perspectives there will be a brief discussion of the value chain concept. 
The value chain concept of Porter 
Porter (1985) has developed the value chain concept, a systematic way for 
analyzing the sources of competitive advantage by examining all the activities a 
firm performs and how they interact. The value chain disaggregates a firm into its 
strategically relevant activities in order to understand the behavior of costs and 
the existing and potential sources of differentiation. A company is considered as 
gaining competitive advantage by performing these strategically important 
activities more cheaply or better than its competitors. 
The value chains of firms in an industry differ, reflecting their histories, 
strategies, and success at implementation. Nevertheless, Porter (1985) has 
                                              
68  In the following, the term ‘core competencies’ will be used synonymously to ‘resource’ 
and ‘capabilities’, because it is the best expression for the purpose of this study. 
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identified nine generic categories of activities, shown in Figure 39, which are 
linked together in characteristic ways every firm’s value chain is composed of.  
Figure 39: The generic value chain 
The value chain displays total value and consists of different value activities and 
a margin. Value activities are the physically and technologically distinct activities 
a firm performs and are considered as the building blocks by which a firm creates 
a product valuable to its buyers. The margin is the difference between total value 
and the collective cost of performing the value activities. These value activities 
are divided into two broad types, primary activities and support activities.  
Primary activities, listed along the bottom of Figure 39, are those activities that 
are involved in the physical creation of the product, its sale and transfer to the 
buyer as well as after-sale assistance. There are five generic categories of primary 
activities (inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, 
service) involved in competing in any industry, which are also divisible in a 
number of distinct activities depending on the particular industry and firm 
strategy.  
Support activities support the primary activities and each other by providing 
purchased inputs, technology, human resource, and various firmwide functions. 
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Support value activities can be divided into four generic categories (procurement, 
technology development, human resource infrastructure, firm infrastructure), 
which are also divisible into a number of distinct value activities. How each value 
activity is performed will determine its contribution to buyer needs and thus 
differentiation. 
Combining the logic of the value chain with the perspective of the resource-based 
view, one important guiding question for the post-acquisition integration of 
biotechnology companies in the structure of big pharmaceutical companies is: 
Are the core competencies of the biotechnology or of the pharmaceutical 
company the basic source of differentiation and ultimate value creation? This 
question will be used when constructing the new post-acquisition integration 
framework in the next section, because both aspects are not considered in the 
extant post-acquisition integration literature. 
5.1.2 Constructing a new approach: Framework for the post-acquisition 
integration of small high-technology companies in the structure of 
large corporations 
Having in mind the limitations of the existing theory and having accepting the 
argumentation of the previous section a new framework can be developed. This 
framework (cf. Figure 40) tries to analyze the position and responsibilities of the 
acquired biotechnology company according to their position within the 
integration box. At this point it is very important to point out that the final 
concluding hypothesis of this explanatory study will be – as the value chain 
differs from industry to industry – that this framework, more precisely the 
different value activity steps, needs to be tailored to each specific industry.  
However, in the context and for the purpose of this study, the framework will be 
developed and presented with the specific industry constellation of this study. 
This means that the framework will be developed at the example of the post-
acquisition integration of biotechnology companies into the organizational 
structure of big pharmaceutical companies. This study claims that this new 
framework is better understood when explained at the concrete example of the 
analyzed cases. Moreover, as the value chain logic can be considered as some 
kind of common/basic knowledge among academics as well as practitioners, it is 
CONSTRUCTING A NEW APPROACH   273
assumed that the application of this concept to an other industry or company can 
easily be transformed. Thus, the construction of the new framework/model is 
intentionally illustrated at the case examples discussed in this study. In addition to 
that, it was the ultimate goal and the explicitly stated intention of this study to 
develop a framework/model for the explanation and future handling of the post-
acquisition integration activities of pharmaceutical companies when facing the 
challenge of integrating biotechnology companies. 
Figure 40: Post-acquisition integration framework 
On the left side of the integration box in Figure 40, there is the autonomy and the 
control from the biotechnology point-of-view, whereas on the right side the 
control and responsibility of the big pharmaceutical company is determined. 
Hence, it is possible to split up this box in two different pieces whose size 
determines the degree of control/autonomy each party has. The bigger the size of 
one area the more control the respective party has. The crucial part of this 
concept is the determination of the ‘border’ between these two areas. The 
determination depends on the perceived core competencies the acquired 
biotechnology company has with regard to the pharmaceutical value chain placed 
over the box as a reference point. This implies that the acquiring pharmaceutical 
company must compare its core competencies with the ones of the biotechnology 
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on each step or, in the words of Porter (1985), primary value activities of the 
pharmaceutical value chain.  
This framework can fulfill two different purposes. In a first step, it can be used 
for ex-post analytical reasons in order to determine the integration strategy of a 
knowledge-intensive high-tech start-up that is to be integrated in a large 
corporation. In this context, this frameworks helps to analyze, classify and 
compare the success of the different integration approaches. In this sense, it is a 
framework for the classification of empirical phenomena. In a second step, which 
is even more important, this framework can serve as a model in order to 
determine the appropriate post-acquisition integration strategy. These are the two 
different application alternatives, which will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
With the help of this box it is possible to determine the different positions of the 
acquired biotech company depending on the different projects it currently 
manages. In the early stages of the pharmaceutical value chain, i.e. research and 
development, biotechnology companies are usually granted more autonomy, 
whereas in the more advanced steps of the value chain, the control is taken over 
by the big pharmaceutical companies. The reason for this is the simple fact, that 
the core competencies of the biotechnology companies are placed in the area of 
research and development. That is also one of the main reasons why they have 
been acquired by the pharmaceutical companies. Hence, the early-stage projects 
remain under the control of the biotechnology company, whereas the late-stage 
ones are slowly or even abruptly taken away from the biotechnology company 
and put under the control of the pharmaceutical company. Doing this for all 
projects, the shifting point in terms of control/autonomy can be found out. As far 
as the supporting functions, or in the words of Porter (1985), supportive value 
activities like financing, human resource, controlling or IT are concerned, they 
are completely carried out by the bigger and acquiring pharmaceutical company. 
In these fields, pharmaceutical companies usually have elaborated systems and 
structures in place. Compared with the smaller companies they can also be 
considered as core competencies. Consequently, they are managed by the larger 
corporation and no knowledge or competence transfer takes place. So far, this 
paragraph has described the first possibility of using this framework, as an ex-
post analytical tool. The next paragraph will go one step further, because the 
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determination of the position in the box is used as the basis for recommending a 
specific post-acquisition integration strategy. 
The determination of the position of the different projects in the integration 
framework has immediate consequences for the post-acquisition integration 
strategy. In the area in which the core competencies of the biotechnology 
company are considered as being better than those of the pharmaceutical 
company, a preservation integration strategy needs to be applied, because core 
competencies are those that are superior in use, hard to imitate, difficult to 
substitute for, and more valuable within the firm than outside. Thus, these core 
competencies can only flourish in the context of the biotechnology company, but 
not in the organizational structure of a big pharmaceutical company. The 
biotechnology companies are the ‘stars’ in the field of biotechnology research, 
which makes this area their core competencies. This fact also explains why there 
is no knowledge transfer between both organizations. There are some further 
implications to consider. The most crucial core competencies of the 
biotechnology companies are their entrepreneurial spirit, their risk-taking attitude, 
their flat organizational hierarchy as well as their innovative capabilities based on 
their specific biotechnology know-how. These are the central characteristics, 
which are particular to an independent and small biotechnology company. 
Remembering the argumentation of Teece (2000), who described the 
determinants of the rate and direction of firm level innovation, these 
characteristics need to be preserved in order to keep up the major core 
competencies of the biotechnology companies. Preserving the innovative 
capability of the biotechnology company has been one of the dominant motives 
for the acquisition. By this, they are to contribute to the long-term growth of the 
pharmaceutical company. Thus, the overall organizational integration strategy 
must be to grant the acquired biotechnology company as much autonomy and 
independence as possible. Because of this, a slow integration process is the right 
alternative to chose. 
Apart from that, the pharmaceutical value chain contains also some steps that do 
clearly belong to the core competencies of a large pharmaceutical company. As 
far as clinical trials, especially late-stage clinical trials, regulatory affairs or even 
sales and marketing are concerned, these areas are the natural core competencies 
of large pharmaceutical companies. They know how to handle large-scale and 
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worldwide operating clinical trials. Moreover, they also have the money to 
finance it, whereas a biotechnology company usually cannot afford this. In fact, 
this lack of experience as well as the missing financial resources are the major 
reasons why the biotechnology companies have accepted the takeover bid of the 
pharmaceutical companies. Thus, advanced clinical trials or marketing and sales 
of a newly approved biotechnology product are nothing what is to be carried out 
by the biotechnology companies. They have neither the necessary experience nor 
the structure for the worldwide distribution of a product. These are the natural 
core competencies of a big worldwide operating pharmaceutical corporation. 
Therefore, the right organizational integration strategy for these areas is an 
absorption approach in which the pharmaceutical company takes over the 
complete control. As the pharmaceutical company is supposed to apply an 
absorption approach, a quick integration process is useful. 
So far, this analysis has shown that pharmaceutical companies have a difficult 
balance to strike by applying a slow preservation strategy, on the one hand, while 
at the same time setting a quick absorption approach in place, on the other hand. 
This necessary procedure of a hybrid strategy bears of course some further 
repercussions, because these two strategies cannot really be separated as they 
need to be applied in a very small organization at the same time. This implies e.g. 
that – after the acquisition – the entrepreneurial spirit gets lost and the acquired 
biotech company turns more into a center of excellence for a specific technology 
with a high degree of autonomy.  
Thus, this framework must be complemented by a dynamic perspective and can 
only be considered as some kind of starting point due to the fact that the nature of 
the biotechnology begins to alter after the acquisition. After the acquisition the 
biotechnology company turns more and more into a center of excellence. The 
explanation for this is also quite obvious. The entrepreneurial spirit is no longer 
needed, because sales and marketing are taken over by the pharmaceutical 
company, which was formerly the goal of the independent management of the 
biotechnology company. However, these people left the company in the 
meantime due to that reason. After the acquisition, the former independent 
biotechnology company is now only focusing on doing basic research. Thus, the 
entrepreneurial spirit has been replaced by a spirit of discovery. This is also 
considered to be one of their core competencies and reveals why they are granted 
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that much autonomy in this field. In addition to that, this makes obvious why 
there is no knowledge transfer. The knowledge about this specific technology is 
the competence of the biotechnology company and not the competence of any 
part in the big pharmaceutical company. If they had possessed that knowledge, 
they would not have had to acquire the biotechnology company. Taken this all 
together, the end point within the integration box will rather be determined by a 
vertical and not by a curve. This vertical clearly separates the field of core 
competencies of the biotechnology company from that of the pharmaceutical 
company. 
As far as the rather ‘simple’ and straightforward organization of the post-
acquisition integration process is concerned a phase-process like that presented 
by Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (1999) is a useful planning tool. The 
discussion in this section has shown that the newly developed framework is a 
useful concept for analyzing and supporting the post-acquisition integration 
strategies of pharmaceutical companies when facing the need to integrate smaller 
biotechnology companies. Additionally, this study claims that this developed 
framework can also be generalized to other high-tech industries in which a 
highly-dynamic, knowledge-intensive and entrepreneurial driven start-up is 
acquired by and needs subsequently to be integrated into the structure of a larger 
corporation. In this case, the value chain must each time be adopted according to 
the requirements of the specific industry. 
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5.2 Revisiting the tentative hypotheses 
As already indicated in the introductory comments to this final chapter, the 
proposition of the ‘framework for post-acquisition integration of small high-
technology companies’ into the structure of large corporations is to be followed 
by confronting this new approach with the set of tentative hypotheses formed in 
Chapter 3.6, the final section of the case study chapter. This confrontation is the 
aim of the following section. Following the juxtaposition of extant post-
acquisition and post-merger integration theory with the case findings in Chapter 
4, this confrontation is the second step of this kind of theory evaluation. 
Although the set of tentative hypotheses is already incorporated in the proposed 
‘framework for post-acquisition integration of small high-technology companies’ 
into the structure of large corporations, there is still a need to revisit them. This 
incorporation took place in two different ways. First, specific components of 
extant organizational integration literature were integrated into this study’s 
approach, because they demonstrated explanatory power for some of the tentative 
hypotheses. Hence, the tentative hypotheses have exerted considerable influence 
on the new concept. Second, and even much more important, the confrontation of 
extant post-acquisition and post-merger integration literature with the set of 
tentative hypotheses found many shortcomings of extant models, because very 
often only some small parts of these models could be used as an explanation for 
the observations made in the case studies. This was also the reason for the search 
for new inputs from previously largely unrelated concepts such as ‘core 
competencies’ and ‘value chain configuration’.  
Combining these inputs with some parts of the extant post-merger integration 
models resulted in the construction of the new framework. In this sense, the 
tentative hypotheses guided the entire search and development process for the 
new concept. Although, as just demonstrated, the tentative hypotheses have 
already been an integral part of the development phase of the new concept, they 
need to be revisited, primarily because of methodological reasons. For any type of 
empirical work – irrespective of whether it may be qualitative case study work or 
quantitative surveys – the establishment of internal validity is a very crucial 
factor. This has also been mentioned in the discussion of the research 
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methodology in Chapter 2. In the context of this study, the question of internal 
validity can be paraphrased in the following way: Is the ‘framework for post-
acquisition integration of small high-technology companies’ into the structure of 
large corporations really able to explain what has been observed in the case 
studies?  
This section tries to answer that question and, by this, is concerned with 
increasing internal validity. This is done by using iterative loops, in which the 
results of a study’s analytical generalizations are repeatedly checked against the 
observed phenomena. For this study this means that the ‘framework for post-
acquisition integration of small high-technology companies’ into the structure of 
large corporations is checked against the set of tentative hypotheses. This 
confrontation allows to identify and, thus, supports what the novel approach does 
explain and, equally important, where the model remains unclear or where it does 
not hold the explanatory power.  
However, it is necessary to emphasize that the support for internal validity is a 
little bit restricted as the developed framework has been illustrated at the example 
of integration activities between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. 
This has been done, because the analysis of the post-acquisition integration 
activities between small biotechnology companies, on the one hand, and large 
pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand, represents the overall analytical 
focus and aim of this study. Hence, the development of the framework took place 
while having the specific constellations between these two kinds of companies in 
mind. Nevertheless, the short confrontation needs to be done because of 
methodological rigor. 
Chapter 3.6 presented a set of 28 tentative hypotheses. For an easier 
confrontation with the ‘framework for post-acquisition integration of small high-
technology companies’ into the structure of large corporations the tentative 
hypotheses are revisited in the same order. The following Table 5 provides a 
classified overview of the tentative hypotheses. 
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 Number Tentative hypothesis 
M&A motives # 1 Filling up R&D pipeline, access to new products (short-term) 
 # 2 Access to knowledge/U.S. market, support growth (long-term) 
 # 3 Financial support and support in regulatory affairs 
Organizational 
integration 
# 4 Overall integration strategy is to grant the acquired biotechnology 
company as much autonomy as possible vs. control in certain areas 
 # 5 Integration strategy depends on the progress of the specific project 
 # 6 Control decision determined according to the core competencies 
 # 7 The more competencies in the biotech company the more autonomy 
 # 8 Organizational collaboration functions primarily on a project base 
 # 9 Supportive activities taken over/controlled by pharma companies 
 # 10 Responsibility for and reporting to a pharmaceutical board member  
 # 11 No systematic knowledge/technology/competence transfer  
 # 12 Biotech companies turn into centers of excellence 
 # 13 Value of biotech know-how only to protect in its original context 
 # 14 Big cultural gap between pharma and biotech, which explains the 
chosen integration strategies 
 # 15 Entrepreneurial/risk-taking spirit of biotech companies gets lost 
 # 16 Development from an entrepreneurial-driven firm into a more 
research-orientated center of excellence of a big company 
 # 17 Significant increase in employee turnover, especially top managers 
 # 18 Special incentives in order to make some of the top executives stay 
 # 19 Missing of a stock option program creates problems 
 # 20 Introduction of special incentives and bonus plans 
 # 21 Some people (especially researchers) appreciated aspects of the 
takeover (job security, access to vast resources) 
Organization of the 
integration process 
# 22 Integration is approved and supported by the top management of the 
acquiring pharmaceutical company 
 # 23 Process carried out by integration teams/managers in a spirit of a 
‘merger of equals’ 
 # 24 Support by external consultants if necessary 
 # 25 Communication on two levels (general speeches, face-to-face) 
 # 26 Speed depends on the integration strategy applied 
General aspects # 27 Nature of the biotechnology company changes as it becomes a center 
of excellence within a big pharmaceutical company 
 # 28 Acquisition of a biotechnology company is considered as an 
investment that pays off or not 
Table 5: Classified summary of the tentative hypotheses 
CONSTRUCTING A NEW APPROACH   281
The acquisition motives needs to be spilt up in two perspectives, one is the 
perception of the pharmaceutical companies and their underlying rationale for 
acquiring the biotechnology companies (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2), and the 
other are the reasons of the biotechnology companies in order to let themselves 
be taken over (Tentative hypothesis #3). Although these motives are not 
explicitly stated in the framework for post-acquisition integration, they represent 
the underlying rationale for this model. The intended motives in combination 
with the core competence situation at the biotechnology companies determine the 
organizational integration strategy. In order to realize the short-term orientated 
motive – access to new products or to fill up a lack in the R&D pipeline – a quick 
absorption integration strategy is useful, whereas the realization of the long-term 
orientated motives demands for a slow, preservation approach. Thus, both 
motives are covered by the framework. Moreover, the last motive-oriented 
tentative hypothesis (#3) also corresponds to the framework as the motives of 
financial and regulatory support are to be realized shortly whereas the access to 
the vast resources of a pharmaceutical company is a long-term commitment and 
ensures the overall growth strategy and future survival of the biotechnology 
company. 
The tentative hypotheses #4, #5, #6, and #7 represent what all this study is about, 
the development of a framework in order to determine the appropriate post-
acquisition integration for an acquired biotechnology company. Tentative 
hypothesis #4 defines the overall organizational integration strategy. As the 
preservation of the culture and innovative spirit is part of the post-acquisition 
integration process, the overall integration strategy must reflect the preservation 
approach. However, this overall integration approach is limited to the area in 
which a preservation is intended. This depends also on the underlying motives for 
the acquisition (Tentative hypotheses #1 and #2). In the field where a control 
from the pharmaceutical-side is desired the second organizational integration 
strategy, absorption, is applied (Tentative hypothesis #5). The decision at what 
steps of the pharmaceutical value chain this second integration strategy will be 
used is based on the analysis of both companies core competencies with respect 
to one another (Tentative hypothesis #6). As a logic consequence out of this 
analysis, tentative hypothesis #7 defines the degree of autonomy and control of 
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the biotechnology company. By this, a specific point in the integration box can be 
determined for each acquired biotechnology company. 
Tentative hypotheses #8, #9, and #10 cope with the organization of the 
collaboration process subsequent to the acquisition. The realization of this 
collaboration process depends on the perceived core competencies and on the 
overall integration strategy. Tentative hypothesis #8 claims that the interactions 
between the acquired biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies take place on 
a project base and not by a complete integration. To a certain extent this is true, 
as it reflects the overall integration strategy and is especially valid for the area 
which is dominated by the preservation strategy. However, this statement is not 
valid as far as the area of the absorption strategy is concerned. In addition to that, 
the supportive activities like human resources or finance are either directly 
managed by the pharmaceutical company or at least carried out according to the 
rules and requirements of the larger, acquiring pharmaceutical company 
(Tentative hypothesis #9). In the context of the newly developed framework, this 
aspect is represented by the large arrow above the different steps of the 
pharmaceutical value chain (cf. Figure 40).  
Tentative hypothesis #10 can be considered as a recommendation for a successful 
realization of the necessary responsibility and reporting structure. It must (or 
should) be a board member who is in charge of the acquired biotechnology 
company, due to the fact that the integration of the biotechnology company 
involves to handle and to support two integration strategies at the same time. The 
decision about what integration strategy to apply at what specific point cannot be 
made by middle management. This is a strategically and politically difficult 
decision, that must be controlled and supported from the very top of the acquiring 
company. Thus, tentative hypothesis #10 is implicitly accounted for, as it more or 
less can also be considered as some kind of basic requirement for a successful 
post-acquisition integration. 
The confrontation of tentative hypotheses #11, #12, and #13, that deal with the 
topic of knowledge transfer with the model’s propositions are relatively 
straightforward as they provide clear support for the choice of the respective 
integration strategy. Tentative hypothesis #11 emphasizes the fact that no 
systematic knowledge and competence transfer takes place between the acquired 
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and acquiring company. The reasoning for this is quite simple and is part of the 
decision about what integration strategy to use. As far as the preservation 
approach is concerned, this specific strategy has been chosen in order to preserve 
the unique knowledge that is embedded in the biotechnology companies. This 
knowledge can only flourish in the context and culture of the biotechnology 
company. Thus, it will not be transferred, because it would get lost in this case. 
As far as the absorption strategy, focusing on the later steps of the pharmaceutical 
value chain, is concerned, the knowledge and experience lay in the 
pharmaceutical company and definitely not in the acquired biotechnology 
company. Again, there is no need for a knowledge or competence transfer. The 
same rationale is valid for the supportive activities like finance or budgeting.  
Tentative hypothesis #12 is a logic consequence that arises out of tentative 
hypothesis #11 and the chosen preservation strategy as it refers to the 
organizational character of the biotechnology company after the acquisition and 
subsequent integration, aiming at preserving the specific knowledge of the 
acquired firm. As time goes by, the biotechnology company turns into a center of 
excellence of the larger pharmaceutical company. Tentative hypothesis #13 
further elaborates on and supports this issue as it points out that the value of the 
biotechnology knowledge can only be preserved in its specific context, the local 
network of the – formerly independent – biotechnology company. 
Three tentative hypotheses (#14, #15, and #16) relate to cultural topics. To start 
with, tentative hypothesis #14 is compatible with the models overall 
recommended integration strategy to grant the acquired biotechnology company 
as much autonomy and independence as possible in order to keep up their 
innovative spirit as long as possible. Thus, because of the two incompatible 
cultures that is the best strategy to chose. Tentative hypothesis #15 puts the 
ultimate success of this strategy in another light. Despite the fact that this 
autonomy approach is chosen, tentative hypothesis #15 states that the culture of 
the biotechnology companies changes and gradually comes closer to the culture 
of the pharmaceutical company. This fact can hardly be reproduced in Figure 40, 
but it is implicitly included in the recommendation that can be derived from the 
framework. This point must be considered in close connection with the issue of 
knowledge and competence transfer discussed in the previous paragraph. In order 
to keep up the value of the knowledge as well as the innovative spirit of the 
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acquired biotechnology company, the only viable solution is to keep them 
independent and make them develop into a center of excellence. This suggestion 
is supported by tentative hypothesis #16 and it also perfectly matches with the 
proposed preservation strategy for the innovative and knowledge-intensive part of 
the acquired biotechnology company.  
The accordance between the tentative hypotheses concerning the human 
resources related issues (Tentative hypotheses #17, #18, #19, #20, and #21) and 
the framework is not as apparent as it is between the hypotheses discussed so far 
and the framework. Indeed, some of these hypotheses have more in common with 
the model than others, which merely are not explained by the framework. 
Tentative hypothesis #17, which claims that there is a significant turnover after 
the acquisition especially from top managers, is more or less an immediate 
consequence that arises out of the biotechnology’s company acquisition and its 
subsequent integration into the structure of a large pharmaceutical company. 
These people leave, because they can no longer fulfill their entrepreneurial 
aspirations as the nature of the formerly independent biotechnology company 
changes. The company is now more or less an integral part of a larger corporation 
with its own culture and different organizational rules. However, the reaction of 
the leaving top managers can be explained with the framework.  
Tentative hypothesis #18 is not directly linked to the framework. It is first and 
foremost part of the underlying organization of the post-acquisition integration 
process, as it tries to identify some trustworthy individuals to build the 
organizational integration upon. Only in a second step, the goal of keeping some 
of the top executives has also something to do with the aim of preserving the 
specific culture of the biotechnology company, because the culture is to some 
extent also rooted in its top managers.  
As far as tentative hypothesis #19 is concerned, the same logic applies as in the 
discussion of the previous tentative hypothesis. At a first glance, stock options 
are an incentive means in order to attract, motivate and retain people. The future 
missing of a stock option program is simply a fact as the larger, acquiring 
corporations do not grant stock options to all employees, in contrast to small 
start-ups which often do that. Granting stock options is considered as being an 
integral part of the culture at U.S. biotechnology companies. This implies that 
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with the lack of the stock option program a part of the specific biotechnology 
culture ultimately disappears, which in turn makes it difficult or, in fact, even 
impossible to keep up the entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture and spirit, an 
independent biotechnology company may have, but not a center of excellence of 
a big pharmaceutical company.  
Tentative hypothesis #20 describes the acquiring company’s reaction on that 
issue. In order to make up for the missing stock option programs alternatives such 
as special incentives or bonus programs are introduced. This problem must be 
handled in the integration process. The final tentative hypothesis (#21) dealing 
with the acceptance of the takeover cannot really be explained by the newly 
developed framework, but it has also no impact on the validity of the framework. 
Considering the tentative hypotheses #22, #23, #24, #25, and #26, it needs to be 
admitted that their primary function is to depict the organization of the post-
acquisition integration process. Broadly speaking, the basic tools, like project 
management, steering committees or integration managers, which were used in 
the organization of the integration of a small biotechnology company into the 
structure of a large pharmaceutical company do not really differ from the tools in 
use when realizing the merger of two large corporations. Nevertheless, some of 
the specific arrangements in the post-acquisition process between small 
biotechnology and large pharmaceutical companies do reflect and influence some 
of the specific characteristics of the newly developed framework.  
Tentative hypothesis #22 deals with the fact that the integration process should 
have the full approval and support of a pharmaceutical’s company board member, 
because the realization of the two integration strategies – preservation as well as 
absorption – needs to be directed and initiated from the very top of the company. 
Such a decision is not made at the level of middle management. Thus, the fact 
that two distinct integration strategies need to be realized at the same time, also 
referred to as hybrid approach, requires the approval and support from the board 
members.  
Tentative hypothesis #23 deals with the subject that the integration process needs 
to be carried out in the spirit of a ‘merger of equals’. This corresponds with the 
overall integration strategy that the acquired biotechnology company is to 
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preserve the maximum of possible autonomy and independence. If that is the 
intention and ultimate goal of the integration process, it will be impossible and 
un-logic to let the integration teams be dominated by the acquiring 
pharmaceutical company. Instead, the integration process must be sustained by 
the spirit of a ‘merger of equals’, so that a preservation approach can be realized 
successfully.  
As far as tentative hypothesis #24 with the possible involvement of external 
consultants is concerned, that is rather some kind of recommendation or 
possibility which is not directly linked to the framework. In case any major 
problems occur during the integration process that cannot be solved without 
external support, one might think about involving consultants. The same 
conclusion applies for tentative hypothesis #25 dealing with the issue of 
communication. This is rather considered as an important enabler or supporting 
function for the easy realization of the post-acquisition integration process and, 
by this, is also not directly related to the framework.  
Tentative hypothesis #26 copes with the topic of speed. In contrast to the two 
previous aspects, this issue is directly associated with the framework, because 
speed needs to be tailored according to the respective integration strategy. In case 
of the preservation strategy that aims at realizing the long-term motives and at 
preserving the independence and autonomy of the biotechnology company a slow 
approach seems to be reasonable. However, considering the absorption strategy 
which primarily relies on the existing core competencies of the acquiring 
pharmaceutical companies, a quick realization of the integration is appropriate. 
Thus, both approaches have their right to exist. 
The cross-case analysis has also made two tentative hypotheses (#27 and #28) 
emerge that rather treat general aspects or findings made in dealing with the 
different cases. Tentative hypothesis #27 claims that the nature of the 
biotechnology company changes after the acquisition and subsequent integration 
into the pharmaceutical company. The previous revisiting of the tentative 
hypotheses has already shown that this hypothesis is implicitly included in the 
developed framework. In contrast to this, no real explanation or support for 
tentative hypothesis #28 is included in the framework. This has also something to 
do with the altering nature of the acquired biotechnology company and its 
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perception by the acquiring pharmaceutical company. However, no support or 
explanation for this issue can be found in the developed framework. As this is 
only an additional, interesting aspect, it does not really matter whether this last 
phenomenon can be explained by the framework or not. 
The preceding confrontation of the ‘framework for post-acquisition integration of 
small high-technology companies’ into the structure of large corporations with 
the set of tentative hypotheses has found overwhelming support of the 
explanations the new framework offers. This is indeed not very surprising as 
already mentioned at the beginning of this section. Most of the tentative 
hypotheses that were derived immediately from observations and analyses of real-
life post-acquisition integration cases can be thoroughly explained by the new 
model.  
However, some questions remain concerning the applicability of this framework 
across all types of industries and companies as the value chain activities need to 
be adapted each time. The focus of this study was clearly put on the relationships 
and interactions between the acquired biotechnology firms and the acquiring 
pharmaceutical companies that had to deal with the challenge of successfully 
mastering the post-acquisition integration. Because of this limited focus, future 
research for the applicability of this concept in other high-tech industries is 
required. The overall aim of this section was to check the new ‘framework for 
post-acquisition integration of small high-technology companies’ into the 
structure of large corporations against the case-based tentative hypotheses in 
order to increase the model’s internal validity. The confrontation performed in 
this final iterative loop led to a substantial corroboration of the new framework as 
it offers profound explanations of almost all tentative hypotheses. Of course, 
results of exploratory research are often not as clear-cut as one would like them to 
be. Hence, the detection of shortcomings and the uncovering of needs for future 
refinement is one of the reasons why this iteration was performed and why future 
research is still necessary. 
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5.3 Implications and directions for further research 
This study has explored the post-acquisition integration activities between 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. Five cases about these integration 
activities were described in detail in the context of the respective development of 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry. The rich description has 
demonstrated how the post-acquisition integration activities were managed. In 
order to analyze this, within-case and cross-case analyses were performed.  
Using the methodological procedure of comparative case-study research this 
study has led to the identification of several common patterns and topics that are 
of crucial importance in the context of post-acquisition integration. These 
observations were assembled to form a set of tentative case-based hypotheses, 
which also served as the point of departure for the indepth discussion of the 
theoretical perspectives of post-merger and post-acquisition issues. The most 
important parts of the large body of extant post-merger and post-acquisition 
integration literature was confronted with the case findings. Although some of the 
propositions from the investigated models offered small, partial explanations of 
what has been observed in the cases, the existing models revealed serious 
shortcomings. Because of this, the study resulted in the construction of a 
‘framework for the post-acquisition integration of small high-technology 
companies’ into the structure of large corporations.  
This new approach ties together the case-study findings, which revealed a clear 
demand for the consideration of core competencies in combination with the value 
chain concept, and the implications of the existing literature about post-merger 
integration. The model’s explanations were cross-checked with the tentative 
hypotheses and were found to be in accordance with the case findings. Thus, 
from the perspective of theory development this research has contributed 
considerably to an extension and, hence, improvement of the existing post-
acquisition integration theory. The framework can be used in two different ways. 
On the one hand, it can be used as a method for the ex-post analysis and 
classification of post-acquisition integration activities. But on the other hand, its 
main objective is to serve as a tool for choosing the right post-acquisition 
integration strategy in order to implement the chosen strategy successfully. 
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Hence, apart from the theoretical contribution, the newly developed framework 
for post-acquisition integration of small high-technology companies’ into the 
structure of large corporations is also a tool for practitioners of management. 
Therefore, it is of course also necessary to highlight the managerial applicability 
of this model. This study makes an explicit effort of emphasizing several findings 
that may serve as valuable inputs for managerial decisions and can be considered 
as points of departure for developing solutions to specific business problems. The 
recommendations are derived from the observation and analysis of the behavior 
of the case companies, on the one hand, and a profound discussion of various 
streams of literature, one the other hand. The combination of the two perspectives 
resulted in the construction of a new approach. 
Perhaps, the most apparent implication to be drawn from the framework is the 
clearly documented fact, that post-acquisition integration strategy does not equal 
post-acquisition integration strategy. Indeed, there are severe differences in the 
various concepts, what has also made Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) develop their 
classification of different post-acquisition integration activities. In the context of 
the acquisition of a highly-dynamic, innovation-driven and knowledge-intensive 
company, it is very difficult to find the right organizational integration strategy, 
because the acquiring company needs to apply two different integration strategies 
at the same time.  
In the knowledge and innovation driven part, the acquired company needs to be 
granted a high degree of autonomy, whereas in the later steps of the underlying 
value chain, the control and responsibility is taken over by the acquiring 
company. As a consequence of this hybrid approach, managers of the acquiring 
company must somehow be ‘double-minded’, because they need to apply both 
strategies at the same time. It is a difficult balance to strike, if an individual needs 
to grant the maximum autonomy to one part of the company, whereas another 
part needs to be completely integrated and receives merely no autonomy at all. 
That is a very complex situation, which also needs to be clearly communicated 
within the acquiring company. Most of the people are normally not aware of the 
fact that they need to treat the acquired company in two different ways. In fact, 
that is probably the toughest thing to manage, getting the employees of the 
acquiring company to accept this ambivalent situation and to adopt their behavior 
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respectively. Being able to apply such a strategy creates the opportunity to fulfill 
the motives connected with the acquisition and to create value. 
This study has been exploratory in nature and therefore definitely does not claim 
to offer ultimate truths. Indeed, some problem remain unresolved. The proposed 
model does not hold the ‘exclusive rights’ to explain of how to realize the post-
acquisition integration of biotechnology companies into the structure of large 
pharmaceutical companies. Because of the shortcomings of the extant literature in 
this field and through repeated confrontation of the new model and the traditional 
models with the case findings, it has however become obvious that the newly 
developed framework offers the most appropriate explanations for the behavior 
observed in the cases. Nevertheless, there are some things that are not adequately 
addressed. Apart from that, the newly developed model does not try to ‘reinvent’ 
the recommendations existing integration theory offers in order e.g. to deal with 
human resource problems or how to get the different IT systems of both 
companies effectively put together. As far as this specific tasks are concerned, 
this study claims that one can easily rely on the already existing concepts that 
were discussed in Chapter 4 although most of them have been found 
inappropriate of explaining most of what has been observed in the cases. 
Nevertheless, these concepts can deal with one specific issue like e.g. human 
resources, but have no explanatory power for the rest. That was the main reason 
why these concepts had been judged inappropriate, not because these concepts 
are not good by itself, but due to the fact that they were unable to establish the 
link and the overall picture between these different concepts. In fact, no existing 
model was able to do that. This resulted in the construction of a new approach 
that tries to establish a link between the single tasks necessary for post-
acquisition integration. The overall goal of the framework for the post-acquisition 
integration of small biotechnology companies into the structure of large 
pharmaceutical corporations is to put these single tasks together under one 
strategic roof. 
In the process of research some light has been shed on previously unexplained 
issues. The ‘framework for post-acquisition integration of small high-technology 
companies’ into the structure of large pharmaceutical corporations has 
demonstrated its contribution to the theory of post-merger and post-acquisition 
integration activities by extending its explanatory power to the integration of 
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small, high-tech start-ups into large firms. The theoretical model has thus 
advanced the theoretical understanding in this context. However, there is still a 
clear need for future research. An issue that deserves special attention in future 
research is the applicability of this concept in other high-technology industries. 
Apart from that, the topic of performance connected with a specific integration 
strategy needs to be addressed. Obviously, there are still a lot of interesting 
questions unanswered, this study could not answer or even just has opened. 
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Summary in German1 
Die vorliegende Arbeit trägt den Titel „Post-acquisition integration of small bio-
technology firms in the structure of large pharmaceutical companies“ und be-
schäftigt sich mit den Problemen und Fragen, die sich im Kontext der Post-
Merger Integration von kleinen Biotechnologie-Unternehmen in die Struktur von 
großen Pharma-Unternehmen ergeben. Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen ist da-
bei einerseits die Erkenntnis, dass eine Vielzahl von M&A-Transaktionen insbe-
sondere aufgrund einer schlechten Post-Merger Integration scheitern, und ande-
rerseits die Tatsache, dass trotz dieser Einsicht und der hohen Bedeutung, die der 
Post-Merger Integration zugeschrieben wird, dieses Phänomen wissenschaftlich 
noch nicht ausreichend erfasst ist.  
Der zentrale Untersuchungsgegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Organisation der 
Post-Akquisitions Integrationsaktivitäten zwischen Biotechnologie- und Pharma-
Unternehmen. Diese Perspektive wurde gewählt, da es (1) eine ständig zuneh-
mende Anzahl von Akquisitionen zwischen beiden Unternehmenskategorien zu 
beobachten gibt und (2) das Post-Akquisitions Integrationsmanagement aufgrund 
der erheblichen Größenunterschiede zwischen Biotechnologie- und Pharma-
Unternehmen vor besonders großen Herausforderungen steht. Eine systematische 
Analyse, wie diese Herausforderungen gemeistert werden können, führt zu Ein-
sichten und Handlungsempfehlungen, die auch beim Integrationsmanagement in 
anderen Branchen fruchtbar genutzt werden sollten. Das zentrale Forschungs-
anliegen dieser Arbeit ist es daher darzulegen, wie es den Pharma-Unternehmen 
gelingt, die akquirierten Biotechnologie-Unternehmen in ihre Struktur zu integ-
rieren, um einerseits Zugang zu dem dort vorhandenen Wissen und den Techno-
logien zu erhalten, gleichzeitig aber auch den unternehmerischen Geist sowie die 
Innovationskraft dieser Biotechnologie-Unternehmen nicht zu gefährden. Die 
Pharma-Unternehmen sehen sich dabei dem Paradoxon gegenüber, dass sie auf 
der einen Seite die Biotechnologie-Unternehmen auf irgendeine Art integrieren 
                                              
1  Diese Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache dient zur Erfüllung der Anforderung gemäß 
§6 Abs. 6 der Promotionsordnung für die Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Universität Bamberg vom 14. Juli 1982, zuletzt geändert durch die „Siebte Satzung zur 
Änderung der Promotionsordnung für die Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Universität Bamberg vom 2. April 2001“. 
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müssen, um Zugang zu dem gewünschten Wissen zu erhalten, während sie auf 
der anderen Seite aber auch eine umfangreiche Autonomie der Biotechnologie-
Unternehmen sicherstellen müssen, um deren unternehmerischen Spirit und ihre 
Innovationskraft nicht zu gefährden.  
Zur genauen Untersuchung dieses Forschungsrätsels ist die Wahl einer geeigne-
ten Forschungsmethodologie erforderlich, die wiederum stark von der Formulie-
rung der Forschungsfrage abhängt. Auf dieser Basis hat sich die Fallstudienana-
lyse als sinnvollste Vorgehensweise herauskristallisiert. Durch Auswertung von 
durchgeführten Interviews, basierend auf einem halbstrukturierten Fragebogen, 
einer ausführlichen Analyse des Branchenkontextes sowie durch Einbeziehung 
umfangreichen Sekundärmaterials wurden die folgenden Fallstudien im Hinblick 
auf ihre Post-Merger Integrationsaktivitäten erstellt: 
• Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. (jetzt: Pharmacia Corp.) – Sugen, Inc. 
• Bayer Diagnostics Corp. – Chiron Diagnostics Corp. 
• Merck KGaA – Lexigen Pharmaceuticals Corp. 
• Sandoz AG (jetzt: Novartis AG) – SyStemix, Inc. 
• Sandoz AG (jetzt: Novartis AG) – Genetic Therapy, Inc. 
Im Rahmen dieser Fallstudien wurden dabei insbesondere die M&A-Motive, die 
übergeordnete Integrationsstrategie, das Management des Integrationsprozesses 
sowie relevante Aspekte der organisatorischen Zusammenarbeit, des Wissens- 
und Kompetenztransfers, der Akkulturation und einzelner personeller Problembe-
reiche erörtert. Nach Untersuchung dieser Aspekte im Rahmen der Einzelfall-
analysen wurde eine komparative Fallanalyse zur Identifikation von Gemeinsam-
keiten und Unterschieden durchgeführt. Um die Verallgemeinerung dieser Er-
gebnisse zu erweitern, wurden darüber hinaus noch vier „Mini-Fallbeispiele“ he-
rangezogen. Die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse wurden in vorläufigen Hypothesen 
zusammengefasst, welche die zentralen Aspekte der Integration von kleinen 
High-Tech-Unternehmen in die Struktur großer Unternehmen charakterisieren.  
Diese aus der komparativen Fallanalyse gewonnenen Hypothesen bilden die Ba-
sis für einen ausführlichen Vergleich der erzielten Erkenntnisse mit den entspre-
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chenden Empfehlungen der bestehenden Literatur. Hierzu wurden unterschiedli-
che Literaturströmungen und Studien herangezogen, die nicht nur auf die M&A- 
und Post-Merger Thematik begrenzt sind, sondern z.B. auch Internationalisie-
rungskonzepte miteinbeziehen. Dabei wurden die unterschiedlichen Dimensionen 
untersucht (M&A-Motive, übergeordnete Integrationsstrategie, Management des 
Integrationsprozesses sowie relevante Aspekte der organisatorischen Zusammen-
arbeit, des Wissens- und Kompetenztransfers, der Akkulturation und einzelner 
personeller Problembereiche), die sich im Rahmen der Fallstudienanalyse als 
wichtig herausgestellt haben. Ziel der Konfrontation der in den vorläufigen 
Hypothesen zusammengefassten Fallstudienergebnisse mit der existierenden 
Theorie ist es aufzuzeigen, inwieweit diese Hypothesen mit den bestehenden 
Konzepten erklärt werden können. Das Ergebnis dieses Abgleichs ist, dass die 
bereits existierenden Konzepte nicht in der Lage sind, die im Rahmen der Fall-
studienanalyse gewonnenen Erkenntnisse ausreichend zu erklären. 
Aufgrund der herausgearbeiteten Unzulänglichkeiten der existierenden theoreti-
schen Konzepte wird im Rahmen dieser Arbeit ein neues Konzept entworfen, 
welches auch für das Management der Post-Akquisitions Integration von kleinen 
High-Tech-Unternehmen in große Unternehmen geeignet ist. Dieses Konzept 
basiert auf zwei weiteren, weit verbreiteten und anerkannten Konzepten (Kern-
kompetenzen sowie Wertschöpfungskette). Zentraler Punkt des neuen Konzepts 
ist die Forderung nach einer expliziten Verknüpfung zwischen den Akquisitions-
motiven und der korrespondierenden Post-Akquisitions Integrationsstrategie. 
Dies bedeutet, dass Großunternehmen gleichzeitig zwei sehr unterschiedliche 
Integrationsstrategien auf ein kleines Unternehmen anwenden müssen. Einerseits 
verfolgen sie in einzelnen Bereichen, in denen die Kernkompetenzen beim Groß-
unternehmen liegen, eine Absorptionsstrategie, während sie gleichzeitig für die 
innovativen und wissensintensiven Bereiche, in denen die Kernkompetenzen der 
kleinen High-Tech-Unternehmen gefordert sind, eine Autonomie- bzw. Erhal-
tungsstrategie anwenden, damit diese Kompetenzen aufrecht erhalten werden 
können. Dies wird im Ergebnis auch häufig dazu führen, dass sich die kleinen, 
wissensintensiven High-Tech-Unternehmen zu „Centers of Excellence“ innerhalb 
der Großunternehmen entwickeln. 
